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EDITORIAL 
 
This year's report is issued at a time when public finances in EMU are at the centre of attention in the 
midst of severe market turbulence. The external financial support necessitated by the fiscal situation in 
Greece and the unprecedentedly high sovereign risk premia in other countries have underlined once again 
the importance of prudent budgetary policies.  
The crisis that started in 2008 has drastically reversed the favourable economic and financial conditions 
that prevailed until 2007 and cancelled twenty years of efforts to reduce the burden of public debt. A 
significant part of the budgetary deterioration in the downturn will not be re-absorbed by the recovery 
under way. High and rising public debt raise questions on governments' solvency and a credible 
commitment to a sustainable path for public finances is instrumental to durable output and employment 
growth. The increasing budgetary costs of ageing populations emphasises the need for addressing the 
budgetary challenges head on. In this context, the 2010 Report on Public Finances in EMU presents 
lessons from successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations based on historical experiences and 
simulations. Past experiences, including financial crisis episodes, can provide guidance to policy-makers 
in developing a strategy for debt reduction, although there is no one-size-fits-all solution and starting 
conditions play an important role in defining the right strategy. 
The report also analyses the link between macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal risks. The crisis has 
shown that the divergent growth patterns in EMU and growing macroeconomic imbalances should have 
been seen as contingent budgetary risks. In particular, the countries that suffered the greatest deterioration 
in their public finances between 2007 and 2009 had typically experienced increasing external imbalances 
and booming credit and domestic demand in the run-up to the crisis, while the countries that suffered the 
smallest deterioration generally had displayed stable or falling macro-financial risks. Credit market and 
asset price evolutions have played a key role in this context by feeding persistently buoyant tax revenues 
and hence allowing excessive public expenditure growth during the booms, followed by large tax revenue 
shortfalls. 
The topics of the two analytical parts of the report – on consolidation strategies and the link between 
imbalances and fiscal policy – are key elements for future fiscal surveillance. The Commission 
Communication of 12 May 2010, entitled 'Reinforcing economic policy coordination' provides input for 
the debate on the revision of surveillance framework. It suggests reinforcing fiscal surveillance and 
recognises the need to expand economic surveillance and deepen the analysis beyond the budgetary 
dimension to address other macroeconomic imbalances. 
In addition to the two analytical parts, the report - following its well-established structure – provides a 
detailed description and analysis of recent budgetary developments in the EU. It also assesses the 
budgetary outlook and examines the implementation of fiscal surveillance and developments in the 
common fiscal surveillance framework. The main issues are the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact throughout the crisis, ways to improve the measure of the cyclically-adjusted budgetary 
balance and an assessment of the role that Member States' fiscal frameworks can play in promoting sound 
budgetary policies and consolidation.  
Given the unprecedented challenging times for public finances, I trust that the analysis in this year's 
report will provide a useful contribution to the policy debate in the EU and thus to a successful reversal to 
sustainable fiscal trends.   
 
   
 Marco Buti 
 Director-General 
 Economic and Financial Affairs 
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SUMMARY 
 
 
The financial crisis has had a large impact on the public finances of the 
European economies. With output no longer shrinking since mid-2009 and a 
tentative recovery seemingly underway, the focus is turning to the legacy the 
recession has left for the public finances. Events in Spring 2010 have exposed 
the urgency of addressing the fiscal challenge in the euro area and the EU, as 
the high and rising public debts raised concerns on governments' solvency. 
The unravelling of the Greek crisis induced financial distress in other 
Member States as sovereign risk premia shot up to levels unprecedented in 
EMU in Member States with perceived high budgetary and macro-financial 
risks. Following the market tensions in sovereign debt markets and financial 
support to Greece and an agreement to set up a European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism, the Council on 9 May 2010 strongly committed to 
ensuring fiscal sustainability and enhanced economic growth in all Member 
States and agreed that plans for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms 
will be accelerated, where warranted.  
Sovereign risk premia 
in the EU under 
pressure… 
Starting from a position of relative strength in 2007, both government deficits 
and debt have deteriorated markedly, reaching levels unprecedented in recent 
times in the EU. While in 2007, general government deficits corresponded to 
less than 1% of GDP in EU27 in 2010 they are forecast to reach over 7%, 
before beginning to shrink from 2011. Debt has also deteriorated strongly. 
While in 2007 EU27 debt corresponded to 59% of GDP, in 2010 it is forecast 
to equal almost 80%.  
…as the crisis has had 
a huge impact on the 
public finances … 
This strong deterioration in the public finances is due to both the automatic 
effect of economic performance and the discretionary support measures 
introduced by EU governments. With real economic growth having fallen to 
–4.2% in 2009, there has been an automatic decrease in revenues and 
increase in spending as a share of GDP. The credit and asset price led boom 
that preceded the crisis in many Member States has increased the impact of 
the recession on the public finances as related previously substantial revenues 
have dried up. Discretionary support measures introduced to support both 
aggregate demand and the financial sector specifically have also added to the 
burden on the public finances. As monetary policy reached its lower bound 
with very low interest rates, fiscal policy interventions helped stabilise the 
economy. The European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) was endorsed by 
the European Council in December 2008 and introduced a sizeable 
discretionary fiscal stimulus aiming to boost demand and stimulate 
confidence over 2009–10. The majority of stimulus measures in 2009 and 
2010 are temporary and are planned to expire by 2011. These temporary 
measures have had positive effects on employment and economic activity 
during the crisis, by supporting private demand and maintaining 
fundamentally sound activities and jobs that could otherwise have been lost. 
However, once economic growth resumes on a durable basis, such measures 
if left in place would add up to an intolerable burden for the public finances; 
they could also hinder adjustment processes within and across sectors by 
subsidising existing firms and specific productions.  
…due to the effect of 
the automatic 
stabilisers and support 
measures taken. 
1 
European Commission 
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Between 2007 and 2011, debt is set to increase by 25 percentage points of 
GDP in EU27 and 22½ percentage points in the euro area, with gross debt 
reaching an average of almost 84% of GDP in EU27 and 88½% in the euro 
area.  These increases in debt are not unprecedented; similar increases were 
experienced by a number of European countries following the oil crises of the 
1970s and during the 1980s. However, as those increases were not (fully) 
reversed, the current increases are occurring from historically high starting 
levels as EU countries have experienced a number of large debt increase 
episodes, which have tended to start from higher levels of debt each time. 
The debt increases 
are considerable, but 
not unprecedented, 
though starting from a 
higher level. 
Moreover, debt is on course to continue increasing beyond 2011. Even with a 
phasing out of the stimulus measures, a cyclical recovery in growth bringing 
with it a rebound in tax revenues to 2007 levels (which is a very favourable 
scenario for a number of countries), debt ratios should continue rising in most 
EU countries. Partial equilibrium debt projections show that on a no-policy-
change scenario, average debt in the EU will rise well above 100% of GDP 
by 2015 and continue rising afterwards to exceed 130% of GDP by 2020. 
Sustained and very sizeable consolidation will be necessary in most Member 
States to start reversing the increase in government debt. This is all the more 
urgent as European societies and economies are facing another challenge to 
sustainability over the medium and long term: that of an ageing population. 
Reduced fertility and increased life expectancy are set to have a considerable 
impact on both the growth potential of Member States' economies and on 
public budgets. Expenditures on age related support such as pension 
provision, healthcare and long-term care will increase significantly over the 
coming 50 years or so, in the absence of reforms to these support systems. 
Based on current policies, for the EU27, age-related expenditure is set to 
increase by 4½ percentage points of GDP between 2010 and 2060. These 
costs will have to be met through reforms to both the services provided and 
the tax and spending systems, with attending efficiency implications. 
Debt is set to keep 
increasing… in part 
due to the cost of 
ageing. 
There are large differences in the degree of risk that the Member States are 
facing from ageing and how this interacts with their underlying fiscal 
position. Member States with large deficits and large projected costs from 
ageing facing the biggest risks, and the most urgency in terms of addressing 
long-term sustainability issues.  
The high projected increases and levels of debt need to be addressed urgently 
to minimise their negative effects on economic growth. Economic theory 
presents three main channels through which government debt is likely to 
affect long-term growth: (i) a crowding-out effect on private investment, as 
national savings are reduced and interest rates increase; (ii) an increase in 
distortionary taxes which are needed to services the debt; (iii) an increase in 
the risk premia paid by governments which increase the burden that debt 
presents. In some cases, the risk premium on sovereign debt may feed 
through to corporate and household debt. Whether, and to what extent, these 
mechanisms operate in a given economy will depend on both the structure of 
the economy and the behaviour of economic agents.  
High debt levels have  
significant negative 
effects on growth… 
Simulations with the European Commission's QUEST III estimate the effects 
of a 10 percentage point increase in government debt on output in the long 
run to be in a range of ½ to more than 2% of GDP, depending on the way the 
increasing interest expenditures are financed. The negative effect on growth 
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comes through the distortionary impact of taxation. How high the impact is 
depends, in part, on how risk premia are affected by the increase in debt. 
Assuming that risk premia are not affected would yield smaller distortionary 
effects than those outlined above, which are based on increases to sovereign 
risk premia due to rising debt. Much higher effects are simulated in the case 
of risk premia spreading to the whole economy, as seems to be occurring in 
the present circumstances. 
The starting level of government debt also appears to have influence on the 
effect that an increase in debt has on sovereign interest rates. Although it is 
the increase in debt which triggers an interest rate effect, it appears that 
countries with higher starting levels of debt are more likely to experience a 
larger increase in the interest premium from an additional increase in their 
debt levels. 
The legacy of the crisis on the public finances means that large 
consolidations are needed to return Member States' public finances to a 
sustainable position. However, just as the effect of the crisis has varied across 
different Member States so is the necessary consolidation different according 
to countries' particular circumstances. For some Member States, budgetary 
developments have been particularly dramatic. Ireland, Greece, Spain and the 
United Kingdom all posted deficits in excess of 10 percentage points of GDP 
in 2009. In terms of the debt increases too there is considerable variation. 
While Bulgaria and Sweden are forecast to show no or a small increase in 
debt as a share of GDP between 2007 and 2010, Ireland, Spain, Latvia and 
the United Kingdom are forecast increases of over 30 percentage points. 
…and require large 
consolidations overall. 
Ministers agreed at the Informal Ecofin in Göteborg of 20 October 2009 on 
the need for a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach on exit strategies, 
encompassing measures to rebuild a stable and viable financial sector, ensure 
fiscal sustainability and to raise potential output. As to the fiscal exit strategy, 
it was agreed that substantial fiscal consolidation was required beyond the 
withdrawal of the stimulus measures of the European Economic Recovery 
Programme in order to halt and eventually reverse the increase in debt and 
restore sound fiscal positions. In particular, the Council agreed on a number 
of principles for the fiscal exit strategies, regarding the need for coordination, 
the size, the timing, the differentiation between countries and the 
accompanying policies. The principles for fiscal exit that the Council agreed 
on Autumn 2009 were a frontrunner for the G20 discussions and agreements 
in Spring 2010. In the EU, the exit strategy should be coordinated across 
countries in the framework of a consistent   implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Provided that the Commission forecasts continue to 
indicate that the recovery is strengthening and becomes self-sustaining,   
fiscal consolidation in all EU Member States should start in 2011 at the latest. 
Specificities of country situations should be taken into account, and a number 
of countries need to consolidate before then. The Council agreed that in view 
of the challenges, the planned pace of the fiscal consolidation should be 
ambitious, and would have to go well beyond the benchmark of 0.5% of GDP 
per annum in structural terms in most Member States. Important flanking 
policies to the fiscal exit would need to include strengthened national 
budgetary frameworks for underpinning the credibility of consolidation 
strategies and measures to support long-term fiscal sustainability, as 
emphasised by the SGP. In addition; structural reform efforts should be 
The Council agreed 
on principles for fiscal 
exit in October 2009. 
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strengthened to enhance productivity and to support long-term investment. 
These elements were reflected in the stability and convergence programmes, 
which had to be transmitted by Member States to the Commission by the end 
of January 2010. 
EU Member States are required by the Treaty to ensure that their government 
deficits do not exceed 3% of GDP and that their debt levels should be 
declining to below 60%. The SGP sets out the procedures to be followed in 
the case of breach. In 2009, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia were placed in the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) by the Council, while Hungary and the 
United Kingdom had their prior recommendations amended. In 2010, the 
Council gave notice to Greece to take measures to correct its excessive deficit 
by 2012. The requirements of Member States placed under the EDP were set 
so as to take the particular needs and circumstances of the different countries 
into account as allowed by the SGP rules. The deadlines set for the correction 
of the excessive deficits have been set depending on the size of consolidation 
that is required, taking wider issues of sustainability and budgetary risks into 
account. 
EU countries are 
bound to keep their 
deficits and debt in 
check… 
The Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) set out Member States' 
budgetary strategies to meet the requirements in the EDPs and their progress 
towards meeting Medium Term Budgetary Objectives (MTOs) over the 
coming years. The latest round of SCPs covers the years up to 2012, 2013 or 
2014.  
... and to set out plans 
to meet medium term 
budgetary objectives. 
The budgetary strategies in the programmes acknowledge the need for 
considerable consolidation and most countries plan to start consolidation in 
2010. Countries with lower budgetary and macro-financial risks have 
typically planned backloaded consolidations. As these countries with room 
for fiscal manoeuvre continue to provide support to the economy, the average 
EU deficit would continue to increase in 2010, reaching 7.2% of GDP on 
average. At EU level, fiscal consolidation is planned to start in 2011, with all 
Member States except Luxembourg showing improvements in their nominal 
budget balances according to their SCPs. The anticipated split between 
revenue and expenditure measures within the consolidations tends to reflect 
the initial revenue ratio; countries with relatively high revenue-to-GDP ratios 
are less likely to rely strongly on planned revenue increases. All Member 
States except Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands show a projected 
reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio over the programme period. For a 
number of countries, a decrease in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio is planned, 
despite a very significant increase in nominal expenditures.  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that plans for consolidation have been set out in 
the SCPs, they are not sufficient to stem or reverse the increases in debt from 
the crisis. Assuming a structural balance as planned in the SCPs for the end-
of-programme year, a cyclical recovery in growth bringing with it a rebound 
in tax revenues to 2007 levels (which is a very favourable scenario for a 
number of countries), a return to revenue rates at least as strong as seen in 
2007 and gradual closing of the output gap would still result in debt 
continuing to rise to almost 90% of GDP by 2020 and remaining on a slight 
upward trend at that point. The significant consolidation set out in the SCPs 
Further progress 
towards the MTO is 
required to reverse the 
increases in debt. 
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is therefore not sufficient to even stabilise the debt levels. Instead, it is 
important that countries continue to progress towards reaching their MTOs. 
As these MTOs have recently been revised to take into account governments' 
implicit liabilities from ageing populations and wider issues of long-term 
sustainability, they are now better able to serve as a guide for the public 
finances. 
Just as the support measures introduced under the EERP are seen as key to 
supporting the economy, a strong fiscal retrenchment could also affect 
demand and growth but in the opposite way. However, as long as the 
consolidation is managed effectively, the negative impact on growth should 
be markedly lower than the positive impact that the support measures had in 
the recession. The measures introduced to support demand were specifically 
designed to be temporary, which would aid their effectiveness. If 
consolidation is credibly perceived to be permanent, the fiscal multipliers are 
much lower, and in the long-term the output effect is positive for most types 
of measures. Also, if effective action is undertaken to restore financial sector 
functioning, liquidity constraints will be softened which may further reduce 
the adverse short-term economic impact of consolidation. 
Short-term output cost 
of consolidations 
depends on the type 
of measures and 
circumstances. 
The Commission Communication "Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth" sets out some key principles to raise 
growth potential as fiscal consolidation is implemented. In particular it 
stresses that the composition and quality of government expenditure matters: 
budgetary consolidation programmes should prioritise 'growth-enhancing 
items' such as education and skills, R&D and innovation and investment in 
networks. The revenue side of the budget also matters and particular attention 
should also be given to the quality of the revenue/tax system. Where taxes 
may have to rise, this should, where possible, be done in conjunction with 
making the tax systems more "growth-friendly". For example, raising taxes 
on labour, as has occurred in the past at great costs to jobs, should be 
avoided. Rather Member States should seek to shift the tax burden from 
labour to energy and environmental taxes as part of a “greening” of taxation 
systems. Fiscal consolidation and long-term financial sustainability will need 
to go hand in hand with important structural reforms, in particular of pension, 
health care, social protection and education systems. Public administration 
should use the situation as an opportunity to enhance efficiency and the 
quality of service. Public procurement policy must ensure the most efficient 
use of public funds and procurement markets must be kept open EU-wide. 
A growth enhancing 
reform agenda in line 
with EU 2020 helps 
consolidation… 
Fiscal multipliers, and hence the impact on output, are highest for 
consolidations based on investment spending and lowest when done via 
general government transfers to households and government consumption. 
However, there can be significant differences in time profile. Regarding 
revenue-based consolidations, raising corporate profit taxes has little negative 
effect in the short term, but very high long-term costs, while labour taxes 
have a bigger adverse impact in the short term than in the long term. 
Consolidations based on indirect tax increases are most growth-friendly in 
the long run and have also smaller negative output effects than labour taxes in 
the short term. VAT increases do not harm competitiveness and hence may 
be appropriate for countries with negative external positions.  
… as confirmed by 
economic analysis. 
 
5 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2010 
Past experiences have also much to teach us in terms of how to ensure that 
fiscal consolidations are successful in reducing government debt. While past 
increases in the public debt-to-GDP ratio have often, although not always, 
triggered fiscal consolidations, these consolidation episodes have not 
necessarily led to significant reductions in debt levels. The success of fiscal 
consolidations in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio depends not only on the 
improvement of the primary fiscal balances, but also on growth, inflation and 
interest rate developments. Ensuring that the financial crisis has been 
resolved and that credit constraints have been alleviated in addition to other 
growth enhancing reforms is likely to improve expected outcomes of 
consolidations by reducing the negative impact on output.  
Past experience can 
help us manage our 
consolidation 
challenge. 
Consolidations starting under unfavourable economic conditions are probably 
more likely to be successful, even though the conditions in which they are 
undertaken are more difficult. Expenditure-based consolidations have better 
track records of success than ones based on tax increases, while gradual 
consolidations tend to have higher success rates than "cold shower" ones. 
Some of these results are partly due to the introduction of accompanying 
structural changes, which are seen as important determinants of whether 
consolidations are successful or not. Econometric evidence shows that 
starting the consolidation after the crisis and implementing it in a gradual 
way is more likely to yield success. However, for high-debt countries there is 
evidence that a cold shower consolidation might be a better approach, due to 
the effect of interest rates (which may themselves be affected by the pace of 
debt reduction) on the debt burden.  
Expenditure based 
and gradual 
consolidations have 
been more successful 
in the past, but for 
high debt countries 
this may not hold. 
Although past experience can guide policy-makers in how to consolidate 
there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Experiences in previous episodes have 
shown that fiscal consolidations have often been pursued at the expense of 
public investment. This undermines growth which is crucial for debt 
reduction. The precise characteristics of each country will determine the 
policy that should be pursued. The level of growth, the level of debt, deficits, 
taxes and spending will all influence the type of consolidation to be 
introduced. But it is not just the type of consolidation that is chosen that is 
important, but also the context within which it will be implemented. Past 
experience with consolidation has shown that countries with strong national 
fiscal frameworks have been most successful in consolidating. Although all 
crises and the circumstances in every country are different, the policy 
responses in Sweden and Finland following their financial and economic 
crises in the early 1990s provide important examples of successful 
resolutions. Despite being strongly affected by their respective financial 
crises, both countries returned to growth rates similar to, or higher, than those 
they enjoyed before the crisis, following strong and decisive government 
action from the early days of the crisis, particularly with regard to addressing 
the weaknesses in the financial sector. It must be noted that also the exchange 
rate depreciations played an important role in the recovery and fiscal 
consolidation.  
The challenge is to 
implement the right 
policies effectively. 
Alongside the public finances, the crisis has also brought attention to the 
prevalence of external imbalances amongst the EU and euro area Member 
States. The last ten years or so have seen a build-up of substantial 
divergences in the external economic performance of the different countries. 
Recently acceded and peripheral euro area Member States saw thriving 
Significant external 
imbalances have 
emerged over the last 
10 years… 
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domestic demand and credit booms, accompanied by increases in domestic 
prices. For the peripheral euro area countries this resulted in large increases 
in their nominal unit labour costs and an appreciation of their real exchange 
rate which harmed their competitiveness and their external position. 
Meanwhile, other countries experienced slow domestic demand growth and 
falls in their domestic prices vis-à-vis their EU and euro area competitors.  
The differences in the external position developed over the last ten years and 
reached an all-time high in 2008, just before the start of the crisis. They can 
be attributed to a number of factors. A part of them reflects the normal 
functioning of the globalised and increasingly integrated EU economy with 
the resulting convergence in prices. Accession to the euro will also have 
given catching-up euro area economies better access to international capital 
markets, facilitating and creating larger trade deficits. Other factors that 
affected the build-up of divergences are more problematic in themselves. The 
increased capital flows financed unsustainable trends in consumption and 
unproductive investment, and they reflect increases in wages, consumption 
and credit growth that were not connected to the underlying economic 
fundamentals. Booming internal demand was central to the deterioration in 
external competitiveness in external deficit countries.  
…due to both 
economic integration 
and booming 
domestic demand.  
There is much debate about the link between current account and fiscal 
balances. Since the onset of the crisis, large current account deficits have 
gone hand-in-hand with large deterioration in fiscal balances. Tax buoyancy 
concealed the true state of public finances before the crisis. This was fuelled 
by capital inflows and credit booms boosting real estate. Current account 
deficits have thus signalled contingent budgetary risks. The countries that 
have shown the greatest deterioration in their public finances since the onset 
of the crisis displayed high and rising macro-financial risks in the years prior 
to its onset, while the countries with the smallest deterioration displayed 
falling macro-financial risks over the same period. The crisis revealed the 
real state of the fiscal situation.  
Budgetary and trade 
balances appear to 
be related – although 
exactly how is subject 
to much debate. 
In terms of the current juncture the presence of external imbalances has 
potential consequences for the trajectory of the economy over the medium 
term. Although the evidence is limited, studies tend to suggest that post-boom 
periods which are accompanied by the correction of current account and 
competitiveness imbalances may be particularly costly from a growth and 
budgetary point of view. As a starting point, considering the impact that 
fiscal policy has on the external position would be prudent, with countries 
with large external deficits needing to be particularly mindful to implement 
policies that reduce their unit labour costs and improve their competitiveness.  
Correcting and 
preventing future 
current account 
imbalances is a 
challenge for the 
medium term. 
The crisis can provide us with an opportunity to learn lessons that will help 
us avoid a recurrence of the crisis in the future. One area for improvement is 
that of budgetary surveillance and the institutions responsible for it. At a 
national level, improving domestic fiscal frameworks can help both in 
implementing consolidation and ensuring that the public finances are not as 
vulnerable to economic downturns in the future. 
The crisis should help 
us avoid a repetition in 
the future, including 
by strengthening fiscal 
frameworks… 
According to existing evidence, rule-based fiscal frameworks centred around 
an expenditure rule supplemented by a revenue and/or budget balance rule 
are particularly successful as concerns both budgetary discipline and 
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stabilisation. Similarly, non-partisan public institutions acting in the field of 
budgetary policy have proven useful for sound budgetary policies in several 
EU countries. Medium-term budgetary frameworks are further considered 
effective tools to foster medium term fiscal planning. As these fiscal 
arrangements are closely interconnected, any reform of national fiscal 
frameworks should carefully consider the interplay between these elements.  
Improving the information available and used in budgetary surveillance 
might also help avoid some of the mistakes of the past. Measuring the 
underlying fiscal stance is important in gaining an understanding of the health 
of the public finances. This requires an estimation of both potential output 
and of the relationship between revenues and spending and the underlying 
economic fundamentals.  Potential output estimation can be improved by 
including real time capacity utilisation data to the estimation of the output 
gap, while considering the effect of domestic demand (rather than just output) 
on government revenues to estimate a cyclically and absorption adjusted 
budget balance can also aid policy making. Complementing our 
understanding of tax elasticities by using data collected at a national level on 
the discretionary changes made to tax categories can further help overcome 
some of the difficulties in estimating underlying revenues. Improvements can 
also be made in terms of how we understand the links between fiscal and 
trade balances. This could enable monitoring of the emergence of macro-
financial imbalances more widely as a way of obtaining a more holistic view 
of the vulnerabilities that exist in the Member States' economies. 
…and by taking a 
wider consideration of 
risks. 
The Commission Communication of 12 May 2010, entitled 'Reinforcing 
economic policy coordination' recognises the need to expand economic 
surveillance and deepen the analysis beyond the budgetary dimension to 
address other macroeconomic imbalances, including competitiveness 
developments and underlying structural challenges in order to prevent the 
occurrence of severe imbalances within the euro area. A scoreboard, 
reflecting both external as well as internal developments, would be defined 
and regularly monitored. It would appear particularly important to detect 
asset price booms and excessive credit growth at an early stage to avert costly 
corrections of fiscal and external imbalances at a later stage. This analysis 
would form the basis for the formulation of the recommendations for 
preventive or corrective measures in the Member State(s) concerned. 
On 12 May 2010, the 
Commission put 
forward proposals in 
this context. 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
 
 

SUMMARY 
In 2007, the last year before the onset of the 
economic and financial crisis, the public finances 
in the EU and euro area were in their strongest 
position for decades. This result owed more than 
was appreciated at the time to favourable 
economic conditions. With the onset of the crisis 
in 2008, GDP growth fell dramatically and turned 
negative by the end of the year leading to a marked 
deterioration in the public finances. 2009 was a 
year of deep recession with growth shrinking by 
4.2% on average in EU27, before beginning to 
gradually pick up during 2010. The overall effect 
on the public finances has been a sharp 
deterioration in the general government balances, 
which is forecast to equal close to 7 percentage 
points of GDP between 2007 and 2010, to reach a 
larger deficit of 7.5% of GDP in the EU27. From 
2011, deficits are expected to start shrinking. Debt 
too has been affected. While in 2007 gross general 
government debt amounted to 59% of EU27 GDP, 
in 2010 it is forecast to come in at 79% and to 
increase further in the coming years. 
The deterioration in the public finances is due to 
both the operation of the automatic stabilisers and 
the measures implemented by governments to 
support both aggregate demand and the financial 
sector. The response of the European governments, 
the European Economic Recovery Plan, allowed 
the automatic stabilisers to operate freely and 
introduced a sizeable discretionary fiscal stimulus. 
The fact that monetary policy had reached its zero 
lower bound, placed additional burdens on fiscal 
policy to provide support aggregate demand. The 
actual budgetary stimulus packages introduced 
varied across Member States, in part due to the 
fiscal space available. These developments are 
examined in Section I.1. While some countries 
were in a position to provide substantial support to 
their economies as they entered the recession with 
a strong fiscal position, others were and are in a 
more difficult situation because of less determined 
consolidation efforts in the past.  
 
EU Member States are required by the Treaty to 
ensure that their government deficits do not exceed 
3% of GDP and that their debt levels are declining 
to below 60%. Whether or not these limits are 
adhered to is determined according the provisions 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which also 
sets out the procedures to be followed in the case 
of breach. In 2009, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Slovakia were placed in the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) by the Council on 
recommendation of the Commission, while 
Hungary and the United Kingdom had their prior 
recommendations and deadlines amended. In 
February 2010, the Council gave notice to Greece 
to take measures to correct its excessive deficit by 
2012. On 2 May 2010, following a request by the 
Greek authorities, the Eurogroup formally 
launched a financial assistance mechanism, 
conditional on the implementation of a programme 
of economic adjustment. The adjustment 
programme was negotiated between Greece and 
the Commission, in liaison with the ECB and the 
IMF. Section I.2 details how the SGP has been 
implemented since Spring 2008, providing 
information on a country-by-country basis.   
The Stability and Convergence Programmes 
(SCPs) set out Member States' fiscal strategies to 
return to medium term budgetary objectives over 
the coming years. The latest round of SCPs is 
examined in Section I.3. The SCPs cover the years 
up to 2012, 2013 or 2014 and their submission was 
delayed to reflect the strategies to correct the 
excessive deficits identified. Overall for EU27, the 
SCPs anticipate a recovery supported by growing 
net exports contributing 0.6 percentage points to 
aggregate real GDP growth in 2010, and 0.3 pp. by 
2013. The overall economic growth assumptions 
are more favourable than those made by the 
Commission services in Autumn 2009, by 0.3 
percentage points in 2010, but rising to 0.7 
percentage points by 2011. There is therefore some 
added downside risk to the budgetary outcomes 
and may require additional fiscal consolidation.  
The budgetary strategies in the programmes for 
most EDP countries aim at correcting the 
excessive deficits by the deadlines recommended 
by the Council and for countries not in EDP at 
keeping the deficit below the 3% of GDP reference 
value or rapidly correcting any breaches. The pace 
and time profile of the fiscal consolidations vary 
considerably across Member States. Most 
countries plan to start consolidation in 2010. 
Countries with lower budgetary and macro-
financial risks have typically planned backloaded 
consolidations. As these countries with room for 
fiscal manoeuvre which include Germany continue 
to provide support to the economy, the average EU 
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deficit would continue to increase in 2010, 
reaching 7.5% of GDP on average in the 
programmes. At EU level, fiscal consolidation is 
expected to start in 2011, with all Member States 
except Luxembourg showing improvements in 
their nominal budget balances according to their 
SCPs. The anticipated split between revenue and 
expenditure measures within the consolidations 
tends to reflect the initial revenue ratio; countries 
with relatively high revenue-to-GDP ratios rely 
less strongly on planned revenue increases. All 
Member States except Luxembourg, Malta, and the 
Netherlands show a projected reduction in the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio over the programme 
period.  
Section I.4 discusses the Commission and 
Council's 2009–2010 SCP assessments of the long-
term sustainability (up to 2060) of the public 
finances and presents new estimates of the long-
term sustainability indicator. The estimates are 
based on medium-term projections of the age-
related expenditures provided by the Ageing 
Working Group of the Economic Policy 
Committee in the 2009 Ageing Report and on the 
public finance developments set out in the SCPs. 
Both quantitative indicators and qualitative 
information are used to arrive at an overall 
assessment of the budgetary challenge posed by 
ageing populations, in the light of the recent 
economic crisis. Compared with last year's 
projection exercise, the current one also 
incorporates projected developments of revenue 
coming from taxation of pensions and property 
income in the quantitative assessments.  
There is a large variation in the degree of long-
term risk that the Member States are facing and 
their cause. Due to the deterioration of initial 
budgetary positions, several Member States were 
moved to a higher risk category than they were in 
last year's exercise, while only few are assessed to 
have improved their long-term sustainability 
position. Countries that are best prepared to 
dealing with the long-term sustainability challenge 
are Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, and, Sweden. 
They generally have a relatively strong budgetary 
position due to having run large surpluses prior to 
the crisis, and having reduced debt and/or 
accumulated assets. They have also implemented 
comprehensive pension reforms, in some cases 
including a shift towards private funded pension 
schemes. They therefore enjoy a low long-term 
risk to fiscal sustainability. In these countries, the 
projected increase in age-related expenditure is 
amongst the lowest in EU at below 4 percentage 
points of GDP.  
Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
United Kingdom are the countries facing the 
biggest challenges. (They are generally 
characterised by a very significant rise in age-
related expenditure over the long-term, in some 
cases in excess of 10 percentage points of GDP.) 
For most of the Member States in this group it will 
be necessary to address both the long-term costs of 
ageing through reforms to pension systems and the 
weakness of their budgetary positions. To a lesser 
extent, the same mixed challenge applies to the 
countries presenting medium long-term risk. In 
particular, reforms to the pension and healthcare 
system which will not adversely affect the 
recovery as they typically take effect over the 
medium to long-term, should be implemented as a 
matter of urgency. This may include measures to 
raise potential growth and employment over the 
medium term. As not all pension and healthcare 
reforms are neutral with respect to the short-term, 
care should be taken to consider the effect of any 
changes undertaken on the recovery. 
Finally, Section I.5 takes stock of Member States' 
efforts undertaken or planned to reform their 
domestic fiscal frameworks, based on information 
disclosed in the 2009-2010 round of the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes. Indeed, according 
to such information, changes to the domestic fiscal 
frameworks are being ahead or implemented in 21 
EU countries. Changes of budgetary procedures 
are most prevalent (19 cases), followed by the 
introduction of new fiscal rules (13 countries). The 
introduction of, or changes in, medium-term 
budgetary frameworks is topical in the case of 10 
Member States, while only three have announced 
the establishment of new independent fiscal 
institutions. While the number of planned or 
implemented actions of fiscal framework reform is 
thus significant, important shortcomings of 
national frameworks will still persist, not least as 
compliance with the most recent policy invitations 
contained in the Council Opinions on the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes is rather limited.  
1. BUDGETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREA AND 
THE EU MEMBER STATES 
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1.1. THE SLOW PATH TO RECOVERY 
The economic outlook remains uncertain as the 
world has just started to recover from its worst 
crisis since the Second World War. The financial 
crisis and the legacy of the imbalances 
accumulated earlier in the world economy means 
that the adjustment process lead to an extensive 
period of weakness in economic activity. The 
Commission services' Spring 2010 European 
Economic Forecast projects real GDP growth for 
the EU at 1.0% in 2010, against the backdrop of a 
very steep recession in 2009 of the order of -4.2% 
of GDP.  
The recession has been broad-based across 
countries, despite sizeable differences. Some EU 
Member States have been subject to a more 
pronounced and/or protracted recession, depending 
on their exposure to the financial crisis and the 
global manufacturing cycle on the one hand, and 
on domestic and external imbalances on the other, 
including a substantial housing-market correction 
or other country-specific factors. In the same vein, 
the subsequent upswing is also likely to occur at a 
differing pace across countries. In the large 
Member States, GDP is expected to grow by 
between 2.7% (Poland) and -0.4% (Spain) this 
year. However, in Greece the output change is 
more markedly in the negative, at -3.0%. 
In the EU27 GDP shrunk for three consecutive 
quarters, from late 2008 to mid-2009, and has only 
very gradually been recovering thereafter. While 
the EU economy has returned to positive growth 
rates on a quarterly basis from the third quarter of 
2009, these have been modest so far. For 2011 
then GDP growth is expected to stand at 1.7%. The 
outlook remains very uncertain, with considerable 
downside risks.  
The economic downturn is increasingly visible in 
the labour market. From the low of 6.7% in early 
2008, the EU unemployment rate has risen rapidly, 
although reacting with some lags to GDP growth. 
In March 2009 it stood at 9.6%. Unemployment is 
likely to remain at broadly similar levels during 
this year, reaching an annual average of 9.8%, and 
also in 2011. Reducing unemployment will be a 
major policy challenge for the EU economy, as the 
worsened outlook also impacts public finances. 
1.2. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE BUDGETARY 
POSITION AND PUBLIC DEBT 
In 2009, the budgetary positions in the euro area 
and the EU deteriorated for the second year in a 
row, recording a very significant deterioration in 
comparison to the previous year. The euro-area 
average headline deficit reached 6.3% of GDP, up 
from 0.6% in 2007 and 2.0% in 2008 (Table I.1.1). 
A similar budgetary deterioration took place in the 
EU as a whole, where the average budget deficit 
increased by another 4.5 percentage points 
reaching 6.8% of GDP in 2009 (Table I.1.2). In 
both the euro area and the EU, the deterioration in 
the headline budget deficit was matched by a 
smaller deterioration in the structural budget 
balance, i.e. the budget balance net of cyclical 
factors and one-off and other temporary measures 
(by 1.9% of GDP in the euro area and 2.1% in the 
EU). Taken at face value this result would seem to 
suggest that to a significant extent the deterioration 
in the headline deficit was due to cyclical factors, 
and that it was only partly of a structural nature. 
The estimates of the structural budget balance are 
likely to be affected by the earlier exceptional 
buoyancy of tax revenues which has gone into 
reverse along with the economic cycle. (1) 
Within the euro area, in 2009 the deterioration in 
the (nominal) budget balance was particularly 
sizeable in Spain (where the deficit increased by 
seven percentage points, while in 2008 still a 
surplus had been posted), in Finland (where a large 
surplus was converted into a considerable deficit), 
and to a lesser extent also in Belgium, Ireland, 
France, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. Greece is a peculiar case 
where statistical revisions have increased past and 
expected deficits several times for both 2008 and 
2009, for the latter up to 13.6% of GDP. (See Box 
I.2.2 on Greece). Hence in the large majority of 
Member States of the euro area the deficit in 2009 
(1) Tax revenues were much higher than projected in the SCPs 
in 2005-2007. 
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Table I.1.1: Budget balances in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
BE -0.2 -1.2 -6.0 -5.0 -5.0 -1.3 -2.1 -3.9 -3.8 -4.0 2.5 1.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.2
DE 0.2 0.0 -3.3 -5.0 -4.7 -1.2 -1.1 -1.7 -3.6 -3.5 1.6 1.6 0.9 -1.0 -0.8
IE 0.1 -7.3 -14.3 -11.7 -12.1 -1.6 -7.0 -9.4 -9.3 -10.2 -0.6 -5.7 -7.3 -6.5 -6.7
EL -5.1 -7.7 -13.6 -9.3 -9.9 -6.8 -8.7 -13.0 -8.5 -8.2 -2.7 -4.2 -8.0 -3.2 -2.4
ES 1.9 -4.1 -11.2 -9.8 -8.8 1.2 -4.1 -8.9 -7.8 -7.0 2.8 -2.5 -7.1 -5.7 -4.4
FR -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -8.0 -7.4 -3.8 -3.8 -6.2 -6.2 -6.2 -1.1 -0.9 -3.9 -3.6 -3.3
IT -1.5 -2.7 -5.3 -5.3 -5.0 -3.2 -3.5 -4.0 -3.7 -3.6 1.8 1.6 0.7 0.9 1.2
LU 3.6 2.9 -0.7 -3.5 -3.9 1.1 2.0 1.2 -1.4 -1.9 1.3 2.3 1.7 -1.0 -1.3
NL 0.2 0.7 -5.3 -6.3 -5.1 -1.0 -0.5 -3.6 -4.9 -4.0 1.2 1.6 -1.4 -2.6 -1.7
AT -0.4 -0.4 -3.4 -4.7 -4.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.4 -3.6 -3.6 1.1 0.8 0.3 -0.8 -0.7
PT -2.6 -2.8 -9.4 -8.5 -7.9 -3.1 -3.8 -8.1 -7.7 -7.0 -0.3 -0.8 -5.2 -4.6 -3.4
SI 0.0 -1.7 -5.5 -6.1 -5.2 -2.9 -4.8 -3.7 -4.4 -3.8 -1.6 -3.7 -2.3 -2.5 -1.8
FI 5.2 4.2 -2.2 -3.8 -2.9 2.6 2.1 0.4 -1.3 -1.0 4.1 3.5 1.6 -0.2 0.2
MT -2.2 -4.5 -3.8 -4.3 -3.6 -3.1 -5.2 -3.8 -4.0 -3.4 0.2 -1.9 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2
CY 3.4 0.9 -6.1 -7.1 -7.7 2.5 -0.4 -5.8 -6.3 -7.1 5.5 2.4 -3.3 -3.6 -4.2
SK -1.9 -2.3 -6.8 -6.0 -5.4 -3.7 -4.7 -6.6 -5.4 -4.7 -2.3 -3.5 -5.1 -3.9 -3.2
EA-16 -0.6 -2.0 -6.3 -6.6 -6.1 -1.9 -2.8 -4.7 -5.0 -4.8 1.0 0.2 -1.8 -2.1 -1.6
BG 0.1 1.8 -3.9 -2.8 -2.2 -1.5 0.0 -2.8 -1.1 -0.8 -0.5 0.9 -2.0 -0.3 0.1
CZ -0.7 -2.7 -5.9 -5.7 -5.7 -2.9 -4.5 -5.4 -4.9 -4.9 -1.7 -3.4 -4.1 -3.2 -2.8
DK 4.8 3.4 -2.7 -5.5 -4.9 3.1 3.3 0.6 -2.7 -3.1 4.7 4.7 2.6 -0.6 -1.0
EE 2.6 -2.7 -1.7 -2.4 -2.4 -1.1 -4.3 -0.6 -2.1 -1.8 -0.9 -4.1 -0.2 -1.6 -1.4
LV -0.3 -4.1 -9.0 -8.6 -9.9 -4.5 -6.4 -6.9 -6.7 -9.0 -4.2 -5.8 -5.3 -4.3 -6.1
LT -1.0 -3.3 -8.9 -8.4 -8.5 -3.1 -5.6 -7.1 -6.8 -6.8 -2.4 -5.0 -6.1 -5.2 -4.9
HU -5.0 -3.8 -4.0 -4.1 -4.0 -5.5 -4.7 -2.2 -2.3 -3.0 -1.4 -0.5 2.6 2.3 1.1
PL -1.9 -3.7 -7.1 -7.3 -7.0 -2.8 -4.6 -7.2 -6.3 -5.7 -0.5 -2.3 -4.6 -3.5 -2.6
RO -2.5 -5.4 -8.3 -8.0 -7.4 -4.7 -7.7 -8.3 -7.1 -6.4 -3.9 -7.0 -6.8 -5.2 -4.4
SE 3.8 2.5 -0.5 -2.1 -1.6 1.6 1.1 1.9 -0.2 -0.5 3.3 2.8 2.8 0.7 0.3
UK -2.8 -4.9 -11.5 -12.0 -10.0 -3.9 -5.2 -9.5 -10.4 -8.7 -1.7 -2.9 -7.5 -7.6 -5.6
EU-27 -0.8 -2.3 -6.8 -7.2 -6.5 -2.1 -3.1 -5.2 -5.6 -5.2 0.6 -0.3 -2.5 -2.8 -2.2
Structural primary balanceBudget balance Structural balance
Note: The structural budget balance is calculated on the basis of the commonly agreed production function method (see European Commission 
(2004)). 
Source:  Commission services' Spring 2010 European Economic Forecast. The figures for Greece are based on information available prior to the 
finalisation on 2 May 2010 of the agreement on the conditionality negotiated between the Greek authorities and the Commission, ECB, and IMF. 
 
exceeded the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. Not a single country reported a surplus. 
An even stronger negative impact was felt outside 
the euro area in 2009, where relative to the 
previous year the budgetary position weakened in 
most Member States. Very large deteriorations of 
between 4.9 and 5.7 percentage points were 
recorded in Latvia,  Lithuania, and Bulgaria. The 
deteriorations posted by Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Romania were slightly lower, of the 
order of 3.48, 3.2, and 2.9 percentage points 
respectively. In all of these countries the deficit 
now exceeded or continued to exceed the 3% of 
GDP reference value of the Treaty. In Hungary the 
deficit remained at approximately 4% of GDP. As 
to the remaining Member States outside the euro 
area, Denmark and Sweden now both reported 
deficits instead of previously solid surpluses. In the 
United Kingdom the deficit increased dramatically 
by more than seven percentage points. 
Looking ahead to 2010 and 2011, the budgetary 
positions are expected to first deteriorate slightly 
further in the light of slow economic growth, 
before essentially reverting to the levels of 2009. 
The Commission services’ Spring 2010 European 
Economic Forecast projects euro area (EU) real 
GDP to increase by only 0.9 (1.0)% in 2010, 
compared to a steep contraction of 4.1 (4.2)% in 
2009, and to increase by no more than -1.5 (1.7)% 
in 2011. Against this growth outlook, the 
aggregate budget deficit of the sixteen Member 
States which have adopted the single currency is 
expected to reach 6.6% of GDP in 2010, another 
0.3 percentage points higher than the year before. 
Based on the no-policy-change assumption an  
improvement to 6.1% of GDP is projected in 2011. 
Broadly the same profile is expected for the EU as 
a whole. The deficit is forecast to rise to 7.2% of 
GDP in 2010, from 6.8% in 2009, and to slightly 
decline again to 6.5% in 2011. 
Outside the euro area, the development of 
budgetary positions is likely to be more diverse. In 
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania the 
headline deficits are expected to remain far above 
the reference value of the Treaty in both years, 
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albeit to varying degrees. For Latvia a further 
limited worsening is projected, while the 
Lithuanian deficit is forecast to stabilise around the 
current very high ratios. The deficit in Estonia is 
expected to stay below the 3% of GDP threshold 
over the forecast horizon. The deficit in Hungary is 
forecast to continue to remain at around 4% of 
GDP in both 2010 and 2011.  Denmark and 
Bulgaria are expected to run deficits above or only 
slightly below the 3% threshold over the forecast 
horizon, while in Sweden the deficit is projected to 
stay well below the 3% of GDP reference value of 
the Treaty in both 2010 and 2011. Finally in the 
United Kingdom a further budgetary deterioration 
to 12.0% of GDP is forecast for 2010, prior to an 
improvement to 10.5% of GDP in 2011. 
In structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical factors and 
one-off and other temporary measures, the 
projected deteriorations in both the euro area and 
the EU in 2010 are smaller than those of the 
headline deficits, but still significant given that 
many Member States continue to support their 
economies with discretionary measures under the 
EERP. In particular, the structural balance is 
estimated to deteriorate by another 0.3% of GDP 
in the euro area and by 0.4% in the EU as a whole. 
For 2011, minor improvements of the order of 
0.2% of GDP in the euro area and of 0.4% in the 
EU as a whole are projected. However, when 
making these estimates one should bear in mind 
that measuring cyclically-adjusted balances is not 
straightforward, in particular during a crisis such 
as the current one. 
While the group of euro-area countries that have 
already achieved their medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO) had already shrunk in 2008, 
structural fiscal positions are forecast to remain 
weak over the projection horizon, with no euro 
area Member State expected to attain its MTO in 
both 2010 and 2011.  
Outside the euro area, a similar picture emerges 
and only Bulgaria is forecast to attain its MTO in 
2010 and 2011 respectively (after having missed 
out on it in 2009) However, it is clear that aiming 
again seriously to attain the MTOs will be a crucial 
element in any exit strategy from the current 
economic crisis.  
Turning to government debt, rising debt-to-GDP 
ratios reflect the deteriorating public finances, 
ailing economies, and public interventions in the 
financial system (Table I.1.4). In the euro area, in 
2009 the ratio rose by 9.3 percentage points to 
78.7%. This can partly be explained by a very 
steep increase of the debt in Spain, albeit from 
relatively low levels. A further increase to 88.5% 
of GDP by 2011 is projected in the euro area as 
primary deficits are coupled with a weak 
contribution from economic growth and the 
additional effect of rising interest expenditure. In 
the EU as a whole, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
projected to rise steeply from its level of 73.6% in  
 
Table I.1.2: Euro area - General government budget balance (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total revenue (1) 45.4 44.9 44.4 44.2 44.1
Total expenditure (2) 46.0 46.8 50.7 50.8 50.2
Actual balance (3) = (1) - (2) -0.6 -2.0 -6.3 -6.6 -6.1
Interest (4) 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.2
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 2.4 1.0 -3.5 -3.6 -2.9
One-offs (6) 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Cyclically adjusted  balance (7) -1.9 -2.9 -4.8 -5.1 -4.8
Cyclically adj. prim. balance = (7) + (4)   1.1 0.1 -1.9 -2.1 -1.7
Structural budget balance = (7) -(6) -1.9 -2.8 -4.7 -5.0 -4.8
Change in actual balance: 0.7 -1.4 -4.3 -0.3 0.5
              - Cycle -0.4 -1.4 -2.5 1.7 1.4
              - Interest 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.2
              - Cycl.adj.prim.balance 0.1 -0.9 -1.9 -0.3 0.2
              - One-offs 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
              - Structural budget balance 0.9 1.0 0.2 -1.8 -2.1
Note: Differences between totals and sum of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services' Spring  2010 Economic Forecast. 
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Table I.1.3: Composition of changes in the government debt ratio in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
Change in 
debt ratio
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007-11 Primary balance
Interest 
&growth 
contribution
Stock-flow 
adjustment
BE 84.2 89.8 96.7 99.0 100.9 16.7 2.2 8.5 6.0
DE 65.0 66.0 73.2 78.8 81.6 16.5 2.2 8.4 5.9
IE 25.0 43.9 64.0 77.3 87.3 62.3 35.5 14.6 12.2
EL 95.7 99.2 115.1 124.9 133.9 38.2 19.7 15.0 3.5
ES 36.2 39.7 53.2 64.9 72.5 36.3 25.7 7.2 3.4
FR 63.8 67.5 77.6 83.6 88.6 24.8 15.6 5.9 3.4
IT 103.5 106.1 115.8 118.2 118.9 15.5 -1.0 14.8 1.7
LU 6.7 13.7 14.5 19.0 23.6 16.9 3.4 0.5 13.1
NL 45.5 58.2 60.9 66.3 69.6 24.1 7.0 5.9 11.2
AT 59.5 62.6 66.5 70.2 72.9 13.4 2.2 6.2 5.0
PT 63.6 66.3 76.8 85.8 91.1 27.5 16.4 8.9 2.2
SI 23.4 22.6 35.9 41.6 45.4 22.0 12.2 4.3 5.5
FI 35.2 34.2 44.0 50.5 54.9 19.7 -0.3 3.4 16.5
MT 61.9 63.7 69.1 71.5 72.5 10.6 3.2 5.7 1.7
CY 58.3 48.4 56.2 62.3 67.6 9.3 9.1 4.0 -3.8
SK 29.3 27.7 35.7 40.8 44.0 14.7 14.8 1.0 -1.1
EA-16 66.0 69.4 78.7 84.7 88.5 22.5 9.0 8.7 4.9
BG 18.2 14.1 14.8 17.4 18.8 0.6 3.8 -0.4 -2.8
CZ 29.0 30.0 35.4 39.8 43.5 14.6 13.7 3.8 -3.0
DK 27.4 34.2 41.6 46.0 49.5 22.1 1.9 6.0 14.2
EE 3.8 4.6 7.2 9.6 12.4 8.6 7.9 1.6 -0.9
LV 9.0 19.5 36.1 48.5 57.3 48.3 24.0 14.0 10.3
LT 16.9 15.6 29.3 38.6 45.4 28.5 23.9 5.6 -1.0
HU 65.9 72.9 78.3 78.9 77.8 11.9 -1.6 10.2 3.3
PL 45.0 47.2 51.0 53.9 59.3 14.3 14.4 -0.5 0.3
RO 12.6 13.3 23.7 30.5 35.8 23.3 23.1 1.0 -0.8
SE 40.8 38.3 42.3 42.6 42.1 1.3 -2.6 0.7 3.2
UK 44.7 52.0 68.1 79.1 86.9 42.2 28.2 5.4 8.6
EU-27 58.8 61.6 73.6 79.6 83.8 25.0 11.5 9.7 3.8
Change in the debt ratio in 
2007-11 due to:Gross debt ratio
Notes: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services' Spring 2010 Economic Forecast. 
 
 
2009 to 79.6% in 2010, and to rise further to 
83.8% in 2011, not least because of a very 
significant increase in the debt ratio in the UK. 
Finally, risks of further debt increases stem from 
public intervention in the financial sector. 
Aggregate figures tend to mask diverging 
developments at the country level. There are 
several Member States which before the current 
financial and economic crisis had low or very low 
debt levels, which however are now rising sharply. 
This group of countries includes Ireland, Spain, 
Latvia, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, three euro area-countries are expected 
to surpass again the 100% of GDP public debt 
threshold by 2011. Notably, Italy already had a 
public debt-to-GDP ratio above 100% of GDP  
 
before the crisis and given that debt has increased 
again and is expected to remain above this 
threshold in 2010 and beyond. In Belgium the debt 
ratio rose again in 2008 and subsequently, after 
having remained on a steady downward path for 
many years. It stood at 84.2% of GDP in 2007, but 
is forecast to exceed the 100% of GDP threshold 
by 2011. In Greece the debt ratio, from a trough of 
95.7% in 2007, is also expected to increase over 
the forecast horizon, up to 133.9% of GDP in 2011 
(as usual under the no-policy change assumption). 
As to the other Member States with debt ratios 
above the 60% of GDP threshold in 2009, namely 
Germany, France, Hungary, Malta, Austria, and 
Portugal, further increases of these ratios are 
projected in all of them but Hungary. 
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Table I.1.4: Euro Area – Government revenue and expenditures (% of GDP) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total revenue 45.4 44.9 44.4 44.2 44.1
Taxes on imports and production (indirect) 13.5 13.0 12.8 12.7 12.7
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.4 12.2 11.3 11.3 11.4
Social contributions 15.1 15.3 15.7 15.7 15.5
of which actual social contributions 14.0 14.2 14.6 14.5 14.4
Other revenue 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.5
Total expenditure 46.0 46.8 50.7 50.8 50.2
Collective consumption 7.9 8.1 8.8 8.8 8.5
Social benefits in kind 12.1 12.4 13.3 13.4 13.4
Social transfers other than in kind 15.8 16.1 17.7 18.0 17.8
Interest 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.2
Subsidies 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.5
Other expenditures 3.4 3.5 4.0 3.6 3.5
Notes: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
                                                          
1.3. GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND 
EXPENDITURE  
In 2009, the observed deterioration in budgetary 
positions in the euro area was largely the result of 
a higher expenditure-to-GDP ratio which was 
mainly due to higher social benefits and transfers, 
and also to higher collective consumption. As 
compared to the change in the expenditure ratio, 
only to a much lesser extent this deterioration was 
due to a lower revenue-to-GDP ratio (Table I.1.5). 
That negative contribution of the revenue side 
stemmed from taxes on imports and production 
and even more so from taxes on income and 
wealth, the latter not least due to a rapid decline of 
corporate income taxes.  
Section I.3 confirms this view on the composition 
of the deterioration in the budget balance. It shows 
that compared to the plans presented in the 2008 
updates of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes, significant nominal expenditure 
overruns came together with limited revenue 
shortfalls.  
 
 
 
 
 
Much lower than expected nominal growth further 
exposes these developments in the expenditure-to-
GDP ratios. A similar pattern can be observed for 
the EU as a whole (Table I.I.5).  
According to the Commission services' Spring 
2010 Economic Forecast, both the expenditure and 
revenue ratios in the euro area will remain 
approximately constant over the forecast horizon, 
2010-2011. On the revenue side in particular 
composition effects are expected to be small. 
The massive deterioration mainly on the 
expenditure side of the budget in 2009 also 
explains the worsening of structural balances over 
the forecast horizon in most Member States. 
Indeed this fiscal expansion can only partly be 
explained by the operation of automatic stabilisers. 
The rest is due to discretionary measures.  
Overall Member States budgetary plans for 2010 
and 2011 have been compiled against a 
background of great uncertainty and exhibit many 
risks, on both the revenue and expenditure 
sides. (2) 
(2) See Part I.3 of this report. 
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Table I.1.5: Government revenue and expenditure (% of GDP) 
           2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DK 55.7 55.3 55.8 53.7 53.3 50.9 51.9 58.5 59.2 58.1
EE 37.4 37.1 43.6 43.4 41.7 34.8 39.9 45.4 45.8 44.1
IE 36.7 34.7 34.1 35.4 33.9 36.6 42.0 48.4 47.1 46.0
EL 39.7 39.1 36.9 39.0 38.5 44.7 46.8 50.5 48.4 48.4
ES 41.1 37.0 34.7 35.9 35.9 39.2 41.1 45.9 45.7 44.7
FR 49.6 49.5 48.1 48.2 48.6 52.3 52.8 55.6 56.1 55.9
LT 33.8 34.2 34.1 34.1 33.2 34.8 37.4 43.0 42.5 41.7
MT 40.3 40.3 40.5 41.7 41.9 42.4 44.8 44.3 46.0 45.5
NL 45.7 46.6 46.3 46.0 46.6 45.5 45.9 51.6 52.3 51.7
PL 40.3 39.6 37.4 38.7 39.3 42.2 43.3 44.5 46.0 46.2
RO 33.5 32.1 32.1 31.9 31.3 36.0 37.6 40.4 39.9 38.8
SK 32.5 32.5 34.0 34.3 33.9 34.4 34.8 40.8 40.3 39.3
HU 44.8 45.4 45.8 44.7 44.2 49.8 49.2 49.8 48.8 48.1
IT 46.4 46.2 46.6 46.0 45.5 47.9 48.9 51.9 51.3 50.5
SI 42.4 42.6 44.4 44.6 44.7 42.4 44.3 49.9 50.7 49.9
UK 41.4 42.4 40.2 40.6 41.3 46.3 47.3 48.3 49.3 50.3
BE 48.2 48.8 48.2 48.7 48.8 48.4 50.0 54.2 53.7 53.9
BG 41.5 39.1 36.9 36.8 36.8 41.5 37.3 40.7 39.7 39.1
CZ 41.8 40.2 40.3 41.4 41.7 42.5 42.9 46.2 47.0 47.4
DE 43.9 43.7 44.3 43.1 42.5 43.7 43.7 47.6 48.0 47.2
CY 45.5 43.5 40.3 41.2 41.3 42.2 42.6 46.4 48.3 49.0
LV 35.4 34.4 34.0 36.2 34.5 35.7 38.6 43.0 44.8 44.4
LU 39.8 40.1 41.6 39.7 39.0 36.2 37.2 42.4 43.2 42.9
AT 48.1 48.4 48.3 47.8 47.6 48.5 48.9 51.8 52.5 52.2
PT 43.2 43.2 41.6 42.5 43.0 45.7 46.1 51.0 51.0 50.9
FI 52.5 53.6 53.2 52.1 52.4 47.3 49.4 55.3 55.9 55.3
SE 56.3 55.5 55.7 53.9 53.2 52.5 53.1 56.3 55.9 54.8
EA-16 45.4 44.9 44.4 44.2 44.1 46.0 46.8 50.7 50.8 50.2
EU-27 44.9 44.6 43.9 43.8 43.8 45.7 46.9 50.7 51.0 50.3
Revenue Expenditure
Source: Commission services' Spring 2010 Economic Forecast. 
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 Box I.1.1: The EERP and the withdrawal of temporary measures in product and labour 
markets
In response to the economic crisis, the Commission launched in November 2008 the European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP), confirmed by the European Council in December 2008 (1). A key objective of the 
EERP was to boost demand and stimulate confidence over 2009-10 through a co-ordinated discretionary 
fiscal impulse amounting to €200 billion out of which Member States should contribute with €170 billion
(around 1.5% and 1.2% of GDP of the EU GDP in 2008 estimated at the time). The EERP foresees that the 
fiscal stimulus is based on common principles and accompanied by structural reform measures in the context 
of the Lisbon strategy. In particular, stimulus measures should be timely, temporary and targeted. Measures 
under the EERP combine revenue and expenditure instruments, such as public expenditure; guarantees and 
loan subsidies; well-designed financial incentives; lower taxes and social contributions. To maximise its 
impact, budgetary stimulus take account of the starting positions of each Member State. For Member States
facing significant external and internal imbalances, budgetary policy should essentially aim at correcting 
such imbalances. The EERP also specified that all Member States should commit to reverse the budgetary 
deterioration and return swiftly to the medium term budgetary objectives. 
There has been strong monitoring of the implementation, both ahead of the June 2009 European Council and 
the December 2009 European Council (2). To this end, the Commission has set up an "EERP data base" in 
order to systematically catalogue relevant support measures taken at national level under the EERP. On this 
basis it is estimated that, overall, in gross terms (that is, before taking account of fiscal consolidation 
measures being implemented in various countries at the same time) the fiscal stimulus measures, taken or 
planned, by Member States amount to a total of 2.9% of annual GDP for 2009 and 2010 (compared to 2008). 
This total of fiscal stimulus measures has been about evenly split across the two years with 1.5% of GDP in 
2009 and 1.4% of GDP in 2010. On a country level a positive feature is that, in line with EERP principles, 
the size of stimulus packages differs across countries, reflecting their individual circumstances. In Member 
States with large macro-economic imbalances stimulus measures have often been financed by off-setting 
consolidation measures, while in some countries measures have focussed directly on fiscal consolidation, 
resulting in no overall stimulus.  
The Commission monitoring of progress has also concluded that recovery plans have been implemented 
speedily and therefore have been timely. They have generally been well targeted to the policy areas 
identified in the EERP: measures that support businesses, labour markets, investment activities, and 
households' purchasing power (including vulnerable groups).  
As regards temporariness, the majority of stimulus measures over 2009 and 2010 take together are 
temporary and are planned to expire by 2011.Most temporary measures have clear sunset clauses/end dates 
or fixed budget envelopes, including those implemented under the State Aid Temporary Framework.
Generally, temporary measures seem to have had positive effects on employment and economic activity 
during the crisis – essentially, by maintaining fundamentally sound activities and jobs that could otherwise 
have been lost. However, once economic growth resumes on a durable basis, such measures if left in place
could hinder adjustment processes within and across sectors since they provide a subsidy for existing 
structures.  
 
                                                          
(1) COM (2008) 800 final, 26/11/2008, 'A European Economic Recovery Plan'. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/Comm_20081126.pdf 
(2) Progress report on the implementation of the European Economic Recovery Plan- June 2009" and dito December 
2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/financial-crisis/documentation/index_en.htm
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However, in 2010, more than half of the stimulus (0.9 % of GDP) consists of permanent measures with a 
durable impact on budget balances. In Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Finland and Sweden, the amounts are 
significantly larger than the EU average. The bulk of these permanent measures (equivalent to 0.6% of 
GDP) are aimed at supporting household purchasing power and a proper functioning of labour market, 
mainly via labour tax cuts. While these measures may appear to be compatible with long-term objectives, 
such as strengthening incentives to work, their permanent nature makes them less effective in terms of 
support to output than temporary measures. Moreover, alleged positive effects on output in the long-run 
should be seen in the context of the permanent deterioration in the budget balance which leads – ceteris 
paribus - to a sizeable increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio and ensuing long-term economic costs. (1)  
                                                          
(1)  See also sections III.3 and III.5 of this report for model simulations of debt increases, stimulus and consolidation 
measures.   
 
Table 1: Budgetary dimension of EERP crisis measures in 2009 and 2010, in % of GDP 
measures 
aimed at 
households
increased 
spending 
on labour 
market
measures 
aimed at 
businesses
increased 
investment 
expenditure
measures 
aimed at 
household
s
increased 
spending 
on labour 
market
measures 
aimed at 
businesses
increased 
investment 
expenditure
in % of 
GDP 
in % of 
GDP 
in % of 
GDP 
in % of 
GDP in % of GDP in % of GDP 
in % of 
GDP 
in % of 
GDP 
in % of 
GDP 
in % of 
GDP in % of GDP in % of GDP 
BE 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.9 BE
BG 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -3.3 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 -3.3 BG
CZ 2.3 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.1 -1.1 CZ
DK 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 DK
DE 1.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 2.4 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 DE
EE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 -10.7 EE
IE 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 -5.4 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 -10.2 IE
EL 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.8 EL
ES 2.4 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.9 -0.3 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.5 -0.9 ES
FR 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 -0.1 FR
IT 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.9 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.8 IT
CY 2.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 1.4 0.0 2.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.0 CY
LV 1.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -11.7 LV
LT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -12.5 LT
LU 3.4 1.6 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.0 2.2 1.4 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 LU
HU 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 -2.2 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 -5.5 HU
MT 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 -1.7 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.3 -2.2 MT
NL 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.1 NL
AT 1.5 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 AT
PL 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.5 -0.6 3.2 0.9 0.1 0.2 2.0 -0.5 PL
PT 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 PT
RO 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -2.7 RO
SI 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.4 -1.0 1.8 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.4 -1.7 SI
SK 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -1.1 SK
FI 1.6 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 2.7 1.7 0.1 0.5 0.4 -0.4 FI
SE 1.7 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.7 0.9 1.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 SE
UK 1.9 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 UK
EU27 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.4 1.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 -0.7 EU27
Out of which,
Discretionary stimulus in 2009
Fiscal policy
Overall 
(gross 
terms)
Consolidation 
measures in 
2009
Discretionary stimulus in 2010
Consolidation 
measures in 
2010
Overall 
(gross 
terms)
Out of which,
Notes. The numbers refer to the sum of the budgetary amounts of the expansionary stimulus measures, taken or 
planned to be taken over 2009/2010, compared to 2008, in response to the crisis and in line with the EERP. Fiscal 
consolidation measures being implemented in various countries at the same time are abstracted from.  
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 2: Temporary and permanent stimulus measures in EU Member States in 2009 and 2010 (% of GDP) 
Temporary measures Permanent measures Temporary measures Permanent measures
BE 0.4 0.7 0.1 1.0
BG 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0
CZ 1.5 0.8 0.2 1.0
DK 0.5 0.3 0.9 1.0
DE 1.2 0.5 1.0 1.5
EE 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
IE 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.8
EL 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
ES 2.2 0.2 0.5 0.2
FR 1.3 0.2 0.4 1.0
IT 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.1
CY 1.8 0.5 1.6 0.4
LV 1.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1
LT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LU 0.7 2.7 0.3 1.9
HU 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.1
MT 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7
NL 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4
AT 0.2 1.2 0.3 1.5
PL 0.0 1.5 0.1 3.1
PT 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3
RO 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
SI 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.2
SK 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0
FI 0.5 1.3 0.6 2.3
SE 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.8
UK 1.7 0.2 0.3 0.4
EU27 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.9
2009 2010
Member States
Source: Commission services. 
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 Box I.1.2: Rethinking the automatic stabilisers
The automatic stabilisers are the features in a country's tax and spending system which affect the amount of 
support given to the economy over the economic cycle without any explicit action being taken. By 
increasing tax revenues more the cyclically while reducing the share of national income spent by the 
government in benefits and on public services as the economy grows, the automatic stabilisers lead to lower 
government borrowing in booms and, through opposite effects when the economy is weak, lead to higher 
government borrowing in recessions. In this way there is an element of automatic stabilisation in the 
economy. 
The degree of stabilisation provided will depend on the size of the stabilisers (other things being equal, the 
greater the size of the public sector the more stabilisation it provides), the elasticity of the stabilisers (that is 
the change in borrowing for a given change in output which will, amongst other aspects, be a function of the 
progressivity of the tax system or the conditionality of the benefit system) and the composition of the 
economy and growth. As some components of gross domestic product are more highly taxed than others, a 
boom fuelled by growth in more highly taxed components will lead to more automatic stabilisation than one 
caused by growth in less highly taxed components.  
The current economic crisis has seen unprecedented levels of fiscal support for the European (and world) 
economies. Some of this was provided through discretionary measures which governments introduced in 
order to help support their economies, but the automatic stabilisation provided in 2009 was greater, overall, 
than the discretionary measures. In 2010, it is expected that the automatic stabilisers will continue to add 
impetus to the European economies despite a contraction in discretionary policy overall.  
The automatic stabilisers have a number of advantages over discretionary policy measures in terms of the 
support they provide. Through their very nature they typically provide timely support as tax receipts are 
linked directly to the performance of the economy; they do not require the identification of underlying trends 
to be analysed by policy makers before any action is taken. The size of the stabilisation provided is linked to 
the magnitude of the recession or overheating of the economy and there is no need to take action to reverse 
the stabilisation provided once the economy returns to a more sustainable path. 
A fundamental disadvantage, however, of the stabilisation provided by the automatic stabilisers is that it is 
determined by their structure. As they are an instrument fulfilling multiple aims, their ability to respond to 
the aim of stabilisation is likely to be hampered by their other facets which are of primary importance. In 
this way, for example income tax systems are typically set up in order to balance the need to government 
revenue with redistribution concerns and it right that this is so. Public spending is usually set in terms of the 
services it is deemed economically or politically desirable for the state to provide.  
The use of extensive discretionary policy as the crisis hit indicates that the amount of automatic stabilisation 
provided was insufficient. Increasing the size of the automatic stabilisers would therefore have strong 
advantages for most countries. However, large stabilisers have costs too – as the size of the stabilisers is 
roughly determined by the size of a country's public sector, there is a tradeoffs between the stabilisation 
offered and the efficiency or growth potential an economy has. How then, to enhance stabilisation, without 
compromising growth? 
A first answer lies in enhancing the elasticity of the stabilisers in exceptional economic circumstances, but 
not their mean value overall. Changing the micro-structure of the tax and benefit system can, at the margin, 
lead to enhancement of the stabilisers while also supporting growth. The ability to do this is does not appear 
widespread though – while some reforms are possible, a radical restructuring of the incentive structure of 
most countries' tax and benefit systems to attain current distributional objectives, while enhancing efficiency 
and stabilisation is somewhat utopian. Some modifications, however, are usually possible. Moving, for 
example from tax deductions to (uniform) refundable tax credits for socially valued activities and from the 
collection of corporate income tax on the basis of a company's previous year's actual income to payments  
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 based on the estimated income for the current year would steps in the right direction (1), as argued in 
Baunsgaard and Symansky (2009). On the expenditure side, in some countries the responsiveness of 
unemployment insurance to the cycle could be enhanced with the time for which such insurance is payable 
to vary with the prevailing labour market conditions. A further option which mimics an increase in elasticity 
could be a pre-stated commitment to adjust particular tax rates up or down in given economic circumstances, 
which would take some heat out of the economy when it is judged to be particularly strong (2). Again, in this 
case, setting the exact criteria for when the adjustments should take place and ensuring that their operation is 
as free as possible from political manipulation is a difficult exercise to undertake. This approach of time-
varying tax rates, could be used to tackle overheating beyond the classical economic cycle. Posen (2009) 
argues that cycles in the housing market could be dampened through taxes that vary in line with the price-
level. In the light of the role that housing booms had in the overheating of many European economies, 
having a tool for dampening asset cycles through enhancements to the structure of asset taxes. 
A difficulty with these enhancements is to preserve the automatic element of the stabilisation. By adding 
criteria that require assessment to determine the operation of the tax and benefit system, there is a risk that 
symmetry of response is compromised with policy being loosened more often or more quickly than it is 
tightened. In addition, any element of judgement or discretion could compromise the effectiveness of the 
change being effected, as the temporary nature of added support is key to its effectiveness. Moreover, as 
stressed in Kaufman (2000) if the lag between identifying macroeconomic conditions that merit adjustment 
and the adjustment of the tax system is significant, there is a risk that stabilisation could be compromised as 
the change in the fiscal stance becomes pro- rather than counter-cyclical. 
                                                          
(1) Baunsgaard T. and S. A. Symansky (2009) "Fiscal Stabilizers: How Can They Be Enhanced Without Increasing the 
Size of Government?", IMF Staff Position Note.   
(2) Kaufman (2000), "Fiscal Policy through Time-varying Tax rates If and How", IMP working paper  no. 00/170, looks 
at time varying income and consumption tax from the point of view of welfare maximisation for individuals in the 
presence of credit constraints. He finds that from a theoretical point of view, time varying tax rates can be welfare 
enhancing under certain conditions and stresses the inherent difficulties in introducing such tax rates in practice.  
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 Box I.1.3: The impact of government interventions supporting financial institutions on public 
finances
Member state governments launched numerous programmes under the umbrella of the European Economic 
Recovery Plan to limit the damage inflicted on the economy by the financial crisis and the triggered 
economic recession and to boost future growth. Other measures aimed at restoring the functioning of 
financial markets and to rescue failing banks and financial institutions. While the former measures had 
strained public finances in all member states and drove the government deficit above the Maastricht 
threshold in numerous countries, the direct financial costs of the interventions in support of financial 
markets appear to be quite limited in comparison to the deterioration in the public accounts.  
To provide a more complete picture of the actual and the potential impact on government deficit and debt 
due to government interventions relating to the financial crisis (and strictly excluding interventions 
addressing the economic downturn or supporting non-financial institutions), Eurostat had started to collect 
and publish information on these government measures as a part of the regular EDP notifications. (1) In 
general, three types of information is gathered, transactions with an actual impact on the EDP deficit or 
surplus, data on stocks of financial assets and liabilities (included in government debt) and activities which 
involve contingent liabilities (such as guarantees) and may therefore affect government liabilities in the 
future. 
The supplementary tables of the April 2010 EDP notification, summing transactions from nineteen 
countries, show that while the direct costs affecting the budget deficit amounted to roughly 0.1% of GDP of 
EU27 in both 2008 and 2009, the impact on both the assets and liabilities of the general government sector 
was somewhat larger, it constituted around 2% of GDP in 2008 and around 3% in 2009. The effect of 
government interventions in support of the financial sector was reported to be even slightly lower in the euro 
area with the impact on the deficit being negligible in 2008 and below 0.1% of GDP in 2009. In the euro 
area, the assets and liabilities of the general government, linked to the support of the financial market, 
reached 2½% of GDP in 2009. 
However, the large scale government interventions to shore up financial institutions did have a sizable 
impact on the stock of contingent liabilities. (2) In the context of the financial crisis, contingent liabilities 
typically involved general government guarantees granted to non-general government units, government 
securities issued under liquidity schemes (but not recorded as government debt) and special purpose entities 
(SPEs) which were classified outside the general government but in which the government had a significant 
role. The supplementary tables of the April 2010 EDP notification show that in the EU27 the stock of 
contingent liabilities related to government interventions in support of the financial sector approached 7% of 
GDP and reached 10% of GDP in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Somewhat lower but still significant stocks 
of contingent liabilities were accumulated in the euro area, representing 5½% and 8½% of their GDP. 
As regards to the impact on general government deficit the interventions (most importantly capital 
injections) in Ireland, United Kingdom and the Netherlands were the most significant. In Ireland, for 
instance, EUR 4 billion was provided to the Anglo-Irish Bank which amounted to 2.4% of GDP. The most 
significant financial sector rescue operations with a direct impact on government debt were carried out in the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany. However, as a percentage point of GDP, interventions in 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Latvia and Denmark were also important. In 2008, the Netherlands increased their 
stock of government liabilities by more than EUR 80 billion (in operations such as the acquisition of Fortis 
Bank), while the British government debt increased by more than GBP 60 billion through financing 
operations. At the same time, government liabilities in Germany related to the support of the financial sector 
                                                          
(1) 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/excessive_deficit/supplementary_ta
bles_financial_turmoil 
(2) Contingent liabilities are hypothetical obligations at the time of inception which only become actual liabilities if 
predefined conditions or events materialize, such as the bankruptcy of the beneficiary financial institution.  
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amounted to more than EUR 50 billion. In 2009 however, while the Netherlands had reduced its outstanding 
stock of government liabilities by more than EUR 20 billion, Germany and the United Kingdom almost 
doubled their obligations. During 2008 and 2009, Belgium and Spain have also accumulated a significant 
stock of liabilities (in the context of financial market support operations) of around EUR 20 billion. 
Not reported in the public accounts are the contingent liabilities of the government, nevertheless, they may 
constitute sizable expenditures in the future. These liabilities are typically guarantees, which were used 
extensively in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany, but also in the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain. 
Guarantees issued by the Irish government in 2008 amounted to EUR 350 billion, which was reduced in 
2009 to around EUR 280 billion; while guarantees of the German government reached EUR 159 billion, up 
from EUR 66 billion in 2008. In addition to guarantees, France and the UK followed alternative approaches 
to reassure markets, which, however, have also increased radically their stock of contingent liabilities during 
the crisis years. In France, a special institution was set up, backed by the government, to revive specific 
segments of the markets. This approach contributed to the stock of contingent liabilities by roughly EUR 80 
billion, on top of state guarantees of around EUR 20 billion. In the UK, state guarantees already summed to 
around EUR 150 billion, which was compounded by the issuance of special government bonds (used only 
under the Special Liquidity Scheme), in a value of EUR 230 billion. 
 
Graph 1: The impact of interventions in the financial sector on general government debt and contingent 
government liabilities (% GDP) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extraordinary recession and the associated 
strong deterioration of budgetary positions has put 
a strain on the EU fiscal framework. (3) This 
section reviews the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure since spring 2009. 
Section II.1 of this report explains the rationale of 
the implementation of the framework throughout 
the crisis. 
In 2009, the number of Member States with a 
nominal budget deficit above 3% of GDP 
increased further to 22, from eleven in 2008 and 
only two in 2007 (see Table I.I.2). According to 
the Commission services' Spring 2010 Economic 
Forecast, in 2009 the government deficits would 
exceed the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty in nearly all Member States (the only 
exceptions being Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Estonia). Based on a no-policy 
change scenario, in 2010 the deficit would remain 
below 3% of GDP only in Bulgaria, Estonia, and 
Sweden. 
Within a context where the near-totality of the EU 
has become subject to the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP), the enforcement of the rules-
based framework of the Treaty and Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) reflects the common interest of 
Member States to anchoring strategies for exit 
from short-term support and for ensuring the 
sustainability of public finances. The flexibility 
introduced by the 2005 reform of the SGP allows 
Member States in excessive deficit to implement 
corrective action in timeframes consistent with the 
(3) Article 126 of the Treaty (this section refers the Article 
numbering in the Lisbon Treaty) lays down an excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) where the reference values for 
deficits and debt are 3% and 60% of GDP respectively. 
This procedure is further specified in Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1467/97 'on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure'. The 
obligation for Member States to achieve and maintain their 
MTO is laid out and specified in Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1466/97 'on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies'. These two regulations are part of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, representing its 'dissuasive' and 
'preventive' arm, respectively. Relevant legal texts and 
guidelines can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy 
_finance/sgp/legal_texts/index_en.htm 
Enforcement mechanisms of the EU budgetary surveillance 
framework are described in Box I.2.1 in this section of the 
report. 
recovery of the economy, with rapid fiscal 
consolidation being called for only in cases of 
immediate fiscal and macro-financial risks. 
Furthermore, the reform established the possibility 
of revising the recommendations for the correction 
of the excessive deficit including an extension of 
the deadline in case of adverse economic 
developments with major unfavourable 
consequences for public finances. This possibility 
is meant to cater for budgetary outcomes falling 
short of targets on account of the deterioration of 
the underlying economic scenario but with full 
effective action as regards the required 
consolidation measures. 
2.1. THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
Proceeding in chronological order, in July 2009, 
following opinions of the Commission and on the 
basis of recommendations from the Commission, 
the Council decided that an excessive deficit 
existed in Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and 
Romania and set deadlines for correction in 
accordance with Article 126(6-7) consistent with 
consolidation over the medium term. Also, the 
Council set a revised deadline of 2011 for Hungary 
in accordance with Article 126(7) in view of 
unexpected adverse macroeconomic events.  
As public finances continued to deteriorate over 
the year, the authorities of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia reported 
a planned breach of the 3% threshold for 2009.  
The Commission adopted reports under Article 
126(3) for all the above countries in October 2009. 
In December 2009, following opinions of the 
Commission and on the basis of recommendations 
from the Commission, the Council decided that an 
excessive deficit existed in the countries listed 
above and set deadlines for correction in 
accordance with Article 126(6-7). Furthermore, the 
Council considered that due to unexpected 
macroeconomic events the deadlines issued to 
France, Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 
April 2009 could no longer be considered realistic 
and adopted new recommendations under Article 
126(7) for these Member States, extending the 
deadline for correction by one year in each case. 
Regarding Greece, the Council decided in 
Part I 
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accordance with Article 126(8) that the Greek 
authorities had not taken effective action in 
response to the recommendations issued under 
Article 126(7) in April 2009. 
In February 2010 the Council gave notice to 
Greece, in accordance with Article 126(9), to take 
measures for deficit reduction judged necessary in 
order to remedy the situation of an excessive 
deficit by 2012. At the same time, the Council 
extended the deadlines for Lithuania, Malta, and 
Romania by one year in each case due to 
unexpected adverse macroeconomic events. In the 
cases of Latvia and Poland the Commission 
considered that effective action had been taken in 
compliance with the July 2009 Council 
recommendations. Developments in the budget 
balance were judged to be on course for correction 
by 2012, making a revision of the deadlines issued 
previously by the Council unnecessary.  
In the context of the April 2010 notification, 
Bulgaria and Cyprus reported a breach of the 3% 
of GDP reference value for 2009. At the same 
time, Denmark, Finland and Luxembourg notified 
a planned breach for 2010. On 12 May 2010 the 
Commission adopted reports under Article 126(3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 for all five Member States. On 15 June 2010, after 
the cut-off day of this report, the Commission will 
adopt opinions under Article 126(5) on the 
existence of an excessive deficit for these countries 
and subsequently decide on recommendations to 
the Council to adopt a Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit under Article 
126(6) and a Council recommendation to correct it 
under Article 126(7). The Council is scheduled to 
discuss these recommendations on 13 July 2010. 
As to Greece, consolidation plans were stepped up 
during March, April, and May 2010, in parallel to 
efforts of making the financial support mechanism 
operational. (See Box I.2.2) Here fiscal 
consolidation was ever more combined with more 
fundamental structural and institutional reforms, to 
the point of the excessive deficit procedure being 
superseded by the macroeconomic adjustment 
programme agreed as a condition for activating the 
financial support mechanism.  
In the following paragraphs, details on the 
surveillance mechanisms in the Member States 
subject to an excessive deficit procedure both 
inside and outside the euro area are discussed in 
the English alphabetical order of Member States. 
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 Box I.2.1: The excessive deficit procedure
Article 126 TFEU (ex Article 104 TEC) states that Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits. In particular Member States shall comply with budgetary discipline by respecting two criteria 
specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty: a deficit ratio and a debt 
ratio not exceeding reference values of respectively 3% and 60% of GDP. (1) Article 126 also sets out the 
detailed procedure to be followed to identify and correct situations of excessive deficit, including the related 
voting modalities. The Regulation 1467/97 of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), as amended by Council 
Regulation 1056/05, clarifies the procedure.  
The first four steps of the procedure, corresponding to the provisions of paragraph 3 to 6 of Article 126, 
concern the identification of situations of excessive deficit. The excessive deficit procedure is triggered if 
the deficit of a Member State exceeds 3% of GDP. In such a situation, the Commission adopts a report, in 
accordance with Article 126(3), reviewing in detail the economic and budgetary situation of the Member 
State considered. As foreseen in Article 126(4) and Regulation 1467/97, the Economic and Financial 
Committee formulates an opinion on this report within two weeks. The Commission takes this opinion into 
account and, if it considers that an excessive deficit does exist, addresses an opinion under Article 126(5) to 
the Council. On the basis of the Commission opinion, the Council decides on the existence of an excessive 
deficit under Article 126(6). 
The subsequent steps of the procedure are dedicated to the correction of the excessive deficits. When it 
decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Council addresses a recommendation to the Member State 
concerned in accordance with Article 126(7). In this recommendation, the Council sets a deadline for the 
Member State to correct the excessive deficit and specifies a fiscal effort to be achieved to this end by the 
Member State concerned (of at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark). Regulation 1467(97) specifies that the 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit shall be set taking into account an overall assessment of 
the factors mentioned in the Article 126(3) TFEU. In case action by the Member State concerned leads to 
the correction of the excessive deficit, the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(12), to 
abrogate its decisions under the excessive deficit procedure. In other words, the procedure is closed. In the 
event where the Council considers that effective action has not been taken, it may decide, as stated in Article 
126(8) TFEU, to make public its recommendation according to 126(7). In case effective action has been 
taken but events outside the control of the government with large adverse consequences on the budget 
prevent the correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists 
to revise the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit in a new 126(7) recommendation. 
The steps described above apply to all EU countries. The further steps of the procedure depend on whether 
the Member State is a euro-area Member State or not. The excessive deficit procedure applies in full to euro-
area Member States. For these countries, Article 126(9) stipulates that, provided the Council adopts a 
decision under article 126(8), it may decide to give notice to the Member State concerned to take the 
necessary measures to reduce the deficit. The recommendations under article 126(9) of the Treaty shall 
include a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and a fiscal effort to be achieved to this end by 
the Member State concerned (of at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark).  
This step constitutes a move towards even closer surveillance, and is the ultimate step before the possible 
imposition of sanctions. If the Member State fails to comply with the recommendations, the Council may 
decide to impose sanctions no later than two months after notice has been given. In case of compliance with 
the recommendations formulated in the notice under article 126(9), the decisions taken under Articles 126(6) 
to 126(9) are abrogated with a Council decision in accordance with Article 126(12), and the procedure is 
                                                          
(1) Article 126(2) TFEU states that a deficit of more than 3% of GDP that is only exceptional and temporary may not be
considered excessive in case the deficit remains close to the reference value. The same Article provides an exception
for countries having a debt ratio above 60%, if this ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the value of 60% of
GDP at a satisfactory pace.  
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Box (continued) 
 
 closed. In case effective action has been taken but events outside the control of the government with large 
adverse consequences on the budget prevent the correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set 
by the Council, the possibility exists to revise the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit in a new 
126(9) notice. As mentioned above, non-euro-area Member States are not exempt from the obligation to 
avoid excessive deficits, but the later steps of the EDP do not apply to them. When a Member State outside 
the euro area in a situation of an excessive deficit fails to respect the recommendations addressed under 
Article 126(7), it cannot be made subject to the last two substantive steps of the excessive deficit procedure, 
namely notice foreseen in Article 126(9) and the imposition of sanctions foreseen in Article 126(11). Non-
compliance with a recommendation under 126(7) may lead to a renewed recommendation according to 
Article 126(7), following a decision according to Article 126(8). 
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 Box I.2.2: The EU's response to the crisis in Greece: financial support conditional on 
implementing a programme of economic adjustment
On 2 May 2010, following a request by the Greek authorities, the Eurogroup formally launched a financial 
assistance mechanism, conditional on the implementation of a programme of economic adjustment 
negotiated with the Greek authorities, and on an assessment by the Commission and the ECB of the risks to 
financial stability in the euro area as a whole. The adjustment programme agreed (1) was negotiated between 
Greece and the Commission, in liaison with the ECB and the IMF, whose involvement allows drawing on its 
long-standing expertise in financial assistance related matters. The programme built on the Council 
Recommendation and Decision of 16 February, which again had followed up on the Council Conclusions of 
2 December 2009 according to which fiscal action taken by Greece had been inadequate.  
The activation of the financial support mechanism was preceded by earlier discussions and agreements. On 
11 February, the European Council signalled its readiness to take determined and co-ordinated action, if 
needed, to safeguard the stability of the euro are as a whole. On 25-26 March, the same specified (some of 
the) concrete modalities of assistance to Greece: pooled bilateral loans, joint intervention with the IMF, 
strong conditionality, non-concessional pricing. On 11 April, the Eurogroup set out concrete parameters for 
the assistance, notably the pricing formula and the euro area contribution for the first year. 
The general background to the current situation are the economic downturn, and the realisation, following 
the Greek elections in October 2009, that the fiscal and public debt positions for 2008 and 2009 were far 
worse than reported by the previous government. These factors caused confidence to drop, financing costs to 
increase, and growth and employment to suffer. Thus the crisis exposed the weak fiscal position of Greece. 
The budget deficit of 5.1 percent of GDP in 2007, at the top of the cycle, shows that Greece entered the 
downturn with a large structural deficit. With weak revenue policies and tax administration, especially in the 
run-up to the 2009 elections and aggravated by the recession, revenues declined notably. Spending, 
meanwhile, increased significantly, especially on wages and entitlements, reflecting weak spending 
discipline and control, which also led to new arrears. The deficit jumped to an estimated 13.6 percent of 
GDP while the public debt rose to over 115 percent of GDP in 2009.  
The financial system has also been adversely affected. With the deteriorating fiscal results came downgrades 
of government bonds by rating agencies, and investors started backing out of Greek bonds, driving up their 
yields. Furthermore, it is clear that the deep macroeconomic and structural problems combined with the 
inevitable strong fiscal adjustment over the medium term are likely to weigh on activity for some time. This 
combination of factors affects negatively the banking system. Impaired loans are rising while borrowing 
costs in the interbank and wholesale markets have increased. In addition, the external deficit is declining 
only gradually, despite the recession with the external interest bill on the foreign debt increasing to over 5 
percent of GDP. Indeed over the last decade, in the aftermath of rapidly increasing labour costs in particular, 
Greece has lost competitiveness. Its restoration should also be a priority, in order to boost investment and 
exports and in view of the high and increasing unemployment. 
The main objectives of the programme of economic adjustment are to correct fiscal, financial, and external 
imbalances and by doing so to restore confidence. Without regaining confidence in the sustainability of 
fiscal and economic developments, the cost of funding the economy is bound to stay high if not to increase 
further. Growth is unlikely to be buoyant as the initial corrective fiscal measures are implemented, but with 
a strong medium-term policy orientation, the economy should emerge from this experience in better shape 
than before. To achieve the programme objectives, all available fiscal, financial, and structural policies will 
be used, specifically in order to correct fiscal imbalances and place debt on a downward path, maintain 
banking sector stability, and restore competitiveness. This includes incomes and social security policies 
needed to buttress the fiscal adjustment effort and the restoration of competitiveness, and structural reforms 
that boost the economy’s capacity to produce, save, and export hence are critical for the medium-term 
                                                          
(1) See Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies and Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality (both 3 May 2010).  
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Box (continued) 
 
 recovery. It is also attempted to share the distribution of the adjustment burden as fairly as possible and to 
protect the most vulnerable in society. 
Nonetheless, fiscal policy is the cornerstone of the programme. The Greek government has committed to put 
in place durable adjustment measures, on top of those already announced in March 2010, of 11 percent of 
GDP in cumulative terms through to 2013, with additional remedial measures in 2014 to reduce the deficit to 
well below 3 percent of GDP. This large adjustment is needed to put the debt-to-GDP ratio on a downward 
trajectory from 2013 onwards, which will be sustained after the programme period by keeping primary 
balances in a sizeable surplus (of at least 5 percent of GDP) up to 2020. To sustain fiscal consolidation over 
the medium term, the fiscal policy framework and fiscal institutions should also be strengthened. There is a 
recognised need to frontload the multiyear adjustment effort given Greece’s very high and still growing, 
debt ratio and large fiscal deficit. A start has already been made leading to a significant reduction in the 
2010 first quarter deficit. For the remainder of 2010 additional measures will be implemented beyond those 
stipulated in the Council Decision and Recommendation of 16 February 2010 and those announced in March 
2010. The three biggest additional upfront measures are a cut in the public sector wage bill and in pension 
outlays, and further increases in the VAT and selected excises. For 2011 and beyond, further revenue and 
expenditure measures have been identified to secure fiscal targets. As a result, expenditures will be cut by 
the equivalent of around 7 percent of GDP until 2013, while revenues will be increased by the equivalent of 
around 4 percent of GDP through to 2013.  
Besides these direct fiscal steps for the budget, a series of important structural fiscal reforms have been 
initiated, including reforms of pensions, healthcare, taxation, and tax administration. Specifically, inter alia, 
the normal retirement age is being set to 65 years and early retirement is restricted, double-entry accrual 
accounting is being implemented in hospitals, exemptions and deductions from income tax are being curbed 
while the fight against tax evasion is intensified, including stronger enforcement and auditing of high-wealth 
individuals and self-employed. To these reforms add far-reaching further improvements of public financial 
management and the fiscal framework, the debt management framework, and also of fiscal and other public 
sector reporting of information. Specifically, this includes the adoption of medium-term budgeting from 
2011 onwards, and a further intensification of efforts to improve the collection and processing of general 
government data compiled according to the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA). 
Greece has committed to take appropriate measures to preserve the programme objectives, including a 
reduction of discretionary spending, should any downside risks materialise. 
Notwithstanding the significant fiscal adjustment, a public financing gap of around €110 billion can be 
projected for the programme period, and expected to be covered through matching bilateral lending support 
from euro area Member States (€80 billion) and IMF support (€30 billion). Greece will draw on these 
resources in parallel, on the bilateral euro area support and the IMF financing in a given ratio in each 
disbursement. If fiscal consolidation proceeds faster than expected or if market conditions improve 
significantly during the programme period, Greece would refrain from drawing on the full support. 
Progress in the implementation of the policies under this programme will be monitored through quarterly 
(and continuous) quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets, structural benchmarks, programme 
reviews, and consultation clauses. Quantitative targets up to December 2010 are performance criteria. 
Targets for 2011-2013 are indicative and for 2011 will be converted into performance criteria at the time of 
the second review before end-2010.  
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2.1.1. The surveillance mechanism in the euro 
area Member States 
Austria 
According to the April 2009 update of the stability 
programme and data notified by the Austrian 
authorities in April 2009, the general government 
deficit was planned to reach 3.5% of GDP in 2009, 
thus exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value of 
the Treaty, while general government gross debt 
would amount to 68.5% of GDP, above the 60% of 
GDP reference value. The planned figures in the 
notification for the deficit and debt in 2009 
provided prima facie evidence on the existence of 
a planned excessive deficit in Austria in the sense 
of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.  
In its October 2009 report under Article 126(3) the 
Commission considered the deficit to be 
exceptional, since it resulted from a severe 
economic downturn in the sense of the Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact. The deficit was not 
considered to be close, since the notified figure of 
3.5% of GDP projection was based on the 
relatively optimistic assumption of GDP growth of 
-2.2% in 2009. On the basis of a significantly 
worse economic outlook (GDP growth of -4.0%) 
the Commission services’ 2009 spring forecast 
projected the deficit to reach 4.2% in 2009. The 
excess over the 3% of GDP threshold was not 
considered temporary. The Commission services’ 
spring 2009 forecast projected that, taking into 
account the measures adopted in the current year 
for the budget for 2010, the deficit would widen to 
5.3% of GDP in 2010 on a no-policy change basis. 
Therefore the deficit criterion of the Treaty was 
not fulfilled. Additionally, the general government 
gross debt ratio was estimated in the April 2009 
EDP notification to increase to 68.5% of GDP for 
2009, above the 60% of GDP Treaty reference 
value (up from 62.5% of GDP in 2008). The 
Commission therefore concluded that the debt ratio 
was not sufficiently diminishing towards the 
reference value and that the debt criterion of the 
Treaty was not fulfilled either. 
Also taking into account the debt ratio, the Council 
decided on 2 December 2009 in accordance with 
Article 126(6) that an excessive deficit existed in 
Austria. It was further noted that the Austrian 
economy was affected by a severe economic 
downturn in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore special 
circumstances were deemed to exist in Austria, 
allowing a correction of the excessive deficit in a 
medium-term timeframe. The Council further 
recognised that the Austrian budgetary position in 
2009 resulted from discretionary measures 
amounting to 1½% of GDP, which were deemed 
an appropriate contribution to the EERP, and the 
free play of automatic stabilisers. This resulted in 
the Council issuing recommendations in 
accordance with Article 126(7), setting a deadline 
for correction by 2013 and requiring an average 
annual fiscal effort of ¾% of GDP over the period 
2011-2013. Consolidation would start in 2011 in 
order to allow the Austrian authorities to 
implement the fiscal measures in 2010 as 
envisaged. After six months time (after 2 June 
2010 and hence after the cut-off date of this 
report), the Commission will assess whether 
effective action has been taken. 
Belgium 
According to the April 2009 update of the stability 
programme and data notified by the Belgian 
authorities in April 2009, the general government 
deficit in Belgium was planned to reach 3.4% of 
GDP in 2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP 
reference value of the Treaty. General government 
gross debt would be 93% of GDP, well above the 
60% of GDP reference value. The planned figures 
for the 2009 deficit and gross debt provided prima 
facie evidence on the existence of an excessive 
deficit in Belgium in the sense of the Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The Commission concluded in its October 2009 
report under Article 126(3) that the planned excess 
over the reference value was exceptional. In 
particular, it was deemed to result, among other 
things, from a severe economic downturn in the 
sense of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. The Commission further considered that the 
deficit would not remain close to the 3% threshold 
in view of the more negative budgetary outlook in 
the Commission services' spring 2009 forecast (-
4.5% of GDP in 2009). Furthermore, the 
September 2009 complement to the April 2009 
update of the stability programme projected a 
deficit of 5.9% of GDP for 2009. The excess was 
not considered temporary. According to the 
Commission services' spring 2009 forecast, the 
general government deficit was expected to reach 
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6.1% in 2010, based on the no-policy change 
assumption. Therefore the deficit criterion of the 
Treaty was not fulfilled. Additionally, the general 
government gross debt ratio was estimated in the 
April 2009 EDP notification to increase to 93% of 
GDP for 2009, above the 60% of GDP Treaty 
reference value (up from 89.6% of GDP in 2008 
and 84% in 2007). The Commission therefore 
concluded that the debt ratio was not sufficiently 
diminishing towards the reference value and that 
the debt criterion of the Treaty was not fulfilled 
either. 
Also taking into account the debt ratio, the Council 
decided on 2 December 2009 in accordance with 
Article 126(6) that an excessive deficit existed in 
Belgium. It was further noted that Belgium was 
affected significantly by the global financial crisis. 
Special circumstances were therefore considered to 
exist in Belgium, permitting a correction of the 
excessive deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The 
Council further recognised that the Belgian 
budgetary position in 2009 resulted from 
discretionary measures amounting to ½% of GDP, 
which were deemed an appropriate contribution to 
the EERP, and the free play of automatic 
stabilisers. This resulted in the Council issuing 
recommendations in accordance with Article 
126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 2012 
and requiring an average annual fiscal effort of 
¾% of GDP over the period 2010-2012. After six 
months time (after 2 June 2010 and hence after the 
cut-off date of this report), the Commission will 
assess whether effective action has been taken. 
Cyprus 
In the April 2010 notification the Cypriot 
authorities estimated the general government 
deficit to have reached 6.1% of GDP in 2009, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold. The figure for 
the 2009 deficit provided prima facie evidence on 
the existence of an excessive deficit in Cyprus in 
the sense of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
 
The Commission adopted a report under Article 
126(3) on 12 May 2010. The Commission 
concluded that the excess over the reference value 
was exceptional, since it resulted from a severe 
economic downturn. Well over the 3%, the deficit 
was not considered close to the reference value. 
The excess over the 3% of GDP reference value 
was not considered temporary, since the 
Commission services' Spring 2010 Economic 
Forecast indicated that the budgetary deficit would 
reach about 7% of GDP in 2010. The Commission 
therefore concluded that the deficit criterion in the 
Treaty was not fulfilled. Additionally, the general 
government gross debt ratio was estimated in the 
April 2010 EDP notification to increase to 62.0% 
of GDP for 2010, exceeding the 60% of GDP 
Treaty reference value. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the debt ratio was not sufficiently 
diminishing towards the reference value and that 
the debt criterion of the Treaty was not fulfilled 
either. 
On 15 June 2010, after the cut-off date of this 
report, the Commission will adopt an opinion 
under Article 126(5) on the existence of an 
excessive deficit for Cyprus. The Commission will 
decide on the same day on recommendations to the 
Council to adopt a Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit under Article 
126(6) and a Council recommendation to correct it 
under Article 126(7). The Council will decide on 
possible further steps on 13 July. 
Finland 
In the April 2010 notification the Finnish 
authorities projected the general government 
deficit to reach 4.1% of GDP in 2010, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. The planned figure for 2010 provided 
prima facie evidence on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in Finland in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The Commission concluded in its report under 
Article 126(3) adopted on 12 May 2010 that the 
planned excess over the reference value was 
exceptional, resulting from a severe economic 
downturn in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The deficit was 
considered temporary, since the Commission 
services' Spring 2010 Economic Forecast indicated 
that the deficit will fall below the reference value 
in 2011. Well in excess of 3%, the deficit was not 
considered close to the reference value. The 
Commission therefore concluded that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled.  
On 15 June 2010, after the cut-off date of this 
report, the Commission will adopt an opinion 
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under Article 126(5) on the existence of an 
excessive deficit for Finland. The Commission will 
decide on the same day on recommendations to the 
Council to adopt a Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit under Article 
126(6) and a Council recommendation to correct it 
under Article 126(7). The Council will decide on 
possible further steps on 13 July. 
France 
The December 2008 French stability programme 
update estimated the general government deficit in 
France to reach 2.9% of GDP in 2008, 3.9% in 
2009, and 2.7% in 2010. On 6 February 2009, the 
French Minister of the Economy, Industry and 
Employment announced, in a letter addressed to 
the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, an upward revision of the deficit estimates 
to 3.2% of GDP in 2008, 4.4% in 2009 and 3.1% 
in 2010. The debt ratio was estimated to be at 
68.0% of GDP in 2008, rising to 73.9% in 2009. 
On the basis of this and following a 
recommendation by the Commission, under Article 
126(6) the Council decided in April 2009 that an 
excessive deficit existed in France. Furthermore, 
the Council issued recommendations in accordance 
with Article 126(7), setting a deadline for 
correction by 2012 and requiring a strengthening 
of the foreseen annual average fiscal effort to at 
least 1% of GDP. Consolidation would start in 
2010, after the implementation of stimulus 
measures taken in line with the EERP.  
 
In November 2009 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the French 
authorities in response to the April 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. It was recognised that France's budgetary 
position in 2009 resulted from discretionary 
measures amounting to 1.2 % of GDP, which were 
an appropriate contribution to the EERP, and the 
free play of automatic stabilisers. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, in December 
2009 the Council issued a revised recommendation 
for France in accordance with Article 126(7), 
setting a deadline for correction by 2013 and 
requiring an average annual fiscal effort of above 
1% of GDP for the period 2010-2013. After six 
months time (i.e. after 2 June 2010 and hence after 
the cut-off date of this report), the Commission 
will assess whether effective action has been taken. 
Germany 
According to the data notified by the authorities in 
July 2009, the general government deficit in 
Germany was planned to reach 3.9% of GDP in 
2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP reference 
value of the Treaty, while general government 
gross debt would amount to 73.9% of GDP, above 
the 60% of GDP reference value and on a rising 
trend. The planned figures for the deficit and debt 
in 2009 provided prima facie evidence on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Germany in the 
sense of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
The Commission concluded in its October 2009 
report under Article 126(3) that the planned excess 
over the 3% threshold was exceptional, since it 
resulted from a severe economic downturn in the 
sense of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Well above the reference value, the deficit 
was not considered close. The planned excess over 
the 3% was not deemed temporary, since the 
Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast 
projected the deficit would widen to 5.9% of GDP 
in 2010 on a no-policy change basis. 
Also taking into account the debt ratio, the Council 
decided on 2 December 2009, in accordance with 
Article 126(6) that an excessive deficit existed in 
Germany. It was further noted that Germany faced 
a severe economic downturn in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Therefore special circumstances were deemed to 
exist in Germany, allowing a correction of the 
excessive deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The 
Council further recognised that the German 
budgetary position in 2009 resulted from 
discretionary measures amounting to 1½ % of 
GDP, which were deemed an appropriate 
contribution to the EERP, and the free play of 
automatic stabilisers. This resulted in the Council 
issuing recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction of 
2013 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of at least 0.5% of GDP over the period 2011-
2013. Consolidation would start in 2011 in order to 
allow the German authorities to implement the 
fiscal measures in 2010 as envisaged. After six 
months time (after 2 June 2010 and hence after the 
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cut-off date of this report), the Commission will 
assess whether effective action has been taken. 
Greece 
According to data notified by the Greek authorities 
in October 2008, the general government deficit 
reached 3.5% of GDP in 2007, thus exceeding the 
3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty. The 
2007 deficit was revised upwards from 2.8% of 
GDP notified in April 2008. The 2007 general 
government gross debt ratio was estimated at 
94.8% of GDP, above the 60% of GDP reference 
value. On the basis of this, the Commission 
adopted a report under Article 126(3) in February 
2009 that considered that the both the deficit and 
the debt criteria in the Treaty were not fulfilled.  
Following a recommendation by the Commission, 
the Council decided in April 2009 that an 
excessive deficit existed in Greece under Article 
126(6). Furthermore, the Council issued 
recommendations in accordance with Article 
126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 2010.  
In December 2009 the Council decided, in 
accordance with Article 126(8), that Greece had 
not taken effective action in response to the April 
2009 Council recommendations. In particular, the 
Council concluded that public finances had 
worsened much beyond what could have been 
expected as a result of the stronger-than-projected 
downturn and were to a large extent a result of 
budgetary policies implemented by the Greek 
government. Moreover, the fiscal consolidation 
measures implemented in 2009 were deemed 
insufficient to achieve the general government 
deficit target of 3.7% of GDP in 2009. Also, the 
large projected increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
exceeded the impact of the deterioration in the 
general government's net borrowing position, 
indicating insufficient efforts to control factors 
other than net borrowing, which contributed to the 
change in debt levels. 
 
In February 2010 the Council gave notice to 
Greece, in accordance with Article 126(9), to take 
measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary 
in order to remedy the situation of excessive 
deficit. The Council set a revised deadline for 
consolidation by 2012, specifying a structural 
annual adjustment of 3½ percentage points of GDP 
for 2010 and 2011 and at least 2½ percentage 
points of GDP for 2012. Additionally, the Council 
listed a set of urgent fiscal measures to be 
implemented by 15 May 2010, supporting 
measures to safeguard the 2010 budgetary targets, 
other measures to be adopted by 2010, and fiscal 
measures to be adopted by 2012. Furthermore, a 
number of recommendations were adopted to 
ensure monitoring of the targets. According to the 
preliminary assessment carried out by the 
Commission in March 2010, Greece was 
implementing, as requested, the fiscal measures 
meant to ensure the achievement of the planned 
deficit target for 2010. However, the abrupt change 
in the economic scenario meant that those 
measures could no longer be considered sufficient. 
At the same time, the depth of the contraction in 
the economy made the achievement of the initial 
deficit reduction path unfeasible. On 
recommendation by the Commission, on 10 May 
2010 the Council adopted a new Decision under 
Article 126(9) and 136, with a view to reinforcing 
and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice 
to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction 
judged necessary to remedy the situation of 
excessive deficit by 2014.  
Ireland 
In the addendum to the October 2008 stability 
programme update, submitted by the Irish 
authorities on 9 January 2009, the general 
government deficit in Ireland was estimated to 
have reached 6.3% of GDP in 2008, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. In its February 2009 Report under Article 
126(3), the Commission considered that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled. Following 
a recommendation by the Commission, the 
Council decided in April 2009 under Article 
126(6) that an excessive deficit existed in Ireland. 
Furthermore, the Council issued recommendations 
in accordance with Article 126(7), setting a 
deadline for correction by 2013 and requiring an 
annual average fiscal effort of at least 1.5% of 
GDP. 
In November 2009 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the Irish 
authorities in response to the April 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. It was recognised that the Irish budgetary 
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situation resulted from the interplay of the severe 
recession and the free play of automatic stabilisers 
on the one hand and significant consolidation 
efforts on the other, which was considered to be an 
appropriate contribution to the EERP. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, in December 
2009 the Council issued revised recommendations 
for Ireland in accordance with Article 126(7), 
setting a deadline for correction by 2014 and 
requiring an average annual fiscal effort of 2% of 
GDP for the period 2010-2014. After six months 
time (after 2 June 2010 and hence after the cut-off 
date of this report), the Commission will assess 
whether effective action has been taken. 
Italy 
In April 2009, the Italian authorities notified a 
planned general government deficit of 3.7% of 
GDP in 2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP 
reference value of the Treaty, and a general 
government gross debt ratio of 110.5% of GDP, 
well above the 60% of GDP reference value and 
on a rising path. After this, the authorities revised 
the abovementioned figures upwards. According to 
the update of the Economic and Financial Planning 
Document (DPEF) adopted by the government on 
22 September 2009, the general government deficit 
was planned to reach 5.3% of GDP in 2009, and 
general government gross debt would be 115.1% 
of GDP. The planned figures for the deficit and 
debt in 2009 provided prima facie evidence for the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Italy in the 
sense of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
 
In its October 2009 report under Article 126(3) the 
Commission concluded that the planned excess 
over the 3% of GDP reference value was 
exceptional. In particular, it was deemed to result 
from a severe economic downturn in the sense of 
the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Well 
in excess of 3%, the deficit was not considered to 
be close to the reference value. The planned excess 
over the 3% threshold was not considered 
temporary as the Commission services' spring 
2009 forecast, based on the usual no-policy change 
scenario, projected the deficit to increase further in 
2010. Therefore the deficit criterion in the Treaty 
was not fulfilled. Additionally, the general 
government gross debt ratio was planned in the 
April 2009 EDP notification to be 115.3% of GDP 
in 2009, well above the 60% of GDP Treaty 
reference value. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the debt ratio was not sufficiently 
diminishing towards the reference value and that 
the debt criterion of the Treaty was not fulfilled 
either. 
Also taking into account the debt ratio, the Council 
decided on 2 December 2009, in accordance with 
Article 126(6), that an excessive deficit existed in 
Italy. It was further noted that the global financial 
and economic crisis was having a strong adverse 
impact on the Italian economy. Special 
circumstances were therefore considered to exist in 
Italy, permitting a correction of the excessive 
deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The Council 
further recognised that the Italian budgetary 
position in 2009 resulted from an appropriate 
contribution to the EERP and the free play of 
automatic stabilisers. This resulted in the Council 
issuing recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7) setting a deadline for correction by 
2012 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of 0.5% of GDP over the period 2010-2012. After 
six months time (after 2 June 2010 and hence after 
the cut-off date of this report), the Commission 
will assess whether effective action has been taken. 
Luxembourg 
In the April 2010 notification the Luxembourgish 
authorities projected the general government 
deficit to reach 4.2% of GDP in 2010, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. The planned figure for 2010 provided 
prima facie evidence on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in Luxembourg in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The Commission adopted a report under Article 
126(3) on 12 May 2010. The Commission 
concluded that the excess over the reference value 
was exceptional, since it resulted from a severe 
economic downturn. Well in excess of the 3% of 
GDP, the planned deficit is not close to the Treaty 
reference value, but according to the Commission 
services' Spring 2010 Economic Forecast the 
general government deficit would come out at 
3.5% of GDP, which can still be considered as 
close. The excess over the 3% of GDP reference 
value was also considered temporary. According to 
the Commission services' Spring 2010 Economic 
Forecast, which was based on the no-policy change 
assumption for 2011, the general government 
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deficit would rise from 3.5% of GDP in 2010 to 
3.9% of GDP in 2011. However, on 5 May 2010, 
after the cut-off date of the forecast the Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg announced consolidation 
measures that would amount, according to 
information provided to the Commission on 7 
May, to 1.6% of GDP in 2011 and another 1.7% of 
GDP in 2012.  The part of this consolidation 
package that can be taken into account for 2011 
was estimated by the Commission at about 1.2% of 
GDP, which would  reduce the 2011 deficit to 
around 2¾%, thus below the 3% of GDP 
threshold. The Commission therefore concluded 
that the deficit criterion in the Treaty was fulfilled.  
Malta 
In the context of the April 2009 notification, the 
Maltese authorities reported a revised figure for 
the 2008 general government deficit of 4.7% of 
GDP, in excess of the 3% of GDP reference value 
of the Treaty. The general government gross debt 
ratio was estimated at 64.1% of GDP in 2008, 
above the 60% of GDP Treaty reference value. In 
its May 2009 report under Article 126(3), the 
Commission considered that both the deficit and 
the debt criteria in the Treaty were not fulfilled. 
Following a recommendation by the Commission, 
the Council decided in July 2009 that an excessive 
deficit existed in Malta under Article 126(6). 
Furthermore, the Council issued recommendations 
in accordance with Article 126(7), setting a 
deadline for correction by 2010.  
In January 2010 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the Maltese 
authorities in response to the July 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. Thus on a recommendation by the 
Commission, in February 2010 the Council issued 
revised recommendations to Malta in accordance 
with Article 126(7), setting a deadline for 
correction by 2011, requiring a fiscal effort of ¾ 
percentage points of GDP for 2011 in addition to 
achieving the deficit target set in the 2010 budget. 
After six months time (after 16 August 2010 and 
hence after the cut-off date of this report), the 
Commission will assess whether effective action 
has been taken. 
Netherlands 
According to data notified by the authorities in 
April 2009 the general government deficit in the 
Netherlands was planned to reach 3.3% of GDP in 
2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP reference 
value of the Treaty. The planned figure for the 
2009 deficit provided prima facie evidence of the 
existence of an excessive deficit in the Netherlands 
in the sense of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
In its October 2009 126(3) report the Commission 
concluded that the planned excess over the 3% 
threshold was exceptional, as it resulted, among 
other things, from a severe economic downturn in 
the sense of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Based on the Dutch authorities' 2010 
budget memorandum published on 15 September, 
which showed a deficit of 4.8% of GDP, it was 
expected that the actual outcome would not be 
close to the threshold. The deficit was not 
considered temporary, since the Commission 
services' spring 2009 forecast projected  the 
general government balance to deteriorate from -
3.4% of GDP in 2009 to -6.1% of GDP in 2010, 
based on the usual no-policy-change assumption. 
Therefore the deficit criterion in the Treaty was not 
fulfilled.  
The Council decided on 2 December 2009 in 
accordance with Article 126(6) that an excessive 
deficit existed in the Netherlands. It was further 
noted that the global financial crisis affected the 
Dutch economy significantly. Therefore special 
circumstances were deemed to exist in the 
Netherlands, allowing a correction of the excessive 
deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The Council 
further recognised that the Dutch budgetary 
position in 2009 resulted from discretionary 
measures amounting to 1% of GDP, which were an 
appropriate contribution to the EERP, and the free 
play of automatic stabilisers. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7) setting a deadline for correction by 
2013 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of ¾% of GDP over the period 2011-2013. 
Consolidation would start in 2011 in order to allow 
the Dutch authorities to implement the fiscal 
measures in 2010 as envisaged. After six months 
time (after 2 June 2010 and hence after the cut-off 
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date of this report), the Commission will assess 
whether effective action has been taken. 
Portugal 
According to the April 2009 EDP notification from 
the Portuguese authorities, Portugal's general 
government deficit was planned to reach 3.9% of 
GDP in 2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP 
reference value, while general government gross 
debt would be 70.2% of GDP, above the 60% of 
GDP reference value and on a rising trend. 
Subsequent official budgetary estimates of the 
Portuguese authorities of May 2009, included in 
the Medium-Term Steering Report on Fiscal 
Policy (Relatório de Orientação da Política 
Orçamental – ROPO), projected a budget deficit of 
5.9% of GDP in 2009, thus also exceeding the 3% 
of GDP reference value, while general government 
gross debt would be 74.6% of GDP, above the 
60% of GDP reference value. The planned figures 
for the 2009 deficit provided prima facie evidence 
on the existence of an excessive deficit in Portugal 
in the sense of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  
The Commission considered in its October 2009 
Report under Article 126(3) that the excess over 
the reference value was exceptional, since it 
resulted, among other things, from a severe 
economic downturn in 2009 in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. As the 
reported figure was well in excess of 3% of GDP, 
the deficit was not considered close to the 
reference value. The excess over the 3% was not 
considered temporary, since the Commission 
services’ spring 2009 forecast projected the 
general government headline deficit to increase to 
6.7% of GDP in 2010, based on the customary 
unchanged policy assumption. Therefore the 
deficit criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled. 
Additionally, the general government gross debt 
ratio was planned in the April 2009 EDP 
notification to be 70.2% of GDP in 2009, later 
revised upwards by the ROPO to 74.6%, above the 
60% of GDP Treaty reference value. The 
Commission therefore concluded that the debt ratio 
was not sufficiently diminishing towards the 
reference value and that the debt criterion in the 
Treaty was not fulfilled either. 
 
Also taking into account the debt ratio, the Council 
decided on 2 December 2009, in accordance with 
Article 126(6), that an excessive deficit existed in 
Portugal. It was further noted that the Portuguese 
economy faced a severe economic downturn in 
2009 in the sense of the Treaty and the Stability 
and Growth Pact in the context of the global 
economic and financial crisis. Special 
circumstances were therefore considered to exist in 
Portugal, permitting a correction of the excessive 
deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The Council 
further recognised that the Portuguese budgetary 
position in 2009 resulted from measures 
amounting to 1½% of GDP, which were an 
appropriate response to the EERP, and the free 
play of automatic stabilisers. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 
2013 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of 1¼% of GDP over the period 2010-2013. After 
six months time (i.e. after 2 June 2010 and hence 
after the cut-off date of this report), the 
Commission will assess whether effective action 
has been taken. 
Slovakia 
In April 2009, Slovak authorities notified a 
planned deficit of 3.0% of GDP for 2009. 
However, according to the Commission services' 
spring 2009 forecast, the general government 
deficit in Slovakia was expected to reach 4.7% of 
GDP in 2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP 
reference value. In a letter to the Commission from 
25 August 2009, the Slovak authorities confirmed 
the deterioration of the general government deficit 
to over 6% of GDP in 2009. According to the 2009 
revised budget, the general government deficit 
would reach 6.3% of GDP in 2009. The projected 
figure for the 2009 deficit provided prima facie 
evidence for the risk of an excessive deficit in 
Slovakia in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
In its October 2009 report under Article 126(3) the 
Commission concluded that the Slovak deficit was 
exceptional. In particular, it was deemed to result, 
among other things, from a severe economic 
downturn in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Well in excess of 3% of 
GDP, the projected deficit was not considered 
close to the Treaty reference value. The projected 
excess over the 3% of GDP reference value was 
not deemed temporary, since the Commission 
38 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
services' 2009 spring forecast projected a widening 
of the general government deficit to 5.4% of GDP 
in 2010 based on the no-policy change assumption. 
Therefore the deficit criterion in the Treaty was not 
fulfilled.  
The Council decided on 2 December 2009, in 
accordance with Article 126(6), that an excessive 
deficit existed in Slovakia. It was further noted 
that, being a very open economy, Slovakia was 
severely affected by the global crisis. Therefore 
special circumstances were deemed to exist in 
Slovakia, allowing a correction of the excessive 
deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The Council 
further recognised that stimulus measures financed 
through reallocation within the budget amounting 
to 0.4 % of GDP in 2009 were an adequate 
response to the EERP, and that consequently the 
worsening of the fiscal position in 2009 resulted 
from the free play of automatic stabilisers. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 
2013 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of 1% of GDP over the period 2010-2013. After 
six months time (i.e. after 2 June 2010 and hence 
after the cut-off date of this report), the 
Commission will assess whether effective action 
has been taken. 
Slovenia 
 
According to data notified by the authorities in 
April 2009, the general government deficit in 
Slovenia was planned to reach 3.7% of GDP in 
2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP reference 
value. After this, the authorities revised upwards 
the abovementioned figure. In the subsequent 
April 2009 update of the stability programme, the 
2009 general government deficit was set at 5.1% 
of GDP. In a letter of 21 August 2009, the 
authorities revised the planned deficit figure 
further upwards, to 5.5% of GDP. The planned 
figure for the 2009 deficit provided prima facie 
evidence for the existence of an excessive deficit 
in Slovenia in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  
In its October 2009 report under Article 126(3) the 
Commission considered the deficit to be 
exceptional, resulting among other things, from a 
severe economic downturn in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
deficit was not considered close, as the reported 
figure was well in excess of the 3% of GDP. The 
planned excess over the 3% of GDP reference 
value was not deemed temporary, as the 
Commission services’ spring 2009 forecast 
projected that the deficit would widen to 6.5% of 
GDP in 2010, based on the no-policy change 
assumption. Therefore the deficit criterion in the 
Treaty was not fulfilled 
The Council decided on 2 December 2009, in 
accordance with Article 126(6), that an excessive 
deficit existed in Slovenia. It was further noted 
that, due to its very high degree of openness, the 
Slovene economy was severely hit by the global 
crisis. Therefore special circumstances were 
deemed to exist in Slovenia, allowing a correction 
of the excessive deficit in a medium-term 
framework. The Council further recognised that 
Slovenia's budgetary position in 2009 resulted 
from recovery measures which, together with tax 
relief benefiting companies decided before the 
onset of the crisis, amounted to around 2 % of 
GDP and were an adequate response to the EERP, 
and the free play of automatic stabilisers. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 
2013 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of ¾% of GDP over the period 2010-2013. After 
six months time (i.e. after 2 June 2010 and hence 
after the cut-off date of this report), the 
Commission will assess whether effective action 
has been taken. 
Spain 
According to the January 2009 update of the 
stability programme, Spain's general government 
deficit reached 3.4% of GDP in 2008, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value. The 
programme foresaw a further deterioration to 5.8% 
of GDP in 2009 before recovering to 4.8% in 
2010. In its February 2009 report under Article 
126(3), the Commission considered that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled. Following 
a recommendation by the Commission, the 
Council decided in April 2009 that an excessive 
deficit existed in Spain under Article 126(6) and 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 
2012 and requiring an annual average fiscal effort 
of at least 1¼ % of GDP.  
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In November 2009 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the Spanish 
authorities in response to the April 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. It was recognised that Spain's budgetary 
position in 2009 resulted from measures 
amounting to slightly above 2 % of GDP, which 
were an adequate response to the EERP, and the 
free play of automatic stabilisers. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, in December 
2009 the Council issued revised recommendations 
for Spain in accordance with Article 126(7), 
setting a deadline for correction by 2013 and 
requiring an average annual fiscal effort of above 
1.5% of GDP for the period 2010-2013. After six 
months time (i.e. after 2 June 2010 and hence after 
the cut-off date of this report), the Commission 
will assess whether effective action has been taken. 
2.1.2. The surveillance mechanism in the non-
euro area Member States 
Bulgaria 
After the cut-off date of this report the 
Commission and the Council may take further 
steps in the excessive deficit procedure. The next 
step in the procedure would be the adoption of a 
Commission opinion under Article 126(5) on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Bulgaria. This 
would be followed by a Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit under Article 
126(6) and a Council recommendation to correct it 
under Article 126(7), both based on a 
recommendation by the Commission. 
Czech Republic 
According to the data notified by the authorities in 
April 2009, the general government deficit in the 
Czech Republic was planned to reach 3.9% of 
GDP in 2009, thus exceeding the 3% of GDP 
reference value. In a letter of 21 August 2009 to 
the Commission, the authorities of the Czech 
Republic estimated that the 2009 government 
deficit could reach 5.5% of GDP, mainly reflecting 
a further deterioration of the economic outlook. 
The planned figure for the 2009 deficit provided 
prima facie evidence for the existence of an 
excessive deficit in the Czech Republic in the 
sense of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact. In the April 2010 notification the Bulgarian 
authorities estimated the general government 
deficit to have reached 3.9% of GDP in 2009, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold. The figure for 
the 2009 deficit provided prima facie evidence for 
the existence of an excessive deficit in Bulgaria in 
the sense of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
The Commission concluded in its October 2009 
report that the excess over the reference value was 
exceptional, since it was due to a severe economic 
downturn in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The deficit was not 
deemed close to the reference value, since the 
reported figures were well above 3% of GDP. The 
excess was not considered temporary, since the 
Commission services' 2009 spring forecast 
projected a widening of the general government 
deficit to 4.9% of GDP in 2010, based on the no-
policy change assumption. Therefore the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled 
The Commission concluded in its report under 
Article 126(3) adopted on 12 May 2010 that the 
planned excess over the reference value was 
exceptional, resulting from a severe economic 
downturn in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The deficit was 
considered temporary, since the Commission 
services’ Spring 2010 Economic Forecast 
indicated that the general government deficit will 
fall below the reference value already in 2010, 
following the end of the worst part of the current 
severe economic downturn and as a result of the 
fiscal consolidation measures undertaken by the 
government. However, the deficit was not 
considered close to the reference value. The 
Commission therefore concluded that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled. 
The Council decided on 2 December 2009, in 
accordance with Article 126(6), that an excessive 
deficit existed in the Czech Republic. It was 
further noted that the global economic and 
financial crisis had caused a very severe recession 
in the Czech Republic. Therefore special 
circumstances were deemed to exist in the Czech 
Republic, allowing a correction of the excessive 
deficit in a medium-term timeframe. The Council 
further recognised that the Czech budgetary 
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position in 2009 resulted from the free play of 
automatic stabilisers and from measures which 
amount to 2.1 % of GDP, which were considered 
an adequate response to the downturn and broadly 
in line with the EERP principles. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 
2013 and requiring an average annual fiscal effort 
of 1% of GDP over the period 2010-2013. After 
six months time (i.e. after 2 June 2010 and hence 
after the cut-off date of this report), the 
Commission will assess whether effective action 
has been taken. 
Denmark 
In the April 2010 notification the Danish 
authorities projected the general government 
deficit to reach 5.4% of GDP in 2010, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. The planned figure for 2010 provided 
prima facie evidence for the existence of an 
excessive deficit in Finland in the sense of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The Commission concluded in its report under 
Article 126(3) adopted on 12 May 2010 that the 
planned excess over the reference value was 
exceptional, resulting from a severe economic 
downturn in the sense of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The deficit was not 
considered temporary, since the Commission 
services' Spring 2010 Economic Forecast projected 
that, taking into account the measures adopted in 
the current year for the 2010 budget, the deficit 
would be at 4.9% of GDP in 2011 on a no-policy 
change basis. Well in excess of 3%, the deficit was 
not considered close to the reference value. The 
Commission therefore concluded that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty was not fulfilled.  
 
                                                          
On 15 June 2010, after the cut-off date of this 
report, the Commission will adopt an opinion 
under Article 126(5) on the existence of an 
excessive deficit for Denmark. The Commission 
will decide on the same day on recommendations 
to the Council to adopt a Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit under Article 
126(6) and a Council recommendation to correct it 
under Article 126(7). The Council will decide on 
possible further steps on 13 July. 
Hungary 
The spring 2004 fiscal notification of Hungary 
reported a general government deficit in 2003 of 
5.9% of GDP, well above the reference value. The 
Commission prepared a report in accordance with 
Article 126(3) of the Treaty in May 2004. 
Following a recommendation by the Commission, 
the Council decided in July 2004 that an excessive 
deficit existed in Hungary. At the same time, the 
Council issued a recommendation under Article 
126(7) recommending that the excessive deficit 
situation be corrected by 2008. In January 2005, 
following a recommendation by the Commission 
in accordance with Article 126(8), the Council 
considered that Hungary had not taken effective 
action in response to its recommendation. Since 
Hungary is a Member State with a derogation 
within the meaning of Article 139 of the Treaty(4), 
the Council issued another recommendation based 
on Article 126(7) in March 2005, confirming the 
2008 deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit. After a substantial deterioration of the 
budgetary outlook in Hungary, the Council 
decided in November 2005, acting pursuant to 
Article 126(8), that Hungary had for the second 
time failed to comply with the recommendations 
under Article 126(7). Accordingly, the Council 
addressed a new recommendation under Article 
126(7) to Hungary in October 2006, postponing 
the deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit to 2009.  
In June 2009 the Commission assessed that, given 
the results of the fiscal adjustment programme 
since 2006, and specifically, the considerably 
higher-than-recommended structural adjustment 
achieved against the background of a much worse 
macroeconomic environment, the Hungarian 
authorities could be considered to have taken 
effective action in response to the 
recommendations from October 2006. In view of 
the depth of the unexpected adverse economic 
events due to the global financial crisis, however, 
the target date of 2009 set in the Council 
recommendation of 2006 could no longer be 
regarded as realistic. On a recommendation by the 
(4) Member States with a derogation are to avoid excessive 
deficits but in the event of inadequate action established 
under Article 126(8) (ex 126(8)), further recommendations 
can be addressed only on the basis of Article 126(7) (ex 
126(7)) as Articles 126(9) (ex 126(9)) and Article 126(11) 
(ex 126(11)) do not apply to them. 
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Commission, in July 2009 the Council therefore 
issued revised recommendations under Article 
126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 2011 at 
the latest, specifying deficit targets for 2009 and 
2010 and requiring a cumulative fiscal effort of 
0.5% of GDP for the years 2010-2011. In January 
2010, the Commission assessed that Hungary had 
taken effective action. The procedure was 
therefore held in abeyance.  
Latvia 
According to the convergence programme update 
submitted by the Latvian authorities on 14 January 
2009, the general government deficit in Latvia was 
estimated to have reached 3.5% of GDP in 2008 
and was expected to deteriorate further to 5.3% in 
2009. The Commission concluded, based on these 
figures, in its February 2009 report under Article 
126(3) that the deficit criterion in the Treaty was 
not fulfilled. Following negotiations in the context 
of the multilateral Balance of Payments assistance, 
the Council decided in July 2009 that an excessive 
deficit existed in Latvia under Article 126(6). 
Furthermore, the Council issued recommendations 
in accordance with Article 126(7), setting a 
deadline for correction by 2012 and requiring an 
annual average fiscal effort of at least 2¾% of 
GDP over the period 2010-2012. In January 2010 
the Commission assessed that Latvia had taken 
action representing adequate progress towards the 
correction of the excessive deficit within the time 
limits set by the Council. The procedure was 
therefore held in abeyance.  
Lithuania 
In the April 2009 notification the Lithuanian 
authorities estimated the general government 
deficit to have reached 3.2% of GDP in 2008, thus 
exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold. In its May 
2009 Report under Article 126(3), the Commission 
considered that the deficit criterion in the Treaty 
was not fulfilled.  Following a recommendation by 
the Commission, the Council decided in July 2009 
that an excessive deficit existed in Lithuania under 
Article 126(6). Furthermore, the Council issued 
recommendations in accordance with Article 
126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 2011 
and requiring an annual average fiscal effort of at 
least 1½% of GDP over the period 2009-2011.  
In January 2010 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the Lithuanian 
authorities in response to the July 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. On a recommendation by the 
Commission, in February 2010 the Council issued 
revised recommendations for Lithuania in 
accordance with Article 126(7), setting a deadline 
for correction by 2012, requiring a fiscal effort of 
2¼% percentage points of GDP over the period 
2010-2012. After six months time (i.e. after 16 
August 2010 and hence after the cut-off date of 
this report), the Commission will assess whether 
effective action has been taken. 
Poland 
According to the April 2009 EDP notification 
submitted by the Polish authorities, the general 
government deficit reached 3.9% of GDP in 2008, 
thus exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value. In 
its May 2009 Report under Article 126(3), the 
Commission considered that the deficit criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled. Following a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
decided in July 2009 that an excessive deficit 
existed in Poland under Article 126(6). 
Furthermore, the Council issued recommendations 
in accordance with Article 126(7), setting a 
deadline for correction by 2012 and requiring an 
annual average fiscal effort of at least 1¼% of 
GDP starting in 2010. In January 2010 the 
Commission assessed that Poland had taken action 
representing adequate progress towards the 
correction of the excessive deficit within the time 
limits set by the Council. The procedure was 
therefore held in abeyance.  
Romania 
In the April 2009 notification the Romanian 
authorities reported a deficit of 5.4% of GDP for 
2008, breaching the 3% of GDP reference value. In 
its May 2009 report under Article 126(3), the 
Commission considered that the deficit criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled. Following a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
decided in July 2009 that an excessive deficit 
existed in Romania under Article 126(6) and 
issued recommendations in accordance with 
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Article 126(7), setting a deadline for correction by 
2011 and requiring an annual average fiscal effort 
of at least 1½% of GDP starting in 2010.  
In January 2010 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the Romanian 
authorities in response to the July 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. On a recommendation by the 
Commission, in February 2010, the Council 
therefore issued revised recommendations for 
Romania in accordance with Article 126(7), setting 
a deadline for correction by 2012, requiring a 
fiscal effort of 1¾% of GDP over the period 2010-
2012. After six months time (i.e. after 16 August 
2010 and hence after the cut-off date of this 
report), the Commission will assess whether 
effective action has been taken. 
United Kingdom 
According to the data notified by the UK 
authorities in March 2008, the general government 
deficit in the financial year 2008/09 was expected 
to reach 3.2% of GDP (3.3% according to the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast) and 
further deficit-increasing measures were 
announced by the government in May 2008. In its 
June 2008 Report under Article 126(3), the 
Commission considered that the deficit criterion in 
the Treaty was not fulfilled.  
 
                                                          
In July 2008 the Council decided, based on a 
recommendation by the Commission that an 
excessive deficit existed in the United Kingdom, 
according to Article 126(6). The consideration of 
relevant factors did not suggest the presence of 
special circumstances warranting a departure from 
the standard deadline for correcting the deficit. 
Accordingly, the Council decided pursuant to 
Article 126(7) that the headline deficit should be 
brought below the 3% of GDP reference value by 
the financial year 2009/10, corresponding to a 
structural improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP in 
2009/10.  
 
 
In April 2009, the Commission assessed that the 
UK authorities had not taken effective action in 
accordance with Article 126(8) in response to the 
July 2008 Council recommendations. On a 
recommendation by the Commission, the Council 
issued new recommendations in accordance with 
Article 126(7)(5). In the light of the progressively 
acute deterioration in economic conditions and 
prospects the Council decided that special 
circumstances existed in the case of the UK, 
allowing correction over the medium term. 
Therefore, the Council set a new deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit by the financial 
year 2013/14, raising the foreseen average annual 
fiscal effort to clearly beyond 1% of GDP, to begin 
after the expiry of the  stimulus measures planned 
for 2009.  
In November 2009 the Commission assessed that 
effective action had been taken by the UK 
authorities in response to the April 2009 
recommendations, but that since then unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances had 
occurred, justifying an extension of the correction 
deadline. It was recognised that the United 
Kingdom's budgetary situation resulted from the 
implementation of measures amounting to around 
1½% of GDP, which were considered an 
appropriate response to the European Economic 
Recovery Plan, and the free play of automatic 
stabilisers. On a recommendation by the 
Commission, in December 2009 the Council 
issued revised recommendations for the United 
Kingdom in accordance with Article 126(7), 
setting a deadline for correction by the financial 
year 2014/15 and requiring an average annual 
fiscal effort of 1¾% of GDP between 2010/11 and 
2014/15. After six months time (i.e. after 2 June 
2010 and hence after the cut-off date of this 
report), the Commission will assess whether 
effective action has been taken. 
 
(5) Pursuant to point 5 of the Protocol on certain provisions 
relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the obligation in Article 126(1) of the 
Treaty to avoid excessive general government deficits does 
not apply to the United Kingdom unless it moves to the 
third stage of economic and monetary union. While in the 
second stage of economic and monetary union, the United 
Kingdom is required to endeavour to avoid excessive 
deficits, pursuant to Article 116(4) of the Treaty. 
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3. STABILITY AND CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES SET OUT 
THE CONSOLIDATION PLANS OVER THE MEDIUM TERM 
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This section provides an overview of the 2009-
2010 updates of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCP) submitted by Member States 
by March 2010. It first discusses the 
macroeconomic scenarios and assumption on 
sectoral balances presented in the updates, against 
the background of the sharp economic downturn in 
2009. It then examines the time-profile and 
composition of planned consolidations. Finally, it 
shows the medium-term objectives (MTOs) that 
Member States presented for the first time 
according to the new agreement including implicit 
liabilities. At the end of this section, table I.3.3 
provides an overview of the key projections and 
budgetary plans in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes. 
A discussion of the medium-term projections for 
the government debt in a scenario that incorporates 
consolidations plans of the SCPs is presented in 
Section III.2. 
3.1. MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS  
At the aggregate level, economic growth 
assumptions in the programmes turn out to be 
more favourable than indicated by the Commission 
services’ Autumn 2009 Forecast. Graph I.3.1 
illustrates real GDP growth as projected in the 
Commission services’ Autumn 2009 Forecast and 
that in the programmes for the EU27. In 2010, 
growth according to the programmes is projected 
to be 0.3 pp. higher than projected by the 
Commission services, whereas for 2011 the 
difference increases to 0.7 pp. (a similar picture 
arises for the euro area, with differences of 0.3 pp. 
in 2010 and 0.6 pp. in 2011). SCPs also generally 
assume higher potential growth, as illustrated in 
Graph I.3.2. Overall, recalculated potential growth 
in the programmes is around 0.3 pp. higher than in 
the 2009 autumn forecast for the EU27 (0.2 pp. for 
the euro area). 
 
 
 
All this also appears to suggest that the downturn 
and the anticipated recovery in 2010 is considered 
of a slightly more cyclical nature in the 
programmes than in the Autumn 2009 Forecast, 
implying that the programmes have a more 
favourable growth outlook. Moreover, the 
difference is more significant in the outer years of 
the programmes: whereas according to the autumn 
2009 forecast growth for the EU27 is projected to 
exceed potential by ½ pp. in 2011, according to the 
programmes this would be 1 pp. (compared to an 
already higher potential in the programmes than in 
the Autumn Forecast), where it remains throughout 
the programme period. In terms of output gap 
closure, the programmes foresee a change in the 
output gap by almost 1 pp. in 2011, falling 
gradually to slightly above ¾ pp. in 2013 (for the 
EU27 aggregate). On the other hand, the 
Commission services’ Autumn 2009 Forecast 
foresees a reduction of the output gap by only ½ 
pp. in 2011. The difference suggests that 
programmes on average count to a greater extent 
on cyclical conditions to contribute to deficit 
reduction than what was implied by the autumn 
forecast.  
Graph I.3.1: GDP growth assumptions (EU27) 
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Looking at the sectoral balances(6) implied by 
Member States planned consolidation against the 
background of external assumption of the 
programmes’ projections, the aggregate picture 
shows that towards 2008 there was a slight 
deterioration in the EU’s net-lending position (see 
Graph I.3.4). 
Graph I.3.2: Potential GDP growth (EU27) 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
COM SCP
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph I.3.3: Difference in growth assumptions (SCP-COM) in 2011 and its breakdown 
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At country level, differences in the growth 
scenario are illustrated in Graph I.3.3, which also 
decomposes the difference in GDP growth 
between the programme scenarios and the 2009 
autumn forecast into a difference in potential 
growth and a cyclical component (i.e. the 
difference in the growth above/below potential). 
The figure shows that the aggregate picture of 
higher growth in the programmes, based on both 
higher potential growth and higher cyclical 
contributions is broadly shared across Member 
States (although to varying degrees and with some 
notable exceptions). Overall, growth assumptions 
in the programmes often appear favourable and in 
a number of cases even markedly favourable, 
implying also that budgetary outcomes could be 
significantly worse than projected in the 
programmes. 
However, on the aggregate programmes project a 
slow recovery of the net-lending position 
throughout the programme period, on the back of 
growing net exports These generally moderate 
changes hide widely different developments at 
sectoral level, with government deficits increasing 
rapidly towards 2010 (a 7.2% of GDP deficit for 
the EU27), mirrored by the build-up of a 7.7% of 
GDP surplus for non-government sectors 
(reflecting inter alia a rapid slowdown of 
household and corporate investment and reduced 
household consumption). At the aggregate level, 
programme scenarios imply a recovery which is to 
a limited extent supported by growing net exports 
                                                          
(6) The analysis of sectoral balances on the basis of 
programme information is hampered by some 
inconsistencies in the reported data, as well as missing 
compulsory and optional data in the programmes. In 
particular, programmes from some countries did not report 
on the net-lending of the total economy and/or the net-
lending of the private sector. In the absence of information 
on the latter variables, consistency between the net-lending 
of the total economy and the net-lending by government 
could not be verified. The analysis of sectoral balances in 
the programmes is limited to those countries reporting net-
lending of the total economy and assuming that 
‘inconsistencies’ are due to differences in the reporting of 
net-lending by ‘non-government’ sectors.  
European Commission 
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(contributing to aggregate real GDP growth for the 
EU by 0.6 pp. in 2010, gradually slowing down to 
0.3 pp. by 2013) and a fall in the net-lending 
position of non-government sectors towards pre-
crisis levels.  
 
At a country level (and therefore taking also into 
account intra-EU net-lending positions), the 
changes during the downturn and the recovery (as 
projected in the programmes) is illustrated in 
Graph I.3.5 (7) and Graph I.3.6. They show that 
during the downturn the net-lending position of 
several countries improved dramatically (in 
particular for a number of countries with large 
imbalances), often as a result of falling imports 
due to lower domestic demand. On the other hand, 
in the programme period up until 2013, in the 
programme period up until 2013, the counterparts 
of the projected reduction in government deficits 
are: (i) in some cases further improvement in the 
external balance, which, to be consistent with the 
projected growth rates, should be accompanied by 
gains in competiveness and/or expansion of the 
export markets; (ii) more significantly, a 
generalised fall in the net financial position of the 
private sector, which would imply the end of the 
deleveraging process triggered by the crisis. 
Graph I.3.4: Net lending position according to programme 
scenario (EU27) 
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(7) Note that although Graph I.3.5 seems to suggest that the 
net-lending position as percent of GDP at country level 
improved in nearly all Member States (with the exception 
of Germany, Austria, Finland and Sweden), this needs to 
be viewed against the background of (in some cases 
sharply) falling GDP, causing an often significant 
denominator effect.  
Graph I.3.5: Change in net lending by sector (pp. of GDP, 2010 
compared to 2008) 
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Graph I.3.6: Change in net lending by sector (pp. of GDP, 2013 
compared to 2010) 
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3.2. TIME PROFILE OF CONSOLIDATION  
Graph I.3.7 summarises the size and distribution 
over time of changes in the nominal budget 
balance presented in the SCPs for the 2010-2012 
period, or 2010-2013 if the submitted programmes 
have a time horizon going beyond 2012. (8) For 
most countries, the strategy in the programmes is 
aimed at correcting their excessive deficit, as 
shown by many deficit targets in 2012/2013 being 
                                                          
(8) Some programmes present, notably for the outer years, 
projections based on current policies/legislation which 
cannot be necessarily considered as representative of the 
budgetary strategy of the government. 
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The general government deficits in 2009 varied 
                                                          
at or just below the horizontal line marking the 3% 
of GDP threshold. Some countries have however a 
deadline for the correction of their excessive 
deficit that goes beyond 2013 (Ireland the United 
Kingdom), while others (the Czech Republic and 
the Netherlands) should correct the deficit by 2013 
but presented programmes with a horizon limited 
to 2012.(9)  
significantly across Member States: the estimate of 
an average EU deficit at 7% of GDP in 2009 (6.3% 
in the euro area) results from estimated deficit 
figures in the programmes ranging from 12.7% of 
GDP in Greece, to 1.1% of GDP in 
Luxembourg. (10) Graph I.3.7 shows that the 
planned pace of consolidation differs across 
Member States, with countries that posted a deficit 
above the EU average in 2009 typically planning 
In addition to deficit levels, debt levels are a main 
                                                          
(9) The programmes submitted by Ireland and the United 
Kingdom cover the period up to the recommended deadline 
for the correction of their excessive deficits (2014 and 
2014/15, respectively). The Irish programme targets a 
deficit at 2.9% of GDP in 2014, while the UK's programme 
projects a deficit clearly above 3% of GDP in 2014/15 
(4.7% of GDP). 
(10) For several countries, the 2009 deficit outturn notified in 
April 2010 (See figures presented in Section I.1) differed 
significantly from the estimate presented in the SCP. 
to start improving their budget balances, also in 
nominal terms, already in 2010. However, at EU 
level the deficit would continue to increase in 
2010, reaching an average of 7.2% of GDP (6.7% 
in the euro area). Fiscal consolidation is planned to 
start at EU level in 2011, when, according to the 
SCPs, the nominal budget balances would improve 
in all Member States but Luxembourg.(11) A 
comparison of the fiscal adjustment planned over 
2010-2011 with the adjustment planned in the 
outer years of the programmes shows that 
intentions concerning the degree of frontloading of 
the consolidation tend to vary across countries, 
only in part in relation to the initial size of the 
deficit.  
criterion for differentiation across countries.  
Account should also be taken of long-term fiscal 
sustainability aspects, the strength of national 
fiscal frameworks, as well as factors relating to the 
financial situation in the Member States, including 
any imbalances between domestic savings and 
(11) Luxembourg appears as an outlier in the graph as, at no-
policy change, the deficit is projected to rise also in 2011; 
it would gradually decrease afterwards, but remain above 
the 2009 level by the end of the programme horizon. 
Graph I.3.7: Planned changes in government deficits over 2010-2012/13 in the SCPs  (in % of GDP) 
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investments, contingent liabilities to the financial 
sector and financial market indicators. The 
Commission services have developed synthetic 
budgetary and macro-financial risks indicators that 
take these factors into account to underpin the 
objective implementation of broader fiscal 
surveillance and framing judgement.(12)  
 
Graph I.3.8 plots countries in 4 quadrants 
                                                          
according to the two indicators. The size of the 
dots shows the degree of frontloading of the 
consolidation in 2010-2011 with respect to 2012-
2013. Countries which plan a fiscal expansion in 
2010 not completely offset by a consolidation in 
2011 are represented by squares. For Member 
States which submitted a programme with a 
horizon limited to 2012, a decline in the general 
government balance in 2013 equivalent to the one 
planned in 2012 is assumed. (13) Even for 
countries that are recommended to correct their 
excessive deficit in 2012, the assumption of a 
protracted fiscal effort going beyond the 
benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per annum in 
structural terms is consistent with the fiscal exit 
strategy agreed by the Council. 
With the NE quadrant grouping the countries 
combining high fiscal and macro-financial 
vulnerabilities, the graph should present all squares 
                                                          
(12) See section IV.3 for the presentation of the composite risk 
indicators. The budgetary risk indicator aims to get a better 
grasp of actual sovereign financing needs and reflects: the 
level of government debt, the share of debt falling due over 
a 24-month horizon, the implicit interest rate on sovereign 
debt and government contingent liabilities in the financial 
sector, and the gap to the primary balance that would lead 
to debt converging to 60% GDP by 2020. The macro-
financial risks indicator aims to cover risks which, if they 
materialized, would put pressure on the fiscal financing 
needs. It includes: external debt falling due over a 24-
month horizon, the current account balance, credit to the 
private sector, competitiveness, the share of construction in 
GDP, the level of GDP per capita (which is used as a proxy 
of potential growth and catching up, i.e. low GDP level is 
considered as a risk-reducing factor). The indicators are 
selected from a much larger group of potential indicators. 
To the extent possible, overlap was avoided as many 
indicators reflect similar risks. 
All scores are relative to the EU average, implying that 
even low risk scores based on the 2010 data still imply a 
relatively high risk in historical perspective, especially as 
regards fiscal risks. 
(13) The assumption of a reduction in the deficit in 2013 
equivalent to the one planned in 2012 if the programme has 
a horizon limited to 2012 has been applied also the Czech 
Republic and to the Netherlands. However, in their 
programmes these countries restate the commitment to 
correct their excessive deficit in line with the 2013 deadline 
set by the Council. 
as well as smaller dots in the SW quadrant and the 
size of the dots should gradually increase with 
their distance from the (0.0) point. A partial 
correspondence with this ideal picture exists, in 
particular for countries with lower vulnerabilities.  
The distribution of countries in the other quadrants 
is less straightforward. The two countries that plan 
the more frontloaded adjustment are Bulgaria and 
Greece. (14) They are characterised by a similar 
degree of macro-economic risk, but present the 
lowest and the highest fiscal risk indicator, 
respectively. While Greece has to correct its 
excessive deficit by 2012, Bulgaria plans to 
consolidate towards the MTO already in 2010. 
Outside the euro area, the need to correct external 
imbalances tends to accelerate the adjustment. The 
nominal adjustment is particularly frontloaded in 
Member States receiving Balance-of-Payments 
assistance (Hungary, Romania and Latvia). In the 
case of Latvia, this is not reflected in Graph I.3.8, 
as a significant adjustment was implemented 
already in 2009. Furthermore, for Latvia and in 
general for Member States where pre-crisis trend 
in expenditure and revenue growth were 
particularly high, e.g. Ireland, the presented 
characterisation of frontloading only partially 
reflects the policy effectively pursued, as sizeable 
measures are being implemented just to stem a 
further deterioration in the deficit against the 
collapse in revenue brought about by the crisis and 
the need to correct the revealed unsustainable 
expenditure trends. 
 
(14) In the graph, Malta also shows a particularly high degree of 
frontloading. However, this reflects the target to correct the 
excessive deficit by the 2011 deadline, with all the 
necessary nominal adjustment planned to be implemented 
in that year. In the following year, the Maltese's Stability 
programme projects a decline in the nominal deficit by 
only 0.1 of a percent of GDP, to 2.8% of GDP. 
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3.3. COMPOSITION OF CONSOLIDATION (15) 
Economic literature finds that fiscal consolidation 
based on expenditure cuts is more effective and 
has a more long-lasting impact than consolidation 
by tax increases. Tax-based consolidation, 
especially by broadening tax bases and simplifying 
tax systems, can also prove efficient when starting 
tax-to-GDP ratios are relatively low and 
implementation is gradual. The sheer size of the 
consolidation requirements in many EU Member 
States makes it virtually impossible to achieve it 
by a sustainable reduction of expenditures only. 
The appropriate mix between expenditures and 
 
                                                          
(15) Graphs in this section reflect revenue and expenditure 
projections in the programmes. However, the expenditure 
and revenue projections that some programmes present for 
the years beyond 2010 are based on unchanged 
policy/legislation scenarios or technical assumptions, thus 
do not allow grasping the planned distribution of 
consolidation between revenue and expenditure. As data 
for revenue and expenditure beyond 201/11 in the UK's 
Convergence Programme are not based on a harmonised 
ESA95 basis, the figures presented for the UK in the 
graphs have been extrapolated from public sector 
projections.  
revenues depends on the characteristics of the 
country concerned. 
The planned distribution between revenue and 
expenditure based consolidation tends to reflect the 
initial revenue ratio. This is illustrated in Graph 
I.3.9, which plots for each country the planned 
changes in the expenditure ratios with the 
countries' order (from left to right) corresponding 
to the current level of the revenue ratio. Countries 
with relatively high revenue ratios tend to rely on 
expenditure based consolidation: among those 
revenue ratios above 45% of GDP, only France 
and Belgium plan a further increase, while the 
others plan revenue reduction. Greece, Poland, 
Latvia, Ireland and Spain plan the largest increases 
in the revenue ratio, while Estonia plans the largest 
reduction.  
The negative relationship between level and 
changes in revenue is confirmed in Graph I.3.10, 
which plots the current revenue and expenditure 
ratios against the planned rates of change in 
revenue and expenditure, respectively. It also 
shows that countries with the highest deficits 
Graph I.3.8: Degree of frontloading of the adjustment and indicators of fiscal and macro-financial vulnerabilities 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Graph I.3.9: Average annual change in the revenue and expenditure ratios planned over the 2010-2012/2013 period versus the estimated 
revenue and expenditure ratios in 2009 
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(larger squares) tend to have relatively low 
revenue and expenditure ratios. There are several 
explanations for this link between revenue ratios 
and the size of deficits. The size of government 
tends to increase with GDP/capita. Most of the 
Member States with low revenue ratios are 
catching up economies that had the strongest 
credit- and housing-driven booms. As a result, they 
suffered most from (i) a large reduction in output 
and domestic demand (ii) a reversal of revenue 
windfalls related to housing and credit. As a result 
of the reduction in GDP, the expenditure ratio 
strongly increased as expenditure levels need to 
adjust to lower levels of potential output than 
previously estimated. 
A planned change in the expenditure ratio can be 
consistent with different rates of growth of 
nominal expenditure, depending on the assumption 
on nominal GDP growth. Graph I.3.11 shows the 
average change in the nominal expenditure growth 
planned by governments over 2010-2012 (2013 for 
programmes with a horizon going beyond 2012) 
and the nominal GDP growth rates that make these 
changes consistent with the percentage change in 
the expenditure ratios presented in the 
programmes. All Member States except 
Graph I.3.10: Planned changes in revenue and expenditure over 2010-2012/13 in the SCPs  (% of GDP) 
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Graph I.3.11: Average annual planned change in nominal expenditure over the 2010-2012/2013 period versus average annual planned 
change in the expenditure ratios over the same period 
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Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands project a 
reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio over the 
period considered. However, only Lithuania, 
Estonia and Latvia plan to cut expenditure in 
nominal terms. In particular, with a nominal GDP 
in 2012 expected to remain below the 2009 level, 
in the case of Latvia a contraction in expenditure 
in nominal terms is necessary to reduce the 
expenditure ratio. By contrast, a number of 
countries plans to achieve a reduction in 
expenditure consistent with positive changes in 
nominal expenditure, which in some cases are 
significant.  
 
3.4. MEDIUM TERM OBJECTIVES IN THE 2008-
09 AND 2009-10 ROUNDS OF SCPS 
In the 2009-10 stability and convergence 
programmes, MTOs were presented for the first 
time according to the new agreement including 
implicit liabilities, according to the revised criteria 
as set out in the Code of Conduct. Section II.4 
discusses the background to the new MTOs in 
detail.  
Table I.3.1 shows the MTOs presented in the 
2009-10 SCPs and Table I.3.2 presents the 
assessment of compliance in the respective 
Council opinion.  
 
Table I.3.1: MTOs 2009-10 and 2008-09 round of SCPs 
MTO 2009-10 round of 
SCPs
MTO 2008-09 round of 
SCPs
BE 0.5 0.5
BG 0.5 1.5
CZ -1.0 -1.0
DK 0.0 0.75 to 1.75
DE -0.5 -0.5 to 0.0
EE 0.0 0.0
IE -0.5 BP*
EL 0.0 0.0
ES 0.0 0.0
FR 0.0 0.0
IT 0.0 0.0
CY 0.0 0.0
LV -1.0 -1.0
LT 0.5 -1.0
LU 0.5 -0.8
HU -1.5 -0.5
MT 0.0 0.0
NL -0.5 -1.0 to -0.5
AT 0.0 0.0
PL -1.0 -1.0
PT -0.5 -0.5
RO -0.7 -0.9
SI -1.0 -1.0
SK 0.0 -0.8
FI 0.5 2.0
SE 1.0 1.0
UK : :
Source: Commission services 
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Table I.3.2: Assessment of the MTOs in the 2009-2010 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes 
Country MTO Assessment
BE 0.5 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
BG 0.5 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
CZ -1.0 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
DK 0.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact 
DE -1/2 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
EE 0.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
IE -0.5 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
EL 0.0 Is not projected to be attained within the programme horizon
ES 0.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact 
FR 0.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
IT 0.0 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
CY 0.0 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
LV -1.0 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
LT 0.5 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
LU 0.5 Does not appear to take sufficiently into account implicit liabilities
HU -1.5 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
MT 0.0 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
NL -0.5 Adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
AT 0.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
PL -1.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
PT -0.5 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
RO -0.7 Reflects the objectives of the Pact
SI -1.0 Does not appear to take sufficiently into account implicit liabilities
SK 0.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
FI 0.5 Appears to reflect the objectives of the Pact
SE 1.0 More than adequately reflects the objectives of the Pact
UK no MTO n.a.
Source: Commission services 
 
 
 
Table I.3.3: Budgetary developments according to the 2009-2010 Stability and Convergence Programme updates 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012
BE -3.1 1.1 1.7 2.2 -5.9 -4.8 -4.1 -3.0 -3.8 -3.4 -2.9 -2.2 98 101 101 101
DE -5.0 1.4 2 2 -3.2 -5½ -4½ -3½ -1.8 -4.4 -3.9 -3.0 72½ 76½ 79½ 81
IE -7.5 -1.3 3.3 4.5 -11.7 -11.6 -10 -7.2 -9.3 -9.2 -8.2 -6.3 65 78 83 84
EL -1.2 -0.3 1.5 1.9 -12.7 -8.7 -5.6 -2.8 -11.4 -7.7 -4.4 -1.9 113 120 121 118
ES -3.6 -0.3 1.8 2.9 -11.4 -9.8 -7.5 -5.3 -9.9 -7.9 -6.1 -4.6 55 66 72 74
FR -2.25 1.4 2.5 2.5 -7.9 -8.2 -6 -4.6 -6.5 -6.8 -4.9 -4.0 77 83 86 87
IT -4.8 1.1 2.0 2.0 -5.3 -5.0 -3.9 -2.7 -3.8 -3.3 -2.7 -1.9 115 117 117 115
CY -1.7 0.5 1.5 3 -6.1 -6.0 -4.5 -3.4 -5.6 -5.2 -3.6 -2.9 56 61 63 63
LU -3.9 2.5 3 2.7 -1.1 -3.9 -5 -4.6 0.9 -2.2 -3.6 -3.4 15 18 24 29
MT -2 1.1 2.3 2.9 -3.8 -3.9 -2.9 -2.8 -3.2 -3.5 -2.8 -3.3 67 69 68 67
NL -4 1.5 2 2 -4.9 -6.1 -5 -4.5 -3.8 -4.8 -3.9 -3.5 62 67 70 73
AT -3.4 1.5 1.5 1.9 -3.5 -4.7 -4.0 -3.3 -2.7 -3.9 -3.3 -2.7 67 70 73 74
PT -2.7 0.7 0.9 1.3 -9.3 -8.3 -6.6 -4.7 -8.3 -7.5 -5.9 -4.1 77 86 89 91
SI -7.3 0.9 2.5 3.7 -5.7 -5.7 -4.2 -3.1 -4.2 -4.0 -2.8 -2.4 34 40 42 43
SK -5.7 1.9 4.1 5.4 -6.3 -5.5 -4.2 -3 -6.0 -4.7 -3.3 -2.7 37 41 43 42
FI -7.6 0.7 2.4 3.5 -2.2 -3.6 -3.0 -2.3 0.3 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 42 48 52 54
EA-16 (2) -4.0 1.0 2.0 2.3 -6.3 -6.7 -5.3 -3.9 -4.8 -5.3 -4.2 -3.2 79 84 87 87
BG -4.9 0.3 3.8 4.8 -1.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.7 1.9 1.7 1.0 15 15 15 14
CZ -4.0 1.3 2.6 3.8 -6.6 -5.3 -4.8 -4.2 -6.1 -4.1 -3.7 -3.5 35 39 41 42
DK -4.3 1.3 1.6 2 -2.9 -5.3 -4.1 -3.1 1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 39 42 46 48
EE -14.5 -0.1 3.3 3.7 -2.6 -2.2 -2 -1.0 -1.1 -1.5 -0.9 -0.1 8 10 13 14
LV -18 -4.0 2.0 3.8 -10 -8.5 -6 -2.9 -7.6 -5.5 -3.9 -1.8 35 55 59 57
LT -15.0 1.6 3.2 1.2 -9.1 -8.1 -5.8 -3.0 -7.2 -6.8 -4.8 -2.3 30 37 40 41
HU -6.7 -0.3 3.7 3.8 -3.9 -3.8 -2.8 -2.5 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -2.5 78 79 77 74
PL 1.7 3 4.5 4.2 -7.2 -6.9 -5.9 -2.9 -7.0 -6.2 -5.3 -2.3 51 53 56 56
RO -7 1.3 2.4 3.7 -8 -6.3 -4.4 -3 -7.5 -5.2 -3.2 -2.1 23 28 29 30
SE -5.2 0.6 3.1 3.8 -2.2 -3.4 -2.1 -1.1 0.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 43 46 46 45
UK (1) -4¾ 1 to 1½ 3¼ to 3¾ 3¼ to 3¾ -12.6 -12 -9.1 -7.3 -10.7 -10.0 -7.7 -6.6 72.9 82.1 88.0 90.9
EU-27 (2) -4.1 1.1 2.4 2.6 -7.0 -7.2 -5.6 -4.2 -5.4 -5.7 -4.5 -3.5 74 80 82 83
Real GDP growth Government balance Structural balance Government gross debt
(1) Convergence programme and autumn forecast: financial years ending in following March. 
(2) In case of missing programmes: weighted average of the figures for those countries that have submitted a programme. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table I.3.4: Overview of the Council opinions on the SCPs – summary  assessments and policy invitations 
Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that, following the expansion in 2009 in line with the EERP, the budgetary stance turns
restrictive in 2010 and 2011 and more significantly so in 2012. At face value, this should lead to a correction of the
excessive deficit by 2012, in line with the recommendation of 2 December 2009 under Article 126(7) of the TFEU. The
government gross debt-to-GDP ratio, which rose in 2008 as a result of the measures to stabilise the financial system, will
continue its upward movement up to 2011 and start declining again in 2012. This would bring the debt back on a
downward path. However, the budgetary path is subject to some downside risks.
In 2010, potentially optimistic tax estimates may lead to a somewhat higher deficit and may call for additional measures
to be taken in the context of the foreseen budget control exercises. As from 2011, the main risk relates to the fact that the
measures underpinning the target for 2011 are only partly specified and there are no measures specified for 2012. In
addition, the slightly favourable macroeconomic assumptions combined with an average annual fiscal effort that is
somewhat below the ¾% of GDP recommended by the Council, pose further downward risks to the targets.
The Belgian government however committed in the programme to take the necessary exceptional measures if economic
growth is insufficient to achieve the 3% of GDP deficit target in 2012, which may indeed be needed. The adjustment
could also benefit from a stronger focus on expenditure restraint. Finally, while the programme announces a number of
improvements to the fiscal framework, more needs to be done to support the consolidation effort, in particular as regards
the introduction of enforceable, multi-annual expenditure ceilings.
Policy Invitations:
Ensure that the 2010 deficit target of the programme is met; specify the measures underlying the budgetary targets from
2011 onwards in order to achieve the recommended average annual fiscal effort of ¾% of GDP in line with the Article
126(7) Recommendation; and stand ready to strengthen the fiscal effort in case risks related to the fact that the
programme scenario is more favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise;
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation any opportunity beyond the fiscal efforts, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference value.
Ensure high primary surpluses over the medium term and undertake structural reforms in order to improve the long-term
sustainability of public finances.
Improve the quality of public finances by adopting a more stringent budgetary framework, encompassing the creation of
enforceable, multi-annual expenditure ceilings.
Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the programme's aim to maintain a sound budgetary position, reflected in planned general
government balanced budgets, is considered adequate at the current economic juncture and in view of the need to contain
the economy's external imbalances. The undertaken consolidation measures and the strong political commitment to fiscal
discipline are expected to partially compensate the risks stemming from the slightly favourable assumptions on growth
and revenue collection. In the short- to medium-term the programme foresees ambitious structural reforms that aim to
strengthen the sustainability of public finances and at the same time to underpin the economic recovery. Subject to the
downside risks from the still high uncertainty in the external environment, the budgetary stance would imply that the
medium term objective of ½% of GDP, although more than adequately reflecting the objectives of the Pact, would be
At the same time keeping tight fiscal policy and restricting wage development in line with productivity growth is 
warranted from the need to enhance competitiveness and correct the external imbalances. In the long-run, improving the 
quality and sustainability of public finances requires vigorous implementation of the planned and long-delayed structural 
reforms and strengthening the administrative capacity.
Policy Invitations:
Strengthen the efficiency of public spending by vigorously implementing the planned structural reforms in the area of
public administration, healthcare, education, and pensions in order to boost productivity and ensure sustainable
convergence within the European Union
CZ Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the budgetary strategy of the Czech Republic for 2010 is appropriate and in line with the
Council Recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The fiscal strategy for the following years lacks ambition and
fiscal targets are subject to risks both on the revenue and expenditure side. In particular, the expenditure targets are not
backed up by specific measures from 2011 on and the favourable macro-economic assumptions put some doubt on the
revenue projections for 2012. Moreover, while the target date for bringing the government deficit below 3% of GDP
(2013) is in line with the Council Recommendation it is not possible to fully assess the budgetary strategy as the 
Therefore, more information on the broad strategy underpinning the correction of the excessive deficit, including in
particular 2013, would be welcome. With respect to the fiscal framework, there are noticeable weaknesses in several
areas, in particular in budgetary procedures, enforcement of the medium-term budgetary framework. Furthermore, the
long-term budgetary impact of ageing is clearly above the EU average which remains a concern for long-term
sustainability of public finances and points to the need for reforms in the areas of pensions and healthcare.
BE
BG
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Policy Invitations:
Implement the 2010 budget rigorously and avoid expenditure slippages; in line with the Council Recommendation under
Article 126(7), target, in the context of the 2011 and 2012 budgets, a larger budgetary adjustment than the one planned in
the programme and specify in more detail the measures that are necessary to correct the excessive deficit by 2013 at the 
Implement the necessary reforms in order to improve the long-term sustainability of public finances.
Take action to improve budgetary procedures and to enforce and monitor more rigorously the medium-term budgetary
targets; in particular, avoid upward revisions of expenditure ceilings beyond the revisions permitted by the budgetary
rules.
DK Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that that the severe economic crisis has substantially affected public finances. The programme's
projections, based on current policies, indicate that the general government deficit will exceed the 3%-of-GDP reference
value from 2010 to 2012. Whereas the projected consolidation path foresees that the MTO of a structurally balanced
budget would be reached by the end of the programme period in 2015, the structural balance, as recalculated by the
Commission services' using the commonly agreed method, is projected to be slightly negative.
Taking also account of the downside risks attached to these projections, it would be desirable that the government
specifies the consolidation measures to be taken.
Policy Invitations:
Reinforce efforts ensuring that the planned breach of the 3%-of-GDP reference value would remain contained as well as
to swiftly correct the projected excess of the deficit over the reference value; and to specify the measures to underpin
fiscal consolidation for the MTO to be reached by 2015 as planned.
DE Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that in the wake of the financial and economic crisis, Germany's public finances have
deteriorated substantially on the back of automatic stabilisers and a wide ranging response in line with the EERP to
counter the crisis. The envisaged expenditure-based consolidation from 2011 onwards would lead to a correction of the
excessive deficit by 2013.
However, taking into account the risks, the budgetary strategy from 2011 on may not be consistent with the Council
Recommendation under Article 126(7) of 2 December 2009. This is linked to the lack of specific measures underpinning
the proposed retrenchment path after 2010, uncertainty as to the implementation of further tax cuts envisaged in the new
government's coalition agreement and their reconciliation with the necessary consolidation, risks related to the strength
of the economic recovery and the possible need of further financial market stabilisation measures.
Policy Invitations:
Specify the measures necessary to underpin the envisaged consolidation, implement the budgetary strategy for 2011-
2013 as outlined in the programme to correct the excessive deficit by 2013.
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation, any opportunity beyond the fiscal efforts, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio back towards the 60% of GDP reference value.
Ensure full implementation of the new constitutional budgetary rule at all levels of government, and reverse the deviation
from the pension adjustment formula in 2008 as envisaged.
EE Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that Estonia implemented a decisive consolidation of public finances in 2009 against a
significant deterioration of the economic situation, contributing to the ongoing adjustment in the economy and aimed at
supporting a smooth participation in ERM II, while striving to avoid an excessive deficit situation. The economy is
currently emerging from a severe recession, while average growth is projected to remain considerably lower over the
medium term than in the upswing and peak years of the recent cycle. The consolidation implemented in 2009 already
constitutes a major adjustment of public finances to the expected lower growth in the medium term. However, achieving
stricter expenditure control and improving the medium-term budgetary framework remain work-in-progress. The
programme targets a gradual decline in the general government headline deficit from 2010, reaching a surplus position in
line with the MTO by the end of the programme period, although these budgetary outcomes are subject to downside risks
in the short and medium term.
Policy Invitations:
Ensure that the general government deficit remains below 3 % of GDP and take the necessary measures to underpin the
targeted return to the MTO in the medium term.
Strengthen the medium-term budgetary framework, particularly by improving expenditure planning, and further
strengthen the system of monitoring the strategic targets and reporting on them.
IE Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that Ireland responded swiftly and with determination to counter the widening of the
government deficit. In spite of this, and due to the severe recession, the general government deficit widened further in
2009 but is planned in the programme to stabilise in 2010, at 11.6% of GDP. From 2011 onwards, the programme
envisages a reduction of the deficit to below the 3% of GDP reference value by 2014, the deadline for the correction of
the excessive deficit set by the Council. Debt would peak at around 84% of GDP in 2012 and then decline mildly. The
budgetary outcomes could be worse than targeted throughout the programme period, mainly due to 
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(i) the fact that the consolidation efforts planned after 2010 are not underpinned by broad measures and are stated to be
subject to review in the context of future budgets;
(ii) the programme's favourable macroeconomic outlook after 2010; and 
(iii) the risk of expenditure overruns in 2010 and also beyond, to the extent that the still to be spelled out strategy should
rely on expenditure restraint. This, together with the likely need for further support measures for the financial sector,
implies that also the debt ratio could turn out higher than planned in the programme. While the significant size of the
savings package for 2010 is broadly in line with the Council recommendation issued on 2 December 2009, it will be
important to address the above-mentioned risks, by spelling out the measures underlying the consolidation strategy and
adopting additional consolidation measures if growth turns out weaker than projected in the programme or if the risk of
expenditure slippages materialises.
Building on the significant efforts already made, implementing a credible fiscal consolidation strategy, which should be
facilitated by a stronger budgetary framework, should foster a return to sustainable economic growth. To help achieve
this, there is also a need to regain competitiveness through measures enhancing productivity growth and adequate wage
policies, and to support the re- and up-skilling of the newly-unemployed to prevent them from turning into long-term
unemployed. With a view to improving the long-term sustainability of public finances, further reforms to the pension
system will be important in addition to the fiscal consolidation efforts. These reforms could usefully build on the March
2010 National Pensions Framework.
Policy Invitations:
Rigorously implement the budget for 2010 and back up the envisaged consolidation packages for the following years
with concrete measures within a broad-based consolidation strategy in order to achieve the recommended average fiscal
effort of 2% of GDP in line with the Article 126(7) Recommendation, while standing ready to adopt further
consolidation measures in case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the programme is more
favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise;
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation, any opportunities beyond the fiscal efforts, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference value;
In view of the significant projected increase in age-related expenditure, and also of the further increase in debt expected
over the programme period, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by implementing further pension
reform measures;
To limit risks to the adjustment, strengthen the enforceable nature of its medium-term budgetary framework, as well as
closely monitor adherence to the budgetary targets throughout the year;
EL Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the programme displays an appropriate degree of ambition given the sheer size of the
consolidation need and is frontloaded. The fiscal consolidation in 2010 focuses more on public revenue enhancement and
to a lesser extent, on public spending retrenchment, while the composition of the fiscal adjustment is planned to be more
balanced between revenues and expenditures in the outer years. The programme presents a package of concrete fiscal
consolidation measures for 2010, providing also the estimated quantification of each one of the measures included, as
well as the timeframe of their adoption and implementation. Some of these measures have already been submitted to
Parliament and are to be implemented shortly. However, the plans for 2011, 2012 and 2013 are much less detailed. The
programme provides a wide range of budgetary measures and structural reforms in order to address the structural
imbalances of the Greek economy and to reverse the upward trend of public debt. Potential delays in rigorously
implementing these measures remain a source of risk.
Moreover, the budgetary strategy is also subject to significant downside risks, with the growth assumptions underlying
the central macroeconomic scenario of the programme being favourable.
In particular, general government expenditure by function and information on debt developments and the components of
stock-flow adjustment (differences between cash and accruals, net accumulation of financial assets, valuation effects and
other), liquid financial assets and net financial debts are not provided.
Consolidation relies also, on the results from the improvement of the tax collection mechanism, widening of the tax base
and increase of tax compliance. The proceeds from the fight against tax evasion constitute a large component of the
overall consolidation effort in 2010 and are subject to large risks. Given the several risks bearing on budgetary
implementation, ensuring the fiscal consolidation path by implementing promptly and rigorously the measures presented
in the stability programme and standing ready to adopt sufficient additional measures, appears necessary. In addition, the
structural nature of the factors underlying competitiveness losses and the widening external imbalances urgently requires
the prompt implementation of bold structural reforms, including the ones presented in the programme. In the long term,
the level of debt which remains among the highest in the EU, coupled with the projected increase in age-related
spending, affects negatively the long-term sustainability of public finances.
Policy Invitations:
The Council is also addressing to the Hellenic Republic a recommendation under Article 121(4) and a notice to take
action under Article 126(9) on 16 February 2010.
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ES Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the current crisis is severely impacting on the Spanish public finances, with a very high
deficit estimated for 2009 and a rapidly-rising government debt ratio. The stability programme update aims at sizeable
continued fiscal consolidation from 2010 on with a view to reducing the government deficit to 3% of GDP by 2013.
Fiscal consolidation is essential, as mounting fiscal deficits and debt might damage sustained economic growth in the
medium term. In addition, improving long-term fiscal sustainability should be a priority also in the light of the projected
high rise in age-related public expenditure.
Yet achieving the ambitious consolidation path may require additional efforts, notably in the light of the markedly
favourable macroeconomic assumptions and the subsequent risk of a lower-than-assumed contribution of economic
growth to fiscal consolidation, and the revenue performance in the outer years of the programme that might be difficult to
attain. At the same time, the adjustment path is not fully backed up with concrete measures for the years beyond 2010. A
functioning budgetary framework, including the regulation of the relations between the different levels of the general
government sector, is an essential instrument to support the achievement of the ambitious consolidation plans against a
setting of high fiscal decentralisation. In addition, further fostering the quality of public finances is important also with a
view to underpinning a smooth adjustment of the economy in the light of the need to continue the adjustment of the
existing macroeconomic imbalances, in particular the external imbalance, notably by lifting potential GDP, fostering
employment creation and boosting productivity and competitiveness.
Policy Invitations:
Implement with rigour the ambitious fiscal plans envisaged in the programme so as to correct the excessive deficit by
2013, backing it up with concrete measures in the years beyond 2010, and stand ready to adopt further consolidation
measures in case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the programme is more favourable than the
scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise;
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation any further opportunity beyond the fiscal efforts, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference value.
In view of the projected increase in age-related expenditure and the rapid rise of the government debt ratio, improve the
long-term sustainability of public finances also by implementing reforms to the old-age pension scheme as proposed by
the Government;
Ensure that the budgetary framework effectively supports the achievement of the outlined medium-term fiscal plans at all
levels of the general government sector, and closely monitor adherence to the budgetary targets throughout the year;
ensure that fiscal consolidation measures are also geared towards continuing the improvement of the quality of the public
finances in the light of the need for further adjustment of existing macroeconomic imbalances;
FR Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that after a significant deterioration of public finances in 2009 triggered by the economic
downturn and measures taken in the context of the EERP, the general government deficit for 2010 is expected to further
increase to 8.2% of GDP. Consolidation measures and the partial phasing out of measures in line with the EERP would
be compensated by further deficit increasing measures with mostly short term costs, including public investment
stemming from a public loan. The budget balance would improve thereafter. The debt ratio is also expected to increase
substantially over the programme horizon. The adjustment path presented in the programme leads to a deficit of 3% of
GDP in 2013 without a safety margin and is based on a markedly favourable macroeconomic scenario from 2011 to 2013
combined with an average annual structural adjustment that is somewhat below the adjustment recommended by the
Council of above 1% of GDP. 
It foresees measures, mostly on the expenditure side, supporting the consolidation strategy, although they are not
specified in the programme and will be identified in the forthcoming months. The budgetary projections are therefore
subject to substantial downside risks and the fiscal consolidation may need to be strengthened accordingly to ensure a
correction of the excessive deficit by 2013. Ensuring higher primary surpluses over the medium term would contribute to
reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. The programme indicates that a reform of the pension system will
be presented in 2010.
Policy Invitations:
Use, throughout the programme period, windfalls related to an improvement of the macro-economic and fiscal outlook,
as well as the implementation of all envisaged tax measures to accelerate the deficit reduction and the decline of the
gross debt ratio back towards the 60% of GDP reference value; stand ready to adopt further consolidation measures, in
case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the programme is more favourable than the scenario
underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise, and further specify the measures necessary to ensure an
average annual fiscal effort of above 1% of GDP over the period 2010  2013 and to achieve a correction of the
excessive deficit by 2013.
Ensure that the budgetary framework is reinforced, in particular on the expenditure side, and effectively supports the
achievement of the outlined medium-term fiscal plans at all sub-government levels, as planned by the French
government;
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IT Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the programme projects the deficit to narrow slightly, to 5% of GDP in 2010, from 5.3% in
2009, thanks to the expenditure-based adjustment adopted in summer 2008 and confirmed by the 2010 budget.
Thereafter, the deficit ratio is planned to decline to below 3% by 2012, the deadline set by the Council for the correction
of the excessive deficit. The strategy is based on (i) the further implementation of the expenditure-based adjustment for
the period 2009-2011 adopted in summer 2008; and (ii) an additional consolidation effort amounting to 0.4 pp. of GDP
in 2011 and further 0.8 pp. in 2012, which is however not underpinned by broad measures. The gross debt ratio is set to
increase from just above 115% of GDP in 2009 to around 117% of GDP in 2010. Thereafter, it is projected to fall
towards 114.6% of GDP in 2012, consistent with the planned budgetary targets and economic growth assumptions.
However, the deficit  and debt ratios could be higher than targeted. 
Overall, the programme's macroeconomic assumptions appear favourable. In addition, beyond the lack of broad
measures underpinning the planned additional consolidation efforts, achieving the trend projections will be very
challenging as they already envisage a very significant degree of expenditure restraint. In this context, the track record
indicates that expenditure overruns cannot be ruled out. A major challenge for fiscal governance is the implementation of
the budgetary process reform and of rules governing fiscal federalism in such a way to improve the accountability of
local governments and ensure fiscal discipline. Besides fiscal consolidation, which is a condition to keep public finances
on a sustainable path in view also of the very high debt ratio, a further key challenge for Italy's economic policy in the
coming years will be to foster a swift and durable recovery in productivity growth so as to restore competitiveness and
raise the country's low potential GDP growth.
Policy Invitations:
Rigorously implement the planned budgetary adjustment, in particular carry out the fiscal consolidation in 2010 as
planned and back up the planned consolidation for 2011 and 2012 with concrete measures, standing ready to adopt the
required consolidation measures in case the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation
materialises;
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation, any opportunity beyond the fiscal efforts, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference value;
Ensure that the implementation of the reform of the budgetary process improves the conditions for expenditure control
and helps sustain the objective of sound public finances and that the rules governing fiscal federalism improve the
accountability of local governments and foster efficiency
CY Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that Cyprus' public finances deteriorated significantly as a result of the economic downturn and
an expansionary fiscal stance due to the adoption of significant stimulus measures in line with the EERP. As a result, the
budgetary balance turned to a deficit of 6.1% of GDP in 2009 from a surplus of 0.9% of GDP in 2008. The programme
outlines a consolidation path starting in 2010 which aims to bring the general government balance below the 3% of GDP
reference value by 2013. However, the adjustment is planned to be achieved mainly from the revenue side of the budget
while the expenditure-to-GDP ratio remains at historically high levels. Moreover, against the background of a frail global
economic recovery, the budgetary strategy is subject to significant downside risks, as the growth assumptions underlying
the macroeconomic scenario of the programme are favourable. 
In the light of the high domestic and external imbalances, maintaining prudent policies and strengthening fiscal
sustainability should be a priority. Therefore, controlling current expenditure through the implementation of an effective
multi-annual budgetary framework would be an essential instrument to support the achievement of the consolidation
plans and budgetary targets. In addition, fostering the quality of public finances is important also with a view to
underpinning a smooth adjustment of the economy in the light of the imbalances it is faced with, notably by lifting
potential GDP, enhancing competitiveness and further narrowing the external imbalance.
Policy Invitations:
Limit the 2010 deficit to at most 6% of GDP, if necessary by reinforcing the consolidation measures, notably in case
macroeconomic developments proves less favourable than the programme scenario, and take timely action to define a
more expenditure-driven consolidation strategy; seize opportunities beyond the announced fiscal effort to accelerate
fiscal consolidation and the reduction of the gross debt ratio back below the reference value; 
Implement, as envisaged, an effective multi-annual budgetary framework in order to ensure the adherence to the
budgetary targets and to firmly contain expenditure over the medium-term.
LV Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that Latvia is undertaking a significant fiscal consolidation and economic adjustment in line
with the Council recommendations, supported by the adoption of a 2010 budget based on high-quality measures, wide-
ranging reforms in the public sector, an improved absorption of EU structural funds, targeted labour market policies, and
action to strengthen the financial sector. Looking forward, risks pertain to the size of the remaining adjustment in the
context of a sluggish economy, uncertainty on future revenue trends and on the measures which should back the
consolidation, and the scope of the reforms which still need to be undertaken to underpin a sustainable recovery. Further
improvements in the budget framework could facilitate the identification and implementation of the necessary measures,
reducing the risk that the budgetary outcome is worse than planned.  
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Policy Invitations:
Fully implement the 2010 budget as adopted on 1 December 2009; prepare a menu of budgetary options producing
savings or additional revenues allowing the adoption of a 2011 budget in accordance with the consolidation needs; adopt
a 2012 budget also consistent with the targeted fiscal path, in line with the Council Recommendation under Article
104(7)
Carry out the thorough and forward-looking analysis needed for a wide-ranging social benefits reform, with a view to
implement such a reform in the course of 2011 together with further measures on the revenue side; improve fiscal
governance and transparency, inter alia by adopting the draft fiscal discipline law, by strengthening the binding nature of
the medium-term budgetary framework, and by putting in place effective sanction procedures for individuals' misuses of
public funds; strengthen control, coordination and sanction mechanisms aiming at tackling the grey economy; foster
economic growth by promoting the shift towards the tradeable sector and productivity improvements, including by
ensuring that the available EU structural funds reach the real economy, and restructuring state-owned banks in a timely
manner, within a medium-term strategy.
LT Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that Lithuania implemented a decisive consolidation of public finances in 2009 against a
significant deterioration of the economic situation, contributing to the ongoing adjustment in the economy and supporting
smooth participation in ERM II and the correction of the excessive deficit. The economy is currently emerging from a
severe recession, while average growth is projected to remain considerably lower over the medium term than in the peak
years of the recent cycle. The consolidation implemented in 2009 already constitutes a major adjustment of public
finances to the expected lower growth in the medium term. Stricter expenditure control and a strengthened medium-term
budgetary framework would support the needed further consolidation.
The programme targets a gradual decline in the general government headline deficit from 2010, aiming at the correction
of the excessive deficit by 2012 as recommended by the Council, although these budgetary outcomes are subject to
downside risks over the whole programme period.
Policy Invitations:
Consider additional corrective measures in 2010 if necessary to achieve the envisaged consolidation, in addition to
implementing rigorously those planned in the budget; specify the necessary measures to underpin fully the required
adjustment over the programme period recommended by the Council under Article 126(7), and stand ready to adopt
further consolidation measures in case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the programme is
more favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise;
Implement planned social security system reforms, including pension reform, so as to reduce the high risks to long-term
sustainability of public finances due to significant projected increases of pension expenditure during the coming decades;
Strengthen fiscal governance and transparency, by enhancing the medium-term budgetary framework and improving
reporting of budgetary data, ensuring comparability of the budgetary indicators on cash and accrual bases;
LU Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that that in view of the downturn and the sound budgetary starting position of Luxembourg the
temporary deterioration in the general government balance in 2009 and 2010 partly reflecting the adoption of stimulus
measures is appropriate. However, from 2011 the fiscal stance as shown in the programme's "unchanged policy scenario"
cannot be considered in line with the requirements of the Pact, as the government deficit would remain above 3% of
GDP until 2014; there would thus be no consolidation effort to ensure that the deficit is brought below 3% of GDP and
progress towards the MTO would not be adequate either. While the authorities indicate their intention to follow a more
ambitious consolidation path with a view to bringing public finances back to balance in 2014 and to achieve the medium-
term objective in the following years, this adjustment path cannot be properly assessed in the absence of any information
including the underlying measures.
More information on these measures would thus be welcome. Concerns remain about the long-term sustainability of
public finance, which will have to bear a very heavy burden in the coming decades as the increase in age-related public
expenditure is projected to be among the strongest in the whole EU.
Policy Invitations:
Start fiscal consolidation as from 2011 with a view to bringing the deficit below the 3% of GDP threshold and thereafter
progressing towards the MTO and specify to this effect the measures that will be needed to achieve this consolidation;
In view of the significant projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the longterm sustainability of public
finances by reforming the pension system and set a MTO that takes sufficiently into account the implicit liabilities related
to ageing.
HU Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that despite the sharp economic contraction in 2009 in the context of the financial crisis, the
budget deficit was stabilised. Following the strongly restrictive fiscal stance in 2009 and the previous two years, the
budgetary stance in Hungary turns broadly neutral in 2010 and 2011 and expansionary in 2012. According to the
programme, this should lead to a correction of the excessive deficit by 2011 and attaining the MTO. 
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The government gross debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to continue its upward movement up to 2010 and start declining
again in 2011, bringing the debt back on a downward path. In particular, the compulsory information on the nominal
effective exchange rate is missing as well as optional data including on general government expenditure by function and
the breakdown of stock-flow adjustments. However, the budgetary path only foresees a small structural improvement in
2010, none in 2011, and a deterioration in 2012. Moreover, this path is subject to considerable downside risks, especially
in the outer years. In 2010, the elimination of the property tax and the downward risks notably linked to the additional
financing need of the public transport could be compensated to some extent by the freezing of budgetary reserves and
contingency expenditure cuts of 0.2% of GDP. 
Regarding the outer years, risks are linked to the fact the macroeconomic scenario presented in the programme is slightly
favourable and that the bulk of the measures underlying the budgetary path is unspecified and not adopted. Against this
background, the correction of the excessive deficit in 2011 in line with the recommendation of 7 July 2009 under Article
104(7) of the TEC and the subsequent further consolidation is not ensured and it will be necessary to specify the savings
measures and strengthen the consolidation efforts from 2011. The programme presents the main elements of the new
fiscal framework; however, enhanced compliance needs to be ensured.
Policy Invitations:
Ensure that the 3.8% of GDP deficit target for 2010 is achieved through tight expenditure control as well as through a
possible freezing of budgetary reserves and the implementation of contingency expenditure cuts if needed; specify the
measures underlying the budgetary targets from 2011 onwards and stand ready to strengthen the fiscal effort in case risks
related to the fact that the programme scenario is more favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 104(7) TEC
Recommendation materialise to ensure that the deficit is brought below 3% of GDP in 2011; and considerably strengthen
the strategy for 2012 to ensure an adjustment towards the MTO in line with the requirements of Stability and Growth
Pact;
Improve the quality of public finances by preparing and adopting a 2011 budget in full compliance with the fiscal
framework and by supporting expenditure moderation through a further reform of public administration and by
addressing the situation of loss-making enterprises through structural reforms;
MT Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that, according to the programme, the general government deficit ratio is targeted to broadly
stabilise in 2010 (at 3.9% of GDP), followed by a return to just below the 3% of GDP reference value in 2011, the
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit set by the Council. In 2012, the final year covered by the programme,
the deficit ratio is again planned to broadly stabilise instead of making progress towards Malta’s medium-term objective
of a balanced position in structural terms. Gross government debt would peak at almost 69% of GDP in 2010 and
thereafter decline marginally. The deficit and debt ratios could be higher than planned throughout the programme period,
mainly due to
(i) assumed tax buoyancy and, especially after 2010, a favourable macroeconomic scenario and
(ii) possible expenditure overruns given recent slippages, the scale of the envisaged retrenchment and the lack of
information on concrete measures underpinning the targeted cut in the spending ratio over the programme period. 
While the deficit target for 2010 set in the budget has been confirmed, as recommended by the Council, it will be
important to address these risks, by spelling out the concrete measures underlying the strategy and adopting additional
consolidation measures if economic growth or revenue increases turn out lower than projected in the programme or if the
risk of expenditure slippages materialises. Furthermore, the envisaged strategy for 2012 should be strengthened
considerably to be in line with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition to achieving a sound
budgetary position and improving long-term sustainability through further reforms to curb the projected rise in age-
related expenditure, Malta faces the challenge of strengthening competitiveness to improve the economy's resilience to
future external shocks. This will require implementing productivity-enhancing measures and promoting an efficient wage
setting process that allows a close link between wage and productivity developments.
Policy Invitations:
Achieve the 2010 deficit target of 3.9% of GDP, if necessary by adopting additional consolidation measures; back up the
strategy to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP in 2011 with concrete measures while standing ready to adopt further
consolidation measures in case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the programme is more
favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise; and considerably strengthen
the strategy for 2012 to ensure an adjustment towards the MTO in line with the requirements of the Stability and Growth
Pact;
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation, any opportunity beyond the fiscal efforts, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference value;
In view of the significant projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public
finances by implementing further reforms of the social security system;
Strengthen the binding nature of the medium-term budgetary framework and improve the monitoring of budget execution
throughout the year, and enhance the efficiency of public spending, especially in the area of health.
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NL Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the Netherlands is hit hard by the crisis, resulting in a sharp deterioration of the budget
balance in 2009, which turned from a surplus of 0.7% of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of 4.9% of GDP, triggering the
excessive deficit procedure. For 2010, a further deterioration is expected, most importantly due to various lagged effects,
like increasing unemployment. The subsequent withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus and a consolidation package should
improve the budget balance in 2011. For 2012, the improvement in the budget comes from cyclical conditions following
the no-policy change scenario. The debt ratio, which breached the 60% Treaty reference value in 2009, is expected to
increase substantially over the programme horizon. The adjustment path presented in the programme is subject to
downside risks and would benefit from a strengthened consolidation beyond 2011. The main risks are related to the
favourable macroeconomic assumptions combined with an annual fiscal effort that is a narrow ¾% of GDP, which was
recommended by the Council. 
The programme includes a commitment to take additional policy measures in order to meet the 2013 deadline. However,
as 2013 is not covered by the programme, it is not possible to fully assess the budgetary strategy. Therefore, more
information on the broad strategy underpinning the correction of the excessive deficit, including in particular 2013,
would be welcome. Ensuring higher primary surpluses over the medium term and implementing reform measures that
curb the projected increase in age-related expenditure would contribute to reducing high risks to the sustainability of
public finances. The recently proposed pension reform would be considered as an important first step, if adopted.
Policy Invitations:
In the context of the fundamental budget review, specify the measures supporting the consolidation from 2011 and
especially in the following years, further strengthen the consolidation effort to secure the required average annual fiscal
effort to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP by 2013, and throughout the programme period use windfalls related to an
improvement of the macro-economic and fiscal outlook to accelerate the deficit reduction and the decline of the gross 
Further improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by implementing structural reforms that curb the
projected increase in age-related expenditure;
AT Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that in the wake of the financial and economic crisis the situation of Austria's public finances
deteriorated significantly as a result of the operation of automatic stabilisers and a sizeable stimulus package adopted by
the government. As the bulk of the measures aimed at combating the downturn are of permanent nature, there is a need to
introduce consolidation measures as from 2011. The budgetary strategy set out in the programme for 2010 is consistent
with the Council recommendation of 2 December 2009. However, the budgetary strategy for the years 2011-2013 may
not be consistent with the recommendation.
The programme does outline a consolidation path on the expenditure side starting in 2011, but it still needs to be
underpinned by concrete measures. Many significant reforms to public expenditure have been undertaken in Austria in
the recent past. However, there is still room for improvement in areas such as health care and education. Substantial
efficiency gains in these areas could be obtained by reforming the fiscal relations between the various layers of
government.
Policy Invitations:
Substantiate the measures deemed necessary to underpin the planned consolidation from 2011 onwards, in order to
achieve the recommended average annual fiscal effort of ¾% of GDP and bring the general government deficit below
the 3% of GDP reference value by 2013;
Seize, as prescribed in the EDP recommendation, any opportunities beyond the fiscal effort, including from better
economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio back towards the 60% of GDP reference value;
Further improve the budgetary framework to strengthen fiscal discipline at all levels of government through enhanced
transparency and accountability notably by aligning legislative, administrative and financing responsibilities between the
different levels of government and by strengthening enforcement mechanisms under the internal stability pact;
PL Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that while Poland is planning to correct its excessive deficit by 2012 in line with the Council
recommendation under the excessive deficit procedure, the fiscal adjustment is considerably backloaded, most of the
deficit reduction being projected to take place in 2012, and deficit targets in the programme are subject to significant
downside risks, both on the revenue and expenditure side. In view of the recovery projected by the authorities from 2010
and the large structural government deficit a more frontloaded fiscal consolidation strategy would be appropriate. 
Risks to fiscal targets reflect favourable real GDP growth assumptions, the lack of sizeable sufficiently concrete
measures in support of fiscal targets from 2011 on, a history of current expenditure slippages compared to plans and
impact of the electoral cycle. Intentions to strengthen the fiscal framework, in particular backed by expenditure rules, are
welcome. With respect to the "temporary" expenditure rule a higher degree of ambition would be appropriate, notably in
terms of the share of government finances covered by the rule.
Policy Invitations:
Implement the 2010 budget rigorously, under-executing primary current expenditure plans wherever possible and
allocating windfall revenue to deficit reduction; 
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Strengthen the planned budgetary adjustment in 2011 in order to achieve the recommended average annual fiscal effort
of 1¼ % of GDP in line with the Article 104 (7) Recommendation and stand ready to adopt further consolidation
measures in 2011 and 2012 in case risks related to the fact that the programme scenario is more favourable than the
scenario underpinning the recommendation under Article 104(7) TEC materialise;
Proceed with strengthening the fiscal framework, including through introduction of an expenditure rule covering a larger
share of the general government primary expenditure than the "temporary" rule presented in the Convergence
Programme, with appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. This would require to reduce the share o
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f
statutory spending in total expenditures;
PT Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the current crisis impact on Portuguese public finances is severe. Yet the actual budgetary
situation reflects also prior fiscal weaknesses, notably high – even if declining structural deficits before the crisis. The
stability programme update aims at achieving a government deficit below 3% of GDP by 2013 through fiscal
consolidation over the entire period, leading to a stabilisation of the debt ratio at around 90% of GDP in 2012-2013. The
consolidation efforts are back loaded as they are concentrated in 2011 and beyond. Fiscal consolidation is essential as
mounting fiscal deficits and debt are likely to damage medium-term economic growth which is already exposed to
negative feedback effects from the large external debt on domestic income. 
Achieving the ambitious fiscal consolidation path may require efforts beyond those outlined in the programme. First, the
outlined revenue performance and expenditure containment may be difficult to attain on the basis of the announced
measures, already in 2010. Second, there is the risk that a lower-than-assumed GDP growth would dampen revenue
growth and jeopardise the fall in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio over the coming years envisaged in the programme,
endangering the planned fiscal consolidation path. In such a context, a functioning medium-term budgetary framework is
an essential instrument to contain the risks to the budgetary targets, in particular to support the achievement of the
envisaged quasi-freeze of primary expenditure. In addition, fostering the quality of public finances also in the context of
a broader reform agenda is paramount to underpin a much needed lift in productivity and potential GDP growth, and to
address other key challenges the Portuguese economy is faced with such as boosting competitiveness, narrowing the
large external imbalance and supporting employment creation;
Policy Invitations:
Achieve the 2010 deficit target of 8.3% of GDP, if necessary by reinforcing the consolidation by adopting additional
measures; back-up the strategy to bring the deficit below 3% by 2013 by the timely implementation of concrete
measures; stand ready to adopt further consolidation measures in case the macroeconomic scenario proves more
favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) recommendation and/or any slippages emerge; seize any
opportunity beyond fiscal efforts, including from better economic conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross
debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference value;
Implement an effective multi-annual budgetary framework in order to ensure the adherence to the budgetary targets
across the government sector and to firmly contain expenditure over the medium-term;
Enhance the quality of public finances, along the lines envisaged in the programme, notably by improving the efficiency
and effectiveness of public spending in the various areas of government action; decisively address the situation of loss-
making state-owned enterprises; and factor into the fiscal sustainability position the spending commitments and risks
arising from public-private partnerships;
Frame fiscal consolidation measures together with efforts to raise productivity and potential GDP growth in a sustained
way, to boost competitiveness and to narrow the large external imbalances, which will also help improving the
sustainability of public finances.
RO Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that, taken at face value, the consolidation path projected in the convergence programme is
appropriate and in line with the Council Recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. However, full implementation of
the consolidation measures foreseen for 2010 is essential to reach the deficit target. In addition, the programme does not
sufficiently specify the consolidation measures to be taken in 2011 and 2012. The Romanian Government has made the
commitment to take contingency measures, if needed, to reach the deficit target set for 2010. Moreover, implementation
of the fiscal governance reforms decided upon within the context of the EU balance of payments assistance programme
to Romania should help in achieving the budgetary targets for 2011 and 2012. Finally, the adoption and implementation
of the draft pension reform will be crucial in improving the long-term sustainability of public finances.
Policy Invitations:
Rigorously implement the fiscal consolidation measures for 2010 agreed as part of the balance-of-payments support
programme and take further corrective action, if needed, to achieve the 2010 target for the general government deficit.
The Romanian authorities are also invited to specify, in the context of the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework to be
prepared by end May 2010, the fiscal consolidation measures necessary to achieve the programme budgetary targets in
2011 and 2012;
Adopt and implement the draft pension law which would contribute to significantly improve the long-term sustainability
of public finances;
Improve the fiscal framework by adopting and implementing the fiscal responsibility law. In particular, take into account
the analysis of the Fiscal Council in the design and conduct of fiscal policy;  
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SI Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the programme plans the general government deficit ratio to stabilise at 5.7% of GDP in
2010 and to gradually decline thereafter, thanks to an expenditure-based and relatively back-loaded consolidation effort,
to well below 3% of GDP in 2013, the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit set by the Council. The gross
debt ratio is planned to increase further, from 34.4% of GDP in 2009, until 2011 to then broadly stabilise at some 42% o
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GDP. The deficit and debt ratios could turn out higher than targeted throughout the programme period. This possibility
increases over time and is related to: 
(i) optimistic revenue projections in 2010 followed by favourable growth assumptions after 2011; 
(ii) possible expenditure overruns in view of the scale of the envisaged retrenchment coupled with the strong observed
dynamics in recent years of especially the wage bill and social transfers, including pensions; and 
(iii) the fact that the expenditure-containment measures have not yet been fully specified and adopted, with some of them
still subject to the outcome of negotiations with the social partners. Nonetheless, to help support the planned containment
of expenditure growth, the government is adopting measures to strengthen expenditure control and the fiscal framework.
In addition, the planned initiatives to enhance public sector efficiency and rationalise the provision of public services and
of social protection should work towards the same purpose. In particular, data on net lending/borrowing vis-a-vis the
rest of the world are not provided.
Even if the full and consistent implementation of the planned fiscal consolidation implies the return to a primary surplus
by 2013, there remain high risks with regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances. Setting a more ambitious
medium-term objective (MTO) and adopting and implementing the announced change in indexation formula and further
pension reform aimed at curbing the substantial increase in age-related expenditure would allow addressing these risks.
The latter could usefully build on the planned two-step pension reform. Besides returning to sound public finances, key
challenges for the Slovenian economy are strengthening its resilience and regaining competitiveness so as to be able to
benefit fully from the global economic recovery. This requires a better alignment of wage and productivity developments
and the implementation of structural reforms.
Policy Invitations:
Rigorously implement the foreseen consolidation measures in 2010 and bring the deficit below the 3% of GDP reference
value by 2013 as planned by fully specifying, adopting and implementing the indicated expenditure-containment
measures in line with the average annual fiscal effort recommended by the Council Article 126(7), while standing ready
to adopt further consolidation measures in case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the
programme is more favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise;
In view of the significant projected increase in age-related expenditure, further reform the pension system and set a more
ambitious MTO that takes sufficiently into account the implicit liabilities related to ageing.
Pursue efforts to enhance expenditure control and the enforceable nature of the multi-annual budgetary plans and
improve public spending efficiency and effectiveness;
SK Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the fiscal strategy presented in the programme is broadly in line with the Council
recommendation under the excessive deficit procedure. It envisages a sizeable, frontloaded fiscal consolidation with a
view to bringing the deficit below 3% of GDP by 2012, one year before the deadline set by the Council, which is
commendable. The budgetary projections are however subject to risks due to favourable growth assumptions for the
outer years and might need more specific measures to achieve the planned savings on the expenditure side. Intentions to
strengthen the fiscal framework are welcome but need to be followed by concrete actions.
Policy Invitations:
Implement the deficit reducing measures in 2010 as planned in the budget, and back up the consolidation path for the
following years with specific measures to secure the correction of the excessive deficit if possible by 2012, and by 2013
at the latest;
Continue reforms of the pension system with a view to ensuring the sustainability of government finances;
Implement the envisaged measures to further strengthen the fiscal framework, in particular the introduction of
enforceable multiannual expenditure ceilings;
FI Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that that the severe economic crisis has substantially weakened public finances, including the
long-term sustainability position. The planned expansionary fiscal policies in 2010 are in line with the EERP. However,
the programme's projections, based on current policies, indicate that the general government deficit would exceed the 3%-
of-GDP reference value in 2010. Moreover, the projected sluggish medium term fiscal consolidation path would not
ensure progress towards the programme's MTO. Taking also account of the downside risks attached to these projections,
it would be highly desirable that the Government takes timely action to specify a comprehensive and concrete medium
term fiscal strategy to consolidate from 2011 onwards. 
Implement the 2010 fiscal policy as planned in line with the EERP, while ensuring that the planned breach of the 3%-of-
GDP reference value would remain contained and temporary;
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Policy Invitations:
Take timely action to define a comprehensive and concrete medium term fiscal strategy to consolidate from 2011
onwards, also with a view to achieve the MTO and to restore the long-term sustainability of public finances;
SE Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that large surpluses in good times allowed fiscal policy to play an active role in the downturn,
in line with the spirit of the Stability and Growth Pact, not only by boosting demand in the short term but also by
strengthening the economy's long-term growth potential. The fiscal stance is appropriately continuing to be expansionary
in 2010 in line with the EERP. Although partly outdated, the programme projects the deficit to widen to 3.4% of GDP in
2010, from 2.2% in 2009, due mainly to the additional stimulus measures taking effect in this year. Thereafter, the deficit
ratio is projected to gradually narrow to 2.1% of GDP in 2011 and 1.1% in 2012.
This improvement is due mainly to assumed strong economic growth, as the programme does not envisage any
consolidation efforts in these years. Overall risks to the planned adjustment seem somewhat tilted to the upside, with
considerable upside risks in 2010 being partly compensated by downside risks in 2011-12. However, should budgetary
outcomes fall short of the projected ones, the government would have to stand ready to adopt timely discretionary
consolidation measures.
Policy Invitations:
Implement the 2010 fiscal policy as planned in line with the EERP, while aiming to avoid breaching of the 3%-of-GDP
reference value; ensure that the nominal budgetary adjustment projected in the programme is achieved, if necessary by
timely adoption of consolidation measures to ensure that lower-than-expected growth does not derail the envisaged
consolidation of government finances in the outer years of the programme, as well as to ensure progress towards the
MTO;
UK Summary Assessment:
The overall conclusion is that the fiscal strategy in the convergence programme is not sufficiently ambitious and needs to
be significantly reinforced to be consistent with the Council recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU of 2
December 2009. The combination of the operation of automatic stabilisers, falls in asset prices and the fiscal stimulus
has provoked a major deterioration in UK public finances. However, the position of the public finances was further
weakened by the fact that UK deficits were at risk of breaching the 3% of GDP reference value already in the period
leading up to the crisis. A restrictive fiscal policy in 2010/11 is appropriate. A credible timeframe for restoring public
finances to a sustainable position, as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact, requires substantial additional fiscal
tightening measures beyond those currently planned.
With the greater part of the projected reduction in the deficit in the medium term driven by the tight overall spending
envelope between 2011/12 and 2014/15, the absence of detailed departmental spending limits to back up those
expenditure targets is a source of uncertainty. The achievement of the consolidation forecast by the UK authorities is
further clouded by the risk that the macroeconomic context could be less favourable than envisaged by the authorities, as
well as the uncertainties relating to the banking sector loans and investments insured by government. Taking into account
the negative risks to the UK fiscal projections, a more ambitious consolidation plan for the near and medium-term is
required. Achieving primary surpluses in the medium term would also contribute to reducing the risks to the
sustainability of public finances which were assessed in the Commission 2009 Sustainability Report as high in the United
Kingdom
Policy Invitations:
Avoid any further measures contributing to the deterioration of public finances in 2010/11 and in the event of weaker
economic growth than foreseen in the programme contain the government deficit in 2010/11 to at most that forecast in
the January 2010 programme in case risks related to the fact that the macroeconomic scenario of the programme is more
favourable than the scenario underpinning the Article 126(7) Recommendation materialise;
Target a more ambitious reduction of the government deficit to less than the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value by
2014/15 at the latest, including by strengthening the planned pace of fiscal effort from 2011/12 onwards in line with the
Council recommendation under Article 126(7), and seize any further opportunities, including from better-than-expected
economic and market conditions, to accelerate the reduction of the gross debt ratio towards the 60% of GDP reference
value, thereby also improving the long-term sustainability of public finances;
Publish in 2010 the detailed departmental spending limits underlying the overall expenditure projections for at least the
three-year period beyond 2010/11; implement the expenditure efficiency savings identified in the Operational Efficiency
Programme (OEP) and in other value for money initiatives;
Source: Commission services. 
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The crisis-related fiscal expansions and the ageing 
of European Union's population raise questions 
about the sustainability of the Member States' 
public finances. As the share of working age 
people in the population falls and the share of the 
old increases, economies are faced with lower 
(potential) economic growth and higher costs 
associated with providing services for the ageing 
population.  
Since the launch of the euro in 1999, the 
Commission has sought to integrate an 
examination of the sustainability of public finances 
into the existing EU framework for the 
surveillance of Member States’ economic and 
budgetary policies, in line with the conclusions of 
the Stockholm (March 2001) and Barcelona 
(March 2002) European Council meetings and the 
March 2003 Ecofin Council. More recently and 
importantly, the 22-23 March 2005 European 
Council put increased emphasis on long-term 
sustainability issues in the context of the reform of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The assessment of long-term sustainability of 
public finances is a multifaceted issue and there is 
not a unique indicator that provides a clear 
response to what extent a country’s public finances 
are sustainable in the long run. Hence, the 
Commission and the Council assess long-term 
sustainability of public finances by using both 
quantitative indicators and qualitative information 
so that panoply of factors affecting the long-run 
state of public finances in the Member States is 
reflected.  
4.1. THE APPROACH USED TO ASSESS THE 
LONG - TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCES 
A pragmatic definition of what constitutes a 
sustainable public finance position is used in the 
assessment by the Commission and the Council, 
namely whether on the basis of current policies 
and projected budgetary trends Member States 
will: (i) meet the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint so that the discounted value of 
future revenues matches the discounted value of 
future government expenditures and the level of 
outstanding debt; and, (ii) continue to comply with 
the budgetary requirements of EMU, and in 
particular, the Treaty requirement to keep debt 
levels below the 60 percent of GDP reference 
value.  
The main quantitative indicators that meet the 
above conditions for a sustainable public financer 
position are the sustainability gaps that measure 
the difference between the current and projected 
budgetary positions (S1 indicator) and that ensure 
sustainable public finances (S2 indicator).  
The Commission and Council approach takes into 
account several factors to complement the 
available information on future quantitative 
budgetary trends. For this purpose, the 
Commission and the EPC Ageing Working Group 
produce a set of long-term budgetary projections 
for several budgetary items, reflecting expected 
demographic development and already approved 
reforms. The following section describes the new 
set of projections that were produced in 2009.   
4.1.1. New projections of the budgetary cost 
of ageing 
An increase in life expectancy, alongside a fall in 
fertility rates is leading to an accelerated ageing of 
the population in the EU and other parts of the 
world. Over the years to 2060, the EU population 
is set to age further. Aside from several social 
consequences, population ageing has significant 
economic consequences due to a reduction in the 
working age population and an increase in 
government expenditure. (16) Consequently, 
population ageing puts pressure on a country’s 
public finances primarily through its effects on the 
labour market and hence economic growth and 
age-related expenditure. With fewer people being 
of working age, the potential growth rate of the 
economy is reduced. Indeed, these changes affect 
the S1 and S2 indicators, through changes in the 
estimated rate of economic growth.  
The direct costs of ageing involve increases in age-
related expenditure. The sustainability assessments 
use the estimates of the fiscal impact of these 
changes as presented in the 2009 Ageing Report. 
(17) As the aim is to provide an estimate of the 
(16) Eurostat  'EUROPOP2008' populations projections.  
(17) ‘2009 Ageing Report’ joint report of the European 
Commission and the EPC, European Economy, 2, and 
Commission Communication ‘Dealing with the Impact of 
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long-term effect on sustainability of ageing, the 
analysis takes the figures for age-related costs 
starting in 2010. The projections are made on a 
basis of no-policy change assumption where it is 
assumed that current tax and spending 
arrangements continue in the future.  The 2009 
Ageing Report considers the public cost of ageing 
using five expenditure categories, the projected 
changes to these categories are used to quantify the 
impact of ageing on the sustainability of the public 
finances. 
Overall, on the basis of current policies, age-
related public expenditure is projected to increase 
on average by 4.6 percentage points of GDP by 
2060 in the EU – especially through pension, 
healthcare and long-term care spending. There are 
however marked differences in the impact of 
ageing across Member States: 
• The increase in government spending in 
ageing-related categories is likely to be very 
significant (7 percentage points of GDP or 
more) in nine EU Member States 
(Luxembourg, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and 
Ireland), although for some countries the large 
increase will be from a fairly low level (18). 
• For a second group of countries – Belgium, 
Finland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
the United Kingdom and Germany– the cost of 
ageing is more limited, but still very high 
(between 4 and 7 percentage points of GDP). 
• Finally, the increase is more moderate, 4 
percentage points of GDP or less, in Bulgaria, 
Sweden, Portugal, Austria, France, Denmark, 
Italy, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. 
Most of these countries have implemented 
substantial pension reforms, in several cases 
also involving a partial switch to private funded 
pension schemes (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland, and Sweden). (19) 
 
                                                                                   
                                                                                  
an Ageing Population in the EU,’ COM (2009) 180 final, 
21 April 2009. 
(18) A number of countries are planning to introduce pension 
reforms in the near future. Should these be adopted the 
classification of these countries may change. 
(19) In case of Hungary, the projection of age-related 
expenditure reflects the recent reforms of the pension 
In addition to the budgetary projections above, the 
quantitative sustainability assessment also takes 
into account the future development of revenues 
coming from taxation of pensions and projections 
on property income.  
4.1.2. The sustainability indicators 
The sustainability indicators provide a firm and 
objective basis to classify the long-term public 
finances sustainability risks in the EU Member 
States. The Commission uses the two core 
sustainability indicators, the S1 and the S2. The S1 
indicator shows the durable adjustment to the 
current primary balance required to reach a target 
debt of 60% of GDP in 2060, including paying for 
any additional expenditure arising from an ageing 
population. The S2 indicator shows the durable 
adjustment of the current primary balance required 
to fulfil the infinite horizon intertemporal budget 
constraints, including paying for any additional 
expenditure arising from an ageing population. (20) 
In general, the long-term sustainability assessment 
puts emphasis on the more stringent S2 indicator. 
This indicator is consistent with the concept of 
sustainability of public finances over an infinite 
horizon and is based on regarding budgetary 
developments and on the most recent comparable 
information regarding the long-term impact of 
ageing populations on public expenditure. 
Alongside the S2 indicator, the relative value of 
the S1 indicator is considered as it gives an 
indication of the urgency of any necessary reforms. 
Where the S1 indicator is markedly lower than the 
S2, the sustainability constraints will materialise 
further in the future and therefore allows the 
Member State a bit more time to implement the 
necessary reforms without risking as large an 
impact on their government gross debt. In case of a 
substantial difference between the S2 and S1 
indicators, the country's long-term sustainability 
position is evaluated more favourably. 
 
scheme introduced in 2009, i.e. after the 2009 Ageing 
Report was released. The latest projections were endorsed 
by the AWG and the EPC and were used in the latest 
assessment of the long-term risk to public finance 
sustainability. 
(20) Further analysis including the derivation of the 
sustainability indicators can be found in the Commission 
publication ''Sustainability Report 2009', European 
Economy 9/2009. 
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The 2010 SCP assessment of risks to long-term 
sustainability of public finances is based on the 
Ageing Report budgetary projections.(21) In 
addition, the assessment reflects developments of 
public finances as designed in the national stability 
and convergence programmes by individual 
Member States.  
4.1.3. Additional factors 
To make an overall assessment on the 
sustainability of public finances, other additional 
relevant factors, not (or not sufficiently) reflected 
in the sustainability indicators, are taken into 
account in order to better qualify the assessment 
with regard to where the main risks are likely to 
stem. Taking into account these other relevant 
factors may lead to a somehow different overall 
assessment than the one that would result from 
evaluating the sustainability indicators only. Next, 
                                                          
(21) The only exception is Hungary which presented a new set 
of projections on age-related expenditure. These 
projections were endorsed by the AWG and EPC. 
the additional factors tend to be reflected more 
once the country of interest is not easy to decide to 
which group it belongs to. Table I.4.2 presents the 
elements when reaching an overall assessment for 
the 27 Member States. 
The level of the outstanding government debt is 
arguably the most important additional factor. 
Indeed, while the sustainability indicators already 
include information on the current level of debt, 
they do not incorporate all the specific risks faced 
by countries with a large initial level of debt. First, 
high-debt countries are more sensitive to 
short/medium term shocks to economic growth and 
to interest rates changes. Second, a high level of 
debt may lead to higher interest rate than assumed 
in the projections and increase further the risks to 
public finance sustainability. Third, when 
calculating the sustainability indicators, it is 
assumed that all countries are able keep their 
structural primary balance as a share of GDP at its 
 
Table I.4.1: Increase in age-related expenditure, 2010-2060, % of GDP 
2010
Change 
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change 
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change 
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change 
2010 to 
2060 2010
Change 
2010 to 
2060
BE 10.3 4.5 7.7 1.1 1.5 1.3 7.3 -0.3 26.8 6.6
BG 9.1 2.2 4.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 3.0 0.2 17.1 3.2
CZ 7.1 4.0 6.4 2.0 0.2 0.4 3.3 0.0 17.0 6.3
DK 9.4 -0.2 6.0 0.9 1.8 1.5 8.0 0.1 25.2 2.2
DE 10.2 2.5 7.6 1.6 1.0 1.4 4.6 -0.4 23.3 5.1
EE 6.4 -1.6 5.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 3.2 0.3 14.8 -0.1
IE 5.5 5.9 5.9 1.7 0.9 1.3 5.3 -0.2 17.5 8.7
EL 11.6 12.5 5.1 1.3 1.5 2.1 3.8 0.1 21.9 16.0
ES 8.9 6.2 5.6 1.6 0.7 0.7 4.8 -0.2 20.0 8.3
FR 13.5 0.6 8.2 1.1 1.5 0.7 5.8 -0.2 29.0 2.2
IT 14.0 -0.4 5.9 1.0 1.7 1.2 4.3 -0.2 26.0 1.6
CY 6.9 10.8 2.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 5.8 -0.6 15.5 10.7
LV 5.1 0.0 3.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 3.3 0.3 12.3 1.3
LT 6.5 4.9 4.6 1.0 0.5 0.6 3.5 -0.4 15.1 6.0
LU 8.6 15.3 5.9 1.1 1.4 2.0 4.0 -0.3 19.9 18.2
HU 10.5 0.6 5.8 1.3 0.3 0.4 4.5 -0.3 21.0 2.0
MT 8.3 5.1 4.9 3.1 1.0 1.6 5.0 -0.7 19.2 9.2
NL 6.5 4.0 4.9 0.9 3.5 4.6 5.6 -0.2 20.5 9.4
AT 12.7 1.0 6.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 5.2 -0.2 25.7 3.3
PL 10.8 -2.1 4.1 0.8 0.4 0.7 3.8 -0.6 19.1 -1.1
PT 11.9 1.5 7.3 1.8 0.1 0.1 5.6 -0.4 24.9 2.9
RO 8.4 7.4 3.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 -0.2 14.7 8.5
SI 10.1 8.5 6.8 1.7 1.2 1.7 5.1 0.7 23.1 12.7
SK 6.6 3.6 5.2 2.1 0.2 0.4 2.9 -0.6 14.9 5.5
FI 10.7 2.6 5.6 0.8 1.9 2.5 6.4 0.0 24.7 5.9
SE 9.6 -0.2 7.3 0.7 3.5 2.2 6.6 0.0 27.1 2.7
UK 6.7 2.5 7.6 1.8 0.8 0.5 4.0 0.0 19.2 4.8
EU-27 10.2 2.3 6.8 1.4 1.3 1.1 4.9 -0.2 23.2 4.6
E 11.2 2.7 6.8 1.3 1.4 1.3 5.0 -0.2 24.5 5.1
TotalPension spending Healthcare Long-term care Unemployment 
A
Source: Commission services and Economic Policy Committee. 
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current level in the future (22).  This factor is used 
symmetrically as a risk-increasing factor for very 
high debt countries (notably Belgium, Greece, 
Italy, Hungary and Portugal) and a risk-decreasing 
factor for very low debt countries (notably 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg and Romania).  
A country's primary balance is also informative 
with regards to changes to its debt level. A 
negative primary balance is associated with a 
rising debt burden while a positive one with falling 
debt as a share of GDP(23). The Commission 2009 
autumn forecast is used to look at the structural 
primary balance evolution over the years 2008 to 
2011.  The forecast deterioration of the structural 
primary balance is seen as risk increasing factor 
for twelve Member States (Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Spain, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and 
United Kingdom), of which three (Denmark, 
Cyprus and Finland) have a particularly marked 
deterioration which should be flagged as a strong 
risk-increasing factor.  
The evolution of the benefit ratio is strongly driven 
by the pension system. The benefit ratio is the 
average benefit for public pension and public and 
other pensions, respectively, as a share of the 
economy-wide average wage (gross wages and 
salaries in relation to employees), as calculated by 
the Commission. (24) A decrease in the public 
benefit ratio usually leads to a reduction (or 
slowdown) in government expenditure in pensions. 
However, it can also lead to other risks to public 
finances, if: (i) it leads to a substantial increase in 
the poverty rate of older people, which may 
require government assistance; (ii) moreover, the 
projected fall in the benefit ratio may be associated 
with a large increase in the relative share of social 
contributions that are diverted from social security 
or other public pension schemes to private 
schemes, which may affect public revenue. The 
sustainability indicators in Poland are clearly 
dependent on such a marked decrease in the 
 
                                                          
(22) The structural primary balance is assumed to stay constant, 
except for the budgetary effects caused by population 
ageing. 
(23) Even in the absence of adverse shocks, a high level of debt 
involves a higher level of interest payments and therefore 
requires a consistently positive primary surplus purely to 
service the debt an higher surpluses to reduce its level. 
(24) Besides the benefit ratio also other indicators on the  
adequacy of pension systems exist. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=752 
benefit ratio that there is significant upward risk to 
the sustainability gap from political pressure. For 
Austria, Portugal and Sweden the decrease is also 
an additional risk. Conversely, the high and 
increasing benefit ratio for Greece must be seen an 
indication of the types of reforms that are 
necessary in the country to address its very large 
sustainability gap. 
A high current tax ratio leaves limited room of 
manoeuvre for using tax increases to finance 
additional public expenditure as compared to a 
lower tax ratio. This is the case for Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy and Sweden, with Belgium 
combining a high tax ratio with a need to reduce its 
very high debt.  By contrast, low tax ratios are not 
considered to be a risk-reducing factor, since a 
possible decision regarding an increase of the tax 
ratio would not only take into account the 
financing needs resulting from ageing but would 
depend on the size of public procurement of good 
and services, the effectiveness of tax systems, the 
structure of the tax system and its impact on 
growth.  
4.2. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
There is a large variation in the degree of risks that 
the Member States are facing and where they 
mainly come from. Overall, compared with last 
year's assessments and taking account of the 
Commission's Spring 2010 Forecast, more 
Member States showed larger sustainability gaps 
only few improved their long-term sustainability 
position.  
It should be noted that countries with different 
characteristics can overall face a similar degree of 
risks to fiscal sustainability. For example, the 
projected cost of ageing can be high while the 
budgetary position is relatively sound. By contrast, 
a country might have a projected cost of ageing 
which actually improves its long-term 
sustainability while its sustainability difficulties 
arise mainly from its weak budgetary position. In 
deed the priorities in the two cases are different; in 
the former case reforms to the social security 
systems that would curb the increase in age–
related expenditure are needed, while in the latter 
case consolidation efforts would be appropriate.  
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Countries that have come furthest in coping 
with the sustainability challenge 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, and, Sweden have in 
general come furthest in coping with ageing, which 
implies a strong budgetary position (running large 
surpluses prior to the crisis, reducing debt and/or 
accumulating assets) and/or comprehensive 
pension reforms, sometimes including a shift 
towards private funded pension schemes, and 
present therefore a low long-term risk. 
For Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and Sweden the 
forecast increases in age-related expenditure are 
amongst the lowest in EU and their current 
structural primary balances are either in or close to 
surplus. This does not mean that in these countries 
there are no risks regarding the long-term 
sustainability of public finances however, but that 
their social protection systems (pension and 
healthcare) at present appear able to deal with the 
pressures of an ageing population on current 
estimates. In particular, in case of Bulgaria and 
Estonia, a positive impact of low debt level and 
implemented pension reforms should be seen in 
the context of the ongoing convergence to the 
levels observed in the rest of EU. 
The intermediate group of countries 
The intermediate countries (Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal 
and Finland) consist of Member States with very 
different characteristics but three distinct 
categories can be distinguished: 
• Belgium, Germany, Austria and Finland are 
countries with a significant cost of ageing and 
where measures might be needed to curb these 
costs, but which currently have relatively 
strong budgetary positions. For these countries, 
reforms to address the rising cost of ageing are 
a priority and these can be undertaken without 
waiting for the end of the financial crisis, 
insofar as the reforms do not adversely affect 
the recovery. This is also the case for 
Luxembourg which faces the highest increase 
in age-related expenditure of all EU countries, 
but which is included in the medium long-term 
risk category due to its low level of debt, high 
stock of assets and lower ageing costs at the 
beginning of the period as shown by its lower 
S1 indicator.  
• Poland and Portugal are countries that need to 
consolidate, though to different degrees, their 
public finances over the medium-term but for 
which the costs of ageing are relatively less of 
a concern, usually as a result of reforms made 
to their pension systems. It may be that the 
government accounts improve when the 
recovery comes, but where this is not the case 
budgetary consolidation will be necessary and 
should be undertaken as soon as the time is 
right in order to reduce risks to public finance 
sustainability. In Poland’s and Portugal’s cases, 
there is an added risk in relation to the sharp 
reduction in the benefit ratio. 
• For Italy and Hungary neither the budgetary 
position nor the long term cost of ageing are 
particularly high. However the initial levels of 
debt give cause for concern. In both Italy and 
Hungary, rapid budgetary consolidation is 
required to ensure a steady reduction of the 
currently very high level of debt, although it 
will need to be undertaken at a time when it 
does not adversely affect the recovery from the 
economic and financial crisis.  
 
 
70 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
 
Countries facing the largest sustainability 
challenges 
Countries with the most challenges (Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and United 
Kingdom) are generally characterised by a very 
significant rise in age-related expenditure over the 
long-term, underlining that measures aimed at 
curbing them will prove necessary. This is not, 
however, the case for Latvia, where age-related 
expenditure is forecast to be just 1.3 percentage 
points (p.p.) of GDP higher in 2060 compared with 
2010. For Greece and Slovenia (as well as 
Luxembourg) the increase in these expenditures is 
over 10 p.p. of GDP. Conversely, Romania is 
characterised by very low levels of debt which 
stand at below 20% of GDP, while for Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia 
debt ratios stand at below 40%. At the other end of 
the spectrum, Greece has a government debt of 
over 100% of GDP, which is combined with one of 
the highest increases in age-related expenditure 
grouping the whole EU. Latvia, while 
characterised by very low debt levels, is forecast to 
have a very large increase in debt by 2010. For 
Belgium, the strong budgetary position in recent 
years is counterweighted by very high levels of 
debt ratio-to-GDP which is forecast to reach 100% 
by 2010.  
For most of the Member States in this group it will 
be necessary to address both the long-term costs of 
ageing through reforms to pension systems and the 
weakness of the budgetary positions. For some 
Member States the deficits may return to surplus 
when the recovery comes, but where this is not the 
case budgetary consolidation will be necessary and 
should be undertaken as soon as the time is right in 
order to reduce risks to public finance 
sustainability. 
Conversely, the reforms to the pension and 
healthcare system which will not adversely affect 
the recovery of the Member States' economies 
 
Table I.4.2: Main factors considered in reaching an overall assessment of the public finance sustainability risks 
S2 in the 2009 
scenario
Level of debt in 
2009
Change in the structural 
primary balance 2008 - 
2011
Tax ratio Difference between the S1 and S2 Benefit ratio 
BE 6.5 98 -2.0 − 0.4
BG 2.8 15 1.9 2.0
CZ 9.8 35 -0.3 2.1
DK -1.4 39 -4.7 − 0.4
DE 4.5 73 -2.2 0.9
EE 1.2 8 2.9 1.2
IE 14.8 65 -2.4 2.0
EL 20.3 113 -2.0 2.9
ES 15.3 55 -2.6 2.5
FR 7.1 77 -2.4 -0.2
IT 2.6 115 -0.1 − -0.7
CY 12.5 56 -5.9 3.4
LV 9.0 35 -0.5 0.5
LT 10.4 30 0.8 1.7
LU 12.7 15 -3.0 7.1
HU -1.3 78 1.3 0.9
MT 6.4 67 0.7 1.9
NL 8.5 62 -2.9 1.8
AT 4.6 67 -1.6 1.0 −
PL 5.6 51 -1.2 0.4 −
PT 8.9 77 -3.5 0.4 −
RO 9.7 23 5.1 2.7
SI 12.2 34 -0.3 3.4
SK 8.5 37 0.7 1.8
FI 4.3 42 -5.0 1.3
SE 0.5 43 -2.8 − 1.2 −
UK 13.5 73 -4.0 0.1
Note: A value preceded by a negative sign indicates that the corresponding factor tends to increase the risk to long-term sustainability. 
Source: Commission services. 
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should be approached with urgency (25). This is 
particularly the case for countries where age 
related expenditure is a significant source of 
unsustainability: Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
(25) Reforming disability and early retirement schemes together 
with increasing the healthy life expectancy are crucial 
factors in achieving the Lisbon strategy objective of 
attracting more people into employment and retaining them 
on the labour market in order to increase the labour supply 
of older persons and to contribute to sustainable economic 
growth in the face of adverse demographic developments. 
A population in better health will be able to work longer as 
it grows older, allowing higher productivity and labour 
participation, and will need less healthcare, ultimately 
resulting in decreased pressure on public finances..  
Malta, Netherlands, Romania and Slovenia. As not 
all pension and healthcare reforms are neutral with 
respect to the recovery, care should be taken to 
consider the effect of any changes undertaken. (26) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
(26) Within these countries, the case of Cyprus should also be 
noted. Thanks to successful consolidation in the pre-crisis 
years, Cyprus managed to significantly reduce its debt 
ratio. Moreover, although the planned increases in age-
related expenditure is very large; its demographic 
projections are such that the increase in ageing-related 
expenditure will be relatively contained in the first half of 
the projection horizon. 
5. CURRENT DOMESTIC FISCAL FRAMEWORK REFORMS 
ACROSS THE EU 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) impose budgetary obligations 
on Member States. In order to ensure the respect of 
objectives, they also stress the importance of 
national rules and institutions for budgetary 
discipline. The report on the SGP reform endorsed 
by the European Council on 22 March 2005 says 
that national budgetary rules should be 
complementary to the Member States’ 
commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact. 
It also says that national institutions could play a 
more prominent role in budgetary surveillance to 
strengthen national ownership, enhance 
enforcement through national public opinion and 
complement the economic and policy analysis at 
EU level. This political orientation has been 
reiterated in subsequent Council conclusions and 
statements.  
In the context of the current crisis, the role national 
fiscal frameworks may play in sustaining 
budgetary retrenchment is gaining more 
importance in the fiscal policy debate. For 
instance, the last year's EFC report on fiscal exit 
strategy acknowledges that fiscal frameworks can 
provide suitable incentives and constraints for 
policy makers to commit to lasting fiscal 
consolidation and sustainable policies, and 
recommends to further work on this issue. In the 
same vein, in the October 2009 Council 
Conclusions, the Ecofin stated that important 
flanking policies to the fiscal exit will include 
strengthened national budgetary frameworks for 
underpinning consolidation strategies and support 
long-term sustainability. In the same conclusions, 
the Council also recalled that this should be 
reflected in the SCPs to be transmitted by Member 
States to the Commission by the end of January 
2010.  
Against this background, the Commission has been 
carrying out a number of analyses and research 
projects in the area of fiscal governance over the 
latest years. For instance, recent past issues of the 
PFR include several analytical chapters dealing 
with different aspects of domestic fiscal 
frameworks. Most of this research is based on 
information provided directly by Member States, 
and has notably led to the dissemination of a 
comprehensive database on domestic fiscal rules, 
independent institutions and medium term 
budgetary frameworks across EU countries, which 
is now available at the external DG Ecfin 
website.(27) The 2010 PFR also deals with these 
issues in the analysis included in Chapter 3 of Part 
II, which provides policy guidelines related to the 
appropriate and desirable institutional reforms 
more conducive to the strengthening of fiscal 
governance at national level.  
This chapter also focuses on fiscal governance but 
from a different perspective. Specifically, it takes 
stock of recent and envisaged reforms of domestic 
fiscal frameworks that have been included by 
Member States in the last round of the SCPs, and 
presents and discusses the main features of these 
announced measures. In line with previous 
analyses, domestic fiscal frameworks are defined 
as the set of elements that form national fiscal 
governance, i.e. the overall system of 
arrangements, procedures and institutions that 
underlies the planning and implementation of 
budgetary policies. The main elements of domestic 
fiscal frameworks are numerical fiscal rules, 
independent public institutions acting in the field 
of budgetary policies, medium-term budgetary 
frameworks for multiannual fiscal planning 
(MTBFs) and budgetary procedures governing the 
preparation, approval and implementation of the 
budget.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides an overview of the informational content 
of the 2009-2010 SCPs as regards the reform of 
national fiscal governance. For those countries that 
included this information in their updates, Section 
3 describes more in detail these measures 
according to the elements of domestic fiscal 
framework (i.e. rules, institutions, MTBFs and 
budgetary procedures). Section 4 focus on the link 
between the recommendations included in the 
Council Opinions and the policy initiatives 
announced in the SCPs. Finally, Section 5 
summarises the main conclusions of this analysis.  
(27) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ 
fiscal_governance/index_en.htm 
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5.2. OVERVIEW OF THE INFORMATION 
CONTAINED IN THE 2009-2010 SCPS  
 
A majority of Member States included in their 
2009-2010 SCPs information related to the reform 
of national fiscal frameworks.(28) Specifically, 21 
countries have already implemented and/or 
envisage to implement changes in their respective 
systems of fiscal governance, which can only be 
considered a positive feature of the last round of 
SCPs (see graph I.5.1).(29) As for those countries 
that do not foresee any substantial reform of the 
fiscal framework in the coming years, most of 
them declare to stick to the prevailing fiscal 
framework to redress the current fiscal imbalances 
(e.g. BE, DK and ES) while others announce 
future reform or strengthening measures but no 
details are provided (e.g. LU, MT and FI).  
Graph I.5.1: Information on national fiscal frameworks included 
in the 2009-2010 updates of the SCPs 
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Source: Commission services, 2009-2010 updated SCPs. 
However, both the level of detail of this 
information and the stage of implementation or the 
degree of advancement of reform plans vary 
widely across countries (see graph I.5.2 below). 
Thus, only 10 Member States included detailed 
information in terms of concrete measures and 
calendars. While the updates of DE, EE, IT, HU, 
NL, AT, PL SI, SE and UK contain exhaustive 
information about ongoing and future reforms, the 
programmes of  BG, CZ, IE, EL, FR, CY, LV, LT, 
PT, RO, and SK only provide scant and generic 
information.   
                                                          
(28) This note is based on the programmes submitted by the 27 
Member States of the EU.  
(29) Changes in national fiscal frameworks reported in the SCPs 
represent all innovations relative to the information set in 
the DG Ecfin fiscal governance database that currently 
covers effectively implemented reforms up to 2008. 
Graph I.5.2: Detailed information on reform plans included in 
the 2009-2010 updates of the SCPs 
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Arguably, the level of detail provided in the SCPs 
is somewhat related to the degree of 
implementation. Indeed, among the 10 Member 
States giving comprehensive information only one 
of them (NL) reports the introduction of reform 
measures from 2011 onwards, while all the 
remaining countries have already put into 
operation (at least partially) the announced policy 
initiatives between 2009 and the 1st quarter of 
2010. By contrast, most of Member States 
reporting a limited amount of information 
announce the introduction of their reform actions 
only from 2010 or 2011 onwards.  
5.3. TYPE OF MEASURES ACCORDING TO THE 
MAIN ELEMENTS OF DOMESTIC 
FRAMEWORKS 
As said in the previous section, 21 Member States 
report recent and/or future changes to their 
national fiscal frameworks. These measures 
address the reform of different elements of these 
frameworks, namely rules, independent 
institutions, MTBFs and budgetary procedures. 
According to this classification, changes to the 
existing budgetary procedures are the most 
frequent policy initiatives and are foreseen by 19 
Member States. These are closely followed by the 
reform and/or introduction of numerical fiscal 
rules in 13 EU countries.(30) Finally, reforms to 
                                                          
(30) In 2 of these 14 Member States (SK and UK) two 
additional rules are planned to be introduced. In the case of 
the UK, these two new rules replace the former golden and 
debt rules. As for PL and RO, according to their SCPs, they 
plan to introduce 4 and 3 new fiscal rules. Specifically, RO 
plans to implement 1 budget balance and 2 expenditure 
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MTBFs and institutions rank more distantly with 
10 and 3 Member States envisaging changes, 
respectively (see graph I.5.3 below). 
Graph I.5.3: Type of reforms according to the main elements of 
domestic fiscal frameworks 
 
 
Table I.5.1: Measures included in the 2009-2010 SCPs to reform domestic fiscal frameworks 
Number of 
rules in 2008
Reform 
existing rules
New rules Already in 
place in 2008
Reform 
existing 
MTBF
New MTBF Number in 
place in 2008
Reform 
current bodies
New bodies Measures 
upgrading 
procedures 
of which higher 
centralisation
of which top-
down 
budgeting
BE 4 0 0 Yes No No 2 No No No ─ ─
BG 2 0 0 Yes No No 0 ─ No No No ─
CZ 2 0 0 Yes No No 0 ─ No Yes No No
DK 3 0 0 Yes No No 1 No No No ─ ─
DE 5 0 1(4) Yes No No 4 No No Yes No Yes
EE 2 1 0 Yes No No 1 No No Yes No No
EI 3 0 0 Yes No No 0 ─ No Yes(5) ─ ─
EL 0 ─ ─ (1) No ─ ─ (2) 1 No ─ (3) Yes Yes Yes
ES 4 0 0 Yes No No 2 No No No ─ ─
FR 5 0 1 Yes No No 2 No No Yes No No
IT 4 0 1 Yes Yes No 1 No No Yes Yes No
CY 0 ─ 0 No No Yes 0 ─ No Yes No No
LV 2 0 0 Yes No No 0 ─ No Yes No No
LT 4 0 0 Yes No No 1 No No Yes Yes No
LU 3 0 0 No ─ ─ 1 No No No ─ ─
HU 2 0 1 No ─ Yes 1 No Yes Yes Yes No
MT 0 ─ 0 Yes No No 0 ─ No No ─ ─
NL 2 0 1 Yes No No 1 No No Yes No No
AT 1 0 1 Yes No Yes 3 No No Yes No No
PL 1 1 4 Yes Yes No 0 ─ No Yes No No
PT 3 0 1 No ─ Yes 2 No No Yes No No
RO 2 0 3 Yes No Yes 0 ─ Yes Yes No No
SI 2 0 1 Yes No No 1 No Yes Yes No No
SK 2 0 2 Yes Yes No 0 ─ No Yes No No
FI 4 0 0 Yes No No 0 ─ No No ─ ─
SE 3 0 0 Yes Yes No 2 No No No ─ ─
UK 2 0 2(6) Yes No Yes 1 No No Yes No No
Total 67 2 19 22 4 6 27 0 3 19 4 2
Independent institutions Budgetary proceduresNumerical rules MTBF
(1) The programme announces the introduction of new rules but neither the number nor their features are specified. (2) The programme does not 
specify whether some multiannual measures strengthening fiscal planning and monitoring constitute the basis for introducing an effective MTBF. (3) 
The programme does not clarify whether a new body to be implemented in the next future can be considered an independent fiscal institution. (4) The 
existing golden rule for the Federal Government was abolished in 2009 and replaced by a new cyclically adjusted balance rule. (5) Inclusion of 
multiannual budgetary targets in the annual budgetary documentation. (6) The two prevailing fiscal rules in 2008 were replaced as of 2010 by binding 
balance and debt targets over the period from 2009 10 to 2010 16. As a result, the total number of fiscal rules in place remains unchanged between 
2008 and 2010. 
Source: 2009 2010 SCPs 
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rules, while PL announces the establishment of 1 budget 
balance rule, 1 debt rule and 2 expenditure rules.   
Table I.5.1 provides a general overview of the 
measures considered by Member States in their 
respective Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
These policy actions are classified both according 
to the elements of the fiscal framework and by 
country. 
Subject to the comprehensiveness of the 
information submitted by Member States, the next 
sub-sections describe more in detail these reform 
measures for each building block of domestic 
frameworks.    
5.3.1. Reforms of numerical fiscal rules 
Measures addressing reforms in the field of fiscal 
rules are primarily implemented through the 
establishment of 19 new rules constraining the 
conduct of fiscal policy, whereas only 2 of the 
European Commission 
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prevailing rules are expected to be reformed (see 
graph I.5.4 below) (31).  
Graph I.5.4: Reformed and new fiscal rules 
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The degree of implementation of these reforms 
diverges across Member States. For instance, DE 
and HU have already introduced, respectively, a 
budget balance rule on a cyclically-adjusted basis 
for the Federal government and the Länders; and a 
debt rule defined in real terms for the central 
government. In both cases, not only the target 
definition and the coverage of the rules are known 
but also their monitoring mechanisms. By contrast, 
FR announces its intention of establishing a new 
budget balance rule on a multiannual basis for the 
whole of the general government sector. A 
working group, analyzing and assessing various 
forms of rules, has been established in order to 
adopt this new rule over the next years. This 
working group is expected to provide its report by 
next summer. Similarly to FR, SK announces the 
introduction of expenditure limits and a debt brake 
with a strong legal basis but no further information 
on these policy initiatives is contained in the 
update. Finally, other countries such as EL also 
envisage the introduction of fiscal rules in the 
                                                          
                                                          (31) In the case of Greece, the update announces the 
implementation of new fiscal rules in 2010. However, no 
details about the type of rules and calendar implementation 
are provided. As a result, Greece has not been included in 
graph 4 of this sub-section.    
short-term but neither details nor calendars are 
provided. 
By type of rule, 8 out of the 19 new numerical 
fiscal rules are expenditure rules, whereas new 
budget balance and debt rules amount to 6 and 5, 
respectively. No new revenue rule obliging the 
government to allocate higher-than-expected 
revenues to debt reduction is announced (see 
Graph I.5.4 below). 
Finally, two countries, PL and EE, plan to reform 
their existing fiscal rules. In the case of PL, the 
reform of the existing debt rule for the general 
government through more stringent corrective 
mechanisms is accompanied by the establishment 
of 4 new rules according to the update: a budget 
balance rule and a debt rule both for local 
governments to be implemented in 2011 and 2014 
respectively, and two expenditure rules 
constraining non-mandatory expenditure.(32) 
5.3.2. Reforms of medium-term budgetary 
frameworks (MTBFs) 
In 2008, a large majority of Member States 
declared to have in place a domestic MTBF for 
fiscal planning, and only EL, CY, LU, HU and PT 
reported not to have such fiscal arrangement in 
their respective fiscal governance systems. 
According to the information provided in the 
2009-2010 SCPs, 10 Member States report 
changes to their national MTBFs. Specifically, in 4 
Member States the existing MTBF is being 
reformed while in the remaining 6 countries a new 
framework is announced (see Graph I.5.5 below).  
In 3 cases (AT, RO and UK), newly introduced 
MTBFs replace the existing frameworks. In the 
case of HU, by contrast, a new MTBF has been set 
for the first time in the form of a fiscal 
responsibility law introducing medium-term fiscal 
plans covering at least three years. This is also the 
case for CY and PT, which did not have such fiscal 
arrangement in place and now announce its 
implementation. By contrast, neither EL nor LU 
envisage the establishment of a domestic MTBF.  
(32) For these two expenditure rules, however, the programme 
does not provide a concrete calendar and is not fully clear 
whether the rule is applied to the general government 
sector or only to the State budget. 
76 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
As a result, the total number of domestic 
frameworks is expected to increase from 22 in 
2008 to 25 at present. 
Graph I.5.5: Reformed and new MTBFs according to the SCPs 
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Finally, the 4 reforms of the existing frameworks 
(IT, PL, SK and SE) mainly consist of the 
reinforcement of the binding nature of fiscal 
targets and the extension of the period covered by 
the framework. The latter applies particularly to 
SE, which has recently set a legally binding 
three-year period for the existing framework. 
5.3.3. Reforms related to independent public 
institutions 
The resort to independent public institutions acting 
in the field of fiscal policy is by far the less 
popular policy option to reform national fiscal 
governance. Thus, only 3 new independent bodies 
have been (or will be) set up compared to the 
situation prevailing in 2008, when the number of 
these institutions in the EU amounted to 27. 
Besides, no reforms of the existing institutions in 
2008 are announced in the 2009-2010 SCPs.  
The newly introduced independent bodies have 
been established in HU and SI. In HU, the new 
body has been entrusted with the mandate of 
assuring the transparency of fiscal planning and is 
supported by a secretariat. In turn, the new 
institution in SI acts as a consultative body for the 
assessment of fiscal policy and budgetary 
developments as well as structural reforms (see the 
country specific annex for further information). 
Finally, the recently approved Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in RO will entail the 
establishment of a new independent institution.  
Overall, these 3 new institutions help rebalance to 
some extent the earlier uneven distribution of these 
bodies across the EU. In 2008, the 27 existing 
institutions were spread across 17 EU countries, of 
which 13 belonged to the former EU15. At that 
time, SI was one of the four new Member States 
having already introduced an independent body 
(i.e. the IMAD, which notably provides 
independent forecasts for the budget preparation).          
5.3.4. Changes to domestic budgetary 
procedures 
Changes to domestic budgetary procedures 
account for the largest number of measures 
addressing the reform of national fiscal 
governance, particularly at the planning stage.(33) 
According to the 2009-2010 SCPs, 19 Member 
States have already implemented, or will do it in 
the next future, policy measures targeting the 
upgrading of the current budget process. 
However, only a limited number of countries 
report having designed and/or implemented 
measures strengthening the centralisation of the 
budget process or the introduction of top-down 
budgeting (see graph I.5.6). These are the two 
elements of domestic budgetary procedures most 
conducive to fiscal discipline as they act to address 
the common-pool problem. Finally, the other 
reported measures aim mainly at performance and 
programme budgeting and, to a lesser extent, the 
reinforcement of monitoring mechanisms and the 
improvement of reporting procedures to increase 
transparency. 
Graph I.5.6: Reforms of budgetary procedures in the SCPs 
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(33) The other two dimensions of the budget process are the 
approval and the implementation stages.  
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5.4. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC 
FISCAL FRAMEWORKS REFORMS 
 
This section summarises key features of the 
assessment on the domestic fiscal frameworks 
reforms. It does so, first, by comparing policy 
invitations in the Council Opinions (COs) made on 
the two last rounds of SCPs. It then compares the 
reforms reported in the 2009-2010 SCPs with the 
policy invitations issued by the Council on the 
previous round of SCPs. Finally, it briefly 
comments the Commission services' Macro Fiscal 
Assessments.  
5.4.1. Last year’s COs and the current COs on 
the 2009-2010 SCPs 
This sub-section looks at the nature of the policy 
invitations issued by the Council on the last two 
rounds of SCPs. Graph I.5.7 shows how the policy 
invitation issued last year, on the 2008-09 SCPs, 
were distributed by type of measure. Overall, the 
graph shows that over 25% of the invitations 
concerned weaknesses in domestic budgetary 
procedures. These policy invitations mainly 
referred to concerns about the transparency, the 
performance and programme budgeting and the 
level of centralisation of the budgetary process. 
20% of the invitations concerned multi-annual 
planning while 22% of the invitations related to 
issues of expenditure control and/or expenditure 
limits. Grouping together the invitations 
concerning expenditure with those on the 
implementation of rules and binding targets and 
those on the reinforcement of monitoring and/or 
enforcement mechanisms, shows that 45% of the 
advice given was directly concerned with fiscal 
discipline. 
Graph I.5.8 shows the distribution of policy 
invitations issued on the current round of SCPs, by 
type of measure. Compared with the previous year, 
there is a significant increase in the share of 
invitations concerning a reinforcement of the 
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms (from 9% 
to 17%) and the coordination across government 
tiers (from 4% to 10%). There is a countervailing 
decrease in the share of recommendations 
requesting a strengthening of budgetary procedures 
and those concerning multiannual planning. 
However, in absolute terms, the number of 
invitations falling in these two categories remained 
roughly the same between last year and this.    
Graph I.5.7: Council policy invitations on last year’s SCPs by 
type of measure  (as a % of total measures) 
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The group of measures addressing fiscal discipline 
more directly, i.e. the invitations on rules, 
monitoring and enforcement procedures and the 
overseeing of public spending developments, 
increased further. In this year's round, 55% of the 
advice given covered these issues, compared with 
45% last year. 
Graph I.5.8: Council policy invitations on this year’s SCPs by 
type of measure (as a % of total measures) 
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5.4.2. Last year’s COs and policy initiatives 
contained in this year’s SCPs 
A relevant question when analysing and assessing 
the reform measures included in the 2009-2010 
SCPs is to what extent they follow the policy 
invitations issued by the Council in last year’s 
COs. 
Last year, 19 Member States received a policy 
invitation relating to the reform of fiscal 
frameworks.(34) Of these, 7 Member States 
included measures in the 2009-2010 SCPs which 
follow (at least partly) their policy invitations, 
while the initiatives of the remaining 12 Member 
State are not in line with the recommendations.  
In conclusion, in spite of the significant number of 
invitations addressing the reform of domestic fiscal 
frameworks, the fulfilment of the policy invitations 
included in the previous round of Council 
Opinions is rather limited. 
5.4.3. The 2009-2010 SCPs and the 
Commission’s assessments 
Finally, an additional interesting exercise consist 
of looking at the Macro Financial Assessment of 
the last round of SCPs to see how the Commission 
has evaluated the reforms announced in the 
updates.(35)  
The assessment is somewhat negative (or mixed in 
same cases) with respect the measures included in 
the SCPs of 10 Member States. For instance, the 
assessment of the recent initiatives in BG points to 
likely counterproductive effects in terms of 
transparency. While in the case of BE, ES and MT 
the update does not foresees major reforms, the 
assessment underlies the need for further 
improvements in their national fiscal frameworks. 
As for CZ, EI, EL, FR, LV and UK the assessment 
considers that progress has been made recently. 
However, in all these countries there is significant 
room for additional improvements and the 
assessment puts forward some policy proposals to 
strengthen the current framework.  
 
                                                          
(34) Those Member States that did not receive any policy 
recommendation in the field of fiscal governance were CZ, 
DK, ES, CY, LU, NL, FI and SE. 
(35) At the time this chapter was being prepared, the 
assessments of the updated programme of Portugal and 
Cyprus were note yet available.  
Although there is still margin for further progress 
to effectively strengthen fiscal governance, the 
Commission concludes that important 
improvements have been achieved (or can be 
achieved if the envisaged measures are 
implemented) in 10 Members States (i.e. DE, EE, 
IT, HU, AT, LT, PL, RO, SI, and SK).  
Finally, no significant weaknesses are identified in 
the case of DK, LU, NL, FI and SE.    
5.5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Following the 2009 Council Conclusions, a 
majority of Member States have included in their 
respective SCPs information related to the reform 
of domestic fiscal frameworks. Specifically, 21 EU 
countries report recent and/or future changes to be 
implemented in the next years. However, detailed 
information on the scope of these measures and/or 
an implementation calendar is only provided in 10 
cases.  
 By type of measure, changes to the existing 
budgetary procedures are the most frequent policy 
initiatives and are foreseen by 19 Member States. 
As for reforms related to numerical fiscal rules, 
they are envisaged in 13 SCPs, and the amendment 
of MTBFs or the introduction of new frameworks 
is reported by 10 countries. Finally, policy 
initiatives in relation to independent institutions 
are limited to 3 Member States. 
Most of the measures targeting the upgrading of 
the existing budgetary procedures are related to 
transparency issues, programme and performance 
budgeting and monitoring mechanisms. By 
contrast, those elements of the budget process most 
conducive to fiscal discipline (i.e. the 
centralisation of the budget process and the use of 
top-down budgeting) are hardly addressed. 
The announced reforms of fiscal rules are for the 
most part based on the introduction of 19 new 
rules, while only 2 countries announce the reform 
of existing rules. 8 of these new rules establish 
constraints on expenditure developments while 
new budget balance and debt rules amount to 6 and 
5, respectively. No new revenue rules are foreseen. 
Changes to MTBFs consist of both the reform of 
the existing frameworks and the introduction of 
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new ones (4 and 6 Member States respectively). 
Three countries not having in place a MTBF in 
2008 announce now the introduction of a new 
framework. Overall, the total number of MTBFs 
currently amounts to 25. 
The resort to independent fiscal institutions is by 
far the less frequent policy initiative according to 
the updates. In only 3 Member States the 
introduction of such bodies acting in the field of 
fiscal policy is announced. 
Similarly to the previous round of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, the draft Council 
Opinions on the 2009-2010 SCPs continue to show 
a majority of policy invitations targeting the 
improvement of the prevailing budgetary 
procedures. However, there has been now a 
significant increase in recommendations requesting 
a reinforcement of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms of fiscal targets. In addition, the sum 
of those policy invitations more directly linked to 
fiscal discipline (i.e. rules, monitoring and 
enforcement procedures and the overseeing of 
spending developments) represents by far the main 
area of this year’s policy invitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In spite of the significant number of recent or 
announced reforms of domestic fiscal frameworks, 
compliance in relation to the last year's policy 
invitations is rather limited. Only in 7 cases the 
measures contained in the 2009-2010 SCPs follow 
(at least partly) last year’s policy invitations.  
To conclude, the Macro Financial Assessments of 
the programmes are somewhat mixed with respect 
the measures included in the SCPs of 10 Member 
States. By contrast, the evaluation of the recently 
implemented or envisaged measures is rather 
positive in other 10 EU countries. However, the 
Commission considers that supplementary policy 
initiatives would be needed with a view to 
effectively strengthening fiscal governance. 
Finally, only in 5 countries, the existing 
frameworks do not seem to present major 
weaknesses. The assessments for CY and PT were 
not yet ready at the time this analysis was 
conducted.  
 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
 
 

SUMMARY 
Budgetary surveillance is a key factor in 
improving the management of the public finances. 
At a time with increased debt and deficits, and 
larger than usual uncertainty about the short and 
medium term evolution of the underlying 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the structure within 
which fiscal policy is set will be key in guiding 
policy making. Addressing the upcoming 
challenges successfully will require strong fiscal 
frameworks at both EU and national level. 
At an EU level, the implementation of budgetary 
surveillance was deeply affected from the start of 
the crisis, due to the need to support aggregate 
demand around Europe through fiscal policy, as 
monetary policy reached its lower bound. The 
European rules-based fiscal framework, which 
requires Member States to avoid excessive deficits 
and to achieve their medium-term budgetary 
objectives (MTOs), was not conceived to cater for 
such extraordinary circumstances. However, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, following the changes 
of the 2005 reform has proved flexible enough to 
accommodate a coordinated budgetary stimulus 
via the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP), while anchoring Member States' medium-
term policies by requiring commitment to timely 
budgetary consolidation beyond reversing the 
budgetary stimulus.   
Section II.1 discusses how the Stability and 
Growth Pact was implemented through the crisis 
and what it means for the exit strategies which are 
beginning to be implemented. Taking account of 
the principles agreed for fiscal exit by the ECOFIN 
Council in October 2009, country-specific 
circumstances are key to its implementation. For 
countries under the Excessive Deficits Procedure 
(EDP), the fiscal effort required and the timeline 
over which it is to be implemented have been 
modulated in light of the overall fiscal situation, 
including primarily deficit and debt levels but also 
other indicators of fiscal and macro-financial risk. 
There has been closer attention paid to long-term 
sustainability issues and the quality of the national 
fiscal frameworks, which provide the structure 
within which fiscal policy is implemented, through 
the issuance of specific recommendations on these 
issues.  
 
Applying the EDP under the circumstances of a 
financial crisis with large capital injections and 
support measures for the financial sector requires 
consistent measurement of the cost of these 
measures. Section II.2 reviews the 15 July 2009 
Eurostat decision, which set out accounting 
guidelines for public interventions carried out in 
the context of the financial crisis. The need for 
elaborating on the applicable accounting rules 
became evident, as measures taken by Member 
States in support of the financial sector often 
involved innovative and complex financial 
transactions, the statistical treatment of which 
could not have been fully foreseen by the ESA95 
rules. Section II.2 devotes particular attention to 
two special cases, the recording of which can be 
particularly intricate. These are the liquidity 
schemes and the majority privately-owned special 
purpose entities.  
Both the principles of the EU fiscal framework and 
the experience with past consolidations confirm 
the importance of strong national fiscal 
frameworks for achieving the maintaining sound 
public finances. Section II.3 looks into the 
components of fiscal frameworks in more detail in 
order to draw conclusions about desirable reforms 
against the unprecedented challenge of fiscal 
consolidation stemming from the crisis. 
Domestic fiscal frameworks comprise the 
arrangements, procedures and institutions 
governing the planning and implementation of 
budgetary policies.  Their main components are 
numerical fiscal rules, independent fiscal 
institutions and budgetary procedures including 
medium-term budgetary frameworks for multi-
annual budgetary planning. The exact combination 
of these that will ensure optimal policy will differ 
on a country by country basis, but expenditure 
rules and an emphasis on mechanisms to enforce 
medium term plans effectively appear to be key to 
successfully managing fiscal policy. What is clear, 
is that the interaction of the various facets of 
domestic fiscal frameworks is of central 
importance and all the elements that comprise and 
influence them should be considered together in a 
holistic way when changes are implemented. In 
parallel, in order for the fiscal framework to 
function effectively, statistical reporting, 
accounting and monitoring issues must function up 
to minimum standards; the strengthening of these 
fundamentals must take place before the fiscal 
framework becomes more constraining. Finally, 
despite the importance of domestic frameworks 
and the need to adjust and strengthen them to aid 
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the consolidation process, they are not a panacea 
and cannot be a substitute for political 
commitment to fiscal discipline.  
Within the European framework, budgetary targets 
should reflect the medium-term objectives (MTOs) 
of the SGP. These set out the position that each 
Member State should aim to reach in order to 
ensure medium and long term sustainability while 
maintaining an adequate safety margin with regard 
to the 3% deficit limit and allowing room for 
budgetary manoeuvre. The 2005 reform of the 
SGP explicitly recognised the need for the MTOs 
to take into account implicit liabilities related to 
ageing, but left the modalities of its 
implementation to be defined. Section II.4 presents 
the principles that have been recently agreed for 
incorporating the budgetary cost of ageing in the 
MTOS while also giving appropriate weight to the 
initial level of debt. 
The final two sections of Part II look at the 
measurement of the underlying fiscal stance in 
more detail. The ability to adequately assess the 
underlying budgetary position is important to both 
EU surveillance and overall policy setting. The 
experience of the crisis has highlighted some of the 
weaknesses of the methodologies used; in 
particular additional revenues received during the 
boom were in many cases considered to be 
structural improvements in the underlying position 
rather than temporary additions due to exceptional 
conditions. 
Despite persisting problems, in recent years there 
have been important developments in the 
measurement of the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance (CAB). Section II.2 discusses these 
developments within the context of the work 
undertaken at the European Commission with 
Member States, through the Output Gap Working 
Group and the Economic Policy Committee. A 
first aspect is the improvement in the measurement 
of potential output. The current production 
function approach can only yield accurate 
estimates after a considerable lag, leading to 
frequent revisions in the estimates. By including 
real-time capacity utilisation data in the estimation 
of the output gap, it is possible to improve the 
accuracy and reduce ex post revisions. Another 
problem is posed by variations in tax elasticities.  
The assumption of constant tax elasticities relative 
to the tax bases may have contributed to EU 
governments overestimating their underlying or 
structural tax revenues. In turn, these 
overestimations of revenues supported either tax 
cuts or increases in spending that proved 
unsustainable in retrospect. By using data collected 
at a national level on the discretionary changes 
made to tax categories, it is possible to improve 
our understanding of how net tax elasticities vary 
and to analyse EU governments' discretionary 
fiscal policy choices in the run-up to the 
2008/2009 crisis. 
The methodology used to estimate the CAB also 
implicitly assumes that all tax bases are linked to 
output. However, recent experience highlights the 
importance of deviations of domestic demand from 
output for tax revenues. This can be particularly 
important in booms involving buoyant domestic 
demand and widening current account deficits. 
Section II.6 presents a complementary indicator, 
the cyclically and absorption adjusted budget 
balance (CAAB), which considers deviations in 
absorption, as well as output, from its 'potential' 
level. This 'potential' corresponds to the level of 
absorption when the country's current account 
balance is in line with fundamentals.  
Overall, the CAB and the CAAB move in parallel. 
However, in countries with large deficits or 
surpluses in the current account, there can be 
substantial divergences between the two measures. 
This is evident in looking at the pre-crisis period. 
The CAAB of Member States with large current 
account deficits was in many cases more than 1 
percentage point (and up to more than 3 percentage 
points for Bulgaria) lower than the CAB. Use of 
the absorption adjusted measure for the budget 
balance during the boom could have helped 
prevent the loosening of fiscal policy, which then 
resulted in the need for greater consolidation once 
the deficits deteriorated with the onset of the crisis. 
Conversely, in countries with large current account 
surpluses, the CAAB was considerably higher than 
the CAB (up to 1 percentage point for Germany 
and the Netherlands and more for Sweden).  
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The unprecedented economic and budgetary 
developments profoundly affected the 
implementation of fiscal surveillance in the EU. 
Since the first signals that economic and financial 
crisis started in the late summer of 2007 would 
have had significant implications for the European 
economies, some commentators rose doubts about 
the opportunity to continue applying the rule-based 
fiscal framework, which they considered an 
obstacle to the adoption of a fiscal policy aimed a 
macroeconomic stabilisation. However, the 
flexibility introduced by the 2005 reform has 
allowed pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy at 
the EU and euro area level, without suspending the 
fiscal policy framework enshrined in the 
Treaty.(36)  
Despite some difficulties, the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) not only 
continues playing a key role in anchoring 
expectations of sustainability, but has also 
provided a highly useful framework for co-
ordination during a crisis that has exposed the need 
for a enhanced co-operation at European and 
global level. It has been recognised as particularly 
important to guide the exit phase from the 
extraordinary fiscal measures adopted in response 
to the crisis. Confirming the Conclusions of the 
October’s Council of finance ministers (Ecofin), in 
December 2009, the European Council emphasised 
that “the fiscal exit strategy will be implemented 
within the framework of the SGP, which remains 
the cornerstone of the EU's budgetary framework” 
(See Box II.1.1).  
While the rules and principles of the SGP are 
relevant and valid, the existing mechanisms have 
failed to induce countries to build up adequate 
buffers in good times. To the end of improving 
economic governance in the EU, the Commission 
has adopted on 12 May 2010 a Communication on 
'Reinforcing economic policy coordination (See 
Box II.1.3). 
                                                          
(36) The EU fiscal framework is enshrined in Articles 121 and 
126 of the Treaty. In particular, Article 126 sets out the 
excessive deficit procedure. The two regulations and the 
Council agreement referred to as Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) further specify how the fiscal surveillance envisaged 
by the Treaty is implemented.  
1.1. FISCAL EXPANSION OVER 2009-2010, 
CONDITIONAL ON FISCAL SPACE 
Based on the requirements for Member States to 
avoid excessive deficits as well as to achieve and 
maintain their medium-term budgetary objectives 
(MTO), the EU fiscal framework was conceived to 
be implemented in a context significantly different 
from the exceptional ones unleashed by the current 
crisis. Its raison d’être is to secure fiscal discipline 
and the sustainability of public finances that are 
necessary to maintaining an economic 
environment in which monetary policy can 
effectively purse price stability. However, the 
financial nature of this crisis weakened the 
traditional monetary transmission mechanism and 
the zero rate interest bound came in sight. In the 
distinctive context of unusually large output gaps 
and unusual reduction in the potency of monetary 
policy, fiscal policy has been called to supporting a 
plummeting aggregate demand. 
The European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), 
launched by the Commission in November 2008 
and confirmed by the European Council in 
December 2008, envisaged a co-ordinated 
budgetary stimulus.(37) The EERP noted that 
Member States should take advantage of the 
framework offered by the SGP and anchored to it 
the counter-cyclical macro-economic response, 
specifying that Member States should commit to 
reverse the budgetary deterioration and return to 
the aims set out in the medium term objectives. 
The EERP also indicated that, to maximise its 
impact, the budgetary stimulus should take account 
of the different room for fiscal manoeuvre of each 
Member State. For Member States facing 
significant external and internal imbalances, 
budgetary policy should essentially aim at 
correcting such imbalances. 
For some Member States outside the euro area, the 
reversals of international capital flows and the 
ensuing financing difficulties made soon evident 
the need for urgent fiscal correction. In particular, 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania have undertaken 
adjustment programs supported by financial 
assistance for their balances of payment from the 
(37) See Box I.1.1. 
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 Box II.1.1: Fiscal exit strategy: principles agreed by the Ecofin Council on 20 October 2009
• The exit strategy should be coordinated across countries in the framework of a consistent 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
• There is a need for timely withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus. Provided that the Commission forecasts 
continue to indicate that the recovery is strengthening and becomes self-sustaining,   fiscal consolidation 
in all EU Member States should start in 2011 at the latest. Specificities of country situations should be 
taken into account, and a number of countries need to consolidate before then. 
• In view of the challenges, the planned pace of the fiscal consolidation should be ambitious, and will 
have to go well beyond the benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per annum in structural terms in most Member 
States. 
• Important flanking policies to the fiscal exit will include strengthened national budgetary frameworks 
for underpinning the credibility of consolidation strategies and measures to support long-term fiscal 
sustainability, as emphasised by the SGP. In addition; structural reform efforts should be strengthened to 
enhance productivity and to support long-term investment.  
These elements should be reflected in the stability and convergence programmes, to be transmitted by 
Member States to the Commission by the end of January 2010. 
 
 
EU, the IMF and other bilateral and multilateral 
sources (See Box II.1.2).  
1.2. THE SGP AND THE FISCAL EXIT STATEGY 
 
In October 2009, the Ecofin Council agreed on 
principles for the fiscal exit strategies making 
explicit that the exit strategy should be coordinated 
across countries in a framework of a consistent 
implementation of the SGP (See Box II.1.1). In 
particular, the differentiation of fiscal 
consolidation on the basis of the different 
countries’ situations is one of the key principles of 
fiscal exit strategy agreed by the Council. This 
point has also to be seen in relation to the 
expansionary fiscal policy that the EERP called to 
be implemented over 2009-2010: in some 
countries the structural fiscal balance will still be 
deteriorating in 2010, while, in view of the higher 
fiscal risks, other Member States, even if not 
subject to EDP, should be already consolidating. 
By ensuring a horizontal consistency across 
countries that does not imply equalisation of the 
effort required but, instead, an effort coherent with 
the fiscal and macrofinancial situation, the 
implementation of the SGP allows for a 
coordination of fiscal policy through the exit from 
the crisis, which, in turn is aimed at balancing 
stabilisation and sustainability concerns.  
Based on a macroeconomic scenario in the 
Commission forecasts that expects real GDP 
growth returning positive while the fiscal stimulus 
is gradually withdrawn, all Council 
recommendations for the correction of the 
excessive deficit, as well as the Council invitations 
in the Opinions on the 2009-2010 Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, envisage fiscal 
consolidation to start in 2011 at the latest. To the 
extent that the recorded output losses reflect 
supply shocks and adjustment needs (commodity 
prices, risk premia increases, overinvestment, 
construction capacity, etc.), it is illusory and 
counterproductive to try to use fiscal policy to 
stabilise output at a pre-crisis level, as this would 
bring the economy further away from its 
adjustment path and endanger fiscal sustainability.  
As indicated by the Council, in most Member 
States the pace of fiscal consolidation goes well 
beyond the benchmark of 0.5 of a percentage point 
of GDP per annum. In fact, the structural 
deterioration in deficit and debt position induced 
by the crisis has been such that a recovery in the 
economy and a withdrawal of the stimulus 
measures adopted in line with the EERP will be in 
most cases insufficient to put public finances back 
on a sustainable path (see illustrative projections 
for the government debt-to-GDP in Section III.2). 
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The Council recalled that the intensification of 
structural reforms is desirable to foster potential 
output growth, which would contribute to a 
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. As indicated 
above, where they could have a more direct impact 
on public finances, the Council has addressed to 
some countries recommendations and invitations 
to implement structural reforms, particularly with 
regard to the social security system. Different 
reforms aimed at enhancing productivity also 
feature as invitations in the Council Opinions on 
the SCPs. Last but not least, strong national fiscal 
rules and institutions are essential for 
implementing the fiscal strategy with the best mix 
of enhancing sustainability, strengthening the 
supply side of the economy and minimising the 
output loss. Anchoring the consolidation in 
medium-term budgetary frameworks with strong 
expenditure control enhances credibility, which 
may positively affect demand and reduce the risk 
of high spreads and market turbulence. 
Accordingly, the Council included the 
strengthening of fiscal frameworks among the 
agreed flanking policy to exit.  
 
                                                          
1.3. ONGOING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FISCAL EXIT STRATEGY THROUGH THE EDP 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of the budgetary impact of the crisis, as 
well as of the adoption of fiscal stimulus measures, 
a majority of Member States recorded a deficit 
above the 3% of GDP reference value in the Treaty 
in 2009, with several countries breaching the 
threshold already in 2008. Ensuing from a severe 
economic downturn, the excess of the deficit over 
the 3% of GDP can be considered as exceptional. 
However, excessive deficit procedures had to be  
 
 
 
 
 
opened to recommend a fiscal adjustment, as the 
deficits did not remain close to the reference value, 
and the excess over the reference value could be 
expected not to be temporary.(38) In December 
2009, the number of countries subject to excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) reached twenty. On the 
basis of the 2009 deficit outturns and the 2010 
planned deficit notified in April 2010, Reports 
under Article 126(3) will have to be prepared/have 
been prepared for other five Member States.   
According to the SGP, where special 
circumstances exist, the Member State may be 
allowed to correct its excessive deficit in a 
medium-term framework, rather than in the year 
following its identification. This provision has 
permitted granting relatively long deadlines for the 
correction of the excessive deficit, allowing 
implementing corrective action in time frames 
consistent with the recovery of the economy, 
except for cases of immediate sustainability risks. 
Furthermore, differently from past practice, in the 
recommendations for the correction of the 
excessive deficit the fiscal effort that the 
concerned Member State should ensure over the 
programme period has been specified in terms of 
an annual average, thus leaving some room for 
adjusting the degree of frontloading/backloading 
of the adjustment path. This is also in line with 
recommendations paying attention to the quality 
and the sustainability of the consolidation rather 
than only the achievement of a nominal or 
structural benchmark for the deficit. The lack of a 
firm annual benchmark should not be taken to 
mean that countries can backload all the 
adjustment to the outer years of the correction, 
particularly as the year when the consolidation 
should start is specified. (39)  
(38) See Section I.2 for details on the ongoing EDPs. 
(39) The starting year indicated in Table II.1.1 represents the 
year from which the average fiscal effort specified in the 
EDP recommendations should be computed. This does not 
necessarily match the starting year reccomended for 
consolidation, which, in a few countries is ongoing since 
2009. However, for most countries consolidation is set to 
begin in 2010. For Austria, the Netherlands and Germany, 
consolidation is recommended to start in 2011.  
       The Council Decision of May 2010 giving notice to Greece 
to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary 
in order to remedy the situation of excessive deficit by 
2014 includes targets in nominal terms.    
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The flexibility introduced by the reform in 2005 
has notably permitted extending some of the 
originally deadlines recommended when the 
economic downturn turned out even more 
pronounced than initially expected. Namely, all the 
deadlines for the correction of excessive deficit set 
in spring 2009 (for Greece, Ireland, France, Spain 
and the United Kingdom (40)) were revised 
following the assessment of effective action 
(inadequate action in the case of Greece), as the 
impact of the deeper-than-expected contraction on 
the government accounts qualified as an 
“unexpected economic event with major 
unfavourable consequences for government 
finances”.  Deadlines for Malta and Lithuania, set 
in July 2009 were also revised in February 2010. 
Instead, there was no reason to change the deadline 
for correction recommended, also in July 2009, to 
Poland and Latvia. The target years for correction 
were normally postponed by one year, except for 
Greece and Hungary, which were granted an 
extension by two years. In the case of Greece, the 
postponement was consistent with a stepping up of 
the excessive deficit procedure. For Hungary, it 
concerned the revision of a Council 
recommendation issued back in 2006, which 
                                                          
(40) In the case of the United Kingdom, the new 
recommendation under Article 104(7) issued by the 
Council on 27 April 2009 followed the assessment that 
action was not taken in response to the recommendation 
that the Council addressed to the UK on 8 July 2008. 
targeted a correction of the excessive deficit by 
2009.  
Table II.1.1 highlights some key features of the 
ongoing EDPs. In particular, it shows that the 
different deadlines recommended do not aim at 
ensuring an identical annual fiscal effort across 
Member States. Quite the opposite, in line with the 
principle agreed by the Council that specificities of 
country situation should be taken into account, the 
recommended fiscal effort vary significantly, 
reflecting the starting budgetary position and, to 
some extent, the very different degree of fiscal and 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities.  
Table II.1.1 also shows that some Member States 
have received recommendations to strengthen the 
fiscal framework and/or implement reforms with a 
direct bearing on fiscal sustainability, such as 
pension reform. In particular, with regard fiscal 
frameworks, the consolidation experiences in the 
run-up to EMU and over the past decade have 
shown that countries with strong medium-term 
budgetary frameworks and expenditure rules 
managed to meet budgetary plans and sustain 
consolidation efforts. (41) Accordingly, where 
frameworks are currently less performing, their 
strengthening is recommended to support the 
(41) For a discussion on the role of budgetary framework in 
sustaining consolidation efforts, see European Commission 
(2008). 
 
Table II.1.1: Recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
Annual average (p.p. 
of GDP) Starting year
Budgetary 
framework Sustainability
BE 2009 2012 5.9 ¾ 2010
CZ 2009 2013 6.6 1 2010 yes
DE 2009 2013 3.4 ≥0.5 2011
IE 2008 2014 12.5 2 2010 yes yes
EL (1) 2007 2014 13.6 >2 2010 specific measures specific measures
ES 2008 2013 11.2 >1.5 2010
FR 2008 2013 8.3 >1 2010
IT 2009 2012 5.3 ≥0.5 2010
LV 2008 2012 10.0 ≥2¾ 2010 yes
LT 2008 2012 9.8 2¼ 2010 yes
HU 2003 2011 3.9 ≥cumulative 0.5 over 2010-2011 2010 yes
MT 2008 2011 4.5 ¾ 2011 yes
NL 2009 2013 4.7 ¾ 2011
AT 2009 2013 4.3 ¾ 2011
PL 2008 2012 6.0 ≥1¼ 2010 yes
PT 2009 2013 8.0 1¼ 2010 yes
RO 2008 2012 7.8 1¾ 2010 yes yes
SI 2009 2013 6.3 ¾ 2010 yes
SK 2009 2013 6.3 1 2010 yes
UK 2008/09 2014/15 13.0 1¾ 2010/11 yes
(1) Council Decision under articles 126(9) and 136 adopted on 10 May 2010. 
EDP          
triggering deficit Deadline
Estimated 2009 
deficit in the 
recommendation (% 
of GDP)         
Fiscal effort Recommendations on
Source: Commission services 
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implementation of the sheer fiscal adjustment 
needed over the relatively long period envisaged 
for the correction. Recommendations addressing 
long-term sustainability normally require the 
implementation of reforms capable of curbing age-
related expenditure growth for those countries 
having a poor performance according to the 
sustainability gap indicator, specifically its cost of 
ageing component (see Section I.4). These reforms 
ensure a reduction in the size of the further 
adjustment needed to put public finances on a 
sound footing beyond the correction of the 
excessive deficit and have a positive effect on 
potential growth. 
addressed on 10 May 2010 to Greece with a view 
to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance 
and giving notice to take measures for the deficit 
reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation 
of excessive deficit. (45)  The Decision sets 
nominal targets for the government deficit over 
2010-2014 and specifies in detail the measures, 
including structural reforms, to adopt in 2010 and 
2011. The stability support provided to Greece 
(See Box I.2.2) is conditional on Greece respecting 
this Decision.   
The case of recommendations going beyond the 
simple specification of a deadline for correction of 
the excessive deficit and related fiscal effort sees 
its farthest application in the case of Greece, for 
which for first time the budgetary and economic 
surveillance instruments foreseen in the Treaty 
have been used simultaneously and in an 
integrated way. On recommendation by the 
Commission, (42) on 12 February 2010,  the 
Council (i) stepped up the excessive deficit 
procedure for Greece by adopting a decision under 
Articles 126(9) and (ii) issued a recommendation 
under Article 121(4) to Greece with a view to 
bringing its economic policies into line with the 
EU's Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). 
The Council called on Greece to implement 
specific consolidation measures and adopt a 
comprehensive structural reform package to 
increase the competitiveness of the economy by 
indicated deadlines.(43) All these elements were 
further developed and specified in the Council 
decision under Articles 126(9) and 136 (44)  
 
                                                          
 
 
                                                          
(42) The Commission also launched an infringement procedure 
to ensure the Greek authorities comply with their duty to 
report reliable budgetary statistics.   
(43) Measures requested and carried out by Greece in the 
aftermath of the 126(9) notice include a reduction of public 
wages, a freeze of pensions, cuts in government financing 
to social security,  increase in VAT rates and excise taxes. 
(44) Article 136(1)(a) foresees the possibility of adopting 
measures specific to the Member States whose currency is 
the euro with a view to strengthening the coordination and 
surveillance of their budgetary discipline. 
As the sovereign debt crisis risked spreading 
across other euro-area economies, the Council of 9 
and 10 May also decided on the establishment of a 
European Stabilisation Mechanism (See Box 
II.1.2). In the same meeting, the Council agreed 
that plans for fiscal consolidation and structural 
reforms would be accelerated, where warranted, 
and welcomed the commitment of Portugal and 
Spain to take significant additional consolidation 
measures in 2010 and 2011. 
On 12 May the Commission issued a 
Communication on 'Reinforcing economic policy 
coordination. It suggests reinforcing fiscal 
surveillance and recognises the need to expand 
economic surveillance and deepen the analysis 
beyond the budgetary dimension to address other 
macroeconomic imbalances (See Box II.1.4). 
 
(45) According to the preliminary assessment carried out by the 
Commission in March 2010, Greece was implementing the 
measures required in the original 126(9) Decision issued in 
February. However, the abrupt change in the economic 
scenario required the issuance of revised recommendations. 
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 Box II.1.2: Establishing a European stabilisation mechanism
As the risk of contagion of the sovereign debt crisis spread towards vulnerable euro-area Member States, the 
Council and the Member States decided on 10 May 2010 on a comprehensive package of measures to 
preserve financial stability in Europe, including a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and 
a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), able together to provide support for a total volume of up to 
EUR 500 billion.  
The EFSM is based on Art. 122.2 of the Treaty, which foresees that Union financial assistance may be 
granted to Member States threatened by severe difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond their 
control. This instrument allows the Commission to borrow in financial markets up to about EUR 60 billion 
on behalf of the Union under an implicit EU budget guarantee. The Commission then on-lends the proceeds 
to the beneficiary Member State. This lending arrangement implies that there is no debt-servicing cost for 
the Community: all interest and loan principal is repaid by the beneficiary Member State via the 
Commission. The EU budget guarantees the repayment of the bonds in case of default by the borrower. The 
mechanism, which is open to all EU countries, will operate without prejudice to the existing facility 
providing medium term financial assistance for non euro area Member States' balance of payments (see Box 
II.1.3).  
Euro area Member States stand ready to complement the resources of the EFSM through the EFSF, up to a 
volume of EUR 440 billion. The EFSF takes the form of a Special Purpose Vehicle that will (if and where 
needed) issue bonds on the markets with the pro rata guarantee of euro area Member States, in accordance 
with their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central Bank. The EFSF then on-lends the proceeds 
to the beneficiary Member States.  
The activation of these mechanisms is subject to strong policy conditionality, i.e. in order to receive the 
instalments of assistance the concerned Member State has to implement a wide ranging set of policy 
measures designed to restore its fiscal viability and competitiveness. The IMF will participate in financing 
arrangements and is expected to provide at least half as much as the EU contribution through its usual 
facilities, jointly with the European programmes.  
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 Box II.1.3: Balance-of-payments assistance and policy conditionality
The Community can provide balance-of-payments support to non-euro area Member States 
through its medium-term financial assistance facility under Article 119 of the Treaty. The 
assistance (1) aims to overcome short-term liquidity constraints while, through policy 
conditionality, supporting the correction of underlying macroeconomic and financial imbalances. 
The funds for the loans under the Facility are raised by the Commission (on behalf of the 
Community) on financial markets, and are on-lent to the recipient country at the same conditions 
(i.e., the borrowing country benefits from the AAA credit rating of the Community).   
In order to be able to respond effectively to the crisis environment, the ceiling for the EU 
balance-of-payments Facility was raised from €12 to €25 billion in late 2008 and further to €50 
billion on 5 May 2009. A total €14.6 billion has been committed under the Facility, following the 
approval of loans to Hungary (€6.5 billion, Latvia (€3.1 billion) and Romania (€5 billion). 
While the facility is in principle a free-standing instrument, in practice the Community financial 
assistance is provided in the context of broader concerted financing packages, involving other 
stakeholders as appropriate (IMF, World Bank, other IFIs, bilaterals). This enhances the leverage 
and effectiveness of the financial support.  
Policy conditionality in the context of the EU balance-of-payments assistance focuses on the key 
challenges that need to be tackled to restore a sustainable external position; in the ongoing 
programmes for Hungary, Latvia and Romania these have been fiscal policy, fiscal governance, 
financial stability (including rescue packages and strengthening of supervision and regulation) 
and structural reforms. Policy conditionality is enshrined in a Memorandum of Understanding 
agreed with the authorities. The fiscal targets in the Memorandum reflect the Member States’ 
obligations under the SGP, particularly in terms of compliance with EDP recommendations. The 
reforms of the budgetary framework and of the pension systems recommended under the EDP are 
specified more in detail in the Memorandum of Understanding.  The Commission monitors 
compliance with conditionality and decides on the release of subsequent instalments, following 
consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC). 
Up to April 2010, disbursements under the three ongoing programmes have amounted to €10.7
billion (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Balance-of-payments assistance 
Hungary Latvia 1/ Romania
Total assistance package €20 bn €7.5 bn €20 bn
EU (Art. 119) €6.5 bn €3.1 bn €5 bn
IMF €12.5 bn €1.7 bn €12.95 bn
Other multilaterals €1 bn €0.5 bn €2 bn
Bilaterals … €2.2 bn/1 …
p.m. Disbursements by the EU    2/ €5.5 bn €2.7 bn €2.5 bn
Notes: 1/ Contributions by Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia.
            2/ Disbursements as of 15 April 2010.
Sources:  European Commission and IMF.
                                                          
(1) The facility is governed by Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002.  
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 Box II.1.4: Reinforcing compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and deeper fiscal 
policy coordination: The Commission Communication of 12 May 2010
The global economic crisis has challenged the current mechanisms of economic policy coordination in the
European Union and revealed their weaknesses. The functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union has 
been under particular stress, as highlighted by the recent experiences with Greece in particular, due to 
insufficient coordination during the crisis and earlier failure to comply with the underlying rules and 
principles. The existing surveillance procedures have not been comprehensive enough.  
To the end of improving economic governance in the EU and remedying the said situation with measures 
that should be taken in the short term on the basis of the Treaty, the Commission has adopted a 
Communication on 12 May 2010, entitled 'Reinforcing economic policy coordination'. (1) That
Communication, apart from suggesting a strengthening of compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, 
also proposes to extend surveillance to macro-economic imbalances in euro area Member States using a 
scoreboard with key indicators and to set up a crisis resolution mechanism for the same countries. Its main 
messages and suggestions for improving budgetary surveillance under title III.1 regarding fiscal policy are 
as follows: 
The rules and principles of the Stability and Growth Pact are relevant and valid. But, the Pact has failed to 
induce countries to build up adequate buffers in good times. Reinforcing the preventive dimension of 
budgetary surveillance must be an integral part of closer coordination of fiscal policy. Also, compliance with 
the rules needs to be improved and more focus needs to be given to the sustainability of public finances. 
• The preparation and assessment of Stability and Convergence Programmes forms the core of the 
preventive work under the Pact. Its impact and effectiveness should be decisively strengthened by 
increasing the ex-ante dimension of the process, and by giving it teeth. The former is addressed below 
through the introduction of a "European semester". The latter could be done, for example, by including 
the possibility of imposing interest-bearing deposits when Member States make insufficient progress
towards their budgetary Medium Term Objectives in good economic times.  
• National fiscal frameworks, i.e. the country-specific institutional policy settings that shape fiscal 
policy-making at the national level, should better reflect the priorities of EU budgetary surveillance. To 
give concrete meaning to the complementarity between the EU and national fiscal frameworks, the 
obligation in Protocol Nr 12 TFEU for Member States to have in place budgetary procedures that 
ensure compliance with their Treaty obligations on budgetary discipline could be specified through 
legally binding instruments. Such instruments would for instance require national frameworks to reflect 
multi-annual budgeting procedures. 
• The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) forms the cornerstone of the corrective part of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. But, the corrective dimension embedded in the EDP comes into play too late to provide 
the right incentives for Member States to tackle emerging fiscal imbalances. The functioning of the 
EDP could be improved by speeding up the procedures, in particular with regard to countries in 
repeated breach of the Pact.  
• More prominence should be given to public debt and sustainability, in view of mounting threats 
deriving from bank rescue packages and ageing populations in particular. Recent events have 
highlighted not only the vulnerability of Member States servicing a very large public debt burden, but 
also the potentially negative cross-border repercussions. High indebtedness weighs on medium- and 
long-term growth prospects and deprives governments of the ability to run credible counter-cyclical 
policies when needed. The debt criterion of the excessive deficit procedure should effectively be 
                                                          
(1) COM (2010) 250 final, 12/05/2010: 'Reinforcing economic policy coordination'  
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 risks stemming from explicit and implicit liabilities should be taken into account as relevant factor. 
Symmetrically, the abrogation of the EDP for Member States with debt in excess of the 60% of GDP 
threshold should be conditional on an assessment of projected debt developments and risks. Indeed the 
EDP should better take into account the interplay between debt and deficit to improve incentives to run 
prudent policies.  
• To ensure better compliance with the Pact, more attention should also be paid to the use of EU funds. 
Currently this only comes in at a relatively late stage of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, when a 
country has already failed to comply with recommendations to correct the excessive deficit (Art. 126.8 
of the TFEU), and then only for recipients of cohesion funds, which are subject to the possible 
suspension of the commitments under the instrument. Moreover, this provision does not help the
country concerned to address the underlying reasons of the excessive deficit. So in order to support 
Member States to safeguard the sustainability of the public finances, action should be taken much 
earlier than currently envisaged, and a broader range of EU funds should be considered.  
For example, conditionality could be enhanced or Member States could be asked to redirect funds to 
programmes and projects that would support revenue-raising or improve the quality of public finances, once 
a report on the existence of an excessive deficit has been prepared (Art. 126.3 of the TFEU). Changes in the 
use of EU funds in this regard could realistically only be introduced in the context of the next Financial 
Framework. Nevertheless, some related measures should be implemented still within the current period, 
such as accompanying recurrent breaches of the Pact by a more rigorous application of the existing clause 
on the suspension of cohesion fund commitments. 
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This section briefly discusses statistical issues in 
government sector accounting arising in the 
context of public interventions that were carried 
out in response to the financial crisis. In particular 
it reviews the 15 July 2009 Eurostat decision (the 
Decision) and its implications for the recording of 
government deficit and debt. The need for further 
elaborating the rules of ESA95 (46) emerged, as 
measures taken by Member States in support of the 
financial sector often involved innovative and 
complex financial transactions, the statistical 
treatment of which could not have been foreseen 
by the original ESA95. Two specific cases are 
explored in more detail in order to take a closer 
look at the application of these new rules, namely, 
the liquidity schemes (such as the Special 
Liquidity Scheme of the UK) and the classification 
of special purpose entities (such as the SFEF of 
France). 
2.1. ACCOUNTING ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE CRISIS 
ESA95 provides a comprehensive accounting 
framework that gives clear guidance on how to 
record the effects of tax and spending decisions by 
governments as well as governments' financial 
transactions. However, the complexity of some of 
the newly invented measures deployed to alleviate 
stress in financial markets called for the 
clarification of the existing accounting rules as to 
ensure appropriate statistical treatment.  
The new Eurostat decision considers seven types 
of transactions that were seen as particularly 
relevant with respect to 'public interventions to 
support financial institutions and financial markets 
during the financial crisis'. (47) While the specific 
characteristics of the individual interventions need 
                                                          
(46) ESA95 stands for European System of National and 
Regional Accounts. ESA95 is the EU version of the UN’s 
System of National Accounts (SNA1993). The ESA rules 
are in Council Regulation (EC) N° 2223/96 (OJ L 310, 
30.11.1996, p. 1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) N° 
1392/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(OJ L 324, 10.12.2007, p. 1). Based on the new edition of 
the SNA (SNA2008) the ESA system is currently being 
revised. The new regulation was originally foreseen to be 
adopted in 2010. 
(47) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/govern 
ment_finance_statistics/methodology/decisions_for_GFS 
to be assessed for statistical recording, the 
Decision set out guidelines, for each transaction 
type, on how the existing ESA95 accounting rules 
should be applied. (48) 
The consistency of treatment across the whole 
range of measures deployed by governments is 
particularly important when very different 
arrangements are used to achieve very similar 
economic purposes. In this respect, it is useful to 
remind that, according to ESA95, transactions are 
recorded according to their economic substance, 
rather than on the basis of their legal or 
administrative arrangements. For instance, one of 
the most pressing problem during the crisis was the 
general mistrust among monetary financial 
institutions (MFIs) stemming from the fact that it 
was impossible to know how much impaired assets 
affected the balance sheet of each institution. One 
option was to permanently remove these assets 
from the banks' balance sheets by selling them to a 
special body, a 'bad bank', which would therefore 
assume all risks associated with these assets. 
Another permanent solution was used in the 
Netherlands, where the government took over 
large part of the risks associated with these assets 
by 'exchanging' a preset stream of payments for the 
gains banks received from holding the impaired 
assets. Special liquidity schemes, like the one used 
in the UK, offer a more temporary solution. In this 
case the government or the central bank, for the 
duration of the crisis, would exchange the 
'infected' assets with trusted government bonds. 
Another temporary solution was found by France, 
where a designated institution, backed by state 
guarantees, was set up to provide medium-term 
funding to banks, this way buttressing the 
improperly functioning market.  
2.2. THE EUROSTAT DECISION 
The appropriate accounting treatment of 
recapitalisation, loan and guarantee type of 
transactions, as referred to by the Decision, were in 
(48) Section II.1 in the Public Finance Report 2009 discusses 
each decision in somewhat more detail. Furthermore, for 
the initiated reader, Eurostat also published a 
methodological note: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/methodol
ogy/guidance_accounting_rules 
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general less controversial among the statisticians 
for the reason that the existing rules were not 
called into question by the practices followed 
during the financial crisis. However, some 
specificities regarding the application of the rules 
deserve some attention. 
The accounting treatment of recapitalisations 
focuses on whether the government acts in a way 
comparable to a private investor; that is, whether 
or not the price paid for the shares or other equity 
bought exceeds their market price or fair value, or, 
equivalently, if the expected rate of return on the 
financial investment is deemed or not to be in line 
with the markets. ESA95 rules prescribe that the 
amount paid in excess of what would be a 
justifiable value has to be recorded as a deficit-
increasing transaction. The Decision recalls that 
EU State Aid rules could provide an appropriate 
benchmark for the valuation of the transactions. 
Similarly to the case of purchase of equity, in the 
statistical recording of purchase of assets 
(including securities and loans) and 
defeasance (49) the proper valuation of the 
transaction is crucial. During a financial crisis, 
however, when markets do not function normally 
or even may cease to exist, it may be difficult to 
determine the market price or the expected rate of 
return of the asset bought. To this end, the 
Decision set forth a decision tree to determine 
whether the price paid for these assets should be 
considered to reflect their fair market value. For 
the valuation of assets at the time of the purchase 
one could use the market value if a functioning 
market exists or if the assets were acquired in a 
way equivalent to a market (e.g. through auctions), 
or one could use the book value of the assets as a 
benchmark. If the above methods fail, the value 
should be determined based on an independent 
valuation, founded on a market-based approach. 
However, the so derived value of the assets has to 
be re-examined when they are eventually sold. If 
the price received for the assets by the government 
is higher than the determined market value, taking 
into account the market conditions under which the 
purchase and sale take place, a capital transfer 
must imputed at the time of the sale. 
 
                                                                                                                    
(49) An operation where the government directly buys impaired 
assets from MFIs or when these assets are moved to a 
separate body (a 'bad bank') in exchange for payments is 
referred to as financial defeasance. 
Granting a loan to a financial institution is 
normally recorded as a financial transaction and 
hence has no direct and immediate impact on the 
government deficit. On the other hand, when other 
than only economic considerations play a role and 
thus it is very likely that the loan will not be 
repaid, the funds transferred to the corporation by 
the government are recorded as a non-financial 
transaction (capital transfer). However, systematic 
future losses are hard to be inferred in times of 
financial crisis and thus this deficit-increasing case 
is likely to be less relevant for financial sector 
support measures. 
Contrary to the previous transaction types, 
guarantees are not recorded (50) and therefore have 
no impact on government accounts, until the 
moment they are actually called. As a corollary to 
this principle, guarantees must be recorded at 
issuance as a liability, with an accompanying 
capital transfer, when there is written or other 
irrefutable evidence that they will be called.  
The Decision also considered the accounting rules 
for exchange of assets and the classification of 
certain new bodies. These transaction types are 
discussed in the next subsection. 
2.3. APPLYING THE RULES TO SPECIAL CASES 
Some of the rescue measures taken in the context 
of the financial crisis included operations that were 
not clearly covered by the existing accounting 
framework or were used in a clearly different 
manner. Two examples are worthwhile 
mentioning: (i) special liquidity schemes and (ii) 
special purpose entities set up in the context of the 
financial crisis. 
Liquidity schemes 
The presence of illiquid or impaired assets on 
banks' balance sheets created problems when 
banks wanted to use their assets as collateral in 
normal financing operations. To address this 
problem, authorities temporarily exchanged these 
illiquid assets for liquid government securities 
(50) A contingent asset is nevertheless recorded as a financial 
asset in cases where the contractual arrangement itself has 
a market value because it is tradable or can be offset on the 
market. 
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agreeing to swap them back when the market for 
these assets has recovered. (51) Such an operation, 
however, not only required issuing large quantities 
of government securities, but needed to be 
arranged in such a way that the large risks 
associated with the illiquid assets would not be 
transferred to the government or the central bank. 
Typically, in such a liquidity scheme, the 
government lends newly issued (but never sold on 
the market) government securities to the central 
bank with no intervening payments in return, 
except for some service fee. The central bank then 
exchanges these securities for the impaired assets 
held by the financial institutions and agrees with 
them that the reverse exchange would take place 
before the issued government securities mature. 
This way, the balance sheets of the banks are 
'cleaned' of these illiquid assets, at least 
temporarily. To reduce the risk borne by the 
authorities, participating banks are requested to 
provide more illiquid assets in value than the value 
of the government securities they receive in 
exchange. 
The statistical recording of this complex operation 
was not clearly defined before the Decision. In a 
conventional stock-lending transaction without a 
flow in cash the ownership of the exchanged assets 
is not transferred, which implies that these 
transactions are not recorded in the system. 
Transactions within a liquidity scheme can be 
viewed as a sequence of 'stock-lending with no 
cash' operations. First, the government lends its 
own liabilities to the central bank and then the 
central bank lends these government securities on 
to other banks without any cash payments in 
return. These banks also lend their illiquid assets to 
the central bank without receiving offsetting cash 
collateral. In this interpretation no transaction 
would have to be recorded in the system (apart 
from the associated fees). 
Although a number of questions arise regarding 
the stock-lending interpretation of this operation, 
we will focus on one specific aspect here. Namely, 
should the government securities, issued for the 
special purpose of this scheme, be viewed as part 
of the outstanding stock of government gross debt? 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(51) Such a scheme, called Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS), 
was used in the UK starting as early as April 2008. 
The question is relevant, since in the above 
interpretation the economic ownership of the 
government securities is not transferred, and thus it 
still lies with the government, in which case 
government debt should not be affected. This is 
exemplified by the fact that the so issued 
government securities must be returned (re-
exchanged) to the central bank some time before 
their maturity. Consequently, no interest or 
principal payments are made related to these 
securities. (52) On the other hand, while being in 
the possession of the participating banks, these 
government liabilities can, in fact, be used as 
collateral or could be traded on the market. Hence, 
in reality they are indistinguishable from other 
government securities, which constitute the 
government debt. 
There is an alternative interpretation of liquidity 
schemes which would result in including these 
government securities in general government gross 
debt. This involves either assuming that the 
government securities do not remain in the 
economic ownership of the government (relevant 
for schemes operated via central banks) or that the 
operation is recorded as two parallel repurchase 
agreements, called back-to-back repos (for 
schemes operated directly by the government). 
The Decision has resolved this issue by stating that 
a liquidity scheme is to be recorded as a stock-
lending transaction (i.e. not affecting the 
consolidated gross debt) only when the exchange 
of assets is temporary and the risk of loss is 
expected to be small. In cases where the liquidity 
scheme is of indeterminate or not short 
duration (53) and/or the risk of loss is not expected 
to be small, the second interpretation should be 
used and hence government debt will be affected. 
Special purpose entities 
The other interesting case to be explored here in 
more detail is how special purpose entities (SPE), 
set up explicitly to address specific aspects of the 
(52) Interest payments for the government securities used in 
these schemes are typically 'rolled-up', meaning that they 
become due at maturity. 
(53) The Decision considers that a scheme is of short duration if 
the initial issuance of government securities takes place 
during the period of the financial crisis. The latter is 
defined as starting in summer 2007, while its end date (for 
statistical purposes) will be also set by Eurostat. 
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financial crisis, are to be recorded in government 
accounts, especially in the case when private sector 
corporations hold the majority stake.  
Special purpose entities were typically used during 
the crisis as a substitute for a deteriorating segment 
of financial markets. (54) Given the substantial 
uncertainty regarding the asset quality of banks' 
balance sheets and consequently high counterparty 
risk in interbank markets, banks were reluctant to 
make business with each other. To compensate for 
this, special financial institutions were set up 
which would intermediate between banks to revive 
the failing market segment.   
The degree of autonomy with regard to the 
decisions and transactions the institution carries 
out is decisive in recording it in either the public or 
private sector. For instance, a government decree 
obliging the unit to enter into certain transactions 
or the government bearing the institution's losses 
or the fact that its operations are covered by a 
government guarantee could imply that the unit's 
economic interest lies with the government, in 
which case the entity should be classified in the 
public sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(54) The French SFEF (Société de Financement de l'Economie 
Française) could serve as an example. 
However, in an attempt to treat the different public 
interventions with akin economic purposes 
similarly, namely to alleviate financial market 
stress, the Decision allows certain majority 
privately-owned entities to be recorded outside the 
general government sector. The conditions include 
that the SPE is established for a short duration, has 
a sole purpose to address the financial crisis and its 
expected losses are small in comparison with the 
total size of their liabilities.  Nevertheless, if the 
body continues to acquire assets after the financial 
crisis then it may be reclassified in the public 
sector. 
In accordance with the Decision, in order to 
improve the quality of data available regarding 
public interventions during the financial crisis, The 
European Commission (Eurostat) has started to 
collect information on guarantees, liquidity support 
measures, and special purpose entity operations in 
a supplementary table, which will be published 
alongside the EDP notifications. 
3. NATIONAL FISCAL FRAMEWORKS 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The current economic crisis has called for huge 
fiscal efforts to avoid a deflationary spiral. This 
resulted in large structural deficits and growing 
debt ratios EU-wide, putting at risk fiscal 
sustainability. The resulting need for fiscal 
consolidation means that a well-designed fiscal 
policy exit strategy once the recovery is firmly 
underway is necessary. At the same time, to 
facilitate the exit and sustain budgetary 
consolidation, domestic fiscal frameworks need to 
be strengthened and adapted in the light of the 
lessons of the crisis. The importance of strong and 
resilient fiscal frameworks has been emphasised by 
the October 2009 Council conclusions on the fiscal 
exit strategy. Specifically, the Council stated that 
"…important flanking policies to the fiscal exit will 
include strengthened national budgetary 
frameworks for underpinning consolidation 
strategies and support long-term sustainability." 
Domestic fiscal frameworks can be defined as the 
set of elements of the institutional policy setting 
that shape fiscal policy making at the national 
level. They comprise the arrangements, procedures 
and institutions governing the planning and 
implementation of budgetary policies. The main 
components of domestic fiscal frameworks are (1) 
numerical fiscal rules, (2) independent fiscal 
institutions (i.e., specific public bodies acting in 
the field of budgetary policy), and (3) budgetary 
procedures governing the preparation, approval, 
and implementation of budget plans. As part of the 
latter category, (4) medium-term budgetary 
frameworks (MTBFs) for multi-annual budgetary 
planning are specifically considered apart because 
of their importance in fostering medium term 
horizons for fiscal policies.  
This chapter analyses what elements and 
considerations should be taken into account more 
carefully in designing resilient fiscal frameworks 
so as to support optimal policy-making during the 
needed fiscal retrenchment, to avoid repeating past 
policy mistakes in the period of expansion, and to 
promote the respect of the Stability and Growth 
Pact provisions. It is organised as follows. First, 
the stylised facts on the contribution of fiscal 
frameworks to budgetary consolidation are 
reviewed (section II.3.2). In the next section, a 
comprehensive overview of the main elements of 
domestic fiscal frameworks as well as different 
policy options for their strengthening are provided 
(section II.3.3).  Next follows a discussion on how 
best to ensure the successful implementation of 
domestic fiscal framework reforms and the 
implications of recent institutional developments at 
both national and EU levels on the appropriate 
design of country-specific fiscal governance 
(section II.3.4). Thereafter, policy lessons are 
drawn from successful country experiences to 
outline an ideal fiscal framework (section II.3.5). 
Finally, a summary of the main arguments is 
provided (section II.3.6).  
3.2. DID DOMESTIC FISCAL FRAMEWORKS 
PLAY A ROLE IN PREVIOUS 
CONSOLIDATION EPISODES? 
In the past twenty years, a sizeable body of 
literature has elaborated on the determinants of 
successful fiscal consolidation. The first wave of 
these analyses – between the late 1980s and the 
mid-1990s –focused primarily on the composition 
of the adjustment and the role played by the 
political and institutional setting (such as coalition 
versus single-party governments and the prevailing 
electoral system). According to this research, 
successful fiscal consolidations were 
preponderantly expenditure-based, particularly 
through primary current expenditure cuts based 
mainly on public wages and transfers. Fiscal 
adjustments following this strategy were generally 
longer-lasting than those based on tax increases 
and investment cuts (Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
ibid. (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998)). More 
recent studies, based on the experience of EMU, 
have qualified these findings, highlighting the role 
of revenue increases as part of a successful mix of 
consolidation measures (European Commission 
(2007)). These findings are likely to reflect the 
specific situation in the run-up to EMU that 
prompted efforts to reduce the size of government 
and therefore reduced the margin to implement 
"easy" expenditure cuts on less sensitive spending 
programmes. At the same time, many countries 
faced sizeable fiscal adjustments to qualify for 
EMU, leading them to resort to tax hikes to 
supplement the expenditure containment efforts. 
Under those circumstances, the success of 
consolidation plans was particularly dependent on 
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policy-makers' ability to maintain both expenditure 
cuts and revenue increases over time. These results 
are particularly relevant in the current scenario, in 
which the huge fiscal efforts required to restore 
budgetary discipline seem only attainable through 
a combination of measures.  
Importantly, this recent research has also 
highlighted the prominent role that some elements 
of domestic fiscal frameworks seem to have played 
in the fiscal consolidation episodes since the early 
1990s. While some research shows that fiscal rules 
have sustained fiscal discipline in a significant 
number of countries (Larch and Turrini (2008), 
Guichard et al. (2007)), other papers emphasise the 
importance of well-designed budgetary procedures 
in ensuring the centralisation of the budget 
formulation (von Hagen et al. (2002)). Other 
contributions have analysed the effect of specific 
characteristics of fiscal frameworks on budgetary 
performance. For example, countries implementing 
stronger rules over a larger share of general 
government finances are found to register better 
budgetary outcomes (Debrun et al. (2008)), whilst 
effective medium-term budgetary planning appears 
instrumental in sticking to budgetary plans 
(European Commission (2007)). The quality of 
domestic budgetary procedures is also shown to 
contribute to better budgetary performance 
(Fabrizio and Mody (2006)). 
3.3. REVIEWING THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF 
FISCAL FRAMEWORKS: SOME GUIDELINES 
This section addresses the reform of the main 
building blocks of national fiscal governance in 
more detail, following the taxonomy considered in 
the introduction. Notwithstanding the separate 
analysis of these elements (i.e. numerical fiscal 
rules, independent public institutions, medium 
term budgetary frameworks and budgetary 
procedures), their complementarities and an 
overall perspective on the reform of the whole 
fiscal framework should be kept in mind, as 
stressed in the previous section.  
3.3.1. Numerical fiscal rules  
 
According to the most commonly agreed 
definition, numerical fiscal rules provide a 
permanent constraint on fiscal policy expressed in 
terms of a summary indicator of fiscal 
performance, such as the government budget 
deficit, borrowing, debt or a major component 
thereof (Kopits and Symansky (1998)). This 
definition thus excludes fiscal targets which may 
be revised frequently without any restriction, such 
as those included in most medium-term budgetary 
frameworks in many EU countries. The main 
objective of fiscal rules is to establish constraints 
on the use of policy discretion in order to promote 
sound budgetary policy-making. In 2008, there 
were 67 rules in place in EU Member States, of 
which more than one third were budget balance 
rules; debt and expenditure rules represented about 
one quarter each, and revenue rules accounted for 
less than 10%. 
Recent research provides ample evidence on the 
influence of numerical fiscal rules on budgetary 
outcomes (Debrun at al. (2008); European 
Commission (2009)). The extent of this influence 
depends strongly on a number of features which 
have been extensively analysed (e.g. Bohn and 
Inman (1996)). The findings of this research 
suggest that elements such as the statutory basis of 
the rule, the monitoring of budgetary 
developments against the fiscal targets, and the 
existence of corrective mechanisms in case of 
non-compliance should be carefully taken into 
account in the design of fiscal rules to ensure their 
effective influence on the conduct of fiscal policy. 
According to available evidence, features related 
to the enforcement and corrective mechanisms are 
particularly relevant for the effectiveness of fiscal 
rules (Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2009)). Box I 
summarises the key elements in the design of 
effective fiscal rules.    
The influence of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes 
can be seen under two angles: budgetary discipline 
and macroeconomic stabilisation. The contribution 
of fiscal rules to the first objective, improving 
fiscal discipline, is well-documented by a large 
number of country-specific consolidation episodes 
and confirmed by the literature (IMF (2009)). A 
potential drawback of their use, however, is their 
possible adverse effects in terms of weak 
macroeconomic stabilisation. In the design of rule-
based fiscal frameworks, an appropriate balance 
between these two objectives needs to be sought. 
The following sub-sections sketch out the features 
of budget balance, debt, expenditure, and revenue 
rules and discuss their implications with regard to 
both fiscal discipline and stabilisation. 
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Budget balance rules  
Budget balance rules are by far the most 
widespread fiscal rules in force across the EU 
Member States, accounting for twenty-six out of 
the sixty-seven fiscal rules in force in 2008. Recent 
empirical research suggests that budget balance 
rules are effective policy tools as, on average, they 
are linked to better budgetary outcomes – that is 
higher surpluses or lower deficits. They therefore 
seem to address satisfactorily the deficit bias and 
are generally appropriate in terms of budgetary 
discipline (Debrun at al. (2008)). However, they 
might entail risks for the quality of public 
expenditure. If no item is excluded from their 
coverage, fiscal adjustment may rely excessively 
on cuts to growth-enhancing, but politically less 
sensitive, expenditure categories (e.g., R&D 
spending). This has prompted some countries to 
introduce budget balance rules that exclude 
investment expenditure, so-called golden rules. In 
practice, though, this concept is difficult to 
operationalise, and conventional definitions offer 
scope for opportunistic behaviour to circumvent 
the rule (European Commission (2003)).  
A major criticism of budget balance rules concerns 
their potential adverse effect on macroeconomic 
stabilisation. Specifically, budget balance rules 
defined in nominal terms (either in level or as a 
percentage of GDP but not cyclically-adjusted) 
may introduce a pro-cyclical bias in the conduct of 
budgetary policy.  
The extent to which deficit rules interfere with the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy depends on 
their design. For example, multi-annual deficit 
rules defined over the cycle are likely to be more 
stabilisation-friendly than budget balance rules 
operating on a single year basis. The most frequent 
problem of rules defined over the cycle is the 
correct assessment of the cyclical position of the 
economy. Alternatively, cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance rules may provide flexibility to account for 
the cycle while ensuring discipline. However, 
these rules are also vulnerable to uncertainties on 
the measurement of the output gap, which renders 
real-time monitoring difficult. Still, the current EU 
fiscal framework relies on cyclically adjusted 
medium-term objectives, not least against the 
background of recent improvements in the 
measurement of the cyclically-adjusted balance 
(see Larch and Turrini, 2009). In addition, some 
Member States such as Germany have recently 
implemented new budget balance rules following 
the same approach as at EU level.  
Further complications of the stabilisation function 
of fiscal policy by budget balance rules arise from 
their distribution across levels of government. In 
the EU Member States, most of these rules apply 
to territorial governments; they are defined in 
nominal terms with annual time horizons, implying 
risks of pro-cyclicality. However, rules defined in 
cyclically-adjusted terms similar to those applied 
to general and central governments are hardly 
feasible at territorial level. Therefore, against the 
risk of pro-cyclicality, well-defined coordination 
mechanisms between the various levels of 
government are required. Coordination should be 
implemented during the preparatory phase of the 
budget process, and it should be based on a 
medium-term perspective that explicitly takes the 
implications of the sub-national rules for fiscal 
stabilisation into account.      
An additional option to endow budget balance 
rules with flexibility to cater for cyclical 
fluctuations is the incorporation of escape clauses 
allowing the temporary suspension of the rule. 
This provisional suspension should be conditional 
on exceptional events such as natural catastrophes 
or a sharp output contraction. However, the 
definition of these escape clauses must be clear 
and confined to strictly specified circumstances in 
order to preserve credibility (see Box II.3.1). The 
GDP contraction experienced in 2008 and 2009 
would presumably fall in any conceivable 
definition of exceptional circumstances.      
A further possibility to counter the risk of pro-
cyclicality is to supplement budget balance rules 
with the so-called "rainy day funds". Such 
stabilisation funds require that fiscal surpluses 
resulting from economic booms be set aside as 
contingency reserves that may be withdrawn 
during slowdowns to finance deficits. For the 
USA, where they are much more widespread than 
in the EU, such funds have been found to 
considerably reduce expenditure volatility and 
enhance the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy 
(Hou and Moynihan (2008), Wagner and Elder 
(2005)). In the EU, however, the introduction of 
"rainy day funds" is discouraged by the definition 
of budget deficits adopted for assessing 
compliance with the rules forbidding excessive 
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deficits. The introduction of such funds would 
therefore first require a review of the current 
ESA95 rules applied both at EU and national level. 
Then clear rules regulating the use of these funds 
would also be needed (see Balassone et al. (2009)).      
Debt rules  
In 2008, eighteen domestic debt rules were in 
operation across EU Member States; the large 
majority applied to sub-national governments. 
 
 
 Box II.3.1: Key elements in the design of fiscal rules
Statutory base: Ideally, any rule should be backed by strong legal provisions signalling the importance 
attached by the government to fiscal consolidation (e.g., a law of fiscal responsibility). The legal statutory 
base should clearly establish the requirements for amending the rule, in order to enhance credibility. It 
should also specify the monitoring mechanisms and the pre-established enforcement procedures in case of 
non- compliance. 
Multi-annual character: Rules embedded into a medium term budgetary framework, as a part of a 
comprehensive fiscal strategy, may better adapt to economic and country specific circumstances, and may 
facilitate the internalisation of the budgetary effects of current policies over the medium term. A
multi-annual timeframe may limit the potential circumvention of the rule by postponing the recording of 
expenditures or the implementation of structural adjustments.   
Accounting system: The use of the ESA95 methodology is consistent with the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. However, data are more readily available on a cash basis. The need for timely monitoring 
therefore suggests a dual approach: a rule could be defined in cash terms with translation into ESA95 done 
on a quarterly basis. 
Monitoring: The effectiveness of monitoring relies on two elements. First, in order to monitor compliance 
with the rule in an effective manner, updated and reliable data must be available. Where they are not, 
compliance can only be assessed with considerable delays. Second, an independent monitoring body is more 
likely to result in necessary adjustments of budgetary trends being implemented once they have been 
identified.  
Enforcement mechanisms: The design of corrective and enforcement mechanisms is an important feature to 
ensure the proper functioning of fiscal rules. The actions to be taken in case of non-compliance should 
always be defined ex-ante so as to make the rule credible and enforceable. Otherwise, the cost of 
non-compliance would be only reputational, which is insufficient in the presence of acute fiscal distress and 
weak budgetary institutions. The enforcement of corrective measures ought to be ensured by a non-partisan 
institution, legally endowed with the requisite competencies. Monitoring and enforcement could be carried 
out by the same independent body.  
Sanctions: In the case of non-compliance with the rule, pre-established sanctions may supplement the 
enforcement mechanisms. They may adopt two different forms. In developed nations, non-compliance 
sanctions typically apply to institutions, comprising fines, automatic withholdings of transfers, restrictions 
on debt insurance, etc. (1) In developing countries, personal sanctions prevail, including dismissal 
procedures, obligations to resign, fines, or lower wages.  
Escape clauses: Well-defined escape clauses constitute a key feature of good fiscal rules. They specify the 
circumstances under which departures from the rule are admissible: usually these include natural disasters or 
acute economic slowdowns or recessions. Precise escape clauses may reinforce credibility, while vague and 
non-concrete clauses may render the rule ineffective. Overall, the definition of escape clauses requires 
particularly attention: they should only allow for a limited number of circumstances. 
                                                          
(1) For example, in Spain the existing law establishes that in case the 3% deficit threshold of the EU fiscal framework is 
breached, all government layers have to contribute to the payment of a possible fine in proportion to their share over 
the overall deficit.  
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They typically limit debt according to the debt 
repayment capacity measured by the debt service-
to-current revenue ratio (Bernoth et al. (2004)). 
For higher levels of government, the target 
definition usually follows the EU debt threshold 
formulation, with a ceiling being set as a 
percentage of GDP. Given the challenge of debt 
reduction in the years ahead, debt rules may gain 
importance across the EU Member States. 
Similarly to balance budget rules, debt rules are 
found to have a strong influence on fiscal 
discipline (Debrun et al. (2008)). Their 
effectiveness depends on the ambition of the target 
and on a number of design features, in particular 
monitoring and enforcement (see Box I). Besides 
possible adverse effects on the quality of public 
expenditure, the same potential shortcomings 
identified for budget balance rules with respect the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy apply to debt 
rules. Debt rules which are embedded in a 
medium-term framework may be better able to 
take into account stabilisation concerns, thus 
limiting their potential pro-cyclical bias. In 
addition, strong policy coordination across 
government tiers when setting fiscal targets is the 
most appropriate way to offset possible 
pro-cyclical effects stemming from debt rules 
applied to sub-national authorities. The 
counter-cyclical stance of debt rules may be 
further enhanced by escape clauses and "rainy day 
funds".  
 
Expenditure rules  
In 2008, seventeen domestic expenditure rules 
were in place in the EU. They represent around 
one third of all fiscal rules and predominantly 
concern central governments and social security 
spending. Most of these rules are embedded into a 
medium-term budgetary framework.  
Expenditure rules serve to address two frequent 
pitfalls in fiscal policy making: recurrent primary 
spending overruns and pro-cyclical budgetary 
policies. They foster accountability by targeting 
the part of the budget that is under more direct 
government control, particularly if specific items 
not fully under the influence of government, such 
as interest payments are excluded from their 
coverage. This strong accountability may promote 
not only the respect of the target but also 
transparency in the course of the budget process 
(Deroose et al. (2006)). Spending rules and 
limitations of their coverage bear similar problems 
with regard to the quality of public expenditure as 
do budget balance rules (see above). 
However, expenditure rules are effective in 
sustaining fiscal discipline, as proven by their 
extensive use during large budgetary 
consolidations. Moreover, they are consistent with 
the stabilisation objective as well as they hardly 
prevent the automatic stabilisers from operating 
and they may curb pro-cyclical spending stemming 
from pressures in the presence of revenue 
windfalls in good times.  
Admittedly, the functioning of this type of rules 
may also be associated with some pitfalls. For 
instance, a pro-cyclical bias could result if the 
expenditure target is defined as a share of GDP. In 
practise, this is however rarely observed. Another 
possible shortcoming of expenditure ceilings is the 
incentive to use tax expenditures for various policy 
objectives to which direct spending might be better 
suited. At worst, the result can be that large tax 
expenditures do away with a significant part of the 
benefits of spending restraint due to lower tax 
receipts, while at the same time these tax 
exemptions may be inappropriate policy 
instruments i.e. less targeted instruments for the 
ultimate purpose. Once significant tax 
expenditures have been introduced, it is politically 
very difficult to withdrawn them, which may 
eventually lead to an erosion of the tax base and a 
complicated tax system. This makes advisable to 
supplement spending ceilings with budget balance 
rules and/or clear regulations constraining the 
resort to tax expenditures.  
Despites this potential disadvantages, expenditure 
rules represent the cornerstones of the most 
resilient domestic fiscal frameworks in some EU 
Member States, namely those of the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. 
Experience in these EU countries shows that 
binding spending ceilings can play a crucial role in 
the functioning of the whole fiscal framework 
(Kopits (2007)). Expenditure rules may also 
prompt the adoption or strengthening of sound 
budgetary procedures, such as top-down budgeting 
and more centralised budgeting processes. 
Well-designed expenditure rules appear decisive to 
ensure the effectiveness of budget balance rules 
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(Guichard et al. (2007)). Ideally, such rules should 
cover the whole of the general government sector, 
which requires proper coordination across levels of 
governments (see sub-section II.3.4.2). Such co-
ordination could enhance ownership of fiscal 
targets and increase their respect, particularly in 
highly decentralised countries. 
Revenue rules 
Revenue rules are not common across national 
fiscal frameworks in the EU: in 2008, only six EU 
Member States had such rules.  
 
                                                          
Revenue rules can aim at a wide range of 
objectives relating to the revenue side of the 
budget, such as establishing a ceiling on the tax 
burden or constraining specific tax revenue 
developments. The most widespread objective is 
the avoidance of pro-cyclical policies. In the 
pursuit of this objective, an important issue is how 
to deal with budgetary revenues that exceed 
budgeted figures and forecasts. One possibility is 
to oblige fiscal authorities to specify the allocation 
of higher-than-expected revenues ex ante in the 
budget law. One obvious example is to allocate 
such revenues to the purpose of debt reduction, 
thereby mitigating expenditure pressures in good 
times. At present, France, Lithuania, and the 
Netherlands operate such revenue rules. However, 
only the latter systematically assigns unexpected 
revenues to deficit reduction. Other fiscal 
arrangements can, of course, supplement revenue 
rules to implement countercyclical fiscal policies 
during economic booms. For example, the 
previously mentioned "rainy day funds" can help 
resist political and social pressure to spend 
windfalls in good times. Finland is an example of a 
country operating such a fund for unemployment 
insurance contributions since 1999.  
A crucial issue in the functioning of the above 
rules is how to distinguish transitory from 
permanent revenue increases. Here,   the current 
economic crisis offers important lessons to be 
drawn in particular in connection with asset price 
increases (Joumard and André (2008)). Owing to 
the technical difficulties inherent in differentiating 
permanent from temporary revenues, higher than 
anticipated tax proceeds from booming property 
and asset prices were considered permanent in 
many cases. This allowed for additional public 
expenditure, leading to risk of pro-cyclicality and 
unsustainable fiscal policies. Spain is a telling 
example in this respect. Ex post analysis has 
shown that since the mid-1990s about half to three 
quarters of tax revenue increases it experienced 
were transitory and caused by the exceptional 
economic growth at the time. However, 
conventional techniques of cyclical adjustment 
overestimated structural revenues and provided an 
incorrect assessment of the fiscal stance at the time 
(Martinez-Mongay et al. (2007)).(55)  
3.3.2. Independent fiscal institutions   
• A complementary policy option to reinforce 
fiscal governance is the establishment of 
independent fiscal institutions (also called 
fiscal councils). These are non-partisan public 
bodies acting in the field of budgetary policy 
that are financed by public funds and are 
functionally independent vis-à-vis fiscal 
authorities. The definition excludes the central 
bank, government or parliament. These 
independent bodies are entrusted with some 
technical tasks relating to fiscal policy, such as 
the preparation of macroeconomic forecasts or 
the assessment of budgetary measures, while 
the final decision on budgetary targets and the 
fiscal stance remains under the sole authority of 
the elected government.(56)   
In 2008, twenty seven independent institutions 
were established in seventeen EU countries. These 
public bodies have been contributing positively to 
(55) This experience once more highlights the importance of 
caution in the adoption of revenue projections for the 
budget preparation. It further underlines that the 
implementation of unfunded tax cuts or expenditure 
increases must be carefully considered, especially those 
that are difficult to revert. To guard against misreading 
revenue windfalls as durable improvements in the 
underlying fiscal position, changes are required in 
budgetary policy making that go beyond the institutional 
setting. In particular, in addition to debt and deficit data, 
the formulation of fiscal policy should be based on a 
follow-up of a wider set of indicators relating to fiscal 
space, such as the external deficit, competitiveness 
indicators, inflationary pressures, and so on. Moreover, 
expenditure projections should take into account long-term 
GDP growth prospects and an inflation target in line with 
the ECB price stability objective rather than over-
optimistic scenarios extrapolating from transitory boom 
periods with buoyant revenues. 
(56) As a result, the type of independent public institutions 
considered in this section does not entail any delegation of 
the conduct of fiscal policy as suggested by some proposals 
in the literature (Wyplosz (2005)).  
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fiscal policy making through one or several of the 
following three channels.   
• The provision of unbiased inputs for the annual 
budget preparation, such as macroeconomic 
forecasts on which budgetary projections are 
based.  
• The provision of independent analysis on fiscal 
policy issues. This may include monitoring 
budgetary developments, assessing compliance 
with the existing fiscal rules and/or estimating 
the budgetary cost of specific policy measures.  
• The issuing of regular assessments and 
recommendations relating to different aspects 
of fiscal policy, such as recommendations 
addressing long-term sustainability issues or 
proposals containing fiscal targets for the 
different tiers of general government.  
In a number of cases, these institutions have been 
successful in disseminating their policy advice and 
effectively influencing the conduct of fiscal policy. 
Such successful institutions include the 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB), the National Account Institute (NAI) and 
the High Council of Finance (HCF) in Belgium, 
the Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) in 
Austria, the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis 
and Development (IMAD) in Slovenia and the 
recently established Swedish Fiscal Policy 
Council. In four of these cases (i.e. the CPB, the 
NAI, the WIFO and the IMAD), the government 
has entrusted the independent institutions with the 
provision of macroeconomic forecasts for the 
budget preparation. Overall, these public bodies 
enjoy a good reputation, which generally has been 
acquired through a long period of time and are 
highly respected by the political establishment.  
In addition to the tasks mentioned above, new 
proposals to enhance the scope of the activities 
entrusted to independent fiscal institutions have 
recently emerged. In the aftermath of the economic 
crisis, the introduction of fast decision-making 
mechanisms to trigger measures for crisis 
prevention has been suggested, including 
mechanisms which aim to reduce the lags that 
usually constrain the effectiveness of discretionary 
policy. Examples of such mechanisms are clear 
escape clauses allowing the temporary suspension 
of fiscal rules in the presence of a marked 
deterioration of economic conditions, the 
specification of state-contingent one-off fiscal 
stimulus measures in consolidation plans to 
safeguard short-term growth, or predefined 
stabilisation measures automating the discretionary 
policy reaction to sharp cyclical fluctuations 
(Solow (2005)), Feldstein (2007)). National 
independent fiscal bodies could be involved in the 
implementation of such mechanisms by assessing 
the suitability and the timing of the measures 
foreseen – for example, whether and when to 
temporarily suspend fiscal rules, implement a one-
off fiscal stimulus, or adopt any pre-established 
stabilisation measures – thereby counteracting the 
credibility risks that arise from political 
interference in their operation. In the European 
context any measures introduced by or due to 
independent fiscal institutions still have to comply 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition, if 
independent fiscal institutions are given a role in 
implementing one-off stimulus measures, this 
raises the risk of asymmetric fiscal expansions. 
Such mechanisms should therefore be 
accompanied by appropriate measures for good 
times, to counter-act the risk of creeping debt 
accumulation. These could include "rainy day 
funds" to allocate revenue windfalls (see section 
II.3.3.1).  
National independent fiscal institutions can also be 
instrumental in addressing credibility problems 
relating to budget balance rules defined in 
cyclically-adjusted terms or over the cycle. 
Technical difficulties in identifying the cyclical 
position of the economy and estimating the output 
gap as well as the shortcomings of preliminary 
data at the time when budgetary decisions are 
taken may harm the credibility of fiscal policy. 
One remedy might involve fiscal councils 
providing cyclically adjusted indicators and 
assessments of the fiscal room for manoeuvre. 
Unlike fiscal rules, which can be operational 
immediately, the setting up of new fiscal 
institutions is less straightforward and more time is 
required until they are fully functional. First, the 
tasks assigned to these bodies generally require 
specific technical and methodological skills, which 
may be scarce in some countries, particularly in 
some small new EU Member States. In such cases, 
the assignment of tasks to the new institution 
should be preceded by an assessment of the 
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available technical expertise to decide what 
technical tasks can be effectively delegated. 
Second, independent fiscal bodies usually need 
time before their mandate is completely developed: 
their performance has been found to improve from 
a long "learning by doing" process and, more 
importantly, time is also needed for the build-up of 
a reputation which is an essential asset of such 
institutions. For this latter reason, some proposals 
suggest to widen the mandates of existing 
institutions – provided that they have the 
capabilities and reputation to effectively play the 
role of a fiscal council – instead of setting up new 
fiscal bodies. This has been done with the courts of 
auditors in some EU Members such as the United 
Kingdom.  
The actual establishment of national fiscal bodies 
depends on domestic institutional characteristics 
and preferences. Still, existing experience provides 
some useful guidance for the design of such 
institutions that focuses on the following elements. 
These are summarized in Box II.3.2. 
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3.3.3. Medium-term budgetary frameworks  
Medium-term budgetary frameworks are fiscal 
arrangements whereby the horizon of fiscal 
planning is extended beyond the annual budgetary 
calendar. Their importance stems from the fact that 
most fiscal measures have budgetary implications 
going well beyond the yearly budgetary cycle. A 
well-designed MTBF reflects the impact of past 
budgetary commitments as well as the future cost 
of new policy measures. In 2008, twenty-two EU 
countries had a MTBF.  
Medium-term budgetary objectives incorporated 
into a MTBF represent a weaker form of 
commitment than a rule including binding targets. 
Still, by shedding light on the future costs of 
ongoing policies, they may enhance fiscal 
discipline. They also facilitate monitoring by 
providing benchmarks against which budgetary 
developments can be assessed over time. Despite 
 
 
 Box II.3.2: Important elements in the design of independent fiscal institutions
The mandate: The mandate should be clear and unambiguous, specifying the tasks assigned to the 
institution and the scope of its activities, and backed by strong legal provisions. In this respect the following 
remarks are pertinent: 
• The mandate should ensure that the tasks assigned to the institution will be carried out on a regular basis 
and not only occasionally. Forecasts, monitoring tasks and assessments should be comprehensive and 
not limited to partial aspects.(1)  
• Should the mandate include the provision of forecasts and/or monitoring tasks, the institution should be 
given access to internal information in the national statistical office, ministries and other governmental 
bodies.   
• Finally, where the institution is entrusted with the enforcement procedures of fiscal targets and rules, the 
scope of the measures this independent body can take and the possible connections with the judiciary 
branch should be unequivocally specified in its mandate and supported by legal provisions. 
Functional independence: A high degree of autonomy and functional independence vis-à-vis fiscal 
authorities are important preconditions to ensuring the institution is not hampered by political interference. 
This can be ensured by: 
• Public financing, preferably stipulated in a legal text. 
• Specific appointment procedures, particularly for the governing board, ensuring its functional 
independence. 
Involvement in the budget process: The involvement of the institution in the budget process emerges as the 
most crucial element determining its influence on the conduct of fiscal policy. The arrangements in some 
EU countries have proved to be effective in conveying the policy messages issued by independent bodies. 
These include, for example, regular hearings in the parliament during the budget preparation, consultation 
by the government in the course of the budgetary process, or the obligation of fiscal authorities to justify 
departures from the forecasts or recommendations released by the institution. Delegation of macro forecasts 
for the budget preparation is an example of strong of involvement in the budget process. Country 
experiences show that independent forecasts result in more realistic macroeconomic scenarios being used to 
adopt policy decisions, with biases in the growth assumptions due to government optimism being reduced 
(Jonung and Larch (2006)). 
                                                          
(1) For example, in some EU countries government revenue projections are provided by an independent body. However, 
these forecasts are based on the macroeconomic assumptions prepared by the government. This is likely to hamper
the quality of the revenue forecasts as optimistic bias in the macro projections would reverberate into tax revenue 
forecasts.   
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the country-specific character of these fiscal 
arrengements, the existing literature on MTBFs 
provides some guidance on the appropiate design 
of such frameworks. Box II.3.3 sumarises these 
desirable design features. 
 
                                                          
In addition to the elements contained in Box II.3.3 
some succesful country policy experiences provide 
a number of valuable insights into how best to 
design MTBFs. Specifically, the two following 
elements are relevant. 
First, complementarities between  multi-annual 
expenditure rules and MTBFs should be exploited 
in order to adhere to medium-term budgetary 
objectives. In particular, expenditure rules cannot 
exclude risks related to the revenue side of public 
budgets, such as non-financed tax cuts or 
systematically upbeat revenue forecasts. Therefore 
it is advisable to supplement expenditure rules 
with medium term objetcives for the budget 
balance based on cautious growth assumptions and 
plausible revenue projections.  
Second, MTBFs should preferably adopt the form 
of a fixed framework relying on binding spending 
ceilings. Fixed frameworks imply that budgetary 
objectives, for example spending targets, are set 
once for all and are not adjusted over time unless 
unexpected exceptional events arise during the 
period covered by the framework. Telling 
examples of this approach are the frameworks 
implemented in the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Finland. Most of these MTBFs are based on a 
multi-annual spending rule providing binding 
expenditure limits. Fixed frameworks represent a 
constraint on discretionary fiscal policy and 
contrast sharply with flexible frameworks, which 
allow for (annual) target revisions according to 
policy changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from the country examples mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, most MTBFs implemented in 
the remaining EU Member States tend to show 
some common shortcomings (European 
Commission (2009)). These include the non-
binding character of the fiscal targets and their 
frequent revision, the lack of political 
commitment,(57) unrealistic macroeconomic 
assumptions on which the budgetary projections 
are based, and the absence of independent 
monitoring and corrective mechanisms in case of 
deviation from the projected fiscal path. These 
weaknesses call for a reform of the MTBFs, 
especially given the need for time-consistent long-
run consolidation plans under the present 
budgetary imbalances. While there is no one-size-
fits-all design of an appropriate MTBF, experience 
suggests that the principles presented in Box III 
can be a useful starting point to strengthen the 
current MTBFs and ensure an effective 
medium-term fiscal planning.  
 
(57) In several EU countries, national parliaments only discuss 
the projected medium-term path together with the annual 
budget law and focus exclusively on the budgetary figures 
of the year ahead.  
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 Box II.3.3: Key elements in the design of MTBFs
Coverage: MTBFs should ideally cover the general government sector, or at least the central government 
plus the social-security sub-sectors, over a period of three or four years. A breakdown of the general 
government budgetary projections into sub-sectors should also be provided, particularly for highly 
decentralised countries. 
Expenditure projections: As explained in the main text, effective MTBFs are usually based on binding 
expenditure limits. An appropriate breakdown of these projected spending ceilings according to the main 
expenditure areas is required in order to incorporate spending policy priorities and the envisaged expenditure 
adjustments in the medium-term fiscal planning. 
Revenue projections:  Expenditure projections should be complemented by plausible revenue projections 
based on cautious macroeconomic assumptions. Similarly to the expenditure side, an adequate breakdown 
by main type of revenues should also be provided in order to show the budgetary impact of tax policy 
measures. 
Analysis of departures from the envisaged fiscal path: The previous year's actual budgetary outcomes 
should be compared to the projections initially set out in the MTBF. Differences and deviations should be 
explained and justified. Likewise, measures implemented to offset deviations from the medium term path of 
fiscal projections should also be spelled out. All this information should be included in the MTBF 
documentation. 
Macroeconomic assumptions: The baseline projections and the corresponding macroeconomic assumptions 
should be supplemented by the inclusion of alternative scenarios. This should allow the identification of 
budgetary priorities in case an unforeseen increase or decrease in revenues materialises, which in turn could 
also be instrumental in reducing the need to resort to ad-hoc supplementary budgets (1).  
Accounting system: The correspondence between fiscal projections on a cash basis and their values based 
on ESA 95 concepts should be clearly specified. While the cash figures allow more timely monitoring, the 
corresponding ESA95 data increase transparency and the consistency of the current medium term budgetary 
planning in relation to the fiscal targets relevant for compliance with the SGP to be checked. 
Input into the annual budget law: The projections and objectives included in the medium term framework 
should form the basis on which the budget law is prepared. In this respect, the role played by the Parliament 
in the MTBF preparation should be strengthened: the projected fiscal path, particularly the expenditure 
targets, should formally be presented, discussed and approved in the Parliament before the submission of the 
annual budget law. (2) 
Monitoring and corrective mechanisms: Monitoring mechanisms should be specified with respect to the 
frequency of assessments and the body responsible for undertaking these and corrective procedures 
pre-defining actions in case of deviations from the envisaged fiscal path should be clearly stipulated. Where 
a MTBF relies on a multiannual spending rule, these mechanisms should be closely linked to those for the 
monitoring the expenditure ceilings. The same institution should monitor and enforce both elements of the 
fiscal framework where these tasks are assigned to an independent body. 
                                                          
(1) This specific aspect is closely linked to the introduction of a revenue rule pre-establishing the allocation of 
higher-than-anticipated revenues. 
(2) A significant shortcoming of most MTBFs in operation is their weak influence on the annual budget law. Ideally, 
fiscal targets included in the budget law should be based on the targets considered in the first year of the MTBF. In 
the same vein, the fiscal strategy adopted in the MTBF should form the basis for the main fiscal measures contained 
in the budget. In a number of Member States, this link is established in the opposite direction (i.e. targets considered 
in the first year of the MTBF are revised annually according to the figures of the annual budget law). This approach 
places fiscal policy making in a very short-term perspective and renders the implementation of a time consistent 
budgetary strategy difficult.  
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3.3.4. Budgetary procedures 
Domestic budgetary procedures encompass all the 
procedural rules laid down in law covering the 
planning, approval and execution of the budget 
process. According to the literature, seven 
budgetary dimensions  are conducive to the quality 
of the budget process (von Hagen and J. M. 
Poterba (1999) and A. Alesina and R. Perotti 
(1999)); these dimensions are set out in Box II.3.4. 
 Given the focus of the present review on the 
contribution of elements of fiscal frameworks to 
budgetary consolidation, below we focus on the 
three dimensions that are most relevant in this 
respect. These are transparency and realistic 
economic assumptions, budgetary centralisation, 
and top-down budgeting. Comprehensive 
information on the budgetary procedures in the EU 
Member States is available from the OECD dataset 
on the subject that includes 20 EU Members (the 
Baltic countries, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria and 
Romania are excluded); this dataset has been most 
recently updated in 2007. In terms of the 
dimensions of budgetary procedures discussed 
above, it shows the following.  
First, concerning prudent economic assumptions 
and transparency, half of the EU countries 
surveyed do not have any independent review of 
the economic assumptions used in the budget 
preparation. Additional sources to the OECD 
database show that the EU Members not covered 
by the survey do not have any independent review 
of the macroeconomic assumptions for budgetary 
forecasts either. Importantly, one third of the EU 
countries surveyed by the OECD do not release the 
methodology used for establishing the economic 
assumptions to the public; this appears to be the 
case for the other seven EU countries as well. 
Also, only in three EU Members are the economic 
scenarios for budget preparation provided  by 
independent bodies; in all other cases, they are 
descided upon by the respective ministry of 
finance or other governmental bodies.  
Second, in terms of the degree of centralisation of 
the budget process, in two thirds of the EU 
countries considered in the survey and apparently 
in the countries left out as well, neither the 
minister of finance nor the prime minister have the 
final say to resolve disputes between spending 
ministries and the central budget authority. In 
twelve Member States out of the twenty, the 
legislature has unrestricted power to amend the 
budget proposed by the executive, including its 
overall size.  
Third, as concerns the implementation of top-down 
budgeting, only a limited number of Member 
States impose a binding expenditure ceiling at an 
early stage of the budgetary planning. In the large 
majority of EU countries, overspending may occur 
before a supplementary budget law has been 
approved by the legislature. 
Thus, in most EU Member States there is 
considerable scope for improvement of their 
budgetary processes along these three important 
dimensions. For the sake of unbiasedness, the 
elaboration of macroeconomic projections for 
budget preparation should be assigned to an 
independent body, as practiced by Belgium among 
others, where the National Accounts Institute 
provides a good example of an independent body 
being based on existing institutions and technical 
capabilities. Next, a higher degree of centralisation 
of the budget preparation should be considered a 
priority in countries exhibiting insufficient central 
control over the budgetary process. Stronger 
centralisation can be implemented by 
strengthening the fiscal rules and the medium term 
budgetary framework (including the 
implementation of binding spending ceilings in 
particular), or by reinforcing the role played by the 
minister of finance. This can include granting him 
or her a veto on spending decisions. Finally, the 
introduction of top-down budgeting should be 
considered an essential element of fiscal 
framework reforms. This can be expected to foster 
the centralisation of the budget process as well. In 
any case, the successful implementation of top-
down budgeting goes hand in hand with the 
establishment of effective binding spending 
ceilings and the existence of a strong minister of 
finance.  
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3.4. THE STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC 
FISCAL FRAMEWORKS: GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS  
The findings summarised in the previous sections 
have given rise to a commonly accepted view that 
fiscal discipline needs to be backed by adequate 
domestic fiscal governance. National fiscal 
frameworks should therefore be reformed where 
necessary to provide the right incentives for fiscal 
policy making to favour sound and sustainable 
fiscal policies. Policy experiences show that the 
success of such reforms is subject to a number of 
preconditions. In addition, in the context of EMU, 
the reform of domestic fiscal governance must be 
consistent with Member States' commitments 
under the EU fiscal framework, while any reform 
also has to be adapted to the domestic institutional 
set-up and the degree of fiscal decentralisation in 
the country in question. The following 
sub-sections elaborate on these issues in more 
detail.   
3.4.1. Preconditions for a successful reform of 
domestic fiscal frameworks 
Reforms of fiscal frameworks have to address 
country specific fiscal problems within the specific 
national institutional and political setting. 
Therefore, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for 
their reform. When planning such a reform, the 
specific domestic circumstances to be taken into 
careful consideration. Nevertheless, experience 
provides important lessons about common 
elements, as discussed in the following paragraphs. 
First and most importantly, the reform of fiscal 
governance must comprehensively address all the 
main institutional pitfalls. Partial or fragmented 
 
 
 Box II.3.4: The seven dimensions of the budget process
(1) Transparency:  Transparency requires reliable and timely budgetary data, standard accounting practices,
and a comprehensive coverage of the budget law. Transparency is crucial for the accountability of fiscal 
authorities.  
(2) Multiannual budgetary planning:  A medium-term budgetary framework provides the basis for fiscal 
strategies beyond the yearly budgetary cycle. It allows fiscal authorities to commit to a pre-defined path for 
the main budgetary aggregates and to take into account the multiannual budgetary impact of policies.  
(3) Budgetary centralisation at the planning and approval stages: As one of the most important 
dimensions of the budget process, budgetary centralisation heavily influences fiscal outcomes. Fragmented 
budget preparation by a large number of actors results in deficit bias because of the common pool problem. 
(4) Budgetary centralisation at the implementation stage: During the execution of the budget, some
decentralisation may be needed in order to better allocate resources. While the overall spending ceiling 
should always be respected, some flexibility in the distribution of resources among spending programmes 
might be appropriate.  
(5) Top-down budgeting:  This approach starts the budgetary planning with a binding ceiling on the total 
amount of resources to be distributed among expenditure areas and programmes. This is more conducive to 
fiscal discipline than the traditional bottom-up approach, where total spending is obtained as the sum of the 
individual expenditure requests of all ministries and agencies. 
(6) Realistic economic assumptions and reserves: Prudent and plausible macroeconomic assumptions 
should avoid systematic overly optimistic budgetary projections. Reserve funds provide flexibility to deal 
with unexpected budgetary developments.   
(7) Performance budgeting: This practice is based on the evaluation of spending programmes against the 
achievement of their policy objectives: resource allocation in the budget preparation is then based on the 
efficiency of past spending.  
 
 
 
110 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
reforms usually fall short of delivering the 
expected improvements. For example, the 
establishment of an independent monitoring body 
and the introduction of fiscal rules are 
complementary rather than substitutive measures, 
displaying strong feedback effects. Policy-makers 
should pay attention to these interplays.  
A second common element to all reforms is the 
need to secure the functioning of the most basic 
fundamentals of the fiscal framework. In 
particular, statistical reporting, accounting and 
monitoring issues must function up to minimum 
standards. A common standardised accounting 
methodology in the whole public administration 
and the regular availability of reliable budgetary 
statistics are key pre-conditions for well-
functioning fiscal frameworks, as are regular 
monitoring and timely reporting of the main 
expenditure and revenue categories. Some EU 
countries currently suffer from these fundamentals 
being insufficiently developed. In this context, the 
appropriate sequencing of the reforms is also 
relevant: the strengthening of these fundamentals 
has to take place prior to the introduction of more 
elaborated elements such as constraining fiscal 
rules or medium-term fiscal planning. Failure to do 
so would render the latter ineffective.  
Finally, explicit tools such as rules or 
medium-term budgetary frameworks do not 
substitute for political commitment to fiscal 
discipline. A strong political willingness to restore 
fiscal stability and a broad social consensus on the 
need to conduct sound fiscal policies must 
necessarily support the establishment of any 
reform to ensure its success. 
3.4.2. Reforming domestic fiscal governance: 
national and EU perspectives  
 
In the last decade, the management of the public 
finances in EU countries has been affected by two 
major changes in the economic and institutional 
setting. These are deeper European integration 
notably including the establishment of EMU, and 
progressive fiscal decentralisation in a significant 
number of EU Member States, which implies the 
assignment of greater fiscal powers to sub-national 
governments. The reshaping of national budgetary 
competencies has not only affected the conduct of 
fiscal policy domestically, but it has significant 
implications for the fulfilment of fiscal 
requirements at EU level as well. The Treaty and 
the SGP obligations apply to the general 
government as whole, i.e. to central, regional, and 
local governments, and the social security sub-
sector. Against the background of growing 
decentralisation, the role of territorial governments 
in ensuring the respect of the SGP provisions has 
considerably increased. The close link between 
national fiscal governance and the fulfilment of 
Member States' commitments at EU level has been 
repeatedly stressed by the Council. The reform of 
national fiscal governance should thus take into 
account the growing budgetary decentralisation 
and its implications for sustained fiscal 
consolidation within the EU framework; fiscal 
relations across levels of government should be 
designed to promote stability-oriented policies. In 
this context, the following elements appear 
relevant.   
First, the distribution of fiscal responsibilities 
across government tiers should be transparent. 
Transparency should apply to all stages of 
intergovernmental relationships. This implies that 
policy responsibilities across layers of government 
should be clearly established, to allow for the clear 
assignment of spending functions to government 
tiers and to avoid responsibility shifting. The 
distribution of expenditure powers should be 
accompanied by a stable financing system for 
territorial governments. The funding mechanisms 
should be based on transparent rules governing the 
transfers to sub-national authorities and the 
working of tax-sharing schemes. In addition, in 
accordance with their spending powers, a 
reasonable extent of tax autonomy should also be 
provided to lower levels of government, to avoid 
vertical fiscal imbalances. Transparency should 
also be present in the monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms in force. Particular tasks might be 
assigned to state audit offices or other specific 
independent bodies. In this context, the timely 
availability of reliable budgetary data for the lower 
tiers of public administration is crucial.  
A second feature to support a fiscal 
decentralisation process compatible with sound 
public finances concerns fiscal rules and 
independent fiscal institutions. All levels of 
government must respect spending limits to ensure 
budgetary discipline; fiscal rules serve to foster the 
respect of the prevailing institutional fiscal 
framework and to support policy makers' 
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accountability. In turn, independent fiscal 
institutions can play a role in enhancing fiscal 
sustainability by promoting strong and efficient 
coordination across different layers of general 
government.  
There is also a view that the disciplining effect 
exerted by financial markets could be more 
supportive to sound fiscal policies at all levels of 
government than fiscal rules. It is argued that as 
sub-national governments gain greater budgetary 
autonomy, they should also have access to 
domestic and international credit markets, which in 
turn could impose fiscal discipline through 
differentiated risk premia. This could reduce the 
need for fiscal rules. However, so far, experience 
shows that credit markets fail to exert disciplining 
pressure on sub-national governments; since these 
have only limited tax autonomy, they are receive 
to transfers from the central government. Just the 
possibility of these transfers may be considered by 
the markets an implicit guarantee of debt. Further, 
controls imposed by financial markets tend to be 
sudden and abrupt, imposing additional costs that 
would be best avoided. For these reasons, the 
market mechanism does not appear to be a suitable 
replacement for fiscal rules in terms of maintaining 
fiscal discipline at a territorial level.  
One final element to ensure sound fiscal relations 
across levels of government is a fluent political 
dialogue supported by appropriate institutions. In 
this context, the commitment of all general 
government tiers to co-operate in such 
coordination is crucial. A disciplinary framework 
proven to foster co-ordination across levels of 
government is provided by the so-called 
"domestic" or "internal stability pacts" currently in 
place in several EU countries, notably Belgium, 
Italy, Spain, and Austria. In these countries, in 
spite of some obvious shortcomings (e.g., weak 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms), 
domestic stability pacts and the rules or working 
agreements that assist their implementation have 
played an important role in coordinating 
government tiers' efforts to support the respect of 
the SGP.     
3.5. IS THERE AN IDEAL MODEL OF FISCAL 
FRAMEWORKS?  
When planning a reform of the national fiscal 
framework, it is important to consider the fact that 
policy setting will adapt to the particular 
specifications of the new framework and that how 
this will occur will depend on political, legal, and 
cultural factors. Therefore, no particular fiscal 
framework can be ideal for all countries. However, 
with a view to strengthening existing domestic 
frameworks, some common principles stemming 
from successful country experiences and reflecting 
the overarching objective to restore fiscal 
sustainability may be identified.   
Specifically, multi-annual spending rules 
embedded into a MTBF have generally been 
adopted as a cornerstone of ambitious 
consolidation plans and are currently one of the 
main building blocks of the most successful and 
resilient domestic fiscal frameworks across EU 
countries. The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland, which can be considered the most 
successful Member States in terms of fiscal 
discipline, have rule-based systems in place which 
are based upon an expenditure rule combined with 
revenue or cyclically adjusted budget balance 
rules. While in all of them the centralisation of the 
budget process is supported by these expenditure 
ceilings and top-down budgeting, the role played 
by independent fiscal bodies (e.g. the CPB in the 
Netherlands and the Swedish Fiscal Policy 
Council) is also crucial to enhancing transparency 
and promoting sound fiscal policies.     
Following these countries' experiences, the 
following lessons concerning the interplay among 
the different targets and rules can be drawn to aid 
the reversal of unsustainable debt trends: 
• Regardless of whether a debt rule is in place or 
not, the central objective of fiscal policy over 
the next years across the EU should consist in 
halting and reversing the growing debt ratio. 
This demands the formulation of a path for 
debt developments consistent with a prudently 
defined sustainability objective and 
macroeconomic scenario. 
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•  The path for the evolution of the debt ratio 
should be underpinned by operational 
(primary) budget balance targets, which might 
be translated into a budget balance rule, ideally 
applying to the whole of the general 
government sector (or at least the central 
government and the social security sector). 
This should be consistent alongside the 
achievement of the medium-term objectives of 
the SGP.  
• These budget balance targets should in turn be 
operationalised through binding expenditure 
ceilings based on a multi-annual spending rule 
for the general government. Expenditure 
thresholds would reflect the envisaged debt 
reduction path be based on cautious 
macroeconomic and revenue projections for the 
relevant period. The expenditure rule could be 
supplemented by a revenue rule to ensure that 
higher-than-expected receipts are allocated to 
debt reduction. 
• Finally, a budget balance and/or debt rule 
consistent with the envisaged overall 
expenditure ceilings should be applied to 
sub-central governments.  
The following illustration encapsulates the main 
relationships among fiscal rules and other elements 
of domestic fiscal frameworks according to this 
ideal model. 
3.6. MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
In the context of the current crisis, the huge fiscal 
effort put in place by EU countries seems to have 
helped avoid a deflationary spiral in the short term. 
However, the other side of the coin is that large 
structural deficits and growing debt ratios will 
have to be addressed in the next future. This places 
fiscal issues at the core of current and future policy 
initiatives to restore stability and promote a 
growth-oriented macroeconomic framework. In 
this context, well-designed domestic fiscal 
Graph II.3.1: Domestic fiscal frameworks based on the expenditure side 
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frameworks can enhance policymakers' 
commitment to a lasting fiscal consolidation and 
sustainable budgetary policies. The appropriate 
features of fiscal frameworks are, however, 
country specific and there are no one-size-fits-all 
solutions. 
Despite the importance of these country-specific 
circumstances, economic analysis and policy 
experience provide a number of insights on how 
the main elements of domestic frameworks should 
be designed and implemented. The reform of these 
elements, namely numerical rules, independent 
fiscal institutions, medium term budgetary 
frameworks and budgetary procedures, should be 
regarded as a single process. All these fiscal 
arrangements are closely interconnected, and the 
functioning of one of them affects the working of 
the remaining elements. Partial or fragmented 
reforms usually fall short of providing the needed 
improvements. For example, the strengthening of 
fiscal rules and the upgrading of budgetary 
procedures are complementary rather than 
substitutive measures. Policy makers should be 
mindful of these interplays. With this in mind, the 
strengthening of domestic fiscal frameworks 
should focus on their four key elements.  
First, national fiscal governance should primarily 
rely on a rule-based framework. There is a large 
body of empirical evidence suggesting that 
numerical fiscal rules can considerably strengthen 
fiscal discipline. While, in the end, their 
effectiveness depends on a number of 
characteristics and on the monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms in particular, potential 
shortcomings relating to the stabilisation function 
of fiscal policy may be addressed by adequate 
design and target definition. This could involve 
rules defined on a cyclically adjusted basis or over 
the cycle. Expenditure rules exhibit a number of 
properties that could adequately tackle some of the 
observed pitfalls in the domestic fiscal policy 
making: recurrent spending overruns and the pro 
cyclical policies. Rule-based systems, consisting of 
an expenditure rule supplemented by a revenue 
rule and/or a budget balance rule, appear to have 
yielded positive budgetary outcomes in terms of 
both discipline and stabilisation in a number of EU 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, 
and Finland). 
Countries with a high degree of fiscal 
decentralisation should pay due attention to the 
interactions between their rules and how fiscal 
policy is implemented across government levels.   
In particular, most fiscal rules applied to territorial 
governments are budget balance or debt rules, 
which may imply a pro cyclical bias of fiscal 
policy. A feasible solution to address this 
shortcoming should be based on a close 
coordination of all government layers and on the 
adoption of a multi-annual perspective to take into 
account the effects of the cycle. This coordination 
should take place at an early stage of the budget 
process, and preferably when fiscal targets for all 
government tiers are set.    
A complementary policy option to reinforce fiscal 
governance is the establishment of non-partisan 
public bodies acting in the field of budgetary 
policy. In some Member States, such as Belgium 
and the Netherlands, these institutions play an 
important role in promoting sound and sustainable 
fiscal policies. The main fields in which these 
bodies carry out their activities are the preparation 
of macroeconomic forecasts for the budget 
preparation, the analysis of budgetary 
developments vis-à-vis the respect of fiscal targets, 
and the estimation of the budgetary impact of 
specific policy measures. 
A third policy option to reinforce national fiscal 
governance and supplement rules and institutions 
is the strengthening of national medium term 
budgetary frameworks for multi-annual fiscal 
planning. Most EU Member States currently have 
a MTBF in place. However, a large majority of 
them also display significant shortcomings that 
hamper the use of this fiscal arrangement as an 
effective policy instrument for time-consistent 
fiscal planning. These weaknesses mainly consist 
of the non-constraining character of fiscal targets 
(i.e. budgetary figures considered in the MTBFs 
are merely projections and are not binding), and a 
lack of political commitment.  Likewise, budgetary 
projections are frequently based on unrealistic 
macroeconomic assumptions resulting in 
credibility problems. Finally, the absence of 
independent monitoring and regular reporting, 
together with the absence of corrective 
mechanisms further weaken the use of this fiscal 
arrangement. All these shortcomings should be 
addressed in order to render domestic MTBF an 
effective fiscal planning tool in the current context 
 
114 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
 
115 
of fiscal consolidation measures over the 
medium-term. 
Finally, available information suggests there is still 
some margin to further improve the existing 
budgetary procedures at national level. These 
procedural rules cover the three stages of the 
budget process, namely planning, approval and 
execution. A significant number of Member States 
show weaknesses, which mainly relate to 
transparency, the centralisation of the budgetary 
process, scant use of top down budgeting and the 
use of overly optimistic economic assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The lack of centralisation at the budgetary 
planning stage emerges as one of the main 
problems in the domestic budget process in a 
number of Member States, particularly in some 
new ones. This potentially enhances the deficit 
bias through the common pool problem and may 
hamper fiscal discipline. This shortcoming should 
be addressed by the reinforcement of the ministry 
of finance with a veto over other ministries' 
requests, the implementation of expenditure rules 
providing binding spending limits, and the 
constraining of the power of the parliament to 
modify the overall size of the budget.  
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In the original SGP, all Member States were 
expected to pursue the attainment of a budgetary 
position close-to-balance or in surplus in the 
medium-term. The reform of the SGP in 2005 
clarified that medium-term budgetary objectives 
(MTO) should be interpreted in structural terms 
and established that they should be differentiated 
to take into account differences in Member States 
economic fundamentals and risks to budgetary 
sustainability. Each Member State therefore sets its 
own medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). As 
a rule, this is the position a Member State aims to 
reach within the period of its stability and 
convergence programme and the programme sets 
out the steps it will take over that period to reach 
the position. 
4.1. MTOS IN THE REVISED SGP  
The revised SGP specifies that MTOs pursue a 
triple aim: a) provide a safety margin with respect 
to the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold; b) ensure 
rapid progress towards sustainability; and c) taking 
the first two objectives into account, allow room 
for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into 
account the needs for public investment. 
Additional provisions were agreed for euro-area 
and ERM II Member States. For these countries, 
the country specific MTOs are specified within a 
defined range between –1 percent of GDP and 
balance or surplus, in structural terms (cyclically 
adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary 
measures). The Council considered in 2005 that 
making the aim of ensuring rapid progress towards 
sustainability fully operational required further 
work. Accordingly, in a transitory phase until 
criteria and modalities for taking into account 
implicit liabilities were established, MTOs were to 
be differentiated on the basis of the debt ratio and 
potential growth, while preserving sufficient 
margin below the reference value of -3% of GDP. 
Setting out MTOs fully reflecting the reform of the 
Pact was therefore effectively conditional on 
reaching a common approach on how to 
incorporate implicit liabilities (increases in public 
expenditure due to ageing populations) in the 
definition of the medium-term budgetary 
objectives. 
                                        
4.2. NEW MTOS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
IMPLICIT LIABILITIES DUE TO AGEING 
POPULATIONS 
Following a technical agreement ultimately 
reached in the Economic and Financial Committee, 
the 7 July 2009 Ecofin Council Ministers took note 
of the new approach to be used for setting MTOs 
in line with the provisions of the reform Stability 
and Growth Pact(58). This followed the 
conclusions of the 9 October 2007 and the 5 May 
2009 Ecofin Council, which had stressed the aim 
of arriving at an agreement in connection with the 
updating of the long-term projections of age-
related expenditure by the Commission and the 
Ageing Working Group of the Economic Policy 
Committee, due in the course of 2009. The 10 
November 2009 Ecofin Council endorsed the 
incorporation of the new approach in the Code of 
Conduct (59) and, in line with earlier conclusions, 
confirmed that the new MTOs were implemented 
starting from the 2009-10 round of Stability and 
Convergence Programmes.  
The relevant provisions in the code of conduct are 
reported in Box II.4.1.  
In order to measure the respect of adequate safety 
margin with respect to the 3 percent to GDP deficit 
the Commission introduced in 2000 the concept of 
minimal benchmark. Since the EU fiscal 
framework requires the 3 percent reference value 
for deficits are to be respected even in the event of 
adverse cyclical developments, automatic 
stabilisers can be allowed to play freely over the 
cycle without breaching the 3 percent reference 
value only when the structural fiscal position 
incorporates a sufficient cyclical safety margin. 
With a view to provide Member States with an 
indication on the minimal structural budgetary 
position consistent with a sufficient safety margin, 
the Commission introduced in 2000 the concept of  
(58) Conclusions of ECOFIN Council of 7 July 2009. 
(59) Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and content of 
Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
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 ‘minimal benchmark’, which has been regularly 
updated by  the Working Group on Output Gaps 
(OGWG) of the Economic Policy Committee(60). 
The debt rules mentioned under (i) and (ii) in  
BOX 1 reflect the need to differentiate between 
low- and high-debt countries by taking as a starting 
point the debt-stabilizing balance for a debt at 60% 
of GDP, and imposing a more demanding 
objective on high-debt countries in proportion t the 
distance to the 60% of GDP reference value, so as 
to ensure that the debt is rapidly brought to below 
the reference value. Concerning the final, and 
more innovative, component of the MTO, 
reflecting the need to partially frontload the 
budgetary cost of ageing, the reference long-term 
projections on age-related expenditure(61) are 
those produced by the Commission and the 
Working Group on Ageing of the Economic Policy 
Committee(62). The same growth projections enter 
also the calculation of the debt-stabilising balance.  
(60) For the definition of the minimum benchmark see 
European Commission: 'Public Finances in EMU 2006'. 
European Economy 3/2006.  
(61) The present value of the change in age-related expenditure 
is calculated in a similar manner as the LTC component in 
the sustainability indicators. The calculations assume an 
infinite horizon with age-related expenditure stabilising to 
the projection end-year-value. See European Commission: 
'Sustainability Report 2009', European Economy 9/2009.  
(62) European Commission and Economic Policy Committee: 
'2009 Ageing Report' European Economy 2/2009.  
.  
Table II.4.1. shows the relevant variables for the 
MTOs for the EU27 Member States. High debt 
ratios, low potential GDP growth and high 
increases in the cost of ageing would respectively 
contribute to a higher MTO, while the minimum 
benchmark and a structural deficit of one (for the 
Euro area and ERM2 countries) act as minimum 
bounds. The new MTOs that Member States have 
presented in their stability and convergence 
programmes are presented in section I.3. 
 
Graph II.4.2: Triple aim of the MTO's 
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 Box II.4.1: Relevant provisions in the Code of Conduct
The MTO is defined in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and other temporary measures. The 
reference method for the estimation of potential output is the one adopted by the Council on 12 July 
2002. (1)  One-off and temporary measures are measures having a transitory budgetary effect that does not 
lead to a sustained change in the intertemporal budgetary position. (2)  
The MTO pursues a triple aim:  
• providing a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit limit. This safety margin is assessed for 
each Member State taking into account past output volatility and the budgetary sensitivity to output 
fluctuations. 
• ensuring rapid progress towards sustainability. This is assessed against the need to ensure the 
convergence of debt ratios towards prudent levels taking into account the economic and budgetary 
impact of ageing populations. 
• taking (i) and (ii) into account, allowing room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into 
account the needs for public investment. 
The MTOs are differentiated for individual Member States to take into account the diversity of economic 
and budgetary positions and developments as well as of fiscal risk to the sustainability of public finances, 
also in face of prospective demographic changes. The country-specific MTOs may diverge from the 
requirement of a close to balance or in surplus position. 
Specifically, the country-specific MTOs should take into account three components: i) the debt-stabilising 
balance for a debt ratio equal to the (60% of GDP) reference value (dependent on long-term potential 
growth), implying room for budgetary manoeuvre for Member States with relatively low debt; ii) a 
supplementary debt-reduction effort for Member States with a debt ratio in excess of the (60% of GDP) 
reference value, implying rapid progress towards it; and iii) a fraction of the adjustment needed to cover the 
present value of the future increase in age-related government expenditure. This implies a partial 
frontloading of the budgetary cost of ageing irrespective of the current level of debt. In addition to these 
criteria, MTOs should provide a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit reference value and, 
for euro area and ERM II Member States, in any case not exceed a deficit of 1% of GDP. The examination 
of the country-specific MTOs by the Commission and the Council in the context of the assessment of 
Stability and Convergence programmes should indicate whether they adequately reflect the objectives of the 
Stability and Growth Pact on the basis of the above criteria. Potential growth and the budgetary cost of 
ageing should be assessed in a long-term perspective on the basis of the projections produced by the 
Working Group on Ageing attached to the Economic Policy Committee. MTOs can be revised when a major 
structural reform with impact on the cost of ageing is implemented and in any case every four years 
preferably after a new set of projections is produced by the Working Group. 
Member States may present more ambitious MTOs than implied by these criteria if they feel their 
circumstances call for it.  
For Member States outside of the euro area and not participating in ERM II, country-specific MTOs would 
be defined with a view to ensuring the respect of the triple aim mentioned above. 
                                                          
(1) Due to data problems, a different method may be used for the estimation of potential output in the case of recently 
acceded member states (RAMS). The method used should be agreed by the Economic Policy Committee on the basis 
of a proposal of the Output Gap Working Group. 
(2) Examples of one-off and temporary measures are the sales of non-financial assets; receipts of auctions of publicly 
owned licenses; short-term emergency costs emerging from natural disasters; tax amnesties; revenues resulting from 
the transfers of pension obligations.  
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Table II.4.1: Subcomponents of the MTOs 
BE 89.6 3.8 -1.3 -1 4.7
BG 14.1 3.7 -1.8 1.3
CZ 29.8 3.6 -1.6 3.5
DK 33.3 3.8 -0.5 -1 1.6
DE 65.9 3.2 -1.6 -1 3.1
EE 4.8 3.8 -1.9 -1 -0.3
IE 43.2 4.4 -1.5 -1 6.7
EL 97.6 3.7 -1.4 -1 11.4
ES 39.5 3.9 -1.2 -1 5.7
FR 68 3.9 -1.6 -1 1.9
IT 105.8 3.5 -1.4 -1 1.4
CY 49.1 4.8 -1.8 -1 8.2
LV 19.5 3.4 -2 -1 0.7
LT 15.6 3.5 -1.9 -1 3
LU 14.7 4.6 -1 -1 12.6
HU 73 3.7 -1.6 1.4
MT 64.1 3.7 -1.7 -1 5.8
NL 58.2 3.5 -1.1 -1 5.1
AT 62.5 3.7 -1.6 -1 3
PL 47.2 3.5 -1.5 -1.7
PT 66.4 3.9 -1.5 -1 1.9
RO 13.6 3.8 -1.8 4.7
SI 22.8 3.4 -1.6 -1 8.3
SK 27.6 3.7 -2 -1 2.6
FI 33.4 3.7 -1.2 -1 4.7
SE 38 3.9 -1 1.5
UK 52 4.1 -1.4 3.5
Cost of ageing 
(infinite horizon)   
%of GDP
Debt (2008)       
%of GDP
Average nominal GDP 
growth (2010-2060)      
%
Minimum 
Benchmark       
Euro area and 
ERM2           
Source: Commission services and EPC 
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The assessment of EU governments' structural 
budget position has led to sometimes sizeable ex-
post revisions due to sharp reversal in economic 
conditions that affected potential output estimates. 
Also discretionary actions taken by EU countries' 
governments affected CAB measurement.  
This section reviews two strands of recent 
methodological work by Commission services 
dealing with these issues in the context of the 
Output Gap Working Group (OGWG) of the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC). First, this 
section describes recent work on to the assessment 
of the output gap using real-time information on 
capacity utilisation. It shows that by including 
information contained in capacity utilisation 
alongside its statistical characteristics, estimates of 
potential output can be enhanced, thereby 
improving the assessment of the structural 
budgetary positions in real time. Second, the 
section deals with the role played by discretionary 
fiscal policy measures to explain short-term 
variations in tax revenues by exploiting data 
collected in the context of the OGWG. In the run-
up to the global 2008/2009 financial crisis some 
countries have introduced generous tax breaks in 
the wake of large tax revenue windfalls which, 
with hindsight, proved to be unsustainable. Results 
are presented providing evidence on the pro-
cyclical nature of discretionary policy changes 
affecting tax revenues in the EU. 
5.1. THE POTENTIAL OUTPUT ESTIMATION AND 
THE PROBLEM OF REVISIONS  
The use of univariate statistical techniques (such as 
the Hodrick Prescott filter, thereafter HP) to derive 
measures of the level of potential output (and of 
the output gap) have been recognized to have at 
least two serious drawbacks, see in particular 
Kuttner (1994). First, potential output measures 
generated with these techniques lack a substantive 
economic foundation. Second, such techniques 
generally allow for identifying turning points in 
the potential output trajectory only with a 
considerable lag and can thus lead to large ex-post 
revisions. This can substantially exacerbate the 
uncertainty associated with real-time potential 
output estimates. 
The estimation method currently applied by 
Commission services is based on the so called 
Cobb-Douglas production function approach. (63)  
This approach relates potential output to the capital 
stock, hours worked, the Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) and the 
permanent component of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP). It is hence better grounded in economic 
theory than a univariate type of approach. 
However, the NAIRU and TFP are themselves 
unobservable and have to be estimated. The 
introduction of a bivariate procedure linking 
unemployment and inflation in a Phillips curve 
relationship to disentangle the permanent and 
cyclical components of labour has allowed 
enhancing the reliability of the NAIRU estimates 
so far. Yet, the permanent and cyclical components 
of TFP have been extracted with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, and hence can be argued to be 
themselves susceptible to Kuttner's critiques. In 
particular, the fact that the method utilizes only 
limited information, see Baxter and King (1995) 
and D'Auria et al. (2010) for a discussion of these 
issues in the recent EU context. 
A direct consequence of the high uncertainty 
around the estimates of TFP components at the end 
of the sample is that the estimates of potential 
output and of the cyclically adjusted budget 
balances (CAB) are frequently revised. This makes 
real-time fiscal policy assessment, especially in the 
vicinity of business cycle turning points difficult. 
Taking these factors into considerations, the 
European Commission has proposed to replace the 
HP method of the TFP components extraction with 
a new bivariate model that exploits the theoretical 
link between TFP cycle and capacity utilisation 
that arises in the Cobb-Douglas production 
framework. The new method has been applied 
officially applied for the first time in parallel to the 
HP filter in the 2010 Spring forecast round. (64) 
The general structure of the new model is 
presented in Box II.5.1. A more detailed technical 
description of the method can be found in D'Auria 
et al. (2010, forthcoming). 
(63) See Denis et al. (2006) for a description of this method. 
(64) The definitive move to the new method will take place in 
the autumn 2010 forecast round as endorsed by the 
Economic and Financial Committee. 
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the x-axis correspond to the different time horizon 
considered to calculate the standard deviations. (68) 
As can be seen, the average standard deviation of 
the revisions of the CAB estimates based on TFP 
cycle estimates obtained with the bivariate method 
is in general smaller than the average standard 
deviation of revisions on HP filter for every time-
horizon considered in nine out of eleven Member 
States. (69) Only for two Member States (Spain and 
UK) the result is ambiguous and depends on the 
time horizon. It is also worth noting that for a 
number of Member States (Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal), the bivariate method 
produced standard deviation of the revisions which 
are smaller by at least 20% across all time 
horizons. This result therefore provides supporting 
evidence in favour of the use of the capacity 
utilisation as this method significantly reduces the 
ex-post CAB revisions compared to the HP 
method. Ongoing work in this area by the 
Commission services will allow to extend the 
method to other Member States once data 
availability becomes sufficient for this purpose. 
CAB revision analysis 
The usefulness of capacity utilisation data for 
disentangling TFP components is justified on two 
grounds: first, capacity utilisation is measured with 
acceptable precision and, crucially, without 
revisions. This can be expected to be helpful in 
reducing TFP trend estimate revisions due to the 
updates of the underlying series. (65) Second, 
capacity utilisation indicators have been found to 
strongly co-move with the unobserved cyclical 
component of TFP, hence enabling unbiased 
extraction of the TFP cycle even at the end of the 
sample. (66) Mechanically, one should expect a 
similar effect of the new method on the real-time 
estimates of national CABs, since their 
construction requires the TFP cycle estimates as 
one of the input arguments.  
Following Planas et al. (2010) the two different 
methods used here, i.e. the HP and capacity-
utilisation affect all years of estimation of the 
CAB. One can exploit this feature to measure the 
sensitivity of CAB estimates to ex-post revisions. 
Graph II.5.1 does this by reporting the standard 
deviations of revisions of CAB measurement 
recorded for 11 EU Member States calculated over 
the period 2000-2008. (67) The revisions are 
computed on CAB estimates using the different 
autumn vintages of DG ECFIN Ameco database 
running from the autumn 2000 to the autumn 2009 
vintages over four different time horizons. The 
number of time horizons considered is conditioned 
by the data needed to compute meaningful 
statistics (i.e. standard deviations are used here) 
over sufficiently long time span to calculate 
differences in the CAB estimates recursively for 
years 2008 till 2000 using the different autumn 
vintages of the Ameco database. The numbers on 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(65) It should however be understood that such revisions will 
never be completely eliminated. 
(66) The positive impact of the new method on decreasing the 
size of TFP cycle revisions in real time has also been 
documented for a sample EU Member States in Planas et 
al. (2010). 
(67) The period 2000 -2008 is determined by the availability of 
previous Ameco vintages from the autumn 2000 till the 
autumn 2009, i.e., the first year for which the estimate of 
the CAB can be compared using the HP and capacity 
utilisation method is 2008 using the autumn 2008 and the 
autumn 2009 Ameco vintages. The countries covered are 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and United 
Kingdom. Due to lack of data the new method is not yet 
applicable for the Austria, Finland, Luxemburg and 
Sweden and the 12 New Member States. 
 
(68) For instance, the first measure of the size of revisions 
reported in Graph II.5.1 covers eight years, i.e., from 2008 
till 2000 and for each of these years the difference between 
two different estimates are calculated the following way: 
The time horizons in the x-axis correspond to the years 
considered to calculate the standard deviation in the 
revisions of the CAB estimates. For instance, the standard 
deviation of the CAB estimate corresponding to the time 
horizon 1 covers the differences in the CAB estimated for 
the years 2008 (using the autumn 2009 and the autumn 
2008 forecast), the year 2007 (using the autumn 2008 
forecast and the autumn 2007 forecast), etc. till the year 
2000 (using the autumn 2001 forecast and the autumn 
2000) forecast. Time horizon 2 covers the years 2007 
(using the autumn 2008 forecast and the autumn 2007 
forecast), etc. till the year 2001 (using the autumn 2002 
forecast and the autumn 2001) forecast. By doing these 
calculations recursively (i.e. moving down from year 2008 
to year 2000) one obtains four standard deviations values 
measuring the size of the revisions in the CAB estimate.  
(69) It can also be observed that the size of revisions tends to 
grow when moving from the first time horizon to the fourth 
time horizon which might simply reflect the smaller 
number of years that is considered each time. 
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 Box II.5.1: A joint model for TFP and capacity utilisation
The basic structure of the new bivariate method is similar to the Phillips-curve augmented unobserved 
component model proposed by Kuttner (1994) for estimating potential output and output gap in the US. 
In the Cobb-Douglas production function framework TFP can be related to the labour efficiency ( LE ) and 
capital efficiency ( KE ) levels of the available technology and to labour and capital capacity utilisation ( LU
and KU  respectively) according to: 
(1)   )()( 11 αααα −−= KLKL UUEETFP  
where the constant α represents the labour share of income. Since efficiency is a persistent process whereas 
capacity utilisation depends on the current economic condition, equation (1) suggests a TFP-decomposition 
into a trend P and a cycle C such that TFP = P × C with: 
   αααα −− == 11 KLKL UUCEEP  
The first relationship has no empirical relevance since efficiency is not measured. Capacity utilisation 
measures are instead available, although so far without discriminating between the different production 
factors. It follows that only aggregate capacity utilisation series (U) can be readily obtained. By construction
we expect UL and UK to be significantly correlated. Given that average hours worked per employee already 
contain some cyclical movements, the link with labour utilisation should be somewhat looser. But if there 
are fluctuations in the degree of labour hoarding that are not captured by the number of hours variable, a 
correlation between labour and capital utilisation may nevertheless be present. It is thus assumed that: 
10 <<+= γεγ KL uu  
where lowercase letters denote logarithms and ε is a random shock. Hence log-TFP is related to capacity 
utilisation through: 
εααγα ++−+= uptfp )1(  
 
This link is exploited to detrend TFP through the following bivariate model: 
(2)   
1
)-(1-1
1    e  c     u
 c  p  tfp
UttUt
ttt
>=++=
+=
γα
ββμ
 
where the small-case letters indicate log-levels of their large-case letter counterparts. Given that both α and γ 
lie in the (0,1)-interval, the loading coefficient β should be greater than one. The value of β can be 
considered a formal quantitative measure of the link between the capacity utilisation and TFP. The term eUt
in the second equation of system (2) stands for a random shock. System (X.2) must be completed with 
assumptions about the unobserved components dynamics. Their general structure as well as specific 
assumptions made for every Member States are discussed in D'Auria et al. (2010, forthcoming). 
Construction of the capacity utilisation composite indicator 
Data on capacity utilisation for the EU can be obtained from: the Capacity Utilisation Indicator (CUI), 
which is available for manufacturing only, and the Business Survey Capacity Indicator (BS) collected for 
both manufacturing and services as a part of the EC Business and Consumer Survey Programme, see the 
European Economy Special Report 5/2006. Due to its wider scope, BS is thought to be a superior measure of 
capacity utilisation for the total economy. It has the disadvantage however that data on the Service sector has 
been collected only since years 1995-1998 for most Member States. For this reason, CUI, suitably rescaled,  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Box (continued) 
 
 is used for the period when BS is not available, while BS is used for the remaining years. Only CUI is used 
for Luxemburg as business surveys are not conducted for this country. Ireland has interrupted business 
surveys in 2009. 
Model estimation  
The model can be estimated using the standard maximum likelihood method or applying a Bayesian 
approach. The latter is preferred as it overcomes a stability problem that can occur with maximum likelihood 
estimation whereby 0-coefficient estimates are obtained for structural shock variances. Another advantage of 
Bayesian approach is that the additional information possessed by modellers and policy makers that is not 
captured in the data can be easily incorporated into the analysis. For instance, some information is a priori
available about the periodicity of the TFP cycle or the inertia of its trend. In the Bayesian framework all 
parameters are considered as random variables with an initial distribution that reflects the prior knowledge. 
The estimation procedure aims at delivering posterior distributions of all unobserved quantities given both 
prior assumptions and observations. The likelihood is evaluated by casting model (2) into a state space 
format in order to apply the Kalman filter. More details about the methodology and the prior distributions 
are given in D'Auria et al. (2010, forthcoming). (1) 
                                                          
(1) All computations are made by programme GAP developed in the Joint Research Centre and downloadable from 
CIRCA website 
 http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/ecfin/outgaps/library?l=/method/nawru_estimation&vm=detailed&sb=Title  
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Graph II.5.1: One to four-step ahead revision standard deviations (x 100) for four different time horizons (1) 
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(1) The time horizons in the x-axis correspond to the years considered to calculate the standard deviation in the revisions of the CAB estimates reported 
in the y-axis. For instance, the standard deviation of the CAB estimate corresponding to the time horizon 1 covers the differences in the CAB estimated 
for the years 2008 (using the autumn 2009 and the autumn 2008 forecast), the year 2007 (using the autumn 2008 forecast and the autumn 2007 
forecast), etc. till the year 2000 (using the autumn 2001 forecast and the autumn 2000) forecast. Time horizon 2 covers the years 2007 (using the 
autumn 2008 forecast and the autumn 2007 forecast), etc. till the year 2001 (using the autumn 2002 forecast and the autumn 2001) forecast. 
 
5.2. THE PRO-CYCLICAL NATURE OF 
DISCRETIONARY MEASURES AFFECTING 
TAX REVENUES  
The data collected by the Commission services on 
the impact of discretionary measures on tax 
revenues in the context of the Output Gap Working 
Group can be used to better understand recent tax 
policy changes (see European Commission, 2009 
for a description of the database). Before 2008 
many EU countries benefited from substantial tax 
revenue windfalls and relatively high apparent tax 
elasticities. This led some to introduce generous 
Source: Commission services. 
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tax breaks which, with hindsight, proved to be 
unaffordable in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 
global financial crisis. Graphs II.5.2-II.5.5 provide 
an illustration of the recent evolution of apparent 
tax elasticities and the output gap, with the latter 
measuring the business cyclical position for a 
limited set of countries. (70) Total tax revenues and 
apparent tax elasticities, both gross and net of the 
effect of discretionary measures for each broad tax 
category are reported for selected countries. The 
net elasticities are derived using the proportional 
adjustment method described in European 
Commission (2009). For each tax category, the tax 
base used is nominal GDP in order to ensure direct 
comparability with the OECD/Commission tax 
elasticities used to calculate the cyclically adjusted 
balance, as depicted in Graphs II.5.2-II.5.5.(71) 
Apparent tax elasticities appear to be very volatile 
in the short-run and can sometimes depart 
substantially from the OECD/Commission 
benchmark. In certain cases, however, the impact 
of discretionary measures on the tax elasticity is 
large, yielding some substantial discrepancies 
between net and gross elasticities in these cases. 
Graph II.5.2 depicts the results for the apparent 
elasticity of direct taxes with respect to GDP in 
selected countries. Both net and gross elasticities 
appear to be very volatile and tend to fluctuate 
around the OECD/Commission benchmark 
elasticities, reflecting general business cycle 
variations as shown by the output gap values. 
Graph II.5.3 shows the results of an equivalent 
exercise for a different set of countries and indirect 
taxes. Again, high volatility of apparent tax 
elasticities can be seen with some significant 
departures from the OECD/European Commission 
benchmark also being due to the overall output 
variations as indicated by the values of the output 
gap. Graph II.5.4 which shows tax elasticities of 
Social Security Contributions shows lower 
volatility for both net and gross elasticities and a 
smaller impact of discretionary measures on the 
tax elasticities. Graph 4 plots gross and net 
apparent elasticities of the total tax revenues for a 
larger sample of countries and also shows that, 
while gross and net tax elasticities are often highly 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(70) Apparent tax elasticities have therefore been computed by 
dividing the annual growth of the revenue series (both 
gross and net) with the nominal GDP annual growth rate. 
(71) The OECD/Commission tax elasticities are available in 
European Commission (2006), Public Finances in EMU 
2006, Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, European Commission. 
correlated, the incidence of discretionary measures 
can in some years be rather large and drive to 
sizeable discrepancy between the two series. (72)  
Graphs II.5.2-II.5.5 can be used to illustrate the pro 
or counter-cyclical nature of discretionary 
measures. For instance, for a given level of output 
growth, tax cuts will result in the net tax elasticity 
being higher than the gross elasticity, as the 
change in tax revenues in the gross case includes 
the tax cut while the change in tax revenues in the 
net case does not. Similarly, in case of a tax 
increase, the net tax elasticity will be lower than 
the gross tax elasticity. (73)Graph II.5.4 concerning 
total taxes shows that discretionary measures 
tended to be counter-cyclical in Italy in 2003, 
counter-cyclical in France in 2004-2005, and in the 
Czech republic in 1998-2003, while they tended to 
be pro-cyclical in Malta in 2004-2005. (74) 
(72) The correction of tax revenues taking into account the 
entire series of discretionary measures yields tax elasticities 
net of discretionary measures which can depart 
significantly from the gross tax elasticities series as shown 
by the Czech case. This reflects the fact that discretionary 
measures can have long-lasting effects and thus can affect 
tax elasticities over long periods of time. 
(73) Apparent net tax elasticities are higher than the gross tax 
elasticities when discretionary measures imply a negative 
variation of tax revenues (i.e. a tax cut) and lower when 
discretionary measures represent a tax revenue increase.  
To see this, one can consider the simple case where the 
change in tax revenues is observed over a two years period, 
between t and t-1, such that net tax elasticities in year t-1 is 
At-1. It can be written as follows using the proportional 
adjustment method, assuming that the year t represents the 
base year: 
tt
t
tt DMT
TTA
−
=
−− 11
tt TA Δ>
   . Tt is the gross tax level and 
DMt is the discretionary measure in year t (i.e. the base 
year). The variation in tax revenues net of discretionary 
measures between t-1 and t will be larger than the variation 
of gross tax revenues,  
11 −− −〉⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
− tt
tt
t
tt TTDMT
TTT
tt TA Δ<Δ
i.e., Δ if: , i.e., if DMt 
< 0 Conversely,  if DMt > 0. 
 
(74) Following the explanation given above, during 
expansionary phases of the cycle, pro-cyclical discretionary 
measures would yield negative tax revenue variations and 
thus higher net tax elasticities than in a no-policy change 
scenario while during slowdowns discretionary measures 
would yield positive tax revenue variations compared to a 
no-policy change scenario, thus resulting in lower net tax 
elasticities. In both cases net tax elasticities changes would 
amplify variations in gross tax elasticities and this would, 
in principle, yield larger variance. 
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Graph II.5.2: Gross and net (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities to GDP and output gap: direct taxes 
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Source:  Commission services. 
Graph II.5.3: Gross and net (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities to GDP and output gap: indirect taxes 
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Graph II.5.4: Gross and net (for the impact of discretionary measures) tax elasticities to GDP and output gap: social security contributions 
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Graph II.5.5: Gross and net tax elasticities to GDP and output gap: total tax revenues 
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The descriptive evidence provided above does not, 
in itself, provide a clear picture on the overall pro- 
or counter-cyclical nature of discretionary 
measures affecting tax revenues. One difficulty is 
that in most cases the time span available does not 
cover a full business cycle. A more consistent way 
to look at the pro or counter-cyclical nature of 
discretionary measures is to consider their 
relationship with the output gap suing econometric 
estimations with the dependent variable being the 
estimated impact of discretionary measures on tax 
revenues (in percent of GDP) and with the output 
gap being included as main explanatory variable as 
of interest. (75) A negative correlation coefficient 
would suggest that discretionary measures are pro-
cyclical and a positive coefficient that they are 
counter-cyclical.  The analysis has been carried out 
by pooling data across countries and years in order 
to overcome the constraints of the short time scale. 
Only countries covering a sufficiently long time 
period for each tax category are used in order to 
capture any cyclical pattern of discretionary 
measures. The period covered by the estimations is 
2001-2007 and the countries included are Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, 
Malta, Sweden and the UK. The following 
equation has been estimated for this sample of 
countries: 
ittiti OGDM εββ ++= −1,10,  (1) 
where DMi,t indicates the variation in tax revenues 
as a result of discretionary measures in percentage 
of GDP in country i in year t and OGi,t-1 is the 
business cycle position which is represented by the 
level of output gap in year t-1. (76) The term εi,t is 
an error term which can be decomposed into two 
subcomponents: 
tiiti ,, λαε +=    (2) 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(75) The lagged output gap is used instead of the actual value in 
order to account for the potential lag in fiscal policy setting 
and to avoid endogeneity issues. Section II provides a 
discussion and references on this point. 
(76) As is usual in the fiscal policy literature analysing the link 
between the fiscal stance and the business cycle, the output 
gap is observed in t-1, as that the fiscal stance measures the 
difference in budgetary position between year t and t-1. In 
addition, the use of lagged output gap reduces the potential 
endogeneity of discretionary measures affecting tax 
revenues. See in particular, European Commission (2006), 
Public Finance Report in EMU-2006, (Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs) for a review of the 
literature. 
The coefficient αi represents an unobserved 
country specific-effect and λi,t is an error term 
which is assumed to have the i.i.d. properties. In 
order to remove the unobserved country-specific 
components which could influence the relationship 
between discretionary measures and the business 
cycle, equation (1) has been estimated using a 
panel fixed (within) estimator which allows the 
removal of these unobserved effects. The results of 
the estimation of Equation (1) are reported in 
Table II.5.1. It presents results for discretionary 
measures concerning all taxes categories as well as 
for each tax category separately. Column (1) of 
Table II.5.1 shows that the sign of the coefficient 
on the lagged output gap is negative and 
significant, indicating that discretionary measures 
tend to increase tax revenues when the output gap 
is lower and to decrease tax revenues when the 
output gap is higher, thus suggesting that 
discretionary measures affecting total taxes are on 
average pro-cyclical for the sample of countries 
and period covered. 
Column (2) of Table 2 includes additional control 
variables that are usually considered in the fiscal 
policy literature. These variables include two fiscal 
indicators: the level of debt and the budgetary 
position in year t-1. The expected sign of the 
estimated coefficients is positive on the debt 
variable and negative on the net lending position 
(assuming that discretionary measures are taken 
for fiscal consolidation, i.e. to reduce deficit and 
debt levels). In addition to the fiscal variables, two 
other variables are used: a dummy variable 
indicating whether in year t-1 general elections 
took place in country i and an indicator measuring 
the quality of fiscal governance, which has been 
found to be relevant in the literature studying the 
pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy. (77) A higher 
value for this variable indicates better fiscal 
governance. The expected sign on the election 
variable is negative if tax reductions are used for 
electoral purposes. The results of the estimation of 
the link between the output gap and discretionary 
measures, controlling for these other potential 
determinants, are reported in Column (2) of Table 
2 and show that the relationship between the 
(77) For a description of the database on fiscal governance, see 
also European Commission (2006), Public Finance Report 
in EMU-2006, (Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs).  For evidence regarding the role played 
by fiscal institutions on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, see 
Debrun et al. (2008). 
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Table II.5.1: Econometric estimation of the link between the output gap and discretionary measures. Panel (fixed-effect) estimations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Output gap -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.01) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Debt -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Net lending -0.047*** -0.014 -0.009 -0.008*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.004)
General elections -0.056 -0.037 -0.022 0.002
(0.044) (0.038) (0.025) (0.013)
Fiscal rules 0.045 -0.017 0.025 0.028
(0.066) (0.056) (0.037) (0.019)
Constant -0.054** -0.092 -0.101*** 0.105 0.026** -0.045 0.004 -0.055
(0.022) (0.294) (0.017) (0.253) (0.011) (0.164) (0.006) (0.085)
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Number of country 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
R-squared 0.38 0.54 0.36 0.41 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.13
F test for fixed effects 4.66*** 2.27** 2.57** 1.53 3.43*** 2.43** 2.16* 0.86
Total taxes Direct taxes Indirect taxes Social security contributions
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The period covered by the estimations is 
2001-2007 and the countries are Belgium, the Czech republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, Malta, Sweden and the UK. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The results indicate that only direct taxes display 
the same pro-cyclicality result as total taxes. This 
result, together with a detailed inspection of the 
data reported by the Member States, could possibly 
suggest that direct taxes are more frequently used 
in a pro-cyclical way to lower the tax burden 
during good times and to increase it during bad 
times, compared to other tax categories. The 
limited sample of countries and time periods 
considered, however, means that these results 
should be interpreted with caution and further 
robustness checks should be conducted over longer 
time spans and for more countries, when 
internationally comparable data become available. 
lagged output gap and discretionary measures 
remains negative and significant. The value of the 
coefficient decreases slightly suggesting that the 
additional control variables considered capture a 
small part of the link between discretionary 
measures affecting tax revenues and the business 
cycle. None of the other variables included in the 
equations are significant, however, excepting the 
net lending variable which displays a negative sign 
suggesting that countries with a deteriorated 
budgetary balance in year t tend to adopt 
discretionary measures that increase tax revenues, 
thus pointing to fiscal consolidation. Similar 
estimations are undertaken for each tax category 
separately in Columns (3) to (8). 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, a number of EU countries 
experienced absorption booms involving phases of 
buoyant domestic demand that were coupled with 
widening current account deficits. (78) When the 
external imbalances underwent a sharp correction 
following the global crisis, the fiscal position also 
abruptly shifted to expose very large deficits.  
This section discusses ways to construct indicators 
for the conduct of fiscal policy, which take both 
the impact of the economic cycle and the 
movements in absorption, and therefore the current 
account, into consideration. Compared with the 
conventional cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
(CAB), correcting budgetary indicators for 
absorption booms and busts it improves the 
assessment of the structural fiscal balance in 
countries experiencing large swings in their current 
account. It could contribute to an appropriate 
calibration of the fiscal impulse. 
6.2. ADJUSTING THE CAB FOR CURRENT 
ACCOUNT IMBALANCES  
There are a number of well documented 
difficulties in assessing the structural budgetary 
position using the CAB. Alongside the inherent 
difficulties of measuring the cycle in real time, 
revenue elasticities may also fluctuate during the 
cycle, leading to an incorrect distinction between 
the cyclical and the structural component of budget 
balances. In particular, in countries experiencing 
fast growth of domestic demand, and therefore 
growing current account deficits and higher than 
normal tax elasticities have contributed to 
artificially pushing up cyclically-adjusted 
balances.  
Introducing improvements in the CAB is not an 
easy task. Despite a consensus that the CAB may 
not always send the right signals due to fluctuating 
revenue elasticities, there has been at best partial 
progress on this issue. The CAB approach 
employed in EU budgetary surveillance measures                                                           
(78) See Part IV for a discussion of fiscal policy in the context 
of absorption booms and busts.  
the cycle using the output gap and adjusts the 
budgetary totals using constant elasticities with 
sensitivities that vary in proportion with the share 
of the budgetary components in GDP. (79) The 
elasticities capture the percentage change of 
budgetary items associated with a percentage 
output change while the sensitivities measure the 
value changes in budgetary items associated with 
value changes in output. This approach implicitly 
assumes that the impact of the cycle on revenues is 
not strictly constant, but varies only in proportion 
of changing revenue composition.  The 
composition of tax bases is assumed to play no 
role. An alternative approach is to take cycles in 
the different tax bases into account, by considering 
the gaps between the actual and the filtered value 
of tax bases. (80) This approach can take into 
account whether tax bases are unusually high or 
low compared with their trend. However, the 
benchmark tax base composition where all tax 
bases are in line with their trend has no strong 
conceptual underpinning and neglects the 
possibility of structural transformations that may 
lead to lasting adjustments in tax bases.  
The main idea behind the fiscal indicator adjusted 
to take into account the impact of absorption boom 
and busts which is developed in this section, is that 
the definition of a well-founded benchmark for the 
composition of tax bases can be naturally related to 
a country's need to maintain prudent current 
account positions. The implicit assumption in the 
CAB is that all tax bases are linked to production 
(output). Hence the underlying budgetary position 
is computed by purging the budget balance from 
the effects resulting from output being different 
from potential. However, as discussed above, a 
sizeable share of taxes is linked to domestic 
demand (absorption) rather than output. For this 
reason a cyclically and absorption adjusted budget 
balance (CAAB) where "gaps" not only in output 
but also in absorption play a role is desirable. 
In line with the approach proposed by Jaeger and 
Klemm (2007), the purpose is to strip out the 
automatic effects of both output and domestic 
(79) See Part II.5 for recent improvements in CAB 
measurement and European Commission (2006) Box II.3 
for more details on the development of the CAB over time. 
(80) For more information, see Bouthevillan et al. (2001). 
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demand (absorption) from the actual balance. A 
meaningful notion of "absorption gap" should 
capture the difference between actual and 
"potential" absorption, where "potential" 
absorption is the level of absorption when the 
country's current account balance is in line with 
fundamentals. A common benchmark for current 
accounts is provided by so-called "current account 
norms", namely current account values consistent 
with medium-term determinants of the saving-
investment balance (e.g., Chinn and Prasad, 2004; 
Lee et al., 2008). 
 
Table II.6.1: CABS and CAABS in EU countries 
 
The box, below, presents details on the 
computation of the CAAB. Regarding the 
determination of the parameters linking the output 
gap and the absorption gap to the CAAB, a natural 
benchmark is provided by the shares of direct and 
indirect taxes. While direct taxes are linked to 
incomes and therefore to value added (GDP), the 
tax base of indirect taxes is more strongly 
correlated with absorption because indirect taxes 
are levied on consumption and imports. Sensitivity 
parameters determined in this way are used to 
estimate the automatic response of the budget to 
output and absorption gaps. 
Both output and absorption gaps are assumed to be 
temporary as they both imply a deviation from 
fundamentals, and are therefore netted out when 
calculating the CAAB. The CAB and CAAB will 
evolve in parallel if output gaps move in line with 
absorption gaps and if there are no major 
fluctuations in indirect taxes. 
6.3. RESULTS 
Based on the formula in the Box, we calculated the 
CAAB indicator for the 27 EU countries. Results 
in table II.6.1, below, show that, although in most 
cases the two indicators present a similar picture 
and tend to evolve in parallel, in some cases the 
divergence is large. These cases correspond to 
those countries where the current account 
underwent periods of exceptionally large deficits 
or surpluses.  
CAAB CAB
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-09 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005-09
BE -2.7 -0.2 -1.1 -2.2 -4.7 -2.2 -2.9 -0.4 -1.4 -2.0 -4.5 -2.3
BG -1.1 -1.8 -5.6 -4.2 -1.3 -2.8 0.8 1.7 -1.5 0.0 -2.8 -0.4
CZ -3.8 -4.1 -3.0 -4.1 -5.5 -4.1 -3.9 -4.0 -2.9 -4.5 -5.1 -4.1
DK 5.0 3.7 3.2 3.6 1.3 3.4 4.7 3.5 3.1 3.3 0.6 3.0
DE -2.0 -1.3 0.0 -0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -2.7 -2.2 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -1.9
EE -0.2 -1.7 -2.7 -4.7 0.8 -1.7 0.3 0.0 -0.7 -4.1 1.3 -0.6
IE 0.3 1.4 -2.4 -7.7 -9.7 -3.6 0.9 2.1 -1.6 -7.0 -11.4 -3.4
EL -6.4 -4.9 -6.4 -9.8 -13.2 -8.2 -5.6 -4.7 -7.0 -9.6 -14.1 -8.2
ES 0.6 1.0 0.4 -5.1 -10.0 -2.6 1.0 1.6 1.2 -4.4 -9.6 -2.1
FR -3.4 -3.0 -3.7 -4.1 -7.7 -4.4 -3.4 -3.0 -3.7 -3.7 -6.2 -4.0
IT -4.5 -4.3 -2.9 -3.6 -3.7 -3.8 -4.6 -4.4 -3.0 -3.3 -3.3 -3.7
CY -3.4 -2.7 0.2 -3.7 -6.2 -3.2 -2.2 -1.3 2.5 -0.4 -5.8 -1.4
LV -2.6 -5.9 -7.3 -7.6 -4.9 -5.7 -1.5 -3.2 -4.5 -6.4 -6.3 -4.4
LT -2.3 -3.2 -5.7 -7.5 -6.6 -5.0 -1.8 -2.1 -3.7 -5.7 -6.7 -4.0
LU -0.1 0.2 1.1 1.1 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.1 1.1 2.0 1.2 0.8
HU -8.9 -11.1 -6.3 -5.0 -1.1 -6.5 -8.7 -10.9 -6.4 -5.1 -2.2 -6.7
MT -3.6 -4.0 -3.8 -6.4 -4.6 -4.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -4.9 -3.1 -3.1
NL 0.9 1.0 -0.5 -0.7 -3.2 -0.5 0.3 0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -3.6 -0.9
AT -0.7 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1 -2.9 -1.5 -1.3 -1.9 -1.6 -1.7 -2.4 -1.8
PL -3.5 -3.9 -3.0 -4.8 -5.8 -4.2 -3.9 -4.0 -2.8 -4.6 -6.9 -4.4
PT -6.2 -4.4 -3.6 -3.7 -7.1 -5.0 -5.7 -3.7 -3.0 -2.9 -8.3 -4.7
RO -3.1 -5.3 -6.4 -9.2 -7.5 -6.3 -2.2 -4.1 -4.7 -8.2 -7.8 -5.4
SI -1.5 -2.4 -2.8 -4.9 -5.1 -3.3 -1.6 -2.6 -2.9 -4.8 -3.8 -3.1
SK -3.4 -4.6 -4.2 -5.4 -7.0 -4.9 -2.5 -3.9 -3.7 -4.5 -6.4 -4.2
FI 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.0 -0.8 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.3 2.1
SE 2.3 2.2 3.8 3.9 1.7 2.8 1.0 0.3 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.3
UK -3.9 -3.7 -3.9 -5.6 -10.2 -5.4 -4.0 -3.5 -3.9 -5.7 -9.7 -5.4  
Source: Commission services. 
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 Box II.6.1: Estimating cyclically and absorption-adjusted budget balances
The CAAB is calculated as the difference between the actual budget balance and two terms measuring the 
output gap and the absorption gap, respectively. Denoting by b, b* and b** the government balance, the 
CAB, and the CAAB, respectively, by y and y* actual and potential output, by ygap the output gap and by 
agap the absorption gap, by a and a* absorption and potential absorption, by ca* the current account norm
and by it the sum of net foreign income and net transfers, the following equations can be derived (some 
second-order terms are ignored for simplification): 
(1)  (b*/y*)t = (b/y)t – λ ygapt 
(2)   (b**/y*)t = (b/y)t – β ygapt – γ agapt, 
(3)   agapt = [(at – a*t)/y*t], 
(4)  a*t = y*t – ca*t + itt. 
From equations (1) and (2) it is evident that the difference between the CAB and the CAAB originates from 
two sources: (i) the fact that the CAAB also subtracts also the impact of the absorption gap from the budget 
balance; (ii) the different sensitivity of the CAAB to the output gap (denoted by λ  and β for the case of the 
CAB and the CAAB, respectively). With the CAAB approach, a part of the revenues is assumed to be linked 
to absorption rather than to output and parameters are set so as to avoid double counting. A natural 
benchmark for determining the sensitivity parameters to output, β, and absorption, γ, in equation (2) is to use 
the shares in GDP of, respectively direct and indirect taxes, so that β= λ-γ, where λ is the standard budgetary 
sensitivity used in EU budgetary surveillance and γ is the share of indirect taxes in GDP. This has the 
implication that: 
(5)  (b**/y*)t =(b*/y*)t – γ(agapt–ygapt) 
Most of the variables used for the computation of CAABs were obtained from the DG ECFIN AMECO 
database. Regarding the computation of current account norms, the approach followed is akin to that in 
Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Lee at al. (2008). Regressions of the current account/GDP ratios on a set of 
explanatory variables were carried out on pooled data from 60 industrial and emerging economies over the 
1970–2009 period. To smooth out cyclical variations and address the issue of reverse causation, the data 
were transformed into time-averages over 4-year non-overlapping sub-periods. The estimated current 
account norms were obtained as the linear predictions from those estimated.  
The explanatory factors, aimed at capturing the determinants of the balance between national savings and 
investment over the medium-to-long term, were chosen as follows:  
• General government budget balance/GDP ratio. The higher the government budget balance surplus, 
the higher national savings and therefore the current account balance. Source: AMECO complemented 
by IMF, World Economic Outlook database. 
• Old-age dependency ratio (the fraction of population older than 65 years over the working-age 
population, defined as those between 15 and 64 years old). Life-cycle consumption theory predicts that 
the higher the old-age dependency ratio, the lower the share of savings on GDP and the current 
account/GDP ratio. Source: AMECO, complemented by United Nations. 
• Real GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) (ratio with respect to US). Countries with 
relatively high (low) per-capita GDP are more likely to lend (borrow) to (from) other countries, and to 
run, ceteris paribus, a higher current account surplus (deficit). Source: Penn World Tables (data beyond 
2004 projected forward using GDP per-capita growth rates from AMECO).  
Real GDP per capita growth. Countries characterised by relatively high (low) growth rates of GDP per 
capita are more likely to borrow (lend) from (to) other countries, and to run, ceteris paribus, lower  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Graphs II.6.1 and II.6.2 illustrate the evolution in 
the difference between the CAAB and the CAB 
since 2000 in selected countries. The first graph 
depicts the case of selected Euro Area countries. It 
suggests that the underlying fiscal position at the 
outset of the crisis (2007–08) was significantly 
worse according to the CAAB than according to 
the CAB in Greece and Portugal, countries that 
were experiencing sizable current account deficits 
at that point in time. Symmetrically, in countries 
that were accumulating surpluses in the years 
before the crisis, like Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden, the underlying budgetary position 
estimated by the CAAB appears stronger than that 
revealed by the CAB. This evidence suggests that 
an assessment of the underlying fiscal position 
based on the CAAB could have helped develop 
policies that were more consistent with a prudent 
development of external imbalances and which 
could have contributed to containing intra-Euro 
Area current account and competitiveness 
divergences. 
Graph II.4.2 depicts the evolution of the CAAB 
and the CAB for selected New Member States: 
Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Romania. In the 
past decade, all these countries underwent boom-
bust dynamics fuelled by rapid financial 
integration and abundant capital inflows. 
Absorption grew at very high rates and current 
account deficits reached record values between 
2007 and 2008, while the global crisis was 
accompanied by major current account reversals 
linked to capital outflows and major contractions 
in absorption. During the boom years, the 
underlying fiscal position in these countries would 
have looked considerably less optimistic if 
judgement were based on the CAAB. In the case of 
Bulgaria the difference between the CAAB 
reached almost 4 percent of GDP; in the case of 
Latvia it reached about 2.5 percent. Such an 
assessment could have contributed to more prudent 
fiscal policies during the boom years. 
Graph II.6.1: Difference between CAAB and CAB, selected euro-
area countries 
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Box (continued) 
 
 current account surpluses (deficits). Source: AMECO complemented by World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
• Net foreign asset/GDP ratio (value at the beginning of each 4-year sample sub-period). A high stock of 
net foreign assets implies, ceterisparibus, higher net investment income and therefore higher current 
account surpluses on GDP. Source: AMECO, complemented by IMF, Balance of Payments data.  
• Oil balance (percentage difference between oil barrels per year produced and consumed). In light of the 
price rigidity of the demand for oil, a higher imbalance between oil consumption needs and production 
capacity translates into a higher current account deficit. Source: BP and US Energy Information 
Administration. 
The estimated current account norms indicate that for relatively high income countries like Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands small deficits or surpluses are expected, while larger deficits are expected for 
relatively low income, catching up economies. 
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Overall, the CAB and the CAAB move in parallel. 
However, in countries with large deficits or 
surpluses in the current account, there can be 
substantial divergences between the two measures. 
This is evident in looking at the pre-crisis period. 
The CAAB of Member States with large current 
account deficits was in many cases more than 1 
percentage point lower than the CAB. Conversely, 
in countries with large current account surpluses, 
the CAAB was considerably higher than the CAB. 
Graph II.6.2: Difference between CAAB and CAB for selected 
New Member States 
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As an instrument to calibrate the fiscal impulse, 
targeting the CAAB rather than the CAB can aid 
the containment of boom-bust dynamics and the 
reduction of large external imbalances via a more 
effective use of fiscal policy. However, it should 
be considered that the CAAB captures only the 
direct effect of the absorption booms and busts on 
the tax bases. Indirect effects through for example 
the inflation of nominal GDP through 
unsustainable wage and price increases are not 
captured. Part IV discusses the wider direct and 
indirect effects of boom and bust cycles and 
external imbalances on fiscal indicators.    
Source: Commission services 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
Correcting budget balances for the impact of 
absorption booms and busts affecting the budget 
that are not netted out from conventional CAB 
indicators to be taken into account improves the 
measurement of the structural (underlying) budget 
position.  
A meaningful indicator complementing 
conventional CAB measures in fiscal surveillance 
could be based on a notion of "absorption gap", 
building on the fact that current account balances 
cannot permanently deviate from values consistent 
with fundamentals. This section of the report 
develops the notion of a cyclically and absorption 
adjusted budget balance (CAAB) with the 
following desirable properties:  
 
 
 
- it is based on sound foundations. Both the output 
gap and the absorption gap are calculated relative 
to well identified benchmarks (potential growth, 
and the current account norm);  
- it is easy to compute and interpret; 
- it addresses the issue of the fluctuating 
composition of tax bases, thus usefully 
complementing the standard CAB. 
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SUMMARY 
Since the onset of the economic and financial 
crisis, increased deficits, low, and even negative, 
economic growth and support measures for the 
financial sector have led to sharply rising 
government debt ratios. According to the 
Commission Spring forecasts, the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio is set to increase across the EU 
by 25 percentage points between 2007 and 2011. 
This is in line with increases during previous 
systemic financial crises and many EU countries 
have experienced comparable rises in debt in 70s, 
80s or 90s. Section III.1 discusses the 
characteristics of previous episodes of debt 
increases and the consolidation episodes that 
followed them. It highlights the fact that, as the 
consolidations undertaken in the past were only 
partially successful in stemming or reversing the 
debt increases, the overall starting level of debt is 
now higher than during previous episodes, adding 
to the pressure on the public finances. 
Moreover, debt is on course to continue increasing 
beyond 2011. Section III.2 presents illustrative 
partial equilibrium debt projections up to 2020 and 
considers the effect of various consolidation and 
economic scenarios on the trajectory of debt.  Even 
with a phasing out of the stimulus measures, a 
cyclical recovery in growth bringing with it a 
rebound in tax revenues, debt ratios would 
continue rising in most EU countries reflecting the 
extent of the deterioration in the structural 
budgetary position, and the incipient impact of 
ageing. Sustained and sizeable consolidation will 
be necessary in most Member States to halt and 
reverse the ongoing increase in government debt. 
For some Member States, the size of the required 
consolidation is unprecedented. 
 
The need to reduce debt levels centres around their 
negative effect on economic growth. These are 
discussed in section III.3, which also presents the 
results of simulations of the effect of higher 
deficits and debt using the European Commission's 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
QUEST III. Economic theory presents three main 
channels though which government debt can affect 
long term growth: (i) a crowding out effect on 
private investment, as national savings are reduced 
and interest rates increase; (ii) an increase in 
distortionary taxes which are needed to services, 
the debt; (iii) an increase in the risk premia paid by 
governments which increase the burden that debt 
presents. In some cases, the risk premium on 
sovereign debt may feed through to corporate and 
household debt. Whether, and to what extent, these 
mechanisms operate in a given economy will 
depend on both the structure of the economy and 
the behaviour of economic agents. For realistic life 
expectancies, the effect on interest rates through 
the savings channel appears negligible in 
overlapping generations models. This even holds if 
the model includes liquidity constrained agents, 
provided that savers are forward-looking. The 
effect on growth thus comes largely through higher 
distortionary taxes and risk premia. The 
composition of the tax increases matters. The 
QUEST III model finds that for a 10 percentage 
point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, there is no 
effect on long term growth if interest payments are 
financed by (non-distortionary) lump sum taxes, 
while taxing corporate profits leads to 1½% lower 
output in the long run. If financed by labour taxes, 
the negative GDP effect is around ½%, while VAT 
is the least costly of the distortionary taxes. If the 
debt increase leads to an increase in the risk 
premium, the GDP effect may be much higher, 
especially if the risk premium also affects the 
private sector. If the economy-wide risk premium 
is calibrated to increase by 3 basis points per 
percentage point increase in debt, output may be 
between 2 and 8 percentage points lower in the 
long run, depending on the tax instrument used. In 
the current context, anticipation of projected 
higher debt ratios with the associated higher future 
tax burdens depresses growth also in the short run. 
Credible permanent consolidation may thus benefit 
from positive anticipation effects in the short run 
that partly offset the direct negative demand 
effects.   
Given the importance of reducing the debt level 
and returning to sustainable public finances in the 
coming years, past experience has much to teach 
us in terms of how to ensure that fiscal 
consolidations are successful. While past increases 
in the public debt-to-GDP ratio have often, 
although not always, triggered fiscal 
consolidations, these consolidation episodes have 
not necessarily led to significant reductions in debt 
levels. The success of fiscal consolidations in 
reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio depends not only 
on the improvement of the primary fiscal balances, 
but also inter alia on growth, inflation and interest 
rate developments.  
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In this context, the Commission Communication 
"Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth" sets out some key principles 
to raise growth potential as fiscal consolidation is 
implemented. In particular it stresses that the 
composition and quality of government 
expenditure matters: budgetary consolidation 
programmes should prioritise 'growth-enhancing 
items' such as education and skills, R&D and 
innovation and investment in networks. The 
revenue side of the budget also matters and 
particular attention should also be given to the 
quality of the revenue/tax system. Where taxes 
may have to rise, this should, where possible, be 
done in conjunction with making the tax systems 
more "growth-friendly". For example, raising taxes 
on labour, as has occurred in the past at great costs 
to jobs, should be avoided. Rather Member States 
should seek to shift the tax burden from labour to 
energy and environmental taxes as part of a 
“greening” of taxation systems. Fiscal 
consolidation and long-term financial 
sustainability will need to go hand in hand with 
important structural reforms, in particular of 
pension, health care, social protection and 
education systems. Public administration should 
use the situation as an opportunity to enhance 
efficiency and the quality of service. Public 
procurement policy must ensure the most efficient 
use of public funds and procurement markets must 
be kept open EU-wide. 
Econometric and model-based analysis confirms 
the core elements of the EU 2020 "growth-
friendly" strategy for consolidation. Section III.4 
first examines the empirical literature on the 
determinants of successful fiscal consolidations. It 
then gathers descriptive evidence on the success of 
fiscal consolidation in financial crises and with 
high debt levels and provides econometric 
evidence gauging the effect of specific factors and 
conditions on the probability of successful debt 
reduction, based on EU27 and some non-EU 
OECD countries over 1970-2008.  
Overall, the literature indicates that unfavourable 
economic conditions, specifically, high initial debt 
levels are probably more likely to lead to 
successful consolidations. Expenditure based 
consolidations have better track record of success 
than ones based on tax increases, while gradual 
consolidations tend to have higher success rates 
than cold shower ones. Some of these results are 
likely due to introduction of accompanying 
structural changes, which are seen as important 
determinants of whether consolidations are 
successful or not. 
The global and financial aspect of the recession 
argues against an early and simultaneous exit from 
fiscal support, while the high levels of debt add 
urgency to consolidating before the rise in risk 
premia threatens government solvency. 
Econometric evidence shows that starting the 
consolidation after the financial crisis and 
implementing it in a gradual way is more likely to 
yield success. However, for high-debt countries 
there is evidence that a "cold shower" 
consolidation might be a preferable, owing to the 
snowball effect of debt (possibly intensified by the 
reaction of interest rates to the level and change in 
debt).  
The magnitude of the consolidations required 
across the EU means that it is likely that a 
combination of spending and tax measures will be 
necessary. In introducing tax increases, it is 
important that the distortionary effects of taxation 
on growth, investment and employment are kept to 
a minimum, while ensuring that tax policy is able 
to contribute to other goals of public policy. The 
empirical literature emphasizes the importance of 
the tax structure for growth, but the design of 
individual taxes has an important role to play as 
well. Section III.5 discusses the issues that policy 
makers will need to consider in planning any tax 
increases, within the context of different systems 
and preference across the EU Member States.  
Section III.6 presents results of QUEST model 
simulations, to look at the effects that the 
forthcoming consolidations might have on growth. 
The simulations point to significant effects of 
growth, although the magnitude depends on the 
nature of the consolidations and the presence of 
credit constraints, monetary accommodation and 
the assumptions made about fiscal policy in the 
rest of the world. Overall, when looking at the 
consolidations, the results point to much smaller 
short-term multipliers than for the fiscal stimulus 
under the EERP, if the consolidation measures are 
credibly perceived to be permanent. For a 
consolidation that is evenly composed of revenue 
and expenditure measures, a one percent 
improvement in the budget balance would 
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immediately lower output, by approximately 0.4 
percent.  
Countries facing high risk premia face the lowest 
costs of fiscal exit. In terms of the type of 
measures, on the revenue-side, consolidations 
through an increase in VAT appear to be the least 
growth unfriendly with GDP exceeding the 
baseline. The long run positive GDP effect is also 
largest in this scenario. Increases in the corporate 
profit taxes have the smallest short-term multiplier, 
but the largest long-term costs as a result of large 
adjustment costs of capital. Of the expenditure 
instruments, the main difference is between 
productive and unproductive spending. Reductions 
in government investment are most detrimental in 
the model and show the largest GDP losses, both 
in short and in the long run. The output costs of 
consolidations through cuts in transfers and 
government consumption are small as they are not 
productive and only serve distributional purposes 
in the model simulations.  
Finally, section III.7 looks in more detail at three 
economic financial crises from the last 20 years, to 
gain an idea of how the horizontal lessons relate to 
experiences in these country cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The examples considered all start in the early 
1990s and cover Finland, Sweden and Japan. 
These countries experienced rapid credit 
expansion, resulting in the creation of a financial 
bubble, followed by a financial crisis brought on 
by severe financial and private sector imbalances. 
They implemented very different strategies in 
response to the crisis, with different outcomes in 
terms of growth, growth potential, budget balances 
and debt. While Finland and Sweden returned to 
growth rates similar to, or higher, than those they 
enjoyed before the crisis, Japan has experienced 
lower growth and seen debt increase steadily. A 
key element in the difference between the three 
countries, was the strong and decisive government 
action that the Finnish and Swedish governments 
took from the early days of the crisis, in contrast to 
the more stop-go fiscal interventions and the long 
delay in addressing structural issues in the 
financial and corporate sectors in Japan which 
were put off until the third wave of the recession. 
But also exchange rate depreciation played an 
important role in the economic recovery and fiscal 
consolidation in Sweden and Finland. 
 
1. EXPERIENCES WITH PAST EPISODES OF FAST DEBT 
INCREASE 
 
Graph III.1.1: Public debt in EU Member States, 2007-2011 (in % of GDP)  1/ 
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Nearly all EU countries are expected to experience 
sharp rises in their debt level in the coming years 
with those countries primarily concerned being 
also those most directly affected by the 2008/2009 
financial crisis. According to the Commission 
Spring 2010 forecast, the increase in the debt to 
GDP ratio between 2007 and 2011 should equal 25 
percentage points of GDP on average in the EU, a 
figure in line with past experiences of systemic 
financial crises, see Graph III.1.1 and Graph 
III.1.2. A specific feature of the debt evolution 
compared to past experiences, however, is that in 
today's crisis EU countries started from higher debt 
levels. The countries expected to experience the 
sharpest rise in public debt (i.e., Ireland, the UK, 
Spain or Latvia) are those most exposed to the 
boom and busts cycle, with expenditure trends 
displaying unsustainable paths. For more details 
see European Commission (2009). 
The magnitude of the debt increase foreseen 
during the 2007-2011 period is not unprecedented, 
however, as many EU countries experienced large 
debt rises in the wake of the two oil shocks in the 
1970s and the 1980s. Graph III.1.3 illustrates this 
by plotting the evolution of the average debt to 
GDP ratio of countries having experienced major 
debt increases since 1970 (a major debt increase 
being defined here as an increase of at least 20 
percentage points in the debt to GDP ratio over a 
period of five years, with this definition being 
chosen as it is close to the average EU-wide 
increase in the current crisis). Compared to other 
large debt increase episodes, the current situation 
of the EU resembles that of Finland and Sweden 
during the 1990s, with pre-crisis period being 
preceded by a period of a stable or even slightly 
declining debt ratio, which can be explained by the 
favourable economic conditions that preceded the 
financial crises in both cases. Public debt to GDP 
ratios appear to rise very quickly in the aftermath 
of the eruption of a financial crisis (2008 for 
today's EU27 and 1991 for Sweden and 
Finland). (81) By contrast, in previous non-
financial crisis-related debt episodes, a increase in 
the debt ratio of a similar magnitude only occurred 
at a steadier pace over a much longer period of 
time. 
More generally, since 1970 EU countries have 
experienced a growing number of large debt 
increase episodes, which have tended to start from 
higher levels of debt each time. Graph III.1.4 
broadens the set of large debt increase episodes 
considered by defining large debt increase 
episodes by increases of at least 10 percentage 
points of GDP (against 20 percentage points in 
Graph III.1.3) over a (maximum) period of three 
(81) This result also corresponds to the econometric evidence 
presented in the European Commission (2009) showing 
that the bulk of the debt increase in the aftermath of a 
systemic financial crisis usually takes place during the first 
two years of such crisis. This also corresponds to the 
descriptive evidence reported in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008). 
Part III 
Fiscal policy, debt reduction and growth after the crisis 
years. This definition generally corresponds to the 
existing literature on large debt increases and will 
be used hereafter. Graph III.1.4 shows that the 
number of countries experiencing such large debt 
increases has tended to grow over time with the 
average starting debt level position also tending to 
rise. (82)  
 
Graph III.1.2: Gross public debt crises episodes (% of GDP) during 
financial crises 
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States data from 1991. 
3/ Includes financial crisis episodes in Finland, Spain and Sweden. 
4/ Includes financial crisis episodes in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan 
and Spain. 
Source: Calculations based on IMF International Financial Statistics and 
AMECO (spring 2010 forecast) 
EU countries have usually relied on a variety of 
strategies to reduce their debt level in the aftermath 
of large debt increase episodes, either resorting to 
sharp consolidations, i.e. cold showers, or 
favouring more a gradual adjustment or even 
alternating between the two types of consolidation. 
The definition of a consolidation episode and the 
distinction between cold showers and gradual 
consolidation used here are the same as in the 
European Commission Public Finances Report, see 
European Commission (2007). 
A fiscal consolidation is defined as an 
improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) of at least 1.5% taking place in 
one single year (cold shower) or taking place over 
three years (gradual consolidation) if each and 
every year the CAPB does not deteriorate by more 
than 0.5% of GDP. (83) While the definition of a 
                                                          
(82) Ireland stands out as having entered the current crisis with 
very low debt to GDP ratio (i.e. 25.1% of GDP in 2007). 
(83) Alternatively, the OECD defines the start of a fiscal 
consolidation episode as an improvement in the CAPB by 
fiscal consolidation episode is quite homogenous 
across existing empirical studies, the success of 
fiscal consolidations can be gauged in different 
ways according to their impact on deficits and debt 
or on the growth performance, see Alesina and 
Ardagna (2009). 
Graph III.1.3: Evolution of debt to GDP ratio during major debt 
increase episodes 1/ 
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(1) Debt increase episodes are identified as corresponding to a minimum 
of a 20 percentage points of GDP increase in a maximum of five years. 
The year t0 corresponds to the first year marking the debt increase 
episode which in the current crisis corresponds to 2007. The last year in 
the current debt increase episode is 2011 (data taken from the 
Commission spring 2010 forecast) and the year t-5 is 2002 and is set in 
order to cover a period of 10 years. For the other debt increase episodes 
the last year, t+4 ,is defined as the one where the debt increase over five 
years (on a moving average basis) reached its maximum value. The years 
t0 and t-5 are then determined recursively to cover a time span of 10 years 
as for the current debt increase episode.  The (unweighted) average value 
of the debt to GDP ratio for the following groups of countries (with time 
periods covered indicated in parentheses) are considered: EU, past large 
debt increases: Belgium (1974-1983), Denmark (1974-1984), France 
(1986-1995), Greece (1978-1987), Ireland (1975-1984), Italy (1975-1984 
and 1985-1994) Malta (1990-1999), the Netherlands (1976-1985), 
Portugal (1975-1984), Spain (1976-1985 and 1987-1996, Sweden (1973-
1982). Non-EU, OECD: Japan (1970-1979), Canada (1976-1985 and 
1984-1993) and Iceland (1986-1993). Finland, Sweden 1990s financial 
crisis: Finland (1985-1994) Sweden (1985-1994) 
Source: Commission services. 
                                                                                   
at least one percentage point of potential GDP in one year 
or in two consecutive years with at least a ½ percentage 
point improvement occurring in the first of the two years, 
see Guichard et al. (2007) and Ahrend et al. (2006). The 
fiscal consolidation continues as long as the CAPB 
improves. An interruption is allowed without terminating 
the episode as long as the deterioration of the CAPB does 
not exceed 0.3 percentage points of GDP and is more than 
offset in the following year (by an improvement of at least 
0.5 percentage points of GDP). The consolidation episode 
stops if the CAPB stops increasing or if the CAPB 
improves by less than 0.2 percentage points of GDP in one 
year and then deteriorates. The consistency of the 
definition of fiscal consolidation episodes used here with 
the OECD one was checked. In most cases consolidation 
episodes are found to coincide. The correlation coefficient 
between the series is equal to 0.71. 
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Here the success of fiscal consolidations is 
assessed according to the level of debt following a 
fiscal consolidation episode as in Alesina and 
Perotti (1995). Accordingly, a fiscal consolidation 
is considered as successful if it brings down the 
public debt level by at least five percentage points 
of GDP in the three years following a 
consolidation episode. (84) Previous definition 
used in European Commission (2007) considered 
instead that a fiscal consolidation episode was 
successful if the consolidation effort was 
safeguarded in the subsequent years (i.e. whether 
the change in CAPB remained below a given 
threshold). (85) Both criteria (i.e. considered the 
post-consolidation episode debt or the CAPB 
level) have their pros and cons. By using the 
CAPB criterion one avoids classifying as 
successful consolidations episodes where the debt 
reduction is due to favourable, albeit non-policy 
related circumstances. At the same time, it cannot 
exclude that consolidations that were insufficient 
to stem the increase in debt are labelled as success. 
The debt criterion was preferred here in light of 
policy considerations. The global financial crisis 
has significantly affected EU countries' public 
finances with debt increasing very fast in most 
countries as evidenced above. The most immediate 
objective of policy makers in the current 
circumstances shall therefore be halting reversing 
the increase in public debt. Tensions in financial 
markets that have emerged since the end of 2008 
have highlighted the risk of feedback loop between 
high and increasing debt and the cost of debt 
servicing and its possible ramification to the rest of 
the economy. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(84) With such definition, one-year consolidations (i.e. cold 
showers) are considered as full episodes while each year of 
a multi-year consolidations episodes (i.e. gradual 
consolidations) are considered as episodes on their own. 
Such definition was also used in Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998) and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998).  Alesina 
and Ardagna (2009) considered instead only one 
benchmark year for multi-year consolidation episodes 
There is a priori no reason to consider that one definition is 
superior to the other as suggested by Alesina and Ardagna 
(2009) as results remain in general broadly similar in both 
cases.  
(85) More precisely, in the European Commission Public 
Finances Report 2007, a consolidation was labelled as 
successful if in the three years after the end of the 
consolidation episode the CAPB did not deteriorate by 
more than 0.75% if GDP in cumulated terms compared to 
the level recorded in the last year of the consolidation 
period, i.e., at least half of the overall minimum fiscal 
correction required to qualify as consolidation was 
safeguarded three years after. 
Graph III.1.5 depicts the evolution of the debt to 
GDP ratio in the EU countries experiencing large 
debt increases, including an indication of the 
period in which such increases have occurred. 
Whether the consolidation was a cold shower or a 
gradual process is also shown. (86) As previously 
indicated, several countries have experienced large 
debt increases comparable in magnitude, and 
sometimes in speed, to the one foreseen in most 
countries for the period 2007-2011. This was the 
case in Denmark, Belgium and Ireland during the 
1970s, Greece, Italy and Sweden during the 1980s 
and Finland and Sweden during the 1990s. In 
contrast, countries such as Germany, France and 
Portugal have tended to experience an almost 
continuous increase in the debt to GDP ratio since 
the 1970s with some rare episodes of stable or 
slightly declining debt levels. Large rises in the 
public debt to GDP ratio have often, although not 
always, triggered fiscal consolidations, while 
consolidation episodes have not necessarily led to 
significant reductions in debt levels. The case of 
France is particularly telling due to the quasi-
absence of any consolidation; only one year of 
adjustment can be considered as a consolidation 
episode according to the definition used here. 
Some countries have also predominantly resorted 
to gradual adjustments (such as Ireland, Germany 
or Luxembourg) while others have tended to adopt 
cold shower strategies (such as Austria, Greece, 
Italy Portugal or Spain). Some consolidation 
episodes did not seem to have a significant impact 
on debt levels, notably Belgium in the 1980s and 
Greece in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Fiscal consolidations appear to be insufficient to 
reduce debt levels significantly in themselves. 
Broad macroeconomic conditions play an 
important role in the success or failure of debt 
reduction. As Graph III.1.6 shows, significant 
reductions in debt that took place in most EU15 
countries around the turn of the century, despite 
the fact that in many instances no fiscal 
consolidation was undertaken during that period.  
(86) The definition of a consolidation episode and the 
distinction between cold showers and gradual consolidation 
used here are the same as the ones used in the Public 
Finances Report (2007, Part IV). A consolidation is defined 
as an improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) of at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP 
taking place in one single year (cold shower) or taking 
place over three years if each and every year the CAPB 
does not deteriorate by more than 0.5 percentage points of 
GDP (gradual consolidation). 
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Conversely, the run-up to the EMU, from the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1991) t the year 
that was decisive for the first group of countries 
joining the single currency (1998), was dotted with 
episodes of consolidation, only in part successful. 
An additional feature of this period concerns the 
evolution of interest rates worldwide, with the 
1990s being characterised by a significant fall in 
long-term interest rates. 
Generally speaking, the success of fiscal 
consolidations appears relatively limited and 
depends to some extent on the time span 
considered. Table III.1.1 provides an assessment of 
the degree of success of past consolidation 
episodes in the EU15, by decade, since 1970. (87) 
Fiscal consolidations succeed in only 1/3 of cases, 
with most successful consolidations episodes 
tending to occur in the 1990s and 2000s. As 
mentioned, this result can be explained at least 
partly by the general fall in interest rates across the 
EU during these periods. The second row of Table 
III.1.1 shows that consolidations following large 
debt increases tend to be less successful with a 
success rate of 24.1%, which could simply reflect 
(87) The recently acceded Member States are not considered 
here in order to get consistent country groups over time. 
the fact that debt-reduction objectives are 
especially difficult to achieve against a sharp 
deterioration of the deficit and debt situation. 
Extending the time span following a consolidation 
episode to gauge the success or failure of fiscal 
consolidation from three to five years only 
marginally increases the success rate of 
consolidations as indicated by the fourth row of 
Table III.1.1 while extending the time span further, 
i.e., until 10 years after a fiscal consolidation, 
brings the success rate down again.  
This might reflect the occurrence of successive 
debt increase episodes as illustrated by the country 
experiences depicted in Graph III.1.6. 
Graph III.1.4: Moving up the ladder: debt increases and starting debt levels during major debt increases episodes in the EU15 since 1970 1/ 
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Graph III.1.5: Large debt increases and fiscal consolidation episodes in the EU, 1970-2008 
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Graph  (continued) 
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(1) Large debt increase episodes are defined as debt increases at least equal to 10% of GDP over a maximum of three-year and are indicated by the 
segment in thick. The start and end of these debt episodes are extended to cover years for which debt growth was at least equal to 1%. A consolidation 
espisode is defined as an improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) of at least 1.5% taking place in one single year (cold shower, 
represented by the black bars) or taking place over three successive years if each and every year the CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.5% of 
GDP (gradual consolidation, represented by the grey bars). Note that three-years gradual consolidations episodes can overlap and thus lead to gradual 
consolidation lasting more three years. 
Table III.1.2 reports results on the success rate of 
fiscal consolidations by splitting consolidation 
episodes into cold showers and gradual 
consolidations. Overall, gradual consolidations 
tend to be more successful, a result also in line 
with the existing literature. See European 
Source: Commission services. 
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able III.1.2. 
                                                          
Commission (2007) for more details. (88)It is 
worth noting, however, that the difference in the 
success rates between gradual consolidations and 
cold showers becomes much smaller when 
considering consolidations during or immediately 
after large debt increase episodes as indicated by 
the third and fourth rows of T
While the success of fiscal consolidations seems at 
first sight limited, counter-factual analysis suggests 
that in the absence of fiscal consolidations, debt 
levels would have increased significantly more in 
the aftermath of large debt rises. The low success 
rate of fiscal consolidations documented earlier 
could simply reflect the fact that consolidations are 
more often undertaken after large debt increases 
and  given high starting levels of debt. (89) Thus, in 
order to gauge the benefit of consolidations it is 
informative to take into account the initial debt 
level and to consider only countries that 
experienced large debt increases. Graph III.1.7 
illustrates this by depicting the evolution of the 
(average) debt to GDP ratio in the aftermath of 
large debt increase episodes depending on whether 
or not a consolidation was carried out in the EU15 
during the period 1970-2007. To abstract from the 
differences in the initial debt level, the debt to 
GDP ratio at the end of a debt increase episode is 
set equal to 100 in both cases. The graph shows 
that the post-crisis rise in the debt to GDP ratio is 
clearly more contained in cases where a fiscal 
consolidation was undertaken than in those where 
                                                          
(88) Gradual consolidation haves also been implemented less 
often as shown by the figures in parentheses indicating the 
frequence of consolidation episodes. 
(89) In the polar case, countries with initially low debt level and 
moderate debt increase undertaking consolidation are more 
likely to succeed. 
this was not the case. (90) These results therefore 
suggest that consolidations, even if not successful 
in reducing the level debt, help contain the upward 
drift in debt compared to a no-consolidation 
scenario. 
The previous results highlight that large debt 
increases have not always led to consolidation 
efforts by governments, and that when these efforts 
were made, they were not always successful in 
reducing debt. The causes and context of large 
debt increases episodes are relevant in explaining 
policy responses and their outcome. (91) Section 
III.5 provides more insights on how economic 
conditions and policy actions might determine the 
chances of achieving successful fiscal 
consolidations in context of high debt level and 
systemic financial crises. 
 
(90) When considering actual data underlying Graph 5, the debt 
to GDP ratio increase by 6.1% and 8.6% for the three and 
five year time horizon respectively in case of no 
consolidation and by 3.4% and 4.4% respectively in case a 
consolidation was undertaken in the aftermath of a major 
debt increase episode. 
(91) For instance, as noted by Boltho and Glyn (2006) a 
fundamental difference exists between the consolidation 
efforts put in place in the 1980s (following the successive 
crises of the 1970s) and during the 1990s. During the first 
period, the main concerns revolved around inflationary 
pressures and balance of payment problems following a 
period of rapid rise in public expenditure. During the latter 
period, concerns regarding long-term debt sustainability 
(together with the pressure exerted by rising real interest 
rates at the beginning of the 1990s) became prominent, 
with the additional feature in the EU context linked to the 
run-up to EMU. 
 
Table III.1.1: The success rate of fiscal consolidations under alternative success criteria 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s* Overall
25 22.7 47.6 42.9 34.5
(16) (44) (42) (14) (116)
0 25.9 31.6 0 24.1
(5) (27) (19) (3) (54)
0 29.6 36.8 0 28.3
(5) (27) (19) (2) (53)
0 3.7 47.4 - 19.6
(5) (27) (19) - (51)
Success criterion based on Debt reduction (t+3)*
Success criterion based on Debt reduction during or following major 
debt increase periods (t+3)*
Success criterion based on Debt reduction during or following major 
debt increase periods (t+5)**
Success criterion based on Debt reduction during or following major 
debt increase periods (t+10)***
(1)  Concerns EU15 countries only. * Consolidations are defined as being successful if during the three years following a consolidation episode the 
debt to GDP ratio is lower by at least 5% relative to the level of debt in the last year of a consolidation episode.  Last year of consolidation is 2005. ** 
Successful consolidations defined as in (*) but extending the post-consolidation period to 5 years. Last year of consolidation is 2003 *** Successful 
consolidations defined as in (*) but extending the post-consolidation period to 10 years. Last year of consolidation is 1998.  Number of consolidation 
episodes considered in parentheses. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.1.2: The success rate of fiscal consolidations: gradual consolidations vs. cold showers 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s* Overall
42.9 41.7 62.5 50 51.2
(7) (12) (16) (6) (41)
11.1 15.6 38.5 37.5 25.3
(9) (32) (26) (8) (75)
- 50 0 0 30
- (6) (3) (1) (10)
0 19 37.5 0 22.7
(5) (21) (16) (2) (44)
Gradual consolidations
Cold showers
Gradual consolidations after large debt increases*
Cold showers after large debt increases*
(1) Concerns EU15 countries only. * Consolidations are defined as being successful if during the three years following a consolidation episode the 
debt to GDP ratio is lower by at least 5% relative to the level of debt in the last year of a consolidation episode.  Last year of consolidation is 2005. 
Number of consolidation episodes considered in parentheses. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Graph III.1.6: Evolution of the debt to GDP ratio following a large 
debt increase episode 
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2. ILLUSTRATIVE PROJECTIONS OF DEBT TRENDS AND 
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CONSOLIDATION NEEDS 
In most EU Member States, the gross government 
debt-to-GDP ratio is on a strongly increasing path. 
Moreover, the economic and budgetary effects of 
ageing populations will put further upward 
pressure on debt developments. The trend increase 
of the debt ratio depends largely on a set of key 
economic variables of which future developments 
are highly uncertain, including output growth, 
price developments, interest rates, and the primary 
balance.  
This section presents projections for the gross 
government debt-to-GDP ratio up to 2020 derived 
as a mechanical extension of the data in the 2009-
2010 updates of the Stability and Convergence 
programmes (SCPs, see Table I.3.3). It first 
illustrates the impact on the average EU and euro 
area debt-to-GDP ratio projected until 2020 of the 
full implementation of the budgetary plan in the 
SCPs. Then, it presents the medium-term 
projections at country level, including a 
breakdown of these projections that allows 
gauging the different contributions on the 
development of the debt ratio of: (i) the primary 
balance; (ii) age-related expenditure (92); and (iii) 
the snow-ball effect, i.e., the compounded impact 
on the debt ratio of interest expenditure and GDP 
growth. (93) Finally, it presents projections based 
on risk scenarios that depart from the programme 
baseline to take account of possible slippages in 
consolidation, lower GDP growth and higher real 
interest rates.   
The figures presented in the section aim at provide 
an illustration of the magnitude of the risks and 
consolidation challenges ahead but should not be 
mistaken for forecasts: they are mechanical 
projections based on partial equilibrium scenarios 
and arbitrary assumptions.  
(92) While the increase of age-related expenditures is part of the 
development of the primary balance, the effects are 
considered separately for reasons of clarity and 
transparency. 
(93) The evolution of the debt ratio can be decomposed as 
follows: 
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       where t is a time subscript; D, PD, Y and SF are the stock 
of government debt, the primary balance (which includes 
age-related expenditure), nominal GDP and the stock-flow 
adjustment respectively, and i and y represent the average 
cost of debt and nominal GDP growth.  
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2.1. DEBT PROJECTIONS UP TO 2020 
The projections of the public finances in EU 
Member States illustrated in Section I.1 raise 
serious concerns due to the overall high 
government debt-to-GDP ratios compounded with 
high structural deficits, a slowdown in GDP 
growth and the expected rise in government 
expenditure on account of population ageing. 
There are also reasons to expect that the 
contribution of GDP growth to the decline of the 
debt ratios would be limited in the coming years, 
as the current economic and financial crisis could 
lead to lasting negative effects on potential 
growth. (94) 
Reflecting these concerns, this section presents 
projections for the gross government debt-to-GDP 
ratio up to 2020 which are based on the 
assumption that real GDP growth rates gradually 
recover to the medium-term potential, and tax 
ratios slowly return to 2007 level. The projections 
are derived on the basis of the assumptions 
described in Box III.2.1, using a partial 
equilibrium analysis that does not consider the 
effect of the public finances on growth. The 
projections explicitly include a progressive 
increase in age-related expenditure derived from 
projections agreed by Member States in the 
Ageing Working Group (95). As shown in Table 
III.2.1, the estimated increase projected for the EU 
is already sizeable by 2020 (1.3 pps. of GDP, 1.6 
pps of GDP in the euro area), with significant 
variations across Member States.  
(94) See European Commission (2009) and European 
Commission (2009). 
(95) Economic Policy Committee and European Commission 
(2009). For information on the projections on the budgetary 
cost of ageing see I.4.1.1. 
Part III 
Fiscal policy, debt reduction and growth after the crisis 
 
Table III.2.1: Level and increases in projected age-related 
expenditure as a share of GDP 
% of GDP 2011 2020 Change 2011-2020
BE 26.2 28.3 2.1
BG 17.1 16.3 -0.8
CZ 17.2 17.5 0.3
DK 20.3 21.7 1.4
DE 22.4 24.3 1.9
EE 15.5 15.1 -0.4
IE 19.6 23.7 4.1
EL 24.0 25.2 1.2
ES 20.9 22.9 2.0
FR 28.4 29.7 1.3
IT 24.5 25.6 1.1
CY 17.0 18.4 1.4
LV 13.1 14.0 0.9
LT 15.4 15.9 0.5
LU 19.9 22.2 2.2
HU 21.8 21.3 -0.5
MT 18.4 21.2 2.8
NL 18.9 20.6 1.7
AT 24.2 25.8 1.6
PL 17.7 16.9 -0.8
PT 24.9 26.1 1.1
RO 15.1 15.9 0.8
SI 20.5 24.4 3.9
SK 15.1 14.9 -0.2
FI 23.6 26.2 2.6
SE 24.0 25.3 1.3
UK 19.4 20.3 0.9
EA-16 24.0 25.5 1.6
EU-27 22.7 24.0 1.3
Source: Commission services. 
 
Box III.2.1 includes an illustration of the five 
scenarios developed on the basis of the common 
assumptions. Graph III.2.1 presents projections of 
the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU and in the 
euro area based on two of these scenarios, namely 
the '2009 scenario' and the 'programme scenario'. 
These scenarios share the same macroeconomic 
setting (which implies an average real GDP growth 
of 1.9% in the EU and 1.8% of GDP in the euro 
area over the 2011-2020 period) but differ with 
regard to the assumed development of the 
budgetary position. The '2009 scenario' extends the 
debt-to-GDP ratios on the basis of a no-policy-
change assumption that takes the 2009 structural 
primary balance as a starting budgetary position. 
Instead, the 'programme scenario' assumes the 
achievement of the consolidation planned in the 
SCPs. For the EU and euro area aggregates, this 
corresponds to an average improvement in the 
structural primary balances by around 2½ pp. of 
GDP in 2012 with respect to 2010, which rises to 
3½ pp. of GDP in 2013 with respect to 2010 for 
the programmes with a longer programme 
horizon. (96) Reflecting the extraordinary 
weakening of the budgetary position in response to 
the current economic crisis, in the '2009 scenario' 
the debt-to-GDP ratio would approach 140% of 
GDP in the EU in 2020, from the around 74% in 
2009 estimated in the SCPs. According to the same 
scenario, the debt ratio is projected to increase 
somewhat less in the euro area, to around 130% of 
GDP in 2020, from the slightly higher starting 
position of about 78% in 2009. Remarkably, even 
in the 'programme scenario', the average debt-to-
GDP ratio is projected to continue rising, to almost 
90% of GDP in the EU and 95% in the euro area in 
2020. I.e., the full implementation of the sizeable 
consolidation envisaged in the SCPs would still 
                                                          
 
Graph III.2.1: Medium-term projections for the average government debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU and in the euro area 
(96) The projections take account of also of the consolidation 
planned beyond 2013 by the countries presenting 
programmes with a longer horizon. 
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not be sufficient to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio 
in the medium-term. (97)  
 
                                                          
The 'programme scenario' assumes no change in 
policy further to the strategy presented in the 
SCPs. The projections therefore cannot be taken as 
foreshadowing future debt developments, which 
can be expected to be affected by additional future, 
as yet unspecified, consolidation measures beyond 
the programme horizon towards the achievement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(97) In the past budgetary outcomes revealed sizeable slippages 
from plans. A risk scenario assuming a lower consolidation 
is presented below. 
 of the medium-term objectives that Member 
States presented in the SCPs, in line with the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (see 
section I.3). Rather, the projections serve to give 
an indication of the magnitude of the adjustment 
needed, with the significant consolidation planned 
and a full cyclical recovery, including a rebound in 
tax revenue from its crisis-related lows, 
insufficient in many countries to prevent debt 
continuing rising.  
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 Box III.2.1: Assumptions underlying the medium term projections for gross debt of the 
general government
In order to simulate the order of magnitude of the risks to potential output related to the economic crisis, the 
2009 Ageing report (1) presented a "Lost Decade" macroeconomic scenario that assumes that it will take 
until 2020 to get back to the long-term potential growth rates in the Ageing Working Group (AWG) 
baseline, which are based on the Commission services' spring 2008 forecast. The projections presented in 
Section III.2 are derived as mechanical extension of the data in the 2009-2010 updates of the SCPs built on 
an update of the "Lost Decade" macroeconomic scenario. 
Notably, the assumptions common to all the projections in this section are: 
• A progressive increase in age-related expenditure derived from the Lost Decade scenario. Over the 
projection period age-related expenditure increases, on average, by 1.6 pps of GDP in the euro area and 
by 1.3 pps of GDP in the EU as a whole; 
• Convergence of the ratio of taxes to GDP to the pre-2007 level for countries with a projected tax ratio in 
2011 in the Commission services' autumn 2009 forecast below its 2007 level (the increase in tax ratios is 
part of the no-policy change scenario and do not take account of consolidation plans in the SCPs. These 
are reflected in the changes in structural balances according to the assumptions in the different scenarios 
presented below). For countries with 2011 tax to GDP ratio above the pre-2007 level, it is assumed that 
the ratio remains constant till 2017. The cyclical component of tax revenues is added to the projected 
values on the basis of OECD elasticities;  
• Zero stock-flow adjustment, which also implies no further financial purchases of assets/recapitalisations 
of financial institutions nor disposal of such assets. 
Further assumptions underlying the different scenarios are: 
2009 scenario 
• No-policy-change assumption taking the 2009 structural primary balance estimated in the SCPs as a 
starting budgetary position; 
• A potential GDP path based on the AWG "Lost Decade" scenario. The output gap in the Commission 
services' autumn 2009 forecast shrinks linearly so that it is completely eliminated in 2017 and becomes 
positive afterwards. It implies real GDP growth to average 1.9% in the EU and 1.8% of GDP in the euro 
area in the 2011-2020 period. 
• Linear convergence of implicit interest rate in real terms from the current level to 3% (the value assumed 
for the purposes of the long-term sustainability of public finance assessment) in 2020. 
Programme scenario 
• Structural primary balance improvement as planned in the SCPs; 
• A potential GDP path based on the AWG "Lost Decade" scenario. The output gap in the Commission 
services' autumn 2009 forecast shrinks linearly so that it is completely eliminated in 2017 and becomes 
positive afterwards. It implies real GDP growth in the EU to average 1.9% in the 2011-2020 period; 
                                                          
(1) Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2009). 
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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2.2. BREAKDOWN OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
THE DEBT PROJECTIONS  
The projections at country level, based on the 
'programme scenario' presented in Graph III.2.2, 
confirm that for a majority of Member States the 
budgetary strategy in the programmes would not 
be sufficient to put the debt ratio on a declining 
path in the medium term. Only for eight Member 
States (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, 
Poland, Spain and Sweden) the shadowed area that 
pictures the projected developments in the debt 
ratios tapers or stabilises approaching 2020. In 
several countries (Belgium, Finland, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the 
United Kingdom) the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
projected to slightly reduce during the next decade, 
but it would start increasing again by 2020. The 
projections vary significantly across countries, 
reflecting differences in the starting points of 
government debt ratios and balances, planned 
consolidation and projected developments in 
macroeconomic variables and age-related 
expenditure. In particular, the charts in Graph 
III.2.2 single out the contribution to the projected 
developments of Member States' debt ratio of: (i) 
the assumed recovery in the tax ratios to the pre-
2007 level; (ii) the structural primary balance 
projected in the last year covered by the SCPs; (iii) 
the projected direct budgetary impact of ageing; 
and (iv) the snow-ball effect, i.e., the compounded 
effect of interest expenditure and GDP growth. 
For all countries the assumed recovery in the tax-
to-GDP ratios has a debt-decreasing impact. While 
Box (continued) 
 
 • Linear convergence of implicit interest rate in real terms from the current level to 3% in 2020. 
Risk scenario 1: Budgetary slippages 
• Structural primary balance improvement is only half of the planned; 
• A potential GDP path based on the AWG "Lost Decade" scenario. The output gap in the Commission 
services' autumn 2009 forecast shrinks linearly so that it is completely eliminated in 2017 and becomes 
positive afterwards. It implies real GDP growth in the EU to average 1.9% in the 2011-2020 period; 
• Linear convergence of implicit interest rate in real terms from the current level to 3% in 2020. 
Risk scenario 2: Low growth  
• Structural primary balance improvement as planned in the SCPs; 
• A potential GDP path based on the AWG "Lost Decade" scenario. The output gap in the Commission 
services' autumn 2009 forecast does not close. It implies real GDP growth in the EU to average 1.4% in 
the 2011-2020 period; 
• Linear convergence of implicit interest rate in real terms from the current level to 3% in 2020. 
Risk scenario 3: Risk premium (1)  
• Structural primary balance improvement as planned in the SCPs; 
• A potential GDP path based on the AWG "Lost Decade" scenario. The output gap in the Commission 
services' autumn 2009 forecast shrinks linearly so that it is completely eliminated in 2017 and becomes 
positive afterwards. It implies real GDP growth in the EU to average 1.9% in the 2011-2020 period; 
• Linear convergence of implicit interest rate in real terms from the current level to 5% in 2020. 
(1) The risk premium scenario may be a realistic risk scenario for some Member States, but not very plausible 
for others.  
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in a number of Member States this impact is 
limited, in others it is very sizeable. E.g., the 2020 
debt ratio in Sweden and Denmark is reduced by 
around 20 pps as a result of this assumption. Also 
for Spain, Ireland and the UK the impact amounts 
to 13 pps or more.  
All Member States project their structural primary 
balances to improve over period covered by SCPs. 
In many cases, they would turn positive by the end 
of the programme horizon, with a consequent 
decreasing impact on the debt level. Accordingly, 
in Graph III.2.2, the line depicting how the debt 
ratio is projected to change in the years in view of 
the end-programme structural primary balance, 
further improved by the assumed recovery in the 
tax ratios, is normally the lower one and often 
presents a declining path. For instance, Greece and 
Italy plan structural primary surpluses in the order 
of 3½ of GDP, which, if sustained up to 2020, 
would translate in debt ratios in that year lower by 
more than 20 pps with respect to those projected 
on the basis of a mere recovery in tax ratios. By 
contrast, in some countries the structural primary 
balances are projected to remain in negative 
territory by the end of the period covered by the 
SCPs, with ensuing debt-increasing impact. This 
effect is particularly evident for the Czech 
Republic and the Netherlands, where maintaining 
up to 2020 the structural primary deficits planned 
in 2012, of around 1½% and 1% of GDP 
respectively, would increase the debt ratio by more 
than 15 pps.  
Graph III.2.2 also shows that cost of ageing has a 
non-negligible contribution to the debt ratios over 
the next decade. Around 20 pps of the debt-to-
GDP ratio projected in Ireland, Slovenia and Malta 
in 2020 are linked to age-related expenditure. In 
Spain, Belgium and Germany this figure is in the 
order of 10 pps. Only in a few countries age-
related expenditure is projected to decrease by 
2020, with a resulting debt-decreasing impact (see 
also Table III.2.1).  
 
                                                          
The overall debt ratios are determined by the 
effects described above compounded by debt-
increasing impact of interest expenditure and the 
effect of changes in the denominator, i.e. GDP, 
which in normal times tend to lower the ratios. 
Under the assumptions described in the 
'programme scenario' in Box III.2.1, notably 
closure of the output gap in 2017 and the 
convergence of implicit interest rate to 3%, the 
combination of these effects is generally projected 
to increase the debt ratios. The impact is 
particularly sizeable in countries with a high stock 
of debt and/or low potential growth. In particular, 
in Italy it is projected at more than 10 pps. It is 
only slightly lower for Belgium and for the 
Netherlands. By contrast, the snowball effect is 
projected to slightly decrease the debt ratio in 
Slovakia.  
2.3. IMPACT OF RISK SCENARIOS ON 
MEDIUM-TERM DEBT DEVELOPMENTS 
Graph III.2.3 shows the projections for the debt 
ratios of Member States based on the three stylised 
risks scenarios presented in Box III.2.1 and 
compares them with the baseline represented by 
the projections according to the 'programme 
scenario' examined above. Assumptions 
underlying the risks scenario are not extreme. 
The 'budgetary slippages' scenario is based on the 
hypothesis that the improvement in the structural 
primary balance is only half of the one planned in 
the SCPs. Indeed, in the past budgetary outcomes 
revealed sizeable slippages from plans, both in 
economic good times and bad times. (98) Even in 
this alternative scenario consolidation would still 
be significant, as the structural primary balances 
would improve by around 1¼ pp. of GDP in 2012 
with respect to 2010 (1¾ pp. of GDP in 2013 with 
respect to 2010 in the Member States that 
submitted SCPs with a longer horizon). 
Graph III.3.2 confirms that consolidation is key for 
debt developments; among the risks scenarios 
considered, for most countries the 'budgetary 
slippages' scenario is the one that would mostly 
affect debt developments.  For some Member 
States this scenario does not appear to be an 
option: it would imply an explosive debt path, 
which in turn would call for immediate action.  
The projections are particularly unfavourable for 
Greece and Ireland, where even with an 
improvement of the structural primary balance of 
around 5 pps of GDP by 2013 and 4 pps of GDP 
by 2014, respectively, the debt ratio would be 
projected close to 160% and 140% of GDP in 
(98) See European Commission (2007) and European 
Commission (2008). 
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2020. By contrast, in these countries the debt ratio 
would be curbed in the 'programme scenario'.  For 
Romania, where consolidation in the 'programme 
scenario' is still insufficient to put the debt ratio on 
a declining path, a fiscal adjustment reduced by 
half (i.e, a reduction in the structural primary 
deficit of around 2½ pps of GDP in 2012 with 
respect to 2009) is projected to result in an 
increase in debt of around 90 pps of GDP in 2020 
as compared to 2009, 60 pps higher that if the 
consolidation planned in the convergence 
programme is fully implemented. Also in other 
countries, budgetary slippages tend to have very 
sizeable implication for debt developments. Due to 
the underlying assumption that only half of 
planned consolidation would be achieved, the 
impact of the slippages also reflects the size of the 
consolidation planned in the SCPs. For Spain this 
scenario projects debt ratios in 2020 that exceed by 
more than 40 pps those computed according to the 
'programme scenario'. For Lithuania, Lavtia and 
the United Kingdom, the differences amount to 
more than 30 pps of GDP.    
 
                                                          
In the 'low growth' scenario, actual GDP growth 
equals the projections of potential GDP growth in 
the AWG 'Lost Decade' scenario. Also for this 
scenario the underlying assumptions are not 
excessively pessimistic: they imply an average real 
GDP growth of 1.4% in the EU and 1.3% in the 
euro area in the 2011-2020 period. This still 
compares favourably to an average growth rate in 
the EU27 and the EA16 of respectively 1.2% and 
1.0% over the period 2000-2010. Other 
assumptions are as in the 'programme scenario', in 
particular, the structural primary balance is 
assumed to improve as planned in the SCPs. Only 
in Hungary, the debt ratios are projected to be 
more affected by the lower economic growth in 
this risk scenario than by the lower consolidation 
assumed in the 'budgetary slippages' scenario. In 
some Member States, the impact of the subdued 
real GDP growth assumed by this scenario would 
be substantial, particularly in Ireland, where a one 
point lower real GDP would increase the debt ratio 
by more than 30 pps of GDP in 2020. However, 
this remains still substantially lower than the 
projected impact of a reduction by half in the 
planned fiscal adjustment.   
 
Finally, the projections in Graph III.3.2 also 
include a 'risk premium scenario' where the real 
interest rates converge to 5% in 2020, rather than 
to 3% as in the other scenarios. The risk premium 
scenario may be a realistic risk scenario for some 
Member States which in addition to higher risk 
premia may face period of low inflation, further 
adding to the increase in real interest rates. The 
differentiation in risk premia is evidenced by the 
rise in sovereign spreads for some countries. The 
high risk premia scenario is not very plausible for 
some other countries.  
Countries with particularly high debt ratios can be 
faced with a consolidation more painful than under 
a baseline scenario if markets impose them a risk 
premium which can have strong implications on 
interest expenditure. In Italy and in Belgium, the 
'risk premium' scenario entails the least favourable 
projections for the debt ratios compared to all other 
scenarios, including the 'budgetary slippage' 
scenario. (99) In both countries, it would lead the 
debt ratios exceeding 130% of GDP despite the 
full implementation of the projected consolidation. 
The impact on the 2020 debt ratios of a 2% rise in 
the interest rates is projected to exceed 20 pps of 
GDP also in the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Hungary, Greece, and France.  
(99) However, the impact of a rise in the interest rate also 
depends on its starting level, which makes the projections 
in this scenario appear particularly unfavourable for 
Member States where rates are lower and are less likely to 
be subject to the assumed increase, e.g., in the case of 
Germany. 
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Graph III.2.2: Medium-term projections for the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU Member States assuming implementation of 
consolidation plans in the SCPs 
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Graph (continued)  
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Graph (continued)  
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Graph (continued) 
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Graph III.2.3: Medium-term projections for the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU Member States with different risk scenarios 
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Graph (continued) 
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Graph (continued) 
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Graph (continued) 
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Previous sections discussed the sharp rises in 
government debt and the magnitude of efforts 
needed to reduce this high stock of debt. Now we 
turn to the question of what impact high levels of 
government debt may have on economic activity. 
First, we give an overview of the theoretical and 
empirical literature that considers the effect of 
government debt on output or interest rates. This is 
followed by some illustrative evidence from model 
simulations of permanently higher deficits and 
debt with the European Commission's dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model QUEST III. 
3.1. TRANSMISSION EXPLAINED BY 
THEORETICAL MODELS  
The debate on the impact of public debt on output 
has resulted in a large body of theoretical and 
empirical literature.(100) There are three main 
channels through which government debt can 
affect long term growth. These are through the 
effect it can have on: 
• national savings/interest rates 
• distortionary taxes 
• risk premia 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in government debt 
reduces national savings, raises interest rates 
'crowds-out' private investment, and reduces future 
output.  This direct impact of raising the necessary 
funds to finance an increase in government debt 
can be illustrated with a simple loanable funds 
model (101). An increase in government debt 
constitutes an outward shift in the demand-for-
funds curve. Assuming for the moment that the 
supply of funds has not changed, this leads to a 
decrease in private borrowing and to an increase in 
yields. This leaves fewer resources for private 
capital accumulation, which in turn will reduce 
labour productivity and output.  
However, if fiscal policy is Ricardian, any increase 
in government debt is matched by an equal 
                                                          
(100) Comprehensive reviews include Bernheim (1987 and 1989) 
and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998). 
(101) For a consistent treatment of debt-financed government 
spending in the IS-LM framework see Silber (1970) or 
Blinder and Solow (1972). 
increase in savings. According to the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition government debt has no 
effect on aggregate savings, interest rates and 
private capital accumulation, as the private sector 
fully internalizes the public sector's budget 
constraint and saves to account for future taxes to 
finance the increased debt burden (Barro, 1974).  
The Ricardian equivalence proposition assumes 
strict conditions. The most often debated 
assumptions are lump-sum or non-distortionary 
taxes, households planning on an infinite horizon 
(or the notion that generations are linked by 
bequests in such a way that they behave as if they 
were planning for the infinite future), and no 
liquidity constraints. Bernheim's (1987) 
comprehensive survey assesses the plausibility of 
all the crucial assumptions underlying the 
theory and contrasts them with the empirical 
evidence. He concludes that these conditions are 
unlikely to be met. The most cited reason for 
rejection of the Ricardian equivalence proposition 
is the assumption of lump-sum taxes. In the 
presence of distortionary taxes, Ricardian 
equivalence does not hold. Replacing the 
assumption of infinitely-lived consumers by finite 
horizons does however not appear to have a major 
impact. Even in an OLG model where households 
leave no bequests and, hence, do not take into 
account the increase in tax liabilities for future 
generations, for realistic life expectancies of over 
50 years the effect on the interest rate and capital 
accumulation is negligible (102). This even holds if 
a share of households is liquidity constraint (103). 
Thus, although this conclusion could in theory be 
different in an overlapping generations framework 
where households leave no bequests to their 
(102) See Kumhof and  Laxton (2009). There is no difference in 
the interest rate response between a 50 year OLG model 
and an infinitely-lived-agent model and significant interest 
rate effects emerge from OLG models only with very short 
time horizons of 5 years or so. A 5 year life expectancy 
leads to the counterfactual implication that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of financial wealth is above 
0.20, while empirical estimates suggest values in the range 
between 0.02 and 0.04 which is roughly in the range of 
models with planning horizons above 50 years. 
(103) Mankiw (2000) shows that what matters is that savers 
(even if they represent only a small share in the total 
population) have an infinite planning horizon. In the 
QUEST model which is applied in section III.3.3 only a 
fraction of households has an infinite planning horizon. 
Liquidity constrained households have a zero planning 
horizon and credit (or collateral) constrained households 
have an effective planning horizon of about 10 years.  
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descendents (104), for realistic life expectancies the 
effect on interest rates through the savings-channel 
is negligible and the effect on growth comes 
largely through higher risk premia and 
distortionary taxes to finances the increased 
interest expenditures.  
3.2. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DEBT, 
GROWTH AND INTEREST RATES 
There exists an extensive empirical literature on 
the macroeconomic effects of government deficits 
and debt. A few studies investigate the relationship 
between fiscal deficits and output directly, while 
most papers consider whether interest rates rise in 
response to an increase in government debt. If no 
increase in interest rates can be measured in 
response to an increase in debt, it would confirm 
Ricardian equivalence proposition. If a link 
between interest rates and debt can be established, 
the finding does not necessarily imply support for 
the conventional approach with crowding-out 
through the aggregate savings effect, as the 
increase in interest rates may be – at least partly – 
due to an increase in the risk premium and not 
necessarily from the savings channel.(105) Portfolio 
effects may affect the risk premia across 
sovereigns in case of efficient international 
financial markets or between sovereign and 
corporate spreads.(106) 
 
                                                          
Box III.3.1 finds that the effect of increasing 
interest rates on government bond yields is 
significantly higher for high debt countries than for 
countries with average debt levels, which points to 
the importance of the risk premium-channel 
relative to the savings channel. 
                                                          
(104) See for instance Blanchard (1984) 
(105) The empirical studies that explicitly aim to test the 
Ricardian equivalence proposition seem at best unable to 
reject the proposition. For instance, while Evans (1988) 
and Rockerbie (1997) could not reject it, Evans (1993) and 
Lopez et al. (2000) find evidence against the hypothesis. 
On the other hand, Afonso (2008) focuses on EU countries 
and dismisses debt neutrality, while Reitschuler (2008), 
who tests the theory in 11 new member states, cannot reject 
the null in all countries. 
(106) Evidence from the US suggests that an increase in 
government debt tends to reduce the spread between 
government and corporate bonds. Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) show that an increase in 
Treasury debt held by public leads to decline in the yield 
spread of AAA corporate debt over Treasuries. 
This finding is also supported by a much cited 
recent study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), which 
shows evidence of a link between growth and debt 
when debt-to-GDP levels are high. The authors use 
an extensive database of forty-four countries and 
about 200 years of observations. They find that the 
growth impact of government debt is negligible for 
levels of debt below a threshold of 90 percent of 
GDP, but above that threshold median growth rates 
fall by one percent, and average growth falls 
considerably more. It is not clear, however, 
whether the causality is unidirectional or whether 
this observation partly reflects the fact that 
countries with low growth are more likely to have 
encountered debt sustainability problems. (107) 
There is some empirical evidence which suggests 
that government debt is associated with an increase 
in real interest rates on government bonds, ranging 
from a 1 to 6 basis-point increase in interest rates 
on government bonds, for each 1 percentage point 
increase in the government debt to GDP ratio (see, 
for example, Laubach (2009). (108) Engen and 
Hubbard (2004) obtain similar results when 
investigating the impact of government debt. There 
is no consensus on whether the estimated increase 
is confined to government bonds or whether it 
affects the general level of interest rates in the 
country in question. In countries that rely heavily 
on external financing of investment, an increase in 
government debt could lead to a general increase 
in the risk premium and raise interest rates for both 
government and private bonds.(109)  
The extensive literature has been more recently 
surveyed by Gale and Orszag (2003), who also 
point out that most studies tend find a significant, 
positive link between fiscal deficits and debt and 
the long-term interest rate. However, they also find 
(107) Another example of a study that investigates the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and output directly is 
Sawhney and DiPietro (1994) who, after controlling for a 
number of variables affecting growth, find no evidence that 
government debt would retard growth. 
(108) Laubach aims to tackle the endogeneity problems (of 
higher interest rates also affecting debt and deficit 
dynamics and higher debt affecting fiscal policies) through 
taking into account the anticipated path of the fiscal 
variables as well. 
(109) This can reflect, for example, increased currency risk or 
increased corporate default risk if large fiscal consolidation 
needs risk hampering economic activity (this assumes that 
taxes are distortionary). In a financial crisis, it can reflect 
the reduced capacity of the government to support the 
financial sector to avoid systemic crises.     
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that while about half of the studies found a 
predominantly positive and significant impact, 
about one-third concluded that the relationship was 
not significant. The authors claim that international 
capital flows significantly reduce the impact of 
budget deficits on interest rates as part of the 
increase demand for funds could be met with 
foreign capital. Hence, only part of the impact of 
government borrowing affects domestic interest 
rates. This explanation assumes an increased 
domestic demand for funds to be the reason for an 
interest rate increase and would be consistent with 
the crowding out channel through national savings. 
Two, recent studies examined this interplay of 
foreign capital markets and the effect of 
government deficits in a European context. Claeys 
et al. (2008) and Faini (2006) find significant spill-
over effects and explain that debt-financed 
expansionary fiscal policy not only increases the 
sovereign interest rate spread vis-à-vis the rest of 
the region but would also raise the level of interest 
rates across the entire currency union. They also 
points out that in countries with a high debt-to-
GDP ratio this harmful spill-over is even stronger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that possible negative effects of higher public 
debt on growth can be offset by the positive effects 
of debt-financed public expenditures, if this raises 
the economy's productive capacity. In this vein 
Tanzi and Zee (1997) advocate the accumulation 
of human capital, while Semmler et al. (2007) 
distinguish between different types of productive 
government spending and find that the government 
debt ratio could be stabilized as long as 
government investments are used in a growth-
maximizing way. Greiner and Fincke (2009), by 
analysing an endogenous growth model, find that 
when real wages are sufficiently flexible in the 
long-run, the optimal government debt-to-GDP 
ratio is zero as the associated debt service distracts 
resources away from productive investment. 
However, when real wages are rigid, maintaining 
non-zero government debt can be beneficial, as the 
proceeds of the additional public investment in 
terms of higher employment and output can 
compensate for the interest burden. 
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 Box III.3.1: The effect of deficits and debt on the sovereign risk premium
The main factors determining the risk premium on sovereign debt are: the perceived credit risk of this debt, 
the liquidity of the debt issuance, the degree of global risk aversion and the microstructure of the bond 
market. The level of debt, in turn, is also affected by these determinants, as the cost of financing debt affects 
the government's willingness to issue bonds and add to the stock of debt. These interactions make the
relationship between the level of government debt and the sovereign interest rate complex (1). 
While a deteriorating domestic outlook for fiscal deficits and debt is associated with higher interest rates, 
there is also evidence that countries with high debt levels are more likely to experience increases in interest 
rates if debt increases further. An econometric analysis using data for euro-area countries over the period 
2003q1-2009q2 suggests an interaction of debt and deficits in determining government bond yields. In 
particular, the impact of deteriorated fiscal balances on government bond yields appears significantly higher 
for high debt countries than for countries with average debt levels. Figure B.1  plots the estimated linear 
relationship between spreads and deficit for a given level of initial debt while controlling for a number of 
other determinants of interest rate spreads vs. Germany (such as liquidity conditions, and global risk 
aversion). It shows that the impact of higher deficit on the yield spread tends to increase significantly with a 
higher initial level of debt.  
Figure B.1: The impact of budgetary balance on 10-year government bond spread at high and average 
debt levels 
 
Source: Commission services 
                                                          
(1) This box draws heavily on Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska and Setzer (2009), "Determinants of 
intra-euro area government bond spreads during the financial crisis" European Economy, 
Economic Papers 388, November 2009.  
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3.3. THE QUEST MODEL: OUTPUT EFFECTS OF 
PUBLIC DEBT 
This section describes the output effects of higher 
government debt in the QUEST model, the 
European Commission's dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model. In the QUEST model, 
simulated either as an infinitely-lived-agent model 
or as an OLG model with 50 years of life 
expectancy, the savings channel of government 
debt is negligible.    
The negative impact of debt on GDP results from 
the financing of deficits via distortionary taxes. 
Higher government debt implies higher interest 
payments requiring additional revenues to service 
this debt. If taxes are distortionary, this has a 
negative impact on potential GDP. How large 
these long run steady state effects are depends on 
how distortionary the taxes used to service the debt 
are.   
The QUEST model also includes a risk premium 
term to government bonds rates that depends 
endogenously on debt levels. This sovereign risk 
premium is calibrated such that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio leads to a 3 
basis-point increase in government bond rates, 
roughly in the middle of the range estimated by 
Laubach (2009). If the risk premium is economy-
wide rather than only affecting sovereign debt, 
long-term output effects can be very large. 
 
Graph III.3.1 shows the long-term effects of a 
permanent 10 percentage point increase in the EU 
debt to GDP ratio in the QUEST model on 
potential output. It shows the effect on output that 
comes from increasing different taxes to service 
the higher debt. The taxes considered are lump-
sum taxes, VAT, labour and corporate taxes. The 
exercise is undertaken with the default model 
setting, where the risk premium applies to 
sovereign bonds. For comparison the graph also 
shows GDP effects without a risk premium. 
In all scenarios deficits are permanently increased, 
initially through reductions in taxes. Taxes then 
increase due to the higher debt servicing costs that 
result from the accumulation of debt. The initial 
tax reductions are reversed and in the long run 
taxes are higher. In the case of lump-sum taxes 
there is no long run GDP effect from higher debt, 
but with distortionary taxes GDP is permanently 
lower.  
The long run output effects are largest for 
corporate profit taxes, due to their effect on capital 
accumulation. The second largest output losses are 
under labour taxes, due to their distortionary 
impact on employment. The distortionary effects 
of labour taxes are larger than those of VAT.  With 
a sovereign risk premium, debt servicing costs are 
higher and larger tax increases are required in the 
long run to keep the increase in debt at this 10 
percentage point.  
To illustrate the importance of the interest rate 
channel, Graph III.3.2 shows simulations where 
the risk premium not only applies to sovereign 
bonds, but also applies to the private sector. This 
shows the extent of crowding-out when an increase 
in debt would lead to an increased in economy-
wide interest rates. This economy-wide risk 
premium is again calibrated at 3 basis points for a 
1 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. In this scenario, the long run GDP effects are 
much larger. In this case the increase in debt leads 
to a large increase in the cost of capital, crowding 
out private capital and reducing potential output, 
even in the case of financing through lump-sum 
taxes. 
Graph III.3.1: Output effects of permanent 10 percentage point 
increase in debt-to-GDP ratios with  and without 
sovereign risk premium 
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Source:  Commission services. 
To conclude, this section has illustrated the 
potentially significant long run GDP effects of 
higher debt. The channels identified in this section 
through which debt can affect output are through 
distortionary taxation for financing debt, sovereign 
risk premia and potentially an increase in 
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economy-wide interest rates. It is noteworthy that 
even in the case when there is no significant effect 
on interest rates, long-run crowding out can still be 
substantial, due to the size of the distortions caused 
by taxes. With an effect on economy-wide interest 
rates, the long run output losses of higher debt are 
much larger. 
Graph III.3.2: Output effects of a permanent 10 percentage point 
increase in debt-to-GDP ratios with economy-wide 
risk premium 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Numerous empirical studies have looked at the 
issue of what determines successful fiscal 
consolidations. The effect of both the prevailing 
economic environment and the characteristics of 
the policy response have been studied. The main 
conclusions of the literature are summarised 
below. 
Prevailing economic conditions can affect both the 
probability that a consolidation will be undertaken 
and the chances it has of success. European 
Commission (2007), Drazen and Grilli (1993) and 
Briotti (2004) find that consolidations are more 
likely to be undertaken when economic conditions 
have become unfavourable. Although 
consolidations should be easier to undertake in 
healthier economic conditions, it appears that it is 
easier to build the required political consensus 
under more difficult conditions: Kumar et al. 
(2007) reviews case-studies and suggests that this 
is indeed  the case. However, some studies, such as 
Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) have found that 
favourable, rather than unfavourable, economic 
conditions are more likely to lead to 
consolidations. Moreover, the effect that the 
conditions in trading-partner countries have on the 
probability of success is also open to debate. While 
von Hagen and Strauch (2001) find that an 
unfavourable international economic outlook is 
more likely to lead to a successful consolidation, 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and McDermott and 
Wescott (1996) find the opposite. Instead, they 
find that the possibilities of export-led growth 
increase the changes of a successful consolidation 
episode. 
In terms of the policy responses there is a broad 
consensus that expenditure based consolidations 
have more chance of succeeding than ones that are 
primarily tax based, although recent research 
provides some interesting additions to the debate. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) Alesina et al. (1998), 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), von Hagen et al. 
(2002), Llera and Granados (2002), Lambertini 
and Tavares (2005) and European Commission 
(2007) all show the higher probability of success 
of expenditure-based consolidations. Focussing on 
cuts to primary expenditure, such as the 
government wage bill, generally enhances the 
probability success. However, the recent research 
described in European Commission (2007) 
suggests that this relationship has become less 
valid in EU in countries. Instead, since the 1990s, 
successful consolidation episodes in the EU have 
been associated with cuts in transfers and non-
wage government consumption. 
The broad consensus that tax-based consolidations 
are less likely to be successful has also been 
qualified  by the research presented in Tsibouris et 
al (2006). This paper shows that such 
consolidations can also prove to be effective where 
the starting tax to GDP ratio is low and where the 
implementation is policy changes are implemented 
gradually. 
The speed of implementation and the 
accompanying structural policy changes are two 
important factors that are both linked with both the 
type of consolidation and may help determine its 
probability of success. In particular, one 
explanation of why expenditure based 
consolidations have tended to be more successful 
than tax based ones is that the former tend to be 
accompanied by structural reforms. These include 
cuts to public sector wages which can spill over to 
private sector wages, reductions in social security 
spending which can increase work incentives and 
improvements to public services' efficiency. 
Conversely, as Kumar et al. (2007) argue, tax-
based consolidations have tended to be less 
successful as they were associated with a weak 
commitment to undertake structural reforms. 
Indeed, where such consolidations have proven 
successful they have tended to be accompanied by 
changes to the structure of the tax system which 
broaden tax bases, simplify the structure and 
reduce the tax burden on SMEs. 
Gradual consolidations have also tended to be 
more successful than sudden, or "cold shower" 
ones according to European Commission (2007) 
and Kumar et al (2007). Again, the studies link this 
to the fact that during a gradual consolidation there 
tend to be accompanying structural reforms which 
aid the persistence of any improvements to the 
fiscal position and which tend to take time to 
deliver. Such gradual consolidations can take up to 
10 years to deliver. Moreover, the existence or 
introduction of fiscal institutions or rules aiding 
European Commission 
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medium term budgeting is found to support the 
ability of governments to deliver lasting 
consolidations, as argued by European 
Commission (2007), Kumar et al (2007) and De 
Brun et al. (2008). The latter paper makes this case 
by focussing on the budgetary rules adopted by EU 
countries in the run-up to EMU. 
 
                                                          
Finally, monetary policy too can play a role. While 
Ahrend et al. (2006) find that accommodative 
monetary conditions at the start of a consolidation 
episode enhance the probability of its success, 
other papers such as von Hagen and Strauh (2001) 
and Lambertini and Tavares (2005) find no such 
influence. Nevertheless, Kumar et al (2007) 
consider monetary policy alongside other 
determinants to conclude that accommodative 
monetary policy is more likely to help achieve the 
political consensus to support successful 
consolidations.   
Concerning the role of the exchange rate, 
Lambertini and Tavares (2005) reach inconclusive 
results as to whether real exchange rate 
depreciation improves the chances that a 
consolidation episode will succeed.   
Against the background of this evidence on the 
determinants of successful fiscal consolidations, 
this section first considers the specificities of the 
current crisis by looking at what the existence of 
both a systemic financial crisis and high debt 
levels might mean for the type of consolidation 
that should be undertaken. Descriptive evidence 
building on the definitions of successful fiscal 
consolidations used in Section III.1 is also 
presented. Finally, the available information is 
brought together in an econometric analysis on the 
determinants of successful fiscal consolidations. 
4.1. ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATIONS: WHAT IS SPECIFIC TO 
THE CURRENT DEBT INCREASE EPISODE? 
Although the literature provides some guidance 
about the determinants of successful 
consolidations, applying the lessons learnt requires 
careful consideration of the particular 
characteristics of current situation. Two aspects of 
the current crisis are of key importance because 
they tend to pull the optimal policy response in 
opposite directions. The first element is that the 
current crisis is one marked by a global financial 
crisis, leading to a protracted period of low growth. 
The second aspect is that the current crisis has 
come at a time when EU countries already have 
significant levels of government debt. 
The fact that the depth and spread of economic and 
financial crisis has been so exceptional by recent 
standards means that ensuring a sustained recovery 
is of primary importance. Just as the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), and other 
support packages globally, has been credited with 
ensuring that the collapse in aggregate demand 
was limited, so there is a risk that a too rapid or 
strong tightening of fiscal policy may choke or 
severely hamper any burgeoning recovery. Instead, 
there is a need to ensure that contractionary fiscal 
policy does not lead to a relapse into recession. 
The presence of a financial as well as economic 
aspect to the crisis makes the situation more 
difficult (110), as reduced access to credit adds an 
additional obstacle to economies' ability to 
restructure and grow. Moreover, as monetary 
policy has already effectively reached its zero 
bound in order to support the economy during the 
crisis, it is no longer in a position to offset the 
contractionary impact of any consolidation through 
a loosening. Finally the global nature of the crisis 
means that it is less likely that European countries 
can rely on export-led growth. 
(110) In order to look at this aspect, the analysis presented later 
in this Section will follow the study by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008). Financial crisis episodes are considered 
and defined there as episodes during which a country's 
corporate and financial sectors face great difficulties 
repaying contracts on time, experience a large number of 
defaults, have a shard increase in non-performing loans and 
when most of the banking system capital is exhausted. This 
section makes use of the Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
database to provide novel evidence on the incidence of 
financial crises on the success of fiscal consolidations. 
Since Laeven and Valencia only define the starting points 
of banking crises but not their length, this study uses the 
information provided in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) to define their 
length. In case of missing or conflicting information from 
those sources, the end of the crisis was determined as the 
year when domestic credit growth bottomed out. 
Accordingly, in absence of additional indications, the end 
of the banking crisis episode corresponds to the year in 
which the private credit-to-GDP ratio recovers. Since the 
credit-to-GDP ratio fall often occurs with a delay, a credit 
ratio increase after the start of the crisis does not mean that 
the episode will be classified as lasting one year only, 
unless the credit-to-GDP ratio grows continuously for at 
least three years without interruption. For more details on 
country-specific episodes with past financial crises, see 
European Commission (2009). 
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While the fragile situation of economic growth 
would point towards erring on the side of delaying 
consolidations, the presence of high levels of 
government debt adds to the urgency of 
consolidating. Both discretionary policy action (to 
support the financial sector and to support 
aggregate demand through the EERP) and the 
increase in deficits due to the operation of the 
automatic stabilisers has led to a significant 
increase in debt levels. According to the 
Commission 2010 Spring forecasts, debt is set to 
increase by 20.8 percentage points of GDP 
between 2007 and 2010 in the EU (18.7 pp in the 
Euro area). With a starting level of debt of 66.0% 
of GDP in Euro Area and 58.8% in EU27, and 
significantly higher for some Member States, this 
reduces the scope for Member States to continue 
running significant deficits which continue to add 
to this debt without the economy bearing 
significant consequences. In particular, delayed 
consolidations risk compromising future growth by 
raising risk premia and burdening the economy 
with higher taxes (than would occur with an earlier 
consolidation). The higher the starting level in a 
given Member State, the more pressure that the 
debt level will place on the need for a rapid and 
strong consolidation.  
Considering that growth is crucial for sustainable 
consolidation and debt reduction, the Commission 
Communication "Europe 2020 – A strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth" stresses 
that budgetary consolidation programmes should 
prioritise 'growth-enhancing items' such as 
education and skills, R&D and innovation and 
investment in networks. The revenue side of the 
budget also matters and particular attention should 
also be given to the quality of the revenue/tax 
system. Where taxes may have to rise, this should, 
where possible, be done in conjunction with 
making the tax systems more "growth-friendly". 
For example, raising taxes on labour, as has 
occurred in the past at great costs to jobs, should 
be avoided. Rather Member States should seek to 
shift the tax burden from labour to energy and 
environmental taxes as part of a “greening” of 
taxation systems. Fiscal consolidation and long-
term financial sustainability will need to go hand 
in hand with important structural reforms, in 
particular of pension, health care, social protection 
and education systems. Public administration 
should use the situation as an opportunity to 
enhance efficiency and the quality of service. 
Public procurement policy must ensure the most 
efficient use of public funds and procurement 
markets must be kept open EU-wide. 
4.2. FISCAL CONSOLIDATION, FINANCIAL 
CRISES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: 
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
Before seeking to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the determinants of successful fiscal 
consolidations, it is worth recalling the definitions 
and summarising the main features of the sample 
used. As in Part III.1, fiscal consolidations are 
defined in terms of the improvement in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and 
success is defined according to the ex-post debt 
level compared to the debt level the year prior the 
start of a consolidation episode. Accordingly, a 
fiscal consolidation occurs when the CAPB 
improves by at least 1.5% with such an increase 
taking place in one single year (cold shower) or 
over three years (gradual consolidation) if each 
and every year the CAPB does not deteriorate by 
more than 0.5% of GDP. A fiscal consolidation is 
considered as being successful if the public debt 
level is lower by at least five percentage points of 
GDP in the following three years. 
Table III.4.1 provides evidence on the success of 
fiscal consolidations considering the EU27 
countries together with selected non-EU OECD 
countries during the period 1970-2008 and 
including information on starting business cycle 
conditions.(111)  
The business cycle position is measured using the 
level and annual change in the output gap at the 
start of a fiscal consolidation episode: "Expansion" 
denotes years with a positive output gap level and 
a positive annual change, "Recovery" denotes 
years with a negative output gap level and positive 
annual change, "Downturn" years are those with a 
positive output gap level and negative annual 
change, while "Protracted slowdown" years have a 
(111) Selected non-EU OECD countries include Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and 
the US. Those countries were selected on the basis of data 
availability. The discrepancy between the total number of 
consolidation episodes reported in the first line and the 
consolidation episodes by business cycle categories 
reported in the 2nd to the 5th line is due to missing data on 
the output gap for Luxembourg 
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Table III.4.1: The success rate of fiscal consolidations and the business cycle: evidence for the EU and non-EU OECD countries 1970-2008 
 
                                                          
widening negative output gap level. It must be 
noted that these variables include the endogenous 
effect of consolidation on cyclical conditions. For 
example, a large consolidation effort in the first 
year may widen an already negative output gap. 
This may lead to a bias in the results, when using 
these business cycle variables in the econometric 
estimation. However, the size of the bias is likely 
to be small, as it only applies to the first year of 
fiscal consolidation episodes, while the success of 
fiscal consolidations spanned over the three 
subsequent years. 
Consolidations are observed for the period 1970 to 
2005, where 2005 is the last year for the 
observation of a consolidation episode and 2008 
the last year for the observation a successful 
consolidation, respectively. Gradual consolidations 
appear to be generally more successful than cold 
showers in the EU, with success rates of 47.7% 
and 27.1% respectively. In non-EU OECD 
countries, however, gradual consolidations post a 
success rate of 27.7% against 38.7% for cold 
showers (112). The success rate if also higher for 
consolidations starting during expansion and 
recovery phases, i.e. when cyclical conditions are 
(112) This result could be explained on account of the fact that 
the non-EU OECD sample of countries includes both 
developed and emerging economies. Emerging economies 
usually have less leeway to run large budget deficits during 
recessions, as they face greater constraints regarding their 
foreign indebtedness and/or higher risk premia on public 
debt, and are therefore likely to undertake cold shower type 
of consolidations. 
favourable, although, again, this result does not 
hold for non-EU OECD countries. For EU 
countries, cold showers consolidations seem 
particularly unlikely to succeed during periods of 
downturn or protracted slowdown with success 
rates of only 6.7% and 16.7%, respectively. 
However, the opposite seems to be the case for 
non-EU OECD countries, as reflected by a success 
rate of 43.7% for cold-shower consolidations in 
protracted downturns. 
Before the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, EU 
countries had been relatively immune to systemic 
financial crises. Notable exceptions were Finland 
and Sweden during the 1991–94 period, Spain in 
the late 1970s and, more recently, a number of 
recently acceded Member States in the context of 
their transition to market economy. The evidence 
presented in Graph III.5.1 suggests that fiscal 
consolidations are more successful when 
undertaken after a financial crisis than during it. 
This result holds for EU countries in particular, 
while for non-EU OECD countries there is no clear 
indication that success in consolidating depends on 
whether a consolidation starts during or after the 
financial crisis. For the EU, success rates are about 
56% for consolidations starting after a financial 
crisis, and only 9% for consolidations starting 
during a financial crisis, against a benchmark case 
of a 34% success rate for consolidations in the 
absence of financial crises.  
All Gradual Cold showers All Gradual Cold showers All Gradual Cold showers
34.5 51.2 25.3 33.7 47.7 27.1 29.3 22.7 38.7
(116) (41) (75) (160) (53) (107) (75) (44) (31)
58 85.7 41.7 44.8 54.5 38.9 25 25 25
(19) (7) (12) (29) (11) (18) (20) (12) (8)
48.4 55.7 45.4 47.6 54.5 45.1 23.8 12.5 60
(31) (9) (22) (42) (11) (31) (21) (16) (5)
26.3 50 9.1 21.7 50 6.7 0 0 0
(19) (8) (11) (23) (8) (15) (4) (2) (2)
21.4 46.1 10.3 26.2 47.4 16.7 40 35.7 43.7
(42) (13) (29) (61) (19) (42) (30) (14) (16)
Expansion
Recovery
Downturn
Protracted 
slowdown
Consolidation by business cycle position**
EU15 EU27 Other non-EU OECD*
All consolidation episodes
* Includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. ** Business cycle position (as defined in Section 2) the first 
year of a consolidation episode. The business cycle position is measured using the level and annual change in the output gap at the start of a fiscal 
consolidation episode: "Expansion" denotes years with a positive output gap level and a positive annual change, "Recovery" denotes years with a 
negative output gap level and positive annual change, "Downturn" years are those with a positive output gap level and negative annual change, while 
"Protracted slowdown" years have a widening negative output gap level. The number of consolidation years are included in parentheses. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
174 
Part III 
Fiscal policy, debt reduction and growth after the crisis 
Graph III.4.1: The success rate of fiscal consolidation and financial 
crises episodes (% of consolidation episodes leading 
to a reduction of debt level by at least 5 pp GDP 3 
years later) 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
In years with no financial
crises episodes*
During a financial crisis
episodes
After a financial crisis episode
other non-EU/OECD
RAMS
EU27
 
Note: * years with no financial crisis episodes exclude both financial 
crisis and post (up to five years) financial crisis episodes 
Source: Commission services. 
4.3. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL 
FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS AND 
FINANCIAL CRISES:  ECONOMETRIC 
EVIDENCE 
Here, we present an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of success of fiscal consolidations 
including, in particular, the influence of systemic 
financial crises, the business cycle position and the 
starting debt level. 
4.3.1. Econometric specification 
The econometric analysis takes the form of probit 
estimates where the dependent variable is a 
dummy indicating whether a consolidation was 
successful or not, according to the criteria 
described earlier. Note that the success of a fiscal 
consolidation is only estimated where the decision 
to consolidate is observed. The results can 
therefore be considered as indicative of the 
determinants of successful fiscal consolidations 
conditional upon fiscal consolidation taking place.  
The explanatory variables are: 
• The occurrence of a systemic financial crisis, 
measured by two dummy variables. The first 
dummy takes a value equal to one for a 
consolidation episode taking place during a 
financial crisis episode as defined in Section 
III.5.1, and zero otherwise. The second dummy 
captures consolidations that start after a 
financial crisis, taking a value of one where the 
consolidation starts within 5 years of a crisis, 
and zero otherwise.  
• The business cycle position, measured for the 
starting year of each consolidation episode by 
the value of the output gap as defined in 
Section III.5.1, captured by three dummy 
variables. These capture whether the 
consolidation starts during a downturn, a 
recovery or a protracted slowdown, with an 
expansion being the omitted category. 
• The debt-to-GDP ratio in year t-1, with the year 
t being the starting year of a consolidation 
episode. (113) 
• The nature of fiscal consolidation, i.e., whether 
predominantly revenue or expenditure based, 
measured through the change between t-1 and 
t+3 of the cyclically adjusted primary 
expenditure as percentage of GDP, with t being 
the starting year of a consolidation episode. 
The change in the cyclically adjusted tax 
revenue as percentage of GDP is also 
considered, and equally defined over the period 
t-1 and t+3. This variable is considered 
separately from the cyclically adjusted 
expenditure variable due to co-linearity 
concerns. 
• The strength of fiscal governance, measured for 
EU countries by a composite indicator based on 
information reported on the European 
Commission Fiscal Governance database; for 
non-EU OECD countries this reduces simply to 
whether or not the countries have a budget 
deficit rule in places based on information 
reported in Guichard et al. (2007). 
• The influence of IMF assistance, measured by 
a dummy variable taking the value of one for a 
consolidation episode coinciding with an IMF 
                                                          
(113) The role played by the starting debt level as determinant of 
successful fiscal consolidation provides a case of potential 
sample selection bias to the extent that the debt level is also 
likely to influence the choice of whether to  consolidate or 
not. For a more detailed discussion of the sample selection 
bias in the context of fiscal consolidations, see Barrios et 
al. (2010). 
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balance-of-payments assistance programme, 
zero otherwise. 
the whole sample of consolidation episodes, fiscal 
consolidations starting during a financial crisis 
have on average 30.2% less chance of  success and 
even if undertaken up to five years after the start of 
a financial crisis have a substantially lower 
probability of reducing public debt level (-24.4%). 
This result suggests that the impact of financial 
crises on the public finances, which is known to be 
both heavy and protracted (see Laeven and 
Valencia 2008, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 and 
European Commission, 2009) makes it more 
difficult for governments to curb rising public debt 
levels.  
• Finally, the snowball effect of public debt, 
defined as an interaction term between the debt 
level in t-1 and the differential between the 
growth rate and the interest rate paid on public 
debt. (114) The choice of a debt-based criterion 
as opposed to a primary balance criterion for 
defining consolidation success raises an issue 
of specification in relation to the definition of 
consolidation, which remains in terms of 
primary balance. Specifically, simple debt 
dynamics imply that the size of the 
consolidation necessary to achieve a reduction 
in debt is directly proportional to the level of 
debt  with the factor of proportionality equal to 
the interest rate-growth rate differential with 
debt dynamics. The estimate of the 
determinants of successful consolidations 
controls for this debt scale factor by including 
the combined  impact of growth an interest rate 
on debt accumulation (s.c. snowball effect) 
among the regressors. 
 
                                                          
4.3.2. Econometric results 
The probit regression has been estimated for three 
groups of consolidations: all consolidations 
(column 1 and 2) cold shower consolidations 
(column 3) and gradual consolidations (column 
4). Table III.6.2 provides the estimated marginal 
effect of each explanatory variable.(115)   
The main results can be summarised as follows: 
Fiscal consolidations starting during or shortly 
after a systemic financial crisis have significantly 
lower chances of success. Specifically, considering 
                                                          
(114) More precisely, the snowball effect of public debt is 
measured by Debt/GDP (t-1) * (i(t) – y(t)/ (1+ y(t))), where i= 
interest rate and y is the nominal GDP growth in year t. The 
average value of this variable over the three-years 
following a consolidation episode is considered in order to 
match the criteria used to determine the success of a fiscal 
consolidation. 
(115) Note that when considering explanatory dummy variables 
(i.e. as in the case of the fiscal governance variable) the 
estimated marginal effect can be interpreted directly as 
indicating the impact of a given variable on the probability 
to achieve a successful fiscal consolidation while for 
continuous variables such interpretation cannot be made 
directly and requires a prior transformation of the 
explanatory variable which are done only to illustrate 
certain specific results.   
Cold-shower consolidations may be more 
successful in the aftermath of a financial crisis. 
The results for the sample of cold shower 
consolidations suggest that undertaking a cold 
shower consolidation in the aftermath of a 
financial crisis, i.e. presumably after the financial 
repair has been completed or well under way, may 
actually boost its chances of success, which, as 
discussed above, are generally lower than for 
gradual consolidations (116).  
Unfavourable cyclical conditions reduce the 
likelihood of success of a consolidation, especially 
for cold-shower consolidations. The results for the 
whole sample of consolidation episodes as well as 
for cold shower and gradual consolidations 
considered separately, suggest that a protracted 
slowdown reduces the probability of success by 
20–30%. The negative effect of a simple 
downturn, however, is significant only for cold-
shower consolidation. Nor does a recovery seem to 
make a significant positive difference to the 
success of consolidations.  
Consolidations accompanied by a strong fiscal 
framework are more likely to success, especially if 
of the gradual kind. Specifically, the probability of 
succeed for countries undertaking consolidation 
(116) In certain specifications the effect of some variables could 
not be estimated owing to 'perfect predictions', reflecting 
the small number of cases. For example, in the case of 
gradual consolidations (column 4) the coefficient on the 
financial crisis dummy cannot be estimated given that such 
gradual consolidations were undertaken in only four 
occasions (corresponding to the cases of the US in 1988 
and 1989 and Latvia in 1996 and 1997) and were never 
successful. Overall the model predicts the probability of 
successful consolidation well, with a percentage of correct 
prediction above 0.7 in all specifications. 
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with 'good' fiscal governance is close to 40% 
higher compared to countries undertaking similar 
consolidation but with 'bad' fiscal governance, and 
highly significant in the case of gradual 
consolidations. However, the advantage conferred 
by 'good' fiscal governance falls to 6% in the case 
of cold shower consolidations and is not 
significant.  
 A high level of debt increases the likelihood of a 
successful consolidation. Specifically, considering 
all consolidation episodes, a 25pp increase in the 
debt to GDP ratio implies an increase in the 
probability to achieve a successful consolidation 
by 12.7%. (117) Note that this result obtains after 
controlling for the 'snowball effect' of debt. It 
suggests that higher debt puts pressure on 
governments to achieve more ambitious 
consolidations.  
Expenditure based consolidations are more likely 
to succeed. Specifically, considering all 
consolidation episodes, a 5% decrease in cyclically 
(117) This figure is simply obtained by multiplying the standard 
deviation of the debt variable for the estimation sample by 
the estimated marginal effect reported in Table III.5.2. All 
probabilities are estimated at the average values of the 
variables. 
adjusted expenditure between t-1 and t+3 increases 
the likelihood of a consolidation episode 
succeeding by 26%. Considering separately cold 
shower and gradual consolidations, expenditure 
cuts are more conducive to success in the case of 
cold-shower than in that of gradual consolidations. 
 A separate analysis of the specific role of 
expenditure and revenue-based consolidations and 
their interaction with starting business cycle 
conditions has also been performed. The results are 
reported in Table III.5.3, where, to facilitate the 
reading, only the results concerning the interaction 
terms between the type of consolidation (i.e., 
expenditure versus revenue based) and the starting 
business cycle position are displayed (the other 
non-reported variables being the same as those in 
column 1 of Table III.5.2). Generally speaking, the 
advantage of expenditure-based consolidations is 
confirmed. Expenditure cuts seem to be especially 
effective when consolidations take place in years 
of protracted slowdown and when they are of cold-
shower type.  By contrast, they do not seem to 
make a significant difference to the success of 
gradual consolidations.  As to revenue increases, 
they seem to lower the chances of successful 
consolidations, particularly in the case of 
protracted slowdowns. 
 
Table III.4.2: The determinants of successful fiscal consolidations, financial crises and the business cycle 1/ 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gradual
Consolidations 2/
(1) (2) (3) (4)
During financial crisis -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.140*** -
(0.042) (0.04) (0.041)
Post financial crisis (up to 5 years after a financial crisis) -0.244*** 0.531** -
(0.06) (0.223)
Debt 0.508*** 0.605*** 0.797*** 1.764***
(0.169) (0.138) (0.164) (0.367)
Δ cyclically adjusted expenditure -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.023* -0.065
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.043)
Downturn -0.111 -0.112 -0.158*** -0.024
(0.106 (0.102 (0.048 (0.261)
Recovery -0.062 -0.093 -0.058 -0.158
(0.101) (0.094) (0.085) (0.202)
Protracted slowdown -0.193** -0.210** -0.282*** -0.354**
(0.089) (0.087) (0.086) (0.169)
Debt-stabilising primary balance -4.994*** -5.687*** -4.080*** -19.256**
(snowball effect of public debt) (1.81) (1.847) (1.562) (7.561)
Fiscal governance 0.004 0.05 0.059 0.397**
(0.089) (0.087) (0.098) (0.189)
IMF programme 0.340* 0.441** -0.009
(0.176) (0.174) (0.113)
Estimated probability of success 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.42
% of probability correctly predicted 0.73 0.75 0.82 0.81
Observations 181 181 110 58
All consolidations All consolidations Cold showers
1/ Marginal effect using Probit estimations, dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 when consolidation is  successful and  0 when it 
fails. Success/failure are conditional on fiscal consolidation being undertaken. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2/  The coefficient on systemic financial crises variables could not be estimated due to low number of non-zero outcome for these variables 
Source:  Commission services. 
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4.3.3. A closer look at the role played by the 
initial debt level and the snowball 
effect: inference for the current debt 
increase episode. 
The level of debt has been shown to increase the 
probability of successful consolidations, after 
controlling for the mechanics of the snowball 
effect. This raises the primary balance required to 
halt the increase in debt in proportion with the 
level of debt, with the factor of proportionality 
being equal to the interest rate growth rate 
differential. Moreover, the estimated effects of 
debt on the probability of success, both directly 
and via the snowball effect, differ depending on 
whether the consolidation is gradual or cold 
shower. Specifically, the results presented in table 
III.4.2 showed that a 1 percentage point of GDP 
increase in the snowball effect reduces the 
probability of success of gradual consolidation by 
nearly 19%, while the corresponding reduction for 
a cold shower consolidation is 4%. Using these 
results, it is possible to estimate the probability of 
success of fiscal consolidations at different levels 
of debt for varying values of the snowball effect 
and holding other variables constant (at their 
average value). (118) As illustrated in Graph III.4.2, 
                                                          
(118) In other words, this exercise assumes that the parameters 
estimated were identical to the ones reported in Table 
III.5.2 although it only considers as explanatory variables 
the debt level, the three business cycle variables, the debt-
stabilising primary balance and the fiscal governance 
variable in order to be able to compare the same model for 
cold shower and gradual consolidations. The range of 
values chosen for the debt-stabilising primary balance 
appear to correspond to the values observed for the 
countries included in the sample used to estimate results 
reported in Table 2. 
at high levels of debt, the size of the snowball 
effect is sufficient to render a cold-shower 
consolidation more likely to succeed than a 
gradual consolidation. Specifically, countries with 
starting debt of over 70% of GDP, a snowball 
effect of over 1% of GDP (i.e., an interest growth 
rate differential of 0.7 percentage points) renders 
cold-shower consolidations more likely to succeed 
than gradual consolidations. By contrast, at 
medium or low levels of debt, gradual 
consolidations dominate cold shower 
consolidations for all plausible values of the 
interest rate growth rate differential. Applying 
these results to the current levels of government 
debt in the EU suggests that the case for cold 
shower consolidations may be stronger than past 
experience would suggest. According to the 
Commission 2010 Spring forecasts, of the eleven 
Member States forecast to have debt above 70% of 
GDP in 2010, ten are also forecast to have 
snowball effects large enough for cold-shower 
consolidations to dominate gradual ones, on 
account of the influence of debt (119).  
 
(119) Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, 
Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal and the UK have starting 
levels of debt of over 70% in 2010. Of these, all except the 
UK have a snowball effect of over 1% of GDP. 
 
 
 
Table III.4.3: The interaction between expenditure-cut/ tax increase-based consolidations and the starting business cycle position: evidence 
from probit estimations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Downturn -0.003 0.028*** -0.101 0.013 0.015 0.032
(0.02) (0.011) (0.09) (0.04) (0.028) (0.088)
Recovery -0.045* -0.031* 0.006 -0.021 -0.009 -0.198
(0.024) (0.017) (0.101) (0.027) (0.019) (0.159)
Protracted slowdown -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.033 -0.033** -0.030** -0.142*
(0.02) (0.018) (0.049) (0.014) (0.012) (0.077)
Δ cyclically adjusted expenditure Δ cyclically adjusted tax revenues
All 
consolidations Cold showers All consolidations Cold showers
Gradual 
consolidations
Gradual 
consolidations
Notes: Results concern interaction between nature of consolidation (i.e. expenditure cut or tax increase) and the starting business cycle position. 
Marginal effect using Probit estimations, dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 when consolidation is successful and  0 when it fails. 
Success/failure are conditional on fiscal consolidation being undertaken. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. The other explanatory variables included in the regressions are those reported in column (1) of Table III.4.2. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph III.4.2: The probability of success of gradual and cold shower fiscal consolidation depending on the level and snowball effect of public 
debt 
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Note:  grey = gradual; black = cold shower 
Source: Commission services. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in chapter III.4 of this report 
concludes that consolidation from the spending 
side is in general more effective than revenue 
driven consolidation. The magnitude of the 
required consolidation after the crisis, however, 
suggests that increases in the tax burden may be 
inevitable in a number of countries. (120) It is 
therefore important to consider which tax changes 
could yield these additional tax revenues, while 
bearing in mind the medium and long term 
consolidation needs as well as the long-run effects 
that different tax changes might have on the 
economy. A sustainable consolidation requires that 
the distortionary effects of taxation on growth, 
investment and employment are kept at a 
minimum, while ensuring that the tax system 
contributes to other policy goals effectively. To 
achieve this, both structure and the tax base for 
different taxes may need to be adjusted. Two other 
aspects, which will not be addressed here in detail, 
can help to increase government revenues and to 
consolidate the budget: innovative financing, that 
is public finance that is raised in new, non-
traditional ways, as analysed in European 
Commission (2010x), and measures to improve tax 
compliance by improving the tax administration 
and by combating tax evasion. 
Current tax systems are in many cases too 
complex. This is because they tend to develop in a 
piecemeal fashion, with exceptions and 
exemptions being added to address specific 
concerns as they arise, without adequate care being 
taken to ensure that they do not create conflicts 
with other objectives. Rather than adjusting tax 
systems at the margins in this way, fundamental 
reform lead to a better overall performance of the 
tax systems. The current economic downturn 
offers a unique opportunity to rethink tax systems, 
to restate the objectives of taxation, assess 
potential conflicts between different objectives, 
and to identify what makes good tax systems for 
the 21st century. 
EU Member States exhibit large difference in 
terms of the level and structure of their taxes, 
                                                          
(120) An analysis of the potential contribution of consolidation 
on the revenue side to overall consolidation in the G20 
countries can be found in Cottarelli and Vinals (2009). 
reflecting different social preferences and 
approaches to public service provision. On average 
in the EU27, the total tax-to-GDP ratio including 
social contributions stood at close to 40% in 2008, 
with individual Member States having ratios 
between less than 30% to close to 50%. The 
composition of total tax revenues in the three main 
tax categories direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
contributions varies considerably between Member 
States, too, (121) with, e.g., the share of direct taxes 
in total taxation ranging from 20% to 60% in 
individual Member States. Despite significant 
difference between Member States, overall 
revenues are divided roughly equally between the 
three main tax categories (see Graph III.5.1). For 
the EU27 and the EA16 averages, these shares 
have been relatively stable in recent years. Graph 
III.5.1 also reflects the impact of the business cycle 
which has a strong effect in particular on direct tax 
revenues. (122) As can be seen in Graph III.5.2, 
within the overall averages, the shares in several 
Member States have changed significantly in 
recent years. While part of these changes is 
probably of a cyclical nature, substantial changes 
reflect political decisions to change the tax system. 
5.2. TAX LEVEL AND GROWTH 
The link between taxation and growth has been the 
focus of a large number of studies. So far, these 
studies only provide partial evidence that the total 
level of taxation, as measured by the tax-to-GDP 
ratio, influences economic growth. (123) The 
analysis is subject to many technical difficulties. In 
particular, the drag on growth from taxation is, in 
general, at least partly offset by the positive effects 
of government spending, which in turn depend on 
(121) In the definition used here, indirect taxes are defined as 
taxes linked to production and imports whereas direct taxes 
are defined as current taxes on income and wealth plus 
capital taxes. See European Commission (2009a) for 
details. 
(122) See European Commission (2010a). For an analysis of the 
long-run trend in the 1970-1997 period, see European 
Commission (2000).  
(123) See for a review, European Commission (2008a) and 
Myles (2009). Several empirical studies do in fact find a 
negative relationship between the level of taxation (or other 
measures of the government size) and GDP growth but, as 
emphasised by Myles (2009), "…none of this analysis 
escapes the fundamental observation that the lack of 
structural modelling limits the interpretation of the 
estimated equations and leaves the causality issue 
unresolved." 
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the quality of government expenditure, a variable 
that is difficult to quantify and treat analytically 
and which may vary considerably across countries. 
This difficulty complicates considerably the task of 
estimating the pure effect of taxation on 
growth. (124) Moreover, tax levels and growth are 
endogenous as not only can tax levels affect 
growth but growth can also affect the level of taxes 
collected. In addition to the work that looks at the 
tax-to-GDP ratio as a measure of the average tax 
burden in the economy, the literature also 
discusses the effect of high marginal tax rates on 
economic growth. It provides some empirical 
evidence that higher effective marginal tax rates 
and higher tax progressivity for a given share of 
tax revenues in GDP have a negative effect on 
growth. (125) This work is, however, subject to 
difficulties in defining and calculating the overall 
effective marginal tax rate.  
 
                                                          
5.3. TAX STRUCTURE AND GROWTH 
While the relationship between the overall level of 
tax and growth is uncertain, more is understood 
about how its components affect GDP per capita 
and its growth. In the current juncture, where it 
appears that tax increases are in many cases 
inevitable as part of the consolidation process, it is 
important to consider which taxes to raise. The 
structure of taxation matters particularly in the 
case of high tax-to-GDP ratios; these are more 
likely in the years to come. (126) Taxes affect 
economic growth through the different 
components of growth: total factor productivity, 
the growth of the capital stock and the growth of 
labour supply. Tax policies that improve research 
and development, entrepreneurship and foreign 
direct investment enhance productivity growth. 
Tax policies that make work pay and promote 
human capital formation augment labour supply in 
the short and long term. Tax policies that 
encourage domestic and foreign investment as well 
as saving increase the capital base of the economy. 
These outcomes can be achieved in two ways: by 
either providing the right incentives within the 
provisions of specific taxes or by shifting the tax 
structures in a desirable way. This applies 
regardless of whether total taxes need to be 
increased or not. 
At a more macroeconomic level, studies (127) have 
shown that taxes on income are usually associated 
with lower economic growth (and so lower steady-
state GDP) and that property, consumption and 
environmental taxes are the least detrimental to 
growth. Personal income taxes (128) and in 
particular corporate income taxes appear to be the 
most detrimental. Personal income and 
consumption taxes can both affect labour supply. 
Moreover, personal income taxes tend to have a 
progressive structure which has negative growth 
effects, while they also discourage saving by 
reducing the returns to saving. In addition, 
consumption taxes are less distortive than personal 
income taxes as they partly fall on accumulated 
assets, which are an inelastic tax base. Corporate 
income taxes have a negative impact on capital 
investment and productivity improvements. In 
terms of property taxes, recurrent taxes on 
immovable property are found to have the smallest 
effect on GDP per capita, with those levied on 
households having a less detrimental effect than 
those levied on companies. Environmental taxes 
can help to internalise external effects and do at 
the same time generate tax revenue. These results 
therefore suggest that possible future tax increases 
should focus on property taxes, consumption taxes 
and environmental taxes and should be 
accompanied by measures to increase labour 
participation, promote education and training and 
encourage investment. So far, there has only been 
a modest shift in the structure of taxation in this 
direction, with the share of environmental taxes 
having even decreased in recent years. (129)  
                                                          (124) How public expenditure affects growth is looked at in more 
detail in the Commission report 'Public Finances in EMU 
2008'. 
(125) See, e.g., Padovano and Galli (2001, 2002), Koester and 
Kormendi (1989) and Mullen and Williams (1994). See 
also Myles (2009) for a critical review of the literature. 
(126) See Agell et al. (1996). 
(127) See, e.g. Johannson et al. (2008), Arnold (2008) and Myles 
(2009).  
(128) In the literature social contributions paid by employees and 
employers as well as payroll taxes are usually included in 
this item. 
(129) See European Commission (2009a, 2009b). 
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This could indicate that there exists significant 
potential for further reforms, although the slow 
progress could be a sign that change is likely to 
prove difficult to introduce. Possible constraints to 
such changes include conflicting interests such as 
diverging preferences in terms of redistribution, 
fairness aspects of the reforms, the desire to 
promote home-ownership, or the presence of 
alternative regulatory measures to achieve similar 
goals such as in environmental matters. It is also 
important to have an understanding of the 
quantitative importance of the different tax 
categories in overall revenues which can indicate 
potential limits to the proposed tax shifts. Whereas 
property and environmental taxes correspond to a 
relatively small share of overall tax revenues in the 
EU on average ( making up around 4% and 6% of 
the total, respectively), the share of VAT and 
personal income taxes amounts to around one fifth 
each, with around 30% stemming from social 
contributions. (130) Differences in revenue shares 
are, however, substantial between EU Member 
States. This concerns in particular property taxes, 
whose share in overall tax revenues ranges from 
around 1% to more than 10% of total tax revenues 
for those Member States for which information is 
available. (131) 
 
 
                                                          
(130) The main other tax revenue categories are taxes on 
corporate income and excise duties and consumption taxes 
(131) See OECD (2009). 
The relationships between individual taxes and 
growth described above are confirmed by 
calculations using the European Commission's 
Quest III model. This model distinguishes labour 
taxes, consumption taxes (VAT) and corporate 
profit taxes. As discussed in detail in Section III.6, 
a consolidation through an increase in VAT is the 
least unfavourable of all tax based consolidations 
and would lead to a larger increase in long-run 
GDP than a consolidation based on higher labour 
taxes. An increase in taxes on corporate profits 
would lead to a loss in long-run GDP. (132)  
When considering which taxes to change it is 
important to bear in mind both the short run and 
long run effects, which may differ and to take into 
account the economic situation. For example, 
Heady et al. (2009) point out that while cuts in 
corporate income tax rates have positive effects for 
long-run growth, these cuts are ineffective in the 
short run when companies make little or no profits 
as is currently often the case. In order to encourage 
investment in the short run, investment tax credits 
would be a better tool in the current circumstances. 
(132) This result is also in line with the calculations published in 
European Commission (2008a), which showed slightly 
positive effects from a tax shift from labour to consumption 
taxes.  
Graph III.5.1: Shares of indirect taxes, direct taxes and social contributions in overall tax revenues 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Graph III.5.2: Change in the share of indirect taxes, direct taxes and social contributions in overall tax revenues, 1995-2008, in percentage 
points 
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5.4. DESIGN OF INDIVIDUAL TAXES 
The design of the individual taxes can be adapted, 
too, in order to reduce the distortionary effects of 
taxation on growth. For example, Li and Sarte 
(2004) find that tax progressivity in the personal 
income tax has a small but non-negligible negative 
impact on long-run growth, a result which was 
confirmed by later research (e.g. Johansson et al., 
2008, and Heady et al., 2009). Tax progression and 
high top marginal personal income tax rates reduce 
productivity growth, especially in industries 
characterised by high entry rates of new firms. Of 
course, tax progressivity might be seen as desirable 
for other reasons, such as reasons of redistribution 
or because progressivity is linked to higher 
automatic stabilisation. Recent research, however, 
suggests that the loss in per capita GDP is too high 
to justify the relatively small stabilising effect. 
(133) As regards VAT, a single rate VAT with only 
a few exemptions is considered preferable to a 
more complex structure, as it reduces distortions 
and facilitates compliance and tax administration. 
Assistance to low-income households, which is 
one of the key arguments often brought forward in 
favour of reduced VAT rates, can be provided at 
lower budgetary costs outside the VAT 
                                                          
(133) See, e.g., IMF (2009c), 
system. (134) In general there is a consensus in the 
literature to argue for broad bases and low tax 
rates. A move to cut inefficient reductions, 
exceptions or exemptions which are either not 
economically justified or display incentives not in 
line with their original aims could be beneficial for 
many countries and could reduce the size of the tax 
increases needed as part of the consolidation. 
However, careful analysis needs to be undertaken 
to ensure that changes do indeed enhance the 
operation of the tax system. 
Tax reforms after the crisis could not only support 
growth, but could also address possible 
deficiencies and distortions of the current systems, 
some of which have appeared more clearly in the 
context of the current crisis and although not 
having caused the crisis, might have contributed to 
it. Several recent publications address this issue, 
e.g. IMF (2009a, 2009b), Hemmelgarn and 
Nicodème (2010), Keen et al. (2010). (135) One 
key aspect is that tax systems are often biased 
towards debt financing which applies to both the 
corporate and the household sector. In the case of 
corporations, interest payments can be deducted 
from the corporate tax base in most Member States 
whereas the return to equity is not deductible. This 
(134) See Heady et al. (2009) and IMF (2010). 
(135) European Commission (2010b) will also address this issue 
in more detail.  
Source: Commission services. 
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creates a tax bias in favour of debt, which is likely 
to an insufficient capitalisation of companies. As 
concerns households, several Member States allow 
for mortgage interest deductibility or even the 
amortisation of mortgages for owner-occupied 
housing whereas imputed rents and in many 
countries capital gains for the principal residence 
are not taxed. While this favours home-ownership, 
it can potentially contribute to housing bubbles and 
promote a high indebtedness of households. 
Overall, higher indebtedness increases the 
vulnerability of the private sector to shocks. 
Solutions to these problems include the 
introduction of an allowance for corporate equity 
(ACE) or a comprehensive business income tax 
(CBIT). (136) In terms of housing taxation, the 
taxation of imputed rents and capital gains could 
be introduced in order to reduce the bias to invest 
in owner occupied housing, or alternatively the 
interest deductibility for owner occupied housing 
could be phased out gradually over a number of 
years. (137)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
(136) The ACE system provides a deductible allowance for 
corporate equity in the calculation of the taxable profits of 
corporations, whereas the CBIT allows no deduction of 
interest payments or the return on equity from taxable 
corporate earnings. Amongst the EU Member States, 
Belgium has recently introduced an ACE system 
(déduction pour les interêts notionnels). See, e.g. de Mooij 
and Devereux (2009) for an analysis of the effects of 
potential ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU Member 
States. 
(137) A more detailed discussion of the possible adjustment of 
the taxation of owner occupied housing can be found in 
IMF (2009b). 
The existing tax structure and the economic 
situation in the different Member State, will 
determine which changes in the tax structure and 
tax design can be expected to have the strongest 
impact on growth. (138) In planning changes, it is 
important to bear in mind the effect that these will 
have on the revenues of different levels of 
government as shifts in the tax structure might 
require adjustments in revenue sharing 
arrangements. Moreover, another crucial aspect of 
taxation is the effect it has on income inequality as 
in many cases there is likely to be a trade-off 
between growth and equity.  
 
 
 
 
 
(138) IMF (2010) presents rough estimations for potential 
revenue increases of different types of taxes in the G-20 
countries. 
6. SIMULATIONS OF THE OUTPUT EFFECT OF FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATIONS 
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In response to the collapse in output following the 
financial crisis, the European Commission called 
for an EU wide framework of fiscal and structural 
measures to support aggregate demand and avoid a 
deeper recession, resulting in the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). (139) Despite 
earlier scepticism about the general effectiveness 
of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool, the specific 
circumstances of the crisis created a strong case for 
fiscal stimulus measures. With an increased 
number of households facing credit constraints and 
with the zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates having been reached, monetary policy was 
limited in its ability to provide stabilisation and 
could, instead, accommodate a fiscal stimulus. The 
presence of both credit constraints and very low 
interest rates increase the effectiveness of 
temporary fiscal stimulus measures and justify 
significant policy interventions. 
However, the fiscal stimulus added to the 
underlying deterioration in fiscal positions which 
manifested itself when the crisis unfolded. In many 
countries credit and asset price booms had led to 
improvements in fiscal positions in recent years. 
The failure to fully account for the direct and 
indirect effect of strong asset prices on fiscal 
positions led to a distorted and overly optimistic 
picture of the underlying fiscal stance. (140) In 
addition, the ongoing negative effects of the 
financial crisis on potential growth put further 
pressure on fiscal positions and have led to 
widespread concern about the long-run 
sustainability of the public finances. Although the 
fiscal stimulus packages were not the main reason 
for the deterioration in the fiscal positions, there 
have been calls for an early exit from the stimulus 
measures. This section discusses some of the 
issues involved. It focuses first on the effects of the 
withdrawal of fiscal stimulus measures, and, 
second, on the effects of permanent fiscal 
consolidations that will be required to put public 
finances back on a sustainable path.    
                                                          
(139) See also Box I.1.1 describing the EERP and the withdrawal 
of temporary measures in product and labour markets.  
(140) See the Report on Public Finances 2009 for an analysis of 
the relation between fiscal policy, credit growth and 
property prices (European Commission (2009)). 
Fiscal stimulus measures and their withdrawal 
Fiscal policy played an important role in 
supporting growth in the current crisis due to two 
main factors. (141) First, the financial crisis led to a 
significant tightening of credit conditions and 
increased the share of credit constrained 
households. Second, with nominal interest rates at 
or near their zero lower bound, monetary policy 
was likely to be accommodative of the fiscal 
stimulus, rather than crowding it out – as would 
have been the case in normal times – through an 
increase in interest rates aimed at keeping inflation 
and inflation expectations in check.(142) However, 
while these two factors make fiscal multipliers 
larger, if they persist they would also make the 
cost of a withdrawal of the stimulus higher.  
Table III.6.1 shows the QUEST model multipliers 
for fiscal stimuli in the EU, for the cases where the 
EU acts alone, and as part of a global stimulus. 
The results also represent the expected loss in 
output stemming from the withdrawal of these 
measures. As is clear from this table, the GDP 
effect depends on the instrument used, the 
presence of credit constraints, monetary 
accommodation and on whether the stimulus is 
regional or global.  
In general, GDP effects are larger – and so the 
losses more severe in the case of withdrawal – for 
public spending measures, such as government 
consumption and investment, than for tax 
reductions and transfers to households. 
Temporarily increasing investment subsidies yields 
sizeable effects since it leads to a reallocation of 
investment spending into the period when the 
purchase of new equipment and structures is 
subsidised. Government investment yields a 
somewhat larger GDP multiplier than purchases of 
goods and services. An increase in government 
wages has a larger impact on GDP (but a smaller 
impact on private sector value-added). An increase 
in government transfers has a smaller multiplier, as 
it typically implies negative labour supply 
(141) Roeger, W. and J. in ’t Veld (2009) , “Fiscal Policy with 
Credit Constrained Households”, European Economy 
Economic Paper no.357 
(142) These two factors also mean that empirical reduced form 
studies are less relevant to gauge the effects of fiscal policy 
in the current situation as these studies assess the effects of 
fiscal stimulus in a normal situation. 
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incentives. However, transfers targeted to liquidity 
constrained consumers provide a more powerful 
stimulus as these consumers have a larger marginal 
propensity to consume out of current net income.  
Temporary reductions in value added and labour 
taxes show smaller multipliers, which are nearly 
entirely generated by higher spending of the 
private sector. A temporary reduction in 
consumption taxes is more effective than a 
reduction in labour taxes as forward looking 
households also respond to this change in the 
intertemporal terms of trade(143). Temporary 
reductions in housing tax has little impact for 
Ricardian households, who smooth their spending, 
but a non-negligible impact for credit constrained 
households. Temporary corporate tax reductions 
would not yield positive short run GDP effects 
since firms calculate the tax burden from an 
investment project over its entire life cycle.  
The presence of credit-constrained agents raises 
the multiplier as these agents have a larger 
marginal propensity to consume out of current net 
income. The multiplier increases especially for 
those fiscal measures which increase current 
income of households directly, such as labour 
taxes and transfers, while the increase is less 
strong for government consumption and 
investment. The reason for this is that credit 
constrained households not only have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume out of current 
(143) Note that this assumes the VAT reduction is fully passed 
through into consumer prices. This intertemporal effect 
will be strongest in the period just before taxes are raised 
again (in t+1). 
income but their spending is also highly sensitive 
to changes in real interest rates (see Roeger and in 
't Veld (2009)). This is because the collateral 
constraint requires that spending must be adjusted 
to changes in interest payments. In other words, 
the interest rate exerts an income effect on 
spending of credit constrained households. For 
realistic magnitudes of indebtedness, the interest 
sensitivity exceeds the interest elasticity of 
spending of Ricardian households, substantially.  
An important lesson from this is that it would be 
better if fiscal exit was only commenced after 
credit conditions have returned to pre-crisis levels. 
As long as credit conditions remain tight, and more 
households face a binding collateral constraint on 
their borrowing, the costs of a withdrawal of fiscal 
stimulus remain higher. 
Fiscal policy multipliers are also enhanced by 
monetary accommodation for a fiscal stimulus 
which is likely to occur when interest rates are at, 
or close to, their zero lower bound. Under normal 
circumstances a fiscal stimulus would put upward 
pressure on inflation and give rise to an increase in 
interest rates. With monetary accommodation and 
nominal interest rates being held constant, higher 
inflation will lead to a decrease in real interest 
rates and this indirect monetary channel amplifies 
the GDP impact of the fiscal stimulus (see also 
Christiano et al. 2009, Erceg and Linde 2009). 
Under monetary accommodation, both spending 
and tax multipliers are considerably larger and this 
effect is amplified in the presence of credit 
constrained households.  
 
Table III.6.1: Fiscal multipliers for temporary stimulus 
Without collat. 
constr.
With collat. 
constr.
With collat. constr. + 
mon. acc.
Without collat. 
constr.
With collat. 
constr.
With collat. constr. + 
mon. acc.
investment subsidies 1.52 1.59 2.04 2 2.11 2.63
government investment 0.89 0.91 1.08 1.04 1.08 1.24
government purchases 0.78 0.81 1.03 0.94 1 1.21
government wages 1.11 1.26 1.39 115 1.34 1.46
general transfers 0.2 0.41 0.53 0.24 0.51 0.62
transfers targetted to collateral 
constrained hh. - 0.67 0.86 - 0.82 1.01
transfers targetted to liquidity 
constrained hh. 0.66 0.69 0.89 0.81 0.86 1.05
labour tax 0.22 0.44 0.55 0.26 0.53 0.64
consumption tax 0.4 0.48 0.65 0.49 0.59 0.76
property tax 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.16 0.21
corporate income tax 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
EU stimulus Global stimulus
Note: Effect on EU GDP (% difference from baseline) for a temporary one year fiscal stimulus of 1% of (baseline) GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
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This also has important implications for the 
optimal timing of a withdrawal. As long as interest 
rates remain low, monetary policy is less likely to 
support a fiscal tightening by reducing interest 
rates. An early withdrawal of fiscal stimulus, while 
monetary policy remains at or close to the zero 
lower bound, risks a much sharper contraction in 
output than when the exit is delayed till monetary 
conditions allow room for accommodation.  
Finally, there are also sizeable positive spill-over 
effects from fiscal stimuli. The effects of a joint 
fiscal stimulus (as in the final three columns in 
table III.6.1) are larger than when acting alone. In 
the current crisis there has been a global fiscal 
stimulus with large fiscal packages implemented in 
all G20 countries. If the fiscal stimuli are 
withdrawn at the same time, output losses are 
likely to be larger.  
Summarising, these model multipliers show that 
just as the positive effects of a fiscal stimulus are 
larger than under normal conditions in the 
presence of credit constrained households and 
monetary policy at the zero lower bound, the cost 
of a withdrawal will also be larger if these 
conditions still hold. This shows the risks of a too 
early exit. It indicates that, if a country has 
sufficient fiscal space, delaying the fiscal exit until 
credit conditions have returned to normal and 
monetary policy is no longer constrained by the 
zero lower bound would importantly support 
output. 
However, there are some additional observations 
to consider. First, it is important to be aware of the 
difference between a temporary fiscal stimulus and 
a permanent fiscal expansion. Unlike temporary 
fiscal stimuli, a permanent fiscal expansion (or one 
that is perceived as such) has a smaller multiplier 
and negative long run GDP effect (see section 
III.3). Second, a stimulus followed by a spending 
reversal (144) has a larger impact multiplier and a 
more positive medium-run GDP effect. A reversal 
in later periods has deflationary effects and the 
implied monetary policy response to this will be 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(144) A spending reversal implies that the stimulus is not only 
withdrawn after a year, but the debt increase is reversed by 
a further temporary improvement in the budget balance.  
felt early on. Also, the tax burden does not 
change.(145)  
Permanent fiscal consolidations 
While the previous section suggested that extreme 
care should be taken when determining the timing 
of the stimulus withdrawal, it is clear that in the 
long run significant consolidation is required in 
most countries to bring the public finances to a 
sustainable path. 
Fiscal consolidations of the magnitude suggested 
in the previous chapters are likely to have 
significant effects on output. This section describes 
some stylised scenarios of fiscal consolidations to 
illustrate the potential impact of permanent 
reductions in deficits. In these scenarios the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio is reduced by 1 percent of 
GDP. This is achieved through a permanent 
across-the-board adjustment in spending and taxes, 
roughly proportionally to their respective shares in 
government budget. Given the assumptions on the 
nominal growth rates in the model, this leads to a 
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 
approximately 25 percentage points in the long 
run. Lower debt implies lower interest payments 
and the additional fiscal space created by this can 
be utilised to reduce labour taxes. As this is a long-
run scenario, we assume a standard monetary 
policy response with the central bank targeting 
inflation and the output gap according to a Taylor 
type rule. A sovereign risk premium is included in 
the model, calibrated such that a 1 percentage 
point reduction in the debt to GDP ratio reduces 
government bond rates by 3 basis points. In this 
scenario, with a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
converging towards 25 percentage points, long run 
government bond rates are 75 basis points lower. 
This is in line with the estimates reported in 
Laubach (2009), who finds an increase in interest 
rates on government bonds of between 2 to 6 basis 
points following a 1 percentage point increase in 
the government debt to GDP ratio. (146) Note that 
(145) Corsetti et al. ("Debt consolidation and fiscal stabilization", 
AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2010 forthcoming) make a 
similar point. They also show that with the ZLB constraint 
binding, the reversal must not come too early on the 
recovery path, or at least it must be suitably gradual. 
(146) Note that analysis does not take account of non-linearity in 
the relationship between debt levels and risk premia. For 
very high debt countries, risk premia effects could be much 
larger. See also the discussion in Section III.3.2 and Box 
III.3.1. 
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this risk premium is applied to government bonds 
and does not affect the general level of interest 
rates in the economy (147).  
Graph III.6.1 and Table III.6.2 illustrate the 
model's dynamic transition between the short run 
and the long run for this fiscal consolidation. The 
composition of the consolidation is divided 50–50 
between expenditure and revenue (148). The 
reduction in spending and increase in tax 
immediately lowers output, by approximately 0.4 
percent. Both private consumption and investment 
are negatively affected. But the multiplier is lower 
than for temporary changes in fiscal instruments, 
as the permanent nature of the fiscal consolidation 
is fully credible and leads to anticipation of a 
lower tax burden in the future. As the government 
deficit is permanently reduced by 1 percentage 
point of GDP, the stock of outstanding debt 
gradually declines, and the costs of servicing this 
(147) Some recent evidence for the US suggests that an increase 
in government debt reduces primarily the spread between 
government and corporate bonds. Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) show that an increase in 
Treasury debt held by public leads to a decline in the yield 
spread of AAA corporate debt over Treasuries. It may well 
be that for countries which rely heavily on foreign 
financing of investment, rising government debt could lead 
to a general increase in the country risk premium and 
increase interest rates for both government and private 
bonds. The premium may be particularly large if currency 
risk is increased.  
 
(148) To be precise, the consolidation consists of cuts on the 
expenditure side in transfers and government consumption 
of 0.2 percentage points and  in government investment of 
0.1 percentage points , and increases on the revenue side of 
0.2 percentage points  in labour taxes and VAT, and 0.1 
percentage points  in corporate profit taxes. 
debt also fall. This creates additional fiscal space 
to gradually reduce labour income taxes, offsetting 
the initial increase in taxes that was part of the 
consolidation package. In the medium and long 
run, labour taxes are actually reduced relative to 
the no-consolidation baseline, and this boosts 
employment and output. In the case of a sovereign 
risk premium, there is an additional effect on 
interest rates. The decline in debt reduces the 
interest rate the government has to pay on its debt, 
creating more space for future tax reductions. The 
impact multiplier is similar but in the medium run 
the GDP gains become somewhat stronger. After 
10 years, output is back to baseline level in the 
case without a risk premium, while it is slightly 
above baseline (+0.1 percent) in the case with 
sovereign risk premia.  
 
 
 
Graph III.6.1: GDP effects of fiscal consolidation 
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Effects of fiscal consolidation by composition 
 
Table III.6.2: Fiscal consolidation: permanent reduction of the deficit to GDP ratio by 1% of GDP 
Consolidation 1% of GDP 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2030 2040 2050
GDP_PCER -0.36 -0.2 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.1 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.15 0.29 0.4
EMPLOYMENT_PCER -0.29 -0.17 -0.1 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.43 0.6 0.73
CONSUMPTION_PCER -0.37 -0.02 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.77 1.04 1.23
INVESTMENT_PCER -0.23 -0.34 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35 -0.33 -0.31 -0.29 -0.27 -0.26 -0.24 -0.12 -0.04 0.01
RPREMB_ER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TL_ER 0.52 0.18 0.03 -0.08 -0.19 -0.29 -0.39 -0.48 -0.57 -0.66 -0.74 -1.43 -1.94 -2.32
UNEMPL.RATE_ER 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.1 -0.12 -0.28 -0.4 -0.48
GOV.DEBT.GDP_ER -0.4 -1.44 -2.38 -3.26 -4.11 -4.93 -5.72 -6.48 -7.22 -7.92 -8.61 -14.27 -18.27 -21.07
GOV.BALANCE.GDP_ER 1 0.99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CURRENT.ACC.GDP_ER 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02
Consolidation with 
sovereign risk premia
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2030 2040 2050
GDP_PCER -0.35 -0.17 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.3 0.47 0.59
EMPLOYMENT_PCER -0.28 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.57 0.76 0.9
CONSUMPTION_PCER -0.38 -0.02 0.1 0.18 0.24 0.3 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.99 1.29 1.51
INVESTMENT_PCER -0.19 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.1 0.04 0.13 0.18
RPREMB_ER -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.1 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 -0.25 -0.42 -0.54 -0.62
TL_ER 0.5 0.12 -0.07 -0.21 -0.35 -0.48 -0.6 -0.71 -0.82 -0.93 -1.02 -1.83 -2.41 -2.82
UNEMPL.RATE_ER 0.18 0.1 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.37 -0.5 -0.59
GOV.DEBT.GDP_ER -0.41 -1.45 -2.38 -3.27 -4.11 -4.93 -5.72 -6.48 -7.21 -7.92 -8.6 -14.27 -18.28 -21.1
GOV.BALANCE.GDP_ER 1 0.99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CURRENT.ACC.GDP_ER 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02
Source: Commission services 
 
The impact of fiscal consolidations on growth 
depends on the composition. Graph III.6.2 shows 
the effects for individual instruments on the 
revenue and expenditure side. All scenarios 
correspond to reductions in the government deficit-
to-GDP ratio by 1 percentage point as illustrated in 
Graph III.6.3. It is achieved by an adjustment in 
the respective instrument that equals 1% of 
(baseline) GDP ex ante, in combination with a 
targeting rule for labour taxes that aims for this 
new lower target in the deficit. In the short run, 
labour taxes only compensate for the working of 
the automatic stabilisers and are raised so that the 
ex-post improvement in government balances is 
equal to 1 percentage point of GDP. The 
improvement in government balances eventually 
leads to a gradual decumulation of government 
debt, and the debt-to-GDP ratio declines by around 
8 percentage points after 10 years and by around 
20 percentage points after 50 years. With lower 
debt interest payments there is space for tax 
reductions, and these raise employment and boost 
GDP in the medium and long run.  
 
On the expenditure side, the main difference is 
between productive and unproductive spending. 
Reductions in government investment (productive) 
are most detrimental in the model and show the 
largest GDP losses, both in short and in the long 
run. Transfers are unproductive in the model and 
only serve distributional purposes. Reducing such 
transfers - and lowering distortionary labour taxes 
in the medium/long run - leads rapidly to positive 
output effects in the model. However, it is 
probably not realistic to consider a 1 percentage 
point of GDP reduction in transfers, as this would 
represent a large real cut for spending, 
compromising their political and social aims.  
Government purchases are unproductive spending, 
a reduction in which has no significant output costs 
when compensated by cuts in labour taxes in the 
medium/long run. Lowering government wages 
has a direct impact on GDP as defined by the 
national accounts. But this is gradually more than 
offset by increases in private sector GDP which is 
boosted by the reduction in goverment debt. 
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Short term effects of tax increases depend partly 
on adjustment costs in capital and labour. An 
increase in corporate profit tax has, with relatively 
high adjustment costs on capital, a relatively small 
short term impact but GDP losses build up over 
following years as investment is depressed and the 
capital stock declines. It has the largest long run 
GDP loss of all tax based consolidations. In 
contrast, a consolidation through labour taxes 
yields an initial GDP loss, but in the long run 
labour taxes can be reduced due to the fiscal space 
that comes available as a result of the reduction in 
government debt, and GDP eventually turns 
positive. Taxes on consumption (VAT and other 
consumption taxes) and taxes on housing property 
have smaller short term impacts. GDP falls by 0.2-
0.1 percent below base but gradually recovers and 
becomes positive after 3-4 years.  
Graph III.6.2: GDP impacts of permanent fiscal consolidations 
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Graph III.6.3: Permanent fiscal consolidations: government balance and debt to GDP ratios 
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 Box III.6.1: The QUEST III model
Model simulations are conducted to gauge the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity, using the 
QUEST III model. QUEST III is the global macroeconomic model which Directorate-General Economic 
and Financial Affairs uses for macroeconomic policy analysis and research. QUEST III belongs to the class 
of New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that are now widely used by 
international institutions and central banks and that have become the workhorse of modern macroeconomic 
modelling. These models have rigorous microeconomic foundations that are derived from utility and profit 
optimisation and include frictions in goods, labour and financial markets. With empirically plausible 
estimation and calibration they are able to fit the main features of the macroeconomic time series. The 
QUEST III model has been estimated on euro area and US data using Bayesian estimation methods (Ratto et 
al., 2009, 2010). Different model versions of the QUEST III model have been constructed, each with a 
specific focus and regional and sectoral disaggregation, to deal with the wide range of policy issues in DG 
ECFIN. (1) 
The model version used in this section is described in Roeger and in 't Veld (2009, 2010). It distinguishes
tradable and non-tradable goods sectors as well as housing. The household sector consists of Ricardian 
households, who have full access to financial markets and can smooth their consumption, liquidity-
constrained households who do not engage in financial markets but simply consume their entire labour (and 
transfer) income at each date, and a third group of households that are credit- (or collateral-)constrained, in 
the fashion of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This third group can smooth consumption over time but faces a 
collateral constraint on their borrowing from Ricardian households, depended on the nominal value of their 
housing wealth. Adding collateral constrained households to the model adds important transmission 
channels of the financial crisis into the real economy through higher risk premia and credit rationing for 
households and firms. By disaggregating households into credit constrained and a non-constrained group, 
we can examine the importance of tighter credit constraints on the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal 
policy. The presence of credit constrained households raises the marginal propensity to consume out of 
current net income and makes fiscal policy shocks that directly impact on households' purchasing power a 
more powerful tool for short run stabilisation. It also reinforces the effects from monetary accommodation as 
credit-constrained consumers react even more strongly to a fall in real interest rates which occurs when the 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding. 
Each firm produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties produced by 
other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are monopolistically competitive in the goods 
market and face a demand function for goods. Domestic firms in the tradable sector sell consumption goods 
and services to private domestic and foreign households and the domestic and foreign government, and they 
sell investment and intermediate goods to other domestic and foreign firms. The non-tradable sector sells 
consumption goods and services only to domestic households and the domestic government and they sell 
investment and intermediate goods only to domestic firms. Preferences for varieties of tradable and non-
tradable goods can differ resulting in different mark ups for the tradable and non-tradable sector. The 
monetary authority follows a Taylor type rule when not constrained by the lower zero bound on nominal 
interest rates, while fiscal policy provides automatic stabilisation through unemployment benefits.  
                                                          
(1) See also: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/research/macroeconomic_models_en.htm  
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This section looks in more detail at three financial 
crises from the last 20 years, to extract lessons 
concerning recovery from crises. The examples 
considered all start in the early 1990s. They cover 
the record of Finland, Sweden and Japan. All three 
countries were hit by balance sheet crises, 
following strong booms in the 1980s. The booms 
were all characterised by overinvestment, too 
much lending and asset price growth, leading to 
recessions where strong negative wealth effects 
affected consumption, savings, investment and 
growth due to the severe imbalances in the 
financial and private sectors. While Finland and 
Sweden were able to deal with their balance sheet 
crises via strong government action, in particular 
with regard to resolution of problems in the 
banking sector, for Japan this was not the case. 
The success or failure of the government support 
measures and the consolidation strategies is looked 
at in terms of both fiscal aggregates and the 
trajectory of real output in the years after the crisis 
started. Figure 1 shows that the paths of potential 
and actual output have been different in these three 
cases, with Japan facing a permanent drop in real 
actual and potential growth, Finland facing a 
permanent drop in the level that was not recovered, 
but returning to pre-crisis growth and Sweden 
making up for the crisis by faster growth in the 
short-term, leading to unchanged potential growth 
trajectories over the medium term. This section 
aims to shed some light about what explains these 
different performances in order to gain lessons that 
are applicable to the current economic situation. 
7.1. FINLAND 
Following a boom in the late 1980s, Finland 
experienced an economic and financial crisis in 
1991–94. As shown in Graph III.7.1, real output 
growth fell from over 5% per year in 1988 and 
1989 to -6.0% in 1991, before attaining positive 
growth again in 1994. By the end of the 1990s, 
Finland was growing by 4 to 6% per year and 
estimates of increase of potential and trend growth 
were higher than before the onset of the crisis.  
Graph III.7.1: Key public finance variables, Finland 1988-2000 
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Source: Commission services. 
The Finnish experience in the early 1990s displays 
classic characteristics of an economic and banking 
crisis. It was preceded by high output growth with 
rapid expansions in credit alongside high asset 
price growth, caused by deregulation in the 
financial markets which brought significant capital 
inflows from abroad (Jonung and Hagberg 2005). 
A move to tighter monetary (and to some extent 
fiscal) policy in 1990 to defend a fixed exchange 
rate that was under threat led to a sharp increase in 
interest rates. As Table III.7.1 shows, real short-
term interest rates increased from just over 2% in 
1988 to over 10% in 3 years. A financial crisis 
erupted. The economic situation was further 
undermined by the collapse in trade with the 
Soviet Union due to the political upheaval this 
country was undergoing. As the peg to the ECU 
became unsustainable, a devaluation took place in 
late 1991 followed by a full floating of the 
exchange rate in September 1992 (Jonung and 
Hagberg 2005). 
A move to floating exchange rates and the ensuing 
depreciation and eventually to subsequent inflation 
targeting has largely been credited with the 
recovery. Graph III.7.2, below shows the 
improvement in exports that begun in 1992 with 
the depreciation of the exchange rate. Further, in 
1992 and 1993 wages were frozen in Finland, and 
overall between 1991 and 1994 real wages were 
falling. The move to credible inflation targeting 
enabled wage agreements that reduced nominal 
wage inflation and improved the competitiveness 
of Finnish goods, aiding the revival in exports that 
proved crucial to the recovery and subsequent 
strength of the Finnish economy. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2010 
Graph III.7.2: Exports and the exchange rate, Finland 1987-2000 
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Prior to the financial crisis, the government had 
been running a budget surplus in excess of 5 
percentage points of GDP. By 1993, this had 
turned to a deficit in excess of 8 percentage points 
of GDP, while the budget did not return to surplus 
before 1998. By 2000, the budget was showing a 
surplus of over 7 percent of GDP. 
The effect of the crisis on public debt was even 
stronger, due to substantial bank support measures 
in the form of capital injections also adding to the 
debt. Overall, Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
estimate that the fiscal costs of the measures to 
support the financial system corresponded to 11.1 
percentage points of GDP net within 5 years of the 
start of the crisis – although taking a longer 
timeframe would result in a lower estimate of the 
net costs as some of the gross outlays were 
recouped later. Starting from a debt level of 14% 
of GDP in 1991, government debt peaked at nearly 
60% of GDP in 1994 and remained nearly 30 
percentage points of GDP higher some 10 years 
after the start of the crisis.  
The effect of the crisis on the public finances is 
similar to the early story that we are seeing in a 
number of European countries in the current crisis. 
The deterioration in the budget balance with the 
onset of the crisis was considerable, whether 
measured in absolute or in cyclically adjusted 
terms. The inability of cyclical adjustment to 
properly estimate the underlying strength of the 
economy in the years prior to the crisis, not least 
due to the effect of substantial increases in asset 
prices, was a factor in allowing the economy to 
overheat and in the deterioration in the budget 
balance being larger than estimated by the 
elasticities used to assess the magnitude of the 
automatic stabilisers (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia 
2008). As a result, when the crisis was underway, 
there was insufficient fiscal space to introduce 
measures to fully support the economy when 
output was retrenching. 
Despite negative growth, Finland started 
consolidating early in the recession. Some 
measures were introduced already in 1991, when a 
new government took office. From 1992 several 
austerity packages were introduced (149). By the 
end of 1995, this resulted in annual budget savings 
corresponding to 6 percent of GDP compared to 
initially projected expenditure levels. Further 
consolidation was undertaken under the next 
government which took office in 1995, with the 
added incentive of joining the single currency. 
Additional measures were also introduced in the 
year 2000, further strengthening the budgetary 
position. 
Spending measures 
The immediate impact of the austerity package 
was on spending. Although real total spending 
increased in the early 1990s, there were nominal 
and real cuts to significant components (see table 
III.7.2).  A series of central government spending 
freezes and limits on local expenditure were 
introduced, with varying levels of success 
(Mutikainen 1998, OECD 1996). While total 
spending increased by 15% in nominal terms 
between 1991 and 1994, public investment, health 
and education spending were cut – largely due to 
the pressure put on the municipality budget 
(OECD 1998). In real terms, health spending was 
cut by 7.5% over 4 years, education spending by 
7.9%, while, partly within this total, investment 
spending was cut by 20.2%.  
Changes to the social benefits system too resulted 
in both nominal and real cuts in social transfers in 
kind despite the severity of the recession. These 
cuts were deemed necessary due to the explosion 
in unemployment, which placed stress on a social 
security system designed to support a small 
proportion of the population for a limited amount 
of time. Counterbalancing this effect, there was a 
very large increase of 14.4% a year in nominal 
                                                          
(149) Cyclically adjusted measures show a deterioration in the 
underlying primary balance every year until 1993 and then 
a further deterioration in 1995, despite these consolidation 
measures, possibly due to the interaction with the 
unwinding of the credit boom. 
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Table III.7.1: Overview of Finnish economy before, during and after the 1990s crisis 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
General government balance 5.3 6.8 5.4 -1.0 -5.5 -8.3 -6.7 -6.2 -3.5 -1.3 1.6 1.6 6.9
CA balance 4.0 3.9 3.0 0.2 -2.4 -4.8 -4.3 -4.8 -2.7 -1.8 0.6 0.8 5.6
effect of cycle 1.3 2.9 2.3 -1.2 -3.1 -3.5 -2.4 -1.4 -0.8 0.5 1.0 0.8 1.3
Primary balance 6.8 8.2 6.7 0.9 -2.9 -3.9 -2.6 -2.2 0.6 2.9 5.1 4.6 9.7
CA primary balance 5.6 5.3 4.4 2.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.8 1.5 2.4 4.1 3.8 8.4
Gross public debt 16.7 14.4 14.0 22.2 40.0 55.3 57.8 56.7 56.9 53.8 48.2 45.5 43.8
public expenditure 46.4 44.4 47.9 56.7 62.3 64.7 63.7 61.5 59.9 56.2 52.6 51.5 48.3
of which: interest 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.5 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.8
public consumption 20.3 20.0 21.7 24.7 25.3 24.2 23.5 22.8 23.2 22.3 21.5 21.2 20.3
social benefits 13.7 13.3 14.6 18.2 22.2 23.7 23.7 21.9 21.3 19.7 18.2 17.7 16.2
public investment 3.6 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.5 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.5
total reveneues 51.6 51.2 53.3 55.8 56.8 56.4 56.9 55.3 56.4 55.0 54.2 53.1 55.2
of which direct taxes 16.9 16.6 17.3 17.4 16.5 15.6 17.2 17.3 18.9 18.4 18.8 18.5 21.1
indirect taxes 15.8 15.6 14.9 15.0 14.8 14.5 14.6 13.5 13.7 14.3 14.0 14.0 13.5
social security contributions 11.2 11.3 12.6 13.4 14.4 14.9 15.8 14.7 14.2 13.3 13.0 12.9 12.1
Discretionary policy 2.1 -0.2 -0.9 -2.3 -1.9 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 2.3 0.9 1.7 -0.3 4.6
(based on CA data)
Unemployment 4.2 3.1 3.2 6.6 11.7 16.3 16.6 15.4 14.6 12.7 11.4 10.2 9.8
Earnings (year on year change, employees) 10.6 11.9 9.2 0.3 -5.5 -5.5 1.8 6.3 4.2 5.4 7.5 4.7 6.2
Output growth 5.2 5.1 0.5 -6.0 -3.5 -0.8 3.6 4.0 3.6 6.2 5.0 3.9 5.3
potential GDP 2.1 2.0 1.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 1.1 2.1 2.6 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.0
output gap relative to potential 2.6 6.0 4.6 -2.2 -5.8 -6.6 -4.3 -2.6 -1.5 0.9 1.9 1.6 2.6
trend output growth 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4
GDP deflator annual change 7.6 6.4 5.5 1.5 0.9 1.9 1.6 4.5 -0.4 2.0 3.4 0.9 2.6
CPI inflation 5.1 6.6 6.1 4.1 2.6 2.1 1.1 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.2 3.4
Real interest rates 2.2 5.8 8.1 11.4 12.2 5.7 3.6 1.2 4.0 1.2 0.1 2.0 1.7
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Table III.7.2: Average annual increases in spending - crisis years and recovery 
Share of 1991 
expenditure
1991-94 1994-2000 1991-94 1994-2000
Total spending 100.0 4.9 2.2 3.3 0.0
Health 11.7 -1.1 5.5 -2.5 3.3
Education 12.6 -1.2 4.7 -2.7 2.5
Social transfers in kind 2/ 27.8 -1.8 4.9 -3.3 2.7
Social transfers other than in kind 3/ 32.1 14.4 1.4 8.6 -1.7
General public services & economic affairs 24.3 7.8 0.8 6.2 -1.4
Public investment 6.4 -5.8 4.1 -7.2 1.9
Nominal annual change Real annual change
1) The variables health, education and general public services and economic affaires are based on COFOG-classification, while social transfers and 
public investments are from National Accounts. These variables could be partly overlapping, implying that the individual variable's share of total 
expenditure add up to more than 100%.  
2) Social transfers in kind consist of individual goods and services provided as transfers in kind to individual households by government units.
3) Social transfers other than in kind comprise social assistant benefits in cash (i.e. children allowance, welfare affairs and services), social security 
benefits in cash, private funded social benefits and unfounded employee social benefits. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
investment grew in real terms, taking up an 
increasing share of the budget.  
planning being 
introduced, along with the concept of management 
duplicate functions and enhance efficiency and 
terms on other social spending which includes 
services (such as labour market programmes and 
retraining), resulting in increasing overall social 
support. In all items that saw spending cuts, 
spending grew again once growth turned positive. 
From 1994 on, overall growth in spending stayed 
constant in real terms (and therefore fell as a share 
of GDP) but spending on education, health and 
The delivery of services was also changed, with 
medium-term economic 
by results. The system of central government 
grants to the municipalities was reformed so that 
the grants more closely resembled lump sums and 
were based on objective criteria rather than the 
costs of production. A restructuring of central and 
local government was also undertaken to remove 
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edly at the end of the 1980s, was not 
only maintained at strong levels but was increased 
effectiveness. The costs and levels of employment 
in central government were cut in 1994 and 1995 
as part of this efficiency drive. The crisis also led 
to the introduction of expenditure ceilings for 
central government, although these were marked 
by limited effectiveness in the years shortly after 
the crisis. 
Through both the crisis and the years after, public 
R&D expenditure, which had already started to 
grow mark
while other spending was cut. Furthermore, active 
decisions were made to direct it towards potential 
growth areas in the economy (OECD economic 
survey 1998, Ylä-Anttila & Palmberg 2007). 
Arguably, the transformation of the Finnish 
economy towards high-technology exports is a 
prime example of a Schumpeterian creative 
destruction success story.  By maintaining the 
emphasis on R&D as a promoter of growth, 
Finland was able to emerge from the crisis with a 
rejuvenated production structure. Spending on 
R&D as a share or GDP increased every year from 
the onset on the crisis until the year 2000, when it 
had reached 3.3% of GDP, from a starting point of 
1.8% in 1990. The emphasis of R&D on the 
growth sector of ICT paid off as the structure of 
the economy focused increasingly on high new 
technology (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia 2008).  As 
Graph III.7.3 shows, R&D expenditure as a share 
of GDP increased both in absolute terms and 
relative to other OECD countries, while Finland 
moved away from traditional high capital 
investment. 
Graph III.7.3: Gross fixed capital formation (left hand axis) and 
R&D expenditure (right hand axis) as a share of 
GDP, Finland and OECD 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Finland (LHS) OECD (LHS)
Finland (RHS) OECD (RHS)
R&D
Source: OECD 
Revenue measures 
e time as the modeAt the sam ration in spending, 
income taxes, payroll taxes and consumption taxes 
were increased. This tightening of policy was able 
to keep revenues high despite the devastating 
effect of the recession on the underlying economy. 
Graph III.7.4 shows that the average tax wedge on 
earners at 100% of average wages increased over 
the years of the recession so that by 1995 it was 
considerably higher than in 1989, despite falling 
wages. Over the medium term, this set the scene 
for a return to fiscal sustainability once the output 
gap closed and the economy returned to a healthier 
position, although it meant that Finland remained a 
nomy. 
n came at a time when a 
than before. Post-recession 
curity by increasing the incentives to work 
high tax eco
The Finnish recessio
programme of rationalisation of the tax system was 
underway, in an attempt to improve the incentives 
and enhance the neutrality of the tax system to 
encourage growth. Much of this had to be put on 
hold given the priority of ensuring sustainability. A  
new flat tax of 25 percent for profits and capital 
income was implemented in Finland in 1993 
replacing the old system with high nominal 
marginal tax rates and relatively low effective tax 
rates.    
As a result of changes introduced both in the crisis 
and in the years after, labour incomes and private 
consumption were taxed more heavily by the end 
of the 1990s 
government were therefore able to concentrate 
more on reducing taxes on labour and improving 
work incentives. 1997 and 1998 saw a range of 
measures on the tax and benefit side, with the 
system of taxes, benefits and incomes-related day 
care fees being reformed so that the effective 
marginal tax rates of the unemployed and low-
income households decreased. In addition there 
were cuts in social benefits, transfers to 
municipalities, subsidies, wages and capital 
spending. Part of the aim was to reduce the cost of 
social se
which had become a problem, especially given the 
high proportion of people claiming social 
security(150). In practice this policy led to targeted 
tax cuts to low-wage workers and to the freezing 
of income support benefits such as unemployment 
                                                          
(150) In 1994, the replacement rate for an unemployed couple 
with 2 children able to earn the average wage was 75%, 
rising to 98% if they were long-term unemployed. 
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terest rates – so there 
were indications of some non-Keynesian effects. 
recovery was clearly supported by a 
following years, moderate wage developments 
wa
t 
(both public and private) in R&D, training and 
th was accompanied by 
further consolidation measures with expenditure 
crisis – very similar to the Finnish one. GDP fell, 
benefits and basic income support. Overall, 
throughout the 1990s, the thrust of the policy 
measures was in a growth enhancing direction in 
terms of the composition of the changes and after 
the end of the crisis the government was able to 
focus on this aspect more. 
Overview 
The success of the Finnish consolidation lies in the 
fact that despite serious consolidation measures 
and cuts in spending, Finland was able to reach 
high levels of growth in the aftermath of the crisis 
with real GDP growing by 4.7% per year on 
average between 1994 and 2000. This occurred 
despite the fact that fiscal policy was pro-cyclical 
during the crisis and that some productive 
spending was cut. A partial explanation is that the 
expenditure cuts led, at least in some instances, to 
reductions in long-term in
The rapid 
substantial improvement in competitiveness. This 
stemmed initially from a 30 per cent effective 
depreciation of the currency and from the wage 
freezes introduced during the crisis. In the 
The Finnish economy is credited with having 
undergone a process of fundamental restructuring 
where firms closed and more efficient ones were 
opened (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia 2008, 
Maliranta 2001), while the tax system was changed 
to improve its incentive structure and neutrality. 
Productivity improved markedly due to investment 
in machinery and equipment, while investmen
were secured in the context of comprehensive 
ge policy agreements. 
education contributed to the process (OECD 
1996). There was an emphasis on high-level 
technical education and strong support for higher 
education overall.  
The years of the recovery might also point to some 
of the elements of success of the Finnish economy. 
After 1994, strong grow
remaining constant in real terms and falling as a 
share of GDP. The strong acceleration in GDP 
occurred in the years 1997 with the first few years 
of the upswing being key to reorganising the 
public sector and creating the basis for a successful 
economy. 
7.2. SWEDEN  
In the early 1990s, Sweden faced a deep financial 
Graph III.7.4: Average income tax rates and total tax wedge by type of earner 1989-1995 
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soared by more than 10 
percentage points of GDP in just one year (see 
lume in the late 80s. A tax system that 
favoured borrowing instead of saving fuelled the 
demand for credit (151). Much of the credit 
roperty and equity markets, 
contributing to the creation of a financial bubble 
e growth worsened the 
competiveness of Swedish export sector and also 
                                                          
the budget deficit rocketed to double digits and 
government debt 
Graph III.7.5). As growth returned, Sweden 
imposed a consolidation programme for the period 
1995-1998, leading to the government budget 
balance returning to surplus in 1998 from a deficit 
of over 10 percent of GDP in 1993 and in addition 
a stabilisation of debt. 
Sweden removed the remaining domestic credit 
regulations in 1985. This resulted in a vast increase 
in credit vo
expansion fed into p
(152).  
In the boom period in the late 1980s, both private- 
and public consumption and transfers to 
households were increased. Thus, despite the 
strong upswing, "no marked tightening of fiscal 
policy took place during this period" (153). Strong 
domestic demand pushed the unemployment rate 
down to a level below 2%, putting upward 
pressure on wages. High domestic inflation 
together with the high wag
competition from imports into the domestic market 
increased. The boom was also supported by an 
international upturn. During this period, 
government finances improved rapidly and the 
debt-to-GDP ratio declined.  
(151) Anderson and Viotti, 1999. 
(152) Jonung, Kiander and Varita, 2008.  
(153) Government bill to the Parliament 2000/01:100 Annex 5, 
p8. 
Graph III.7.5: Key public finance variables, Sweden 1985-2000 
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Output growth came to a sudden stop in 1990, and 
turned negative for three consecutive years. The 
main driving force behind the recession, according 
to Jonung et al. (2008), was a strong upturn in the 
 rate. There were several 
factors behind the real interest rate increase. The 
cts. 
ention, 
combined with growing unemployment and falling 
                                                          
real after-tax interest
German reunification pushed up interest rates in 
Europe, and Sweden (which had a fixed exchange 
rate regime in the early 1990s) had to increase 
interest rates as well. Sweden also carried out a 
tax-reform in 1990/91 that favoured savings and 
worsened the condition for borrowing. Falling 
inflation in the beginning of the 1990s did also 
contribute to rising real interest rates.  
Another reason for the recession was a downturn 
in the global economy and international trade. The 
export sector, which already had lost 
competiveness during the boom-period, suffered 
from decreasing demand for their produ
Also domestic demand fell and 
unemployment increased sharply (154). In addition, 
higher real interest rate contributed to a banking 
crisis, forcing the government to intervene to 
prevent a systematic crisis. This interv
output deteriorated public finances.  
As a consequence of the difficulties in the 
economy, the krona came under speculative 
pressure, forcing  the Riksbank to abandon the  peg 
of the krona in November 1992 and allow the 
(154) The unemployment rate increased from 1.7% in 1990 to 
9.1% in 1993.  
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aimed to stabilise 
the central government debt to GDP ratio by 1998 
• It should have a swift effect on central 
nsure 
that the demand was not too hard hit. 
• 
• Public activity (i.e. education, health care and 
holds. 
 
                                                          
krona to float and subsequently to depreciate  (155). 
The competitiveness of Swedish export sector 
improved, contributing to a sharp upswing in 
industrial production. The economy started to 
recover in 1993, but domestic demand was still 
weak and unemployment high.  
After a general election in Sweden in autumn 1994 
a new government took office. It put forward a 
consolidation programme that 
at latest (156). The programme was imposed 
stepwise from 1995, and comprised specific 
measures that were estimated to permanently 
improve the cyclically adjusted balance by about 
7.5% of GDP (157). In 1995, the budget policy 
ambitions were increased. Central government 
debt in percent of GDP was now to be stabilised by 
1996, while the public finances were to be in 
balance by 1998. In addition, the public sector 
deficit should be no more than 3% of GDP in 1997 
(to fulfil the deficit criteria for participation in the 
EU monetary union). In order to control the 
development of the consolidation programme, the 
government carried out half-yearly reviews of 
budget prospects. 
The design of the consolidation programme was 
based on three basic principles (158):  
government debt, but at the same time 
distribute the effect over several years to e
Those with high income should contribute 
most. 
social services) was prioritised above transfers 
to house
 
eform of the budgetary framework was another 
important part of the consolidation programme. 
                                                          
(155) By the end of 1992, the krona had depreciated by about 
15% in relation to the ECU.  
(156) Government bill 2000/01:100 Annex 5, p28.  
(157) In 1996 the Consolidation programme was extended to 8 % 
of GDP. 
(158) Government bill to Parliament 2000/01:100 Annex 5, p27. 
R
The parliamentary period was extended from three 
to four years, to allow government time to carry 
out its priorities. In the Parliament, the Standing 
Fiscal Committee was strengthened at the expense 
of other committees. In addition was Ministry of 
Finance's coordinating role versus the other 
ministries reinforced (159).  Sweden also imposed a 
three-year nominal ceiling on all central 
government expenditures (including investments 
and entitlement programs) except interest 
payments on government debt. The expenditure on 
the old-age pension system presented outside the 
central government budget was included under the 
ceiling. The ceiling was part of a general strategy 
to introduce top-down budgeting (160). 
Furthermore, Sweden decided in 1997 to introduce 
a long-term surplus target as of 1999. 
  
(159) OECD, 1999. 
(160) In 1997 the Parliament started making decisions on the 
budget in two steps. First, the Parliament decide on the 
overall budget space and divides expenditure into 27 
expenditure areas. Then, Parliamentary committees 
considerer the expenditures in each area, before the 
Parliament makes the final decision on the various 
appropriations. 
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Spending measures 
In a study of recent fiscal consolidations Kumar et 
al. (2007) show that expenditure measures put 
forward in the Swedish consolidation programme 
included a reduction in pension and welfare 
spending (including unemployment benefits), and 
cuts across a broad range of spending programs. In 
real terms, expenditure on social benefits was 
slashed on average by 1.3% annually from 1994 to 
1998 (see Table III.7.3, which shows the change in 
general government variables), while public 
investment was cut by an annual average of 3.6%. 
Interest payments were also significantly reduced, 
partly as a result of the successful budget 
consolidation, and partly a result of strong market 
confidence that monetary policy would be able to 
achieve its price stability objectives reducing 
currency risk (161). Overall, total nominal 
expenditure was almost unchanged in the years 
1994 to 1998, and down by an annual average of 
1.3% in real terms. Measured as percent of GDP, 
the general government's total expenditure 
decreased by 11 percentage points, from 70% to 
59%, between 1994 and 1998 (see Table III.7.4). 
Revenue measures 
Kumar et al. (2007) also show that the revenue 
reinforcements in the consolidation programme 
were mainly increases in social security fees, full 
taxation of dividends and capital gains and 
increases in personal income tax rates. As can be 
seen from Table III.7.3, the government income 
from social contributions and taxes increased on 
                                                          
(161) Nominal long term interest rate (yearly average) 
differential relative to Germany decreased from 3.5 
percentage points in 1995 to 0,4 percentage points in 1998. 
average by respectively 3.7% and 4.2% in real 
terms per year between 1994 and 1998. However, 
strong economic growth would have been 
responsible for at least some of the increase in tax 
revenues (162). Even though total real revenue 
increased on average by 2.7% annually in this 
period, revenue in per cent of GDP was slightly 
down from 1994 to 1998. This can be explained by 
the strong growth in GDP (163). 
Overview  
In the real economy, the floating of the exchanges 
rate in November 1992 had a very positive impact 
on exports. There was an effective depreciation of 
over 20%, which strongly boosted exports. Real 
income from exports increased by 62% in the 
period from 1993 to 1998. This amounted to an 
average growth of 10% per year, and was the main 
force behind the GDP growth in the consolidation 
period. Fuelled by improved profitability, lower 
interest rate and gradually rising utilisation of 
capacity, business investment also increased over 
that period (164). However, the development in the 
labour market was lagging behind. In 1998 the 
unemployment rate was still above 8%.  
In a survey on Sweden, the OECD (1999) 
compares the expected effect of the convergence 
programme in 1998 submitted to the European 
Union in mid-1995, with actual outcome in 1998 
(see Table III.7.5). Outcomes were much better 
than anticipated. The revenue-to-GDP ratio was 
(162) In addition has Swedish Government pointed out that tax 
receipts in 1998 can, partly, be regarded as temporarily 
high (Government bill 1997/98:1, p9).  
(163) Average annual growth in real GDP from 1994 to 1998 
amounted to 2.9% per year. 
(164) Government bill to Parliament 1997/98:1, p5. 
Table III.7.3: Average annual  percentage change in general government expenditure and revenue 1985-1998 
Nominal Real*** %-point of GDP Nominal Real***
%-point of 
GDP Nominal Real***
%-point of 
GDP
Total expenditure 8.0 1.0 -0.88 6.7 2.6 1.65 0.3 -1.3 -2.68
   OW   Interest -1.3 -7.7 -0.65 11.4 7.2 0.38 -3.0 -4.6 -0.40
             Consumption 9.0 2.0 -0.14 2.8 -1.0 -0.23 3.8 2.1 -0.22
             Social benefits 10.8 3.7 0.20 9.1 5.0 1.04 0.3 -1.3 -0.84
             Investments 4.2 -2.5 -0.13 8.7 4.6 0.11 -2.0 -3.6 -0.23
Total revenue 10.8 3.7 0.63 0.8 -3.0 -1.69 4.4 2.7 -0.11
   OW   Direct taxes 11.9 4.7 0.44 0.5 -3.3 -0.67 6.0 4.2 0.26
             Indirect taxes 10.4 3.3 0.11 -0.5 -4.3 -0.62 5.9 4.2 0.20
             Social contributions 11.8 4.6 0.27 1.0 -2.8 -0.37 5.4 3.7 0.10
1985-1990* 1990-1994* 1994-1998**
* Former definition, ** ESA 1995, *** GDP deflator 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.7.4: Key indicators in Sweden  1986-1998 /1 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
General government balance /1 -1.2 4.0 3.3 5.0 3.9 -1.0 -7.2 -11.2 -9.1 -7.4 -3.2 -1.5 1.1
CA balance /1 -1.3 3.1 2.0 3.4 2.9 -0.6 -5.5 -7.8 -6.8 -6.1 -1.5 0.0 2.1
Effect of cycle /1 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.1 -0.5 -1.7 -3.3 -2.2 -1.3 -1.7 -1.6 -1.0
Primary balance /1 5.8 10.1 8.5 10.1 8.6 3.7 -2.2 -5.5 -2.9 -2.0 2.1 3.6 5.8
CA primary balance /1 5.7 9.2 7.3 8.4 7.6 4.2 -0.5 -2.2 -0.6 -0.7 3.8 5.2 6.8
gross public debt 60.4 53.3 47.7 42.8 41.2 49.2 62.2 69.9 72.4 72.2 73.0 71.0 69.1
public expenditure /1 59.6 55.8 55.9 56.1 57.0 58.2 63.6 71.7 69.6 65.1 63.0 60.9 58.8
OW   Interest /1 7.0 6.1 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.7 6.2 5.3 5.4 5.2 4.6
          public consumption /1 25.9 25.1 24.4 24.5 25.7 25.3 25.9 28.8 27.8 26.6 27.3 26.7 27.0
          Social benefits /1 17.9 18.1 18.8 18.6 18.7 19.8 21.8 22.2 21.7 20.1 19.3 18.5 18.3
          public investment /1 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.5 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.0 3.1
Total revenue /1 58.4 59.8 59.2 61.1 61.0 57.2 56.4 60.5 60.5 57.8 59.7 59.3 60.1
OW   Direct taxes /1 20.5 22.4 22.8 23.6 22.0 18.5 19.0 19.1 20.0 19.6 20.6 21.1 21.0
          Indirect taxes /1 15.8 16.3 15.4 15.2 16.1 16.5 15.1 16.6 16.0 15.3 15.8 16.0 16.8
          Social contribution /1 13.4 12.9 13.2 14.2 14.6 14.3 13.7 13.0 13.1 12.8 13.8 13.6 13.6
          Discretionary policy /1 0.9 3.4 -1.9 1.1 -0.8 -3.4 -4.6 -1.7 1.5 -0.1 4.5 1.4 1.6
Unemployment rate 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.7 3.1 5.6 9.1 9.4 8.8 9.6 9.9 8.2
earning (year on year change; employees) 9.0 9.6 8.2 9.2 12.8 10.6 5.2 -1.3 -1.8 4.8 4.3 6.4 3.4
Export 33.3 32.8 32.5 32.3 30.5 28.3 28.2 32.8 36.2 39.8 38.6 42.1 43.1
output growth 2.9 3.5 2.7 2.8 1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -2.1 3.9 4.0 1.5 2.5 3.8
potential GDP 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.7
output gap relative to potential 0.1 1.5 2.1 2.7 1.7 -0.8 -3.0 -5.8 -3.9 -2.3 -3.0 -2.7 -1.7
trend output growth 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.7
GDP deflator (annual change) 6.5 4.9 6.3 8.0 8.7 9.0 1.0 3.2 2.7 3.7 0.9 1.5 0.6
CPI inflation 4.2 4.2 5.8 6.5 10.5 9.3 2.3 4.6 2.2 2.5 0.5 0.5 -0.1
real interest rate (short term) 3.1 4.6 3.7 3.4 4.6 2.6 12.3 5.3 4.9 5.0 5.1 2.8 3.8
 
expected to increase almost 2%, while the actual 
increase in revenue was roughly 5% of GDP. Total 
expenditures fell by the expected amount, as a 
result of reduced interest payment offsetting a 
lower than expected decline in household transfers 
and public consumption and investments. In total, 
about 60% of the budget improvement in 1998 
stemmed from cuts in the expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio while 40% stemmed from increases in the 
revenue ratio. 
General government debt fell from 72% of GDP in 
1994 to 69% of GDP in 1998, while the budget 
went from a deficit of 9.1% of GDP to a surplus of 
1.1% over the same period. This improvement was 
due to both the consolidation efforts and the effect 
of a return to strong growth on the public finances, 
which in part was due to low interest rates and the 
depreciation of the krona and achieved despite the 
strong consolidation efforts.  
Consolidation on the revenue side was done 
through progressive taxation, in line with the stated 
aims of the consolidation programme, with 
evidence that "the fifth of households which have 
the highest economic standard contribute with over 
43% of the total budget reinforcements while the 
fifth with the lowest economic standard 
contributed with 11%" (165).  
 
Table III.7.5: Contributions to budget consolidation (% of GDP)/1 
Convergence 
Programme
Actual 
outcome
1.9 4.9
Taxes 1.9 6.3
Capital income -0.1 -1.5
Other income 0.2 0.1
-7.6 -7.6
Households transfers -4.8 -3.3
Other transfers -0.8 -1
Interest payments 1.1 -1.1
Consumption and investments -3.1 -2.2
9.5 12.5
Net primary balance 10.8 12.9
Expenditure
Net lending
Revenue
/1 Cumulative change 1994-1998 as measured in the convergence 
programme and in the 1999 spring bill 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1999. 
 
                                                          
(165) Government Bill 2000/01 Annex 5, p28. 
/1  Former definition in the years 1986-1992;ESA1995 as of 1993 
Source: Commission services. 
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7.3. JAPAN 
Starting in 1991-1992, Japan entered a period of 
sluggish growth. Between 1975 and 1991 real 
growth averaged 4.5% per year, while between 
1991 and 2005 this annual average fell to 1.1%, as 
Graph III.7.6 shows. In 1993, the budget balance 
became negative, reaching a deficit of 5% of GDP 
in 1995-1997, before plunging to over 11% of 
GDP in 1998. For most of the early 2000s, it 
displayed a deficit of about 7-8%, with some 
improvement coming just before the current crisis. 
As a result, gross debt has risen from just under 
70% of GDP in 1991 to around 190% in 2006, 
before the impact of the current crisis. 
Graph III.7.6: Key public finance variables, Japan 1988-2006 
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The Japanese experience can be seen as a series of 
3 recessions in a row, and a combination of 
economic and banking crises. In 1990, following 
some 15 years of strong output growth the stock 
market bubble burst. Over the 1980s, Japan had 
experienced the greatest asset price boom of any 
country post-war. The real estate bubble burst a 
year later, starting a relatively slow but long-
lasting and severe decline in real estate prices. A 
failure to fully resolve weaknesses in the banking 
sector during the 1991–93 recession allowed the 
banking sector to limp on in a state of fundamental 
weakness and left the economy vulnerable to 
further downturns. A full banking crisis erupted in 
1997 when several financial institutions failed. The 
result was a credit crunch in 1997–1998. In the 
third wave, 2001–2003, the banking sector was 
again central to the problems that emerged with the 
economy, necessitating yet another policy 
programme to restore the banking sector by 
writing off debts (OECD 2001). It was only at this 
stage that serious policy measures were taken and 
were coupled with regulatory reform. 
The overall result of the delays in restructuring the 
banking system was particularly high costs. 
According to Laeven and Valencia (2008), the net 
cost 5 years after the start of the 1997 crisis 
amounted to 13.9% of GDP. A longer term 
perspective presented in Spilimbergo et al (2008) 
estimates this net cost to be much lower at 5.3% of 
GDP 11 years after the start of crisis, showing that 
Japan was able to recoup the costs of its support 
measures over the medium term. Nevertheless, in 
comparison with other countries, the burden to the 
government was particularly high. 
The 1991–93 crisis started as an asset price bust. 
Declining consumer confidence led to output 
falling dramatically while the overall situation was 
worsened by the weak financial shape of Japanese 
companies. By 1994-95 there were some modest 
signs of improvement on the back of rising 
consumption and exports, it still only grew by less 
than 1%. 
Monetary authorities responded to the recession 
with cuts in the overnight discount rate from 6% 
1991 to below 2% by 1994; the overnight rate has 
not risen above 1% since 1995. In addition, 
monetary injections were used to provide 
additional liquidity to the market in an attempt to 
stem deflationary pressures. In terms of fiscal 
policy, between 1992 and 1995 the government 
introduced 7 stimulus packages. As Table III.7.7 
shows, by 1996 this had contributed to a loosening 
equal to around 6 percentage points of GDP, based 
on the cyclically adjusted primary balance figures. 
During the same period, real growth in GDP 
amounted to 6.5 percentage points of 1991 GDP, 
indicating that it is this fiscal loosening that was 
primarily responsible for any growth in the 
economy. 1995 saw an acceleration of growth 
which returned to 2.6% in 1996 fuelling optimism 
about the end of the recession, as private demand 
picked up. In 1997, however, the eruption of the 
Asian crisis, a strong contraction in fiscal policy 
and the failure of several key financial institutions 
pushed the Japanese economy firmly into recession 
with negative growth in both 1998 and 1999, 
before staging a short recovery and falling back 
into recession in 2001–2003 with the bursting of 
the ICT bubble which had been a key growth area 
for the Japanese economy in 1999 and 2000  
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(OECD 2001). Nevertheless, as Graph III.7.7 
shows, export growth has been key to the recovery 
from the end of the first wave of recession on, 
despite the fact that overall the exchange rate has 
remained strong compared with its level at the 
onset of the first wave of recession.  
Graph III.7.7: Exports and the exchange rate, Japan 1987-2005 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
The Japanese governments launched a series of 
fiscal packages throughout the 3 waves of 
recession. Table III.7.7 sets out their magnitude 
and composition. The efficacy of these packages, 
the appropriateness of the measures and the timing 
of the expansions and contractions has been called 
into question. Through the use of successive short-
term support package, which included a series of 
temporary measures, the Japanese governments 
were criticised for creating uncertainty and failing 
to increase confidence in an economy that was in 
great need of some, while nevertheless presiding 
over very significant increases in debt.  
A recurrent criticism of Japanese policy involves 
the tightening that occurred in 1997, just as the 
recovery was showing tentative signs of starting. It 
is argued that this recovery was too weak to 
support the retrenchment and this was in part 
responsible for tipping Japan back into recession. 
Given that the retrenchment involved a pre-
announced increase in consumption taxes from 3 
to 5%, it is arguable that the tentative recovery 
itself was driven by fiscal policy boosting private 
 
Table III.7.6: Overview of the Japanese economy before, during and after the crisis (% of GDP) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
0.6 1.5 2.0 1.8 0.8 -2.4 -3.8 -4.7 -5.1 -4.0 -11.2 -7.4 -7.6 -6.3 -8.0 -7.9 -6.2 -6.7 -1.6
CA balance 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.9 -0.2 -2.7 -3.7 -4.6 -5.4 -4.5 -10.6 -6.4 -7.2 -5.6 -7.1 -7.1 -5.9 -6.8 -2.1
effect of cycle -0.6 0.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 -0.3 0.1 0.5
Primary balance 4.5 5.2 5.7 5.3 4.3 1.1 -0.4 -1.3 -1.6 -0.6 -7.7 -3.9 -4.3 -3.1 -5.0 -5.2 -3.6 -4.3 0.8
CA primary balance 3.0 2.8 2.3 1.9 0.9 -1.6 -3.1 -3.9 -4.2 -3.3 -4.1 -5.1 -5.7 -4.3 -5.7 -5.6 -4.4 -5.2 -1.9
Gross public debt 71.4 68.3 68.4 68.1 72.5 78.5 84.6 92.5 100.3 107.1 120.1 133.8 142.1 151.7 160.9 167.2 178.1 191.6 191.3
public expenditure 31.7 30.5 31.1 30.2 31.8 33.6 34.1 35.0 36.7 35.7 42.5 38.6 39.0 38.6 38.8 38.4 37.0 38.4 36.2
OW interest 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4
public consumption 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.4 9.6 15.3 15.3 15.9 16.5 16.9 17.5 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.1 17.9
social benefits 7.4 7.1 7.3 6.9 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.5 8.7 8.8 9.5 10.0 10.1 10.5 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.3 11.5
public investment 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.4 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.3 5.7 5.5 5.9 5.1 5.1 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.3
total reveneues 32.9 32.8 33.8 33.6 33.1 32.1 32.1 31.9 31.6 31.7 31.3 31.2 31.4 32.2 30.8 30.5 30.9 31.7 34.5
OW direct taxes 12.8 13.0 13.2 13.3 12.5 11.3 10.3 9.7 9.8 9.8 8.6 8.3 8.8 9.3 8.0 7.6 7.6 8.3 9.1
indirect taxes 7.9 7.5 7.9 7.3 7.8 7.5 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.9 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.6
social security 
contributions 7.8 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.8 9.3 9.5 9.7 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.4 10.5 10.9 10.4 10.6 10.8
Discretionary policy -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -2.5 -1.5 -0.8 -0.3 0.9 -0.8 -1.0 -0.6 1.4 -1.4 0.1 1.2 -0.8 3.3
(based on CA data) total since 1992 -1.0 -3.5 -5.0 -5.8 -6.1 -5.2 -6.0 -7.0 -7.6 -6.2 -7.6 -7.5 -6.3 -7.1 -3.8
Unemployment 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.1
6.1 7.5 8.4 7.4 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 2.0 -2.0 -1.6 0.6 -1.2 -2.5 -1.9 -0.1 1.4 1.8
Output growth 7.1 5.4 5.6 3.3 0.8 0.2 0.9 1.9 2.6 1.6 -2.0 -0.1 2.9 0.2 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.0
potential GDP 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7
0.9 2.0 3.9 3.9 2.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 0.3 0.6 -2.3 -3.3 -1.2 -1.8 -2.1 -1.5 0.3 1.5 2.8
trend output growth 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
0.3 2.2 2.3 2.6 1.6 0.4 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 0.5 0.0 -1.3 -1.7 -1.2 -1.5 -1.6 -1.1 -1.2 -0.9
CPI inflation 0.7 2.2 3.1 3.4 1.6 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.3
Real interest rates 3.6 3.1 5.4 4.7 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.2
General government 
balance
Earnings (year on year 
change, employees)
output gap relative to 
potential
GDP deflator annual 
change
Source: OECD, Commission services. 
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demand and that the underlying fundamentals of 
the economy were significantly weaker than the 
data for 1996 showed at the time (OECD 1998). 
This explanation, which is disputed by those who 
point to the importance of the Asian crisis in the 
downturn, is consistent with view that a lack of 
consumer confidence and deflation were acting a 
break on demand – the stronger consumer inflation 
in 1997, caused in part by the increase in 
consumption taxes, would have been anticipated 
and fuelled increased spending in 1996 through a 
substitution effect. The assessment at the time was 
based on concern about the unsustainability of the 
fiscal position, particularly given the ageing of the 
population which was already beginning.   
Moreover, in 1997 the government had just 
introduced a Fiscal Structural Reform Act which 
set out the means for consolidating the public 
finances, including an aim to reach a 3% surplus 
by 2005 and introducing caps on government 
expenditure. This Act lasted for 2 financial years 
before being suspended in 1998. As a result of this 
Act and of the structure of the Japanese budgets 
which necessitates the use of a supplementary 
budget to institute any deviations to borrowing or 
spending limits even when caused by the cycle, 
fiscal policy continued to be undertaken on a stop-
start basis. It took until April 1998 before more 
fiscal measures could be implemented once the 
recession set in, thus reversing the tightening that 
had been introduced with the Fiscal Structural 
Reform Act. As was the case during previous 
support packages, the support focused temporary 
income tax cuts and an increase in the expenditure 
budget for social infrastructure (OECD 2001). 
 
For the 3rd wave of the recession, following the 
election of a new government in 2001, Japan set 
deficit targets to be met over the medium term, 
although the worsening economic situation and 
ongoing doubts about the weakness of the 
underlying fundamentals of the economy meant 
that progress, especially on the tax side, was slow. 
By 2006, however, reductions in deficit through 
cuts in investment spending, the reversal of the 
temporary tax cuts and increases in social security 
contributions to help deal with population ageing 
were apparent as the public finances strengthened. 
Nevertheless, the legacy of 15 years of weakness 
was a public debt of some 190% of GDP, requiring 
much more consolidation before it could stabilise 
and begin to fall. 
All 3 waves of the Japanese recession were 
characterised by low business confident, due to the 
weak position of Japanese companies, and 
arguably, by weak consumer confidence as well. 
From after the first wave, deflation added to this 
problem, while concern about the sustainability of 
the public finances (both in the short-term and due 
to population ageing, over the longer term) and the 
solvency of the banking system arguably 
contributed to a reticence amongst Japanese 
consumers and businesses to increase demand, 
thus contributing to the  downturn. 
Spending measures 
The spending measures introduced in the support 
packages rested heavily on traditional 
infrastructure projects, as can be seen in Table 
III.7.7. The projects typically lacked significant 
social returns and resulted in little impetus for 
sustained growth. Between 1991 and 1995, public 
investment spending increased from 4.9% of GDP 
to 6.1%, before beginning to fall until the 1998 
supplementary budget increased it again in 1999. 
Thereafter, public investment spending fell 
gradually as attempts to consolidate focussed, in 
part, on this part of the budget which fell to 3.3% 
of GDP by 2006. 
At the time of the first recession, public investment 
in Japan was roughly twice the OECD average and 
centred on construction projects that supported an 
already bloated construction sector. By increasing 
to support this sector the Japanese government 
have been criticised for not providing optimal 
support to the economy, but rather impeding the 
necessary restructuring and rationalisation of a 
sector in need of reform (European Commission 
2009). Moreover, while investment is important 
for long-term growth, it is not the most timely way 
of supporting an economy in recession as it 
typically takes time for projects to be implemented 
thus delaying support. By increasing investment in 
the support packages but cutting it during the 
consolidation phase, Japan arguably did the 
opposite of what would provide the most impetus 
to its economy over the medium term. 
A significant part of the spending increases was 
introduced through local government, which had 
responsibility for significant parts of the budget. 
Due to the limited control that central government 
had over the spending of local governments, this 
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has led many to question whether the plans set out 
in the economic packages were indeed 
implemented. Posen (1998) argues that a central 
part of the Japanese approach to supporting the 
economy involved planned spending increases that 
were never implemented due to the inability of 
central government to impose spending conditions 
directly on local government resulting in less 
support and stabilisation than the announcements 
by the Japanese government would imply.   
Revenue measures 
On the revenue side, the measures introduced in 
the economic packages were consistently and 
explicitly temporary. In a situation of ongoing low 
consumer confidence a series of temporary 
measures did not seem appropriate to stimulate 
demand (Ihori et al. (2003)), particularly given the 
historical high savings rate of Japanese taxpayers 
at the time. 
Faced with both weak demand and increasing 
concern about an ageing society, the Japanese 
government engaged in a substantial tax reform in 
1994 and subsequent increases in social security 
contributions and healthcare charges to prepare for 
an ageing population.  
Within the constraints imposed by the worsening 
economic situation Japan was able to reduce the 
national corporate income tax  by 3 percentage 
points in 1998 and local corporate enterprise tax by 
1 percentage point, bringing down some of the 
taxes on business which had previously been 
amongst the highest in the OECD. From 2000 on, 
a series of reforms were also imposed on social 
security contributions as the necessity to deal with 
population ageing became more pressing, while 
the temporary tax cuts that had been introduced in 
a series of packages began to be withdrawn. 
Overview 
The failure to resolve the structural problems in the 
banking sector undoubtedly led to problems in the 
economy dragging out for longer than was 
necessary. Rather then forcing a restructuring the 
authorities kept insolvent institutions afloat either 
by not imposing transparency requirements, or by 
merging them forcibly with healthy institutions. As 
a result, this too allowed inefficient firms to 
continue to exist through the provision of cheap 
loans and default forgiveness, delaying any 
necessary restructuring in the economy and 
resulting in a suboptimal allocation of resources to 
more productive firms/industries. 
Japan's recessions and fiscal policy during that 
period are inextricably linked to the high savings 
rate in the country. A high propensity to save has 
arguably made fiscal expansions less expansionary 
than they would have been, while the keeping 
interest rates low due to the high demand for 
 
Table III.7.7: Fiscal measures introduced on a project cost basis (% of GDP) 
General public 
works
Building and 
equipment
Public works 
by local govts. Total
28-Aug-92 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.9
13-Apr-93 2.7 0.8 0.2 0.5 1.6 0.0 1.1
16-Sep-93 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.9
08-Feb-94 3.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.2 1.0
14-Apr-95 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7
20-Sep-95 2.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.0 1.3
24-Apr-98 3.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.9
16-Nov-98 4.7 1.1 0.4 0.0 1.6 1.2 1.9
11-Nov-99 3.6 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.4 0.0 2.3
19-Oct-00 2.2 0.5 na 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.2
16-Nov-01 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
01-Feb-02 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0
30-Jan-03 0.7 0.3 na 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.2
Total 28.2 7.0 1.7 2.2 12.5 3.3 12.4
Total
Social infrastructure investment
Tax cuts Other
Source: OECD. 
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Japanese bonds. This high propensity to save has 
been linked to low levels of social protection 
leading to self-insurance, alongside a realisation 
amongst taxpayers that population ageing has both 
fiscal and personal consequences in terms of 
making adequate provision for retirement.  
Graph III.7.8: Finland, Sweden and Japan exchange rates and 
export shares 
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7.4. KEY LESSONS 
All 3 cases considered in this section deal with 
economic and banking crises following credit and 
asset price booms. These booms were not 
adequately recognised at the time when they were 
happening and nor was their effect on the public 
finances understood. Cyclically adjusted balances 
underestimated the extent to which revenues were 
boosted by the boom, leading a sharp drop in 
budget balances with the onset of the crisis.  
Source: Commission services. 
In all 3 cases, the increase in exports played an 
important role in the recoveries. A weakening of 
their currencies was important for growth as it 
coincided with an increase in exports – as can be 
seen in graph III.7.8 (166). In Japan's case, the 
evolution of the exchange rate did not contribute to 
increasing exports, although these did pick up after 
the recovery starting in 2003.  
The differing experiences of the 3 countries show 
that the amount of time needed for budget balances  
to return to surplus can be very variable. While 
Sweden and Finland returned to surplus before the 
end of the 90s, for Japan this has still not yet been 
achieved. Also, Sweden and Finland had similar 
time horizons of around 7 years until they were 
able to return to surplus despite different 
circumstances – Finland started consolidating 
earlier and was also faced with a deeper recession. 
Finally, the importance of adequately dealing with 
the problems in the banking sector can be seen by 
contrasting the ongoing problems seen in Japan 
with the experiences of the two Nordic countries. 
By not addressing the underlying issues that first 
plunged Japan into recession for over 10 years, 
banking crises were able to return prolonging the 
difficulties faced by the Japanese economies. In Finland's case, the low starting rate of debt 
(below 20% of GDP at the start of the crisis) 
allowed some respite from the deficit problems 
that emerged once the crisis hit. This meant that 
despite interest spending increasing sharply at the 
start of the crisis, it still remained at manageable 
levels and did not lead to the snowballing of debt. 
Nevertheless, debt 10 years after the crisis was 
more than double its level at the start. Sweden too 
had levels of debt (around 40% of GDP just before 
the start of the crisis) that allowed it some leeway 
in its public finances and in this case too debt 
ended up nearly 30 percentage points of GDP 
higher at the end of the decade. In Japan's case, the 
higher starting debt created less pressure than it 
might have done under other circumstances due to 
the willingness of Japanese savers to keep on 
buying Japanese bonds, thus stopping the debt 
financing costs from exploding as debt exceeded 
100% of GDP and started to approach 200%.                                                            
(166) The graph shows the Real Effective Exchange Rate. For a 
further discussion on the role of exchange rates see section 
IV.4. 
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SUMMARY 
Alongside the stability offered by the single 
currency, the financial and economic crisis has 
drawn attention to the macroeconomic imbalances 
that have developed within the euro area. Over the 
last ten years, significant divergences in the 
external economic performance of the Member 
States have built up and this carries contingent 
economic and budgetary costs. Recently acceded 
EU Member States and peripheral euro area 
Member States saw booming domestic demand 
and fast credit expansion, with domestic prices 
increasing significantly. This resulted in large 
increases in unit labour costs and an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, while other countries 
experienced slow domestic demand growth and 
falls in their domestic prices vis-à-vis EU and euro 
area competitors. The onset of the crisis and the 
shrinking of credit that went with it triggered the 
unwinding of external imbalances; as private 
demand fell abruptly, fiscal borrowing replaced 
private borrowing. This has brought into focus the 
consequences of external imbalances and the 
interrelation between the two key challenges of 
winding them down and reversing the increases in 
government debt ratios. The ongoing experience of 
the crisis can provide new evidence and a better 
understanding on the debate on adjustment, 
overheating and overcooling in the monetary 
union, and the role of fiscal policy.  
Section IV.1 describes the budgetary and 
macroeconomic developments in the run-up to the 
crisis. It highlights how rising current account 
deficits and deteriorating competitiveness went 
hand-in-hand with – at least on an ex-post basis – 
loose budgetary policies as countries with booming 
domestic demand typically enjoyed strong revenue 
growth, which was channelled into government 
spending. To the extent that the deteriorating 
current accounts and appreciating real exchange 
rates point to a potentially unsustainable growth 
pattern and inflated nominal GDP, future external 
imbalances can act as warning for budgetary risks 
that are not captured by standard indicators used 
for budgetary surveillance.  The existence of 
imbalances is therefore reason for concern at the 
current juncture, as post-boom periods involving a 
correction in the current account and 
competitiveness imbalances tend to be particularly 
costly from a growth and budgetary perspective. 
 
Given the links between current account and 
budgetary imbalances, there is case for considering 
whether fiscal policy can contribute significantly 
to the prevention of external imbalances. Section 
IV.2 reviews the economic literature on the 
relationship between the current account and fiscal 
policy. It finds that the evidence on the impact of 
fiscal policy on external imbalances is 
inconclusive. Most studies consider the effects of 
budget deficits and government debt on aggregate 
demand. According to the Keynesian approach, 
where fiscal deficits are assumed to result in higher 
domestic, the accompanying increase in imports 
leads to the so-called twin deficits. The literature 
finds some, albeit limited, support for this effect. 
In contrast according to the Ricardian approach, as 
the private sector adjusts its future expectations of 
income in the light of rising public debt and the 
attending debt burden and increases its savings 
accordingly, both output and the current account 
balance are unaffected by fiscal policy. There is 
some evidence in favour of the Ricardian approach 
too, in the literature, qualified by the prevalence of 
liquidity constraints faced by private agents. 
However, alongside the overall inconclusive 
evidence of these macro studies, it is worth bearing 
in mind the possible effect of macro and micro 
transmissions channels whereby fiscal policy can 
affect investment and savings decisions despite the 
fiscal stance being neutral. A thorough analysis of 
non-conventional macro and microeconomic 
transmission channels is required to expose the full 
effect of the public finances on external 
imbalances. 
Section IV.3 considers the possibility of using 
synthetic indicators reflecting fiscal and 
macrofinancial risks in EU countries as a tool for 
fiscal surveillance. Three composite indicators are 
considered, summarising information on budgetary 
risk indicators, macro-financial risk indicators and 
short-term budgetary adjustment rigidity, 
respectively.  The current value of the indicators, 
which measure the position of each country 
relative to the others, as well as their evolution 
over time relative to base-year values are then used 
to provide a guide to the types of adjustment that 
might be or might have been appropriate. In 
particular, used retrospectively, they show that the 
countries that have seen the greatest deterioration 
in their public finances since the onset of the crisis 
displayed high and rising macro-financial risks in 
the years prior to its onset, while the countries 
exhibiting the smallest budgetary deterioration 
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displayed falling macro-financial risks over the 
same period. While these indications are 
suggestive, it should be borne in mind that as they 
follow from the aggregation of the information 
included in the indicators, they do not dispense 
from an examination of the underlying economic 
dynamics.  
The Commission Communication of 12 May 2010, 
entitled 'Reinforcing economic policy 
coordination' recognises the need to expand 
economic surveillance and deepen the analysis 
beyond the budgetary dimension to address other 
macroeconomic imbalances, including 
competitiveness developments and underlying 
structural challenges in order to prevent the 
occurrence of severe imbalances within the euro 
area.  The surveillance will include a scoreboard 
that will indicate the need for action. It would 
encompass a relevant set of indicators and reflect, 
inter alia, developments in current accounts, net 
foreign asset positions, productivity, unit labour 
costs, employment, and real effective exchange 
rates, as well as public debt and private sector 
credit and asset prices. It would appear particularly 
important to detect asset price booms and 
excessive credit growth at an early stage to avert 
costly corrections of fiscal and external imbalances 
at a later stage. This analysis would form the basis 
for the formulation of the recommendations for 
preventive or corrective measures in the Member 
State(s) concerned. 
The coming years will see governments undertake 
consolidations at a time when external imbalances 
will have to be corrected. The effects on output - 
through large multipliers affecting domestic 
demand and revenues - may be sizeable owing to 
credit and liquidity constraints. At the same time, 
very low nominal growth would make servicing of 
accumulated liabilities very difficult. Debt 
dynamics depend on the difference between 
interest rates and growth. In times of 
competitiveness adjustment of overvalued real 
exchange rates, real growth will be low and real 
interest rates high as relative prices adjust, 
resulting in a high snowball effect, especially if 
debt itself is high. 
 
 
Section IV.4 considers the role that changes in the 
real exchange rate and the size of external 
imbalances have played in the success of past 
consolidation episodes. The (quantitative) analysis 
is based on the data and definitions used assessing 
the determinants of successful consolidations in 
Part III. Overall, the analysis suggests that while 
exchange depreciations/devaluations are 
sometimes associated with successful fiscal 
consolidations, this is by no means a regularity. At 
the same time, there is evidence for successful 
fiscal consolidations to be preceded by 
improvements in the external position. Moreover, 
containment of the government wage bill is 
confirmed as instrumental to successful 
consolidations, in line with the hypothesis on the 
importance of microeconomic channels of 
adjustment. 
The experience of a selection of countries is 
examined in section IV.5. Particularly illustrative 
is the case of Ireland, which experienced a long 
boom including very high domestic demand in the 
run-up to the crisis. High public expenditure 
growth and favourable treatment of housing appear 
to have been instrumental to the build-up of 
imbalances. An appreciation of the real exchange 
rate weakened the competitive position in the run-
up to the crisis, while apparently healthy public 
finances were heavily reliant on revenues linked to 
domestic demand. With the onset of the crisis, 
growth turned strongly negative and the 
government balance exhibited a double digit 
deficit. Looking forward, it is important to 
ascertain the effect that government's consolidation 
plans might have on the country's competitiveness 
position. 
 
1. EXTERNAL IMBALANCES SIGNALING UNDERLYING 
BUDGETARY IMBALANCES 
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EU Member States have experienced significant 
divergence in their external economic 
performance. (167) This trend has been particularly 
evident for competitive positions as measured by 
price, wage and real effective exchange rate 
indicators. Recently acceded and peripheral euro-
area Member States saw thriving domestic demand 
and credit booms, with domestic prices increasing 
significantly. At the same time, others experienced 
slow domestic demand growth and falls in their 
domestic prices vis-à-vis EU and euro-area 
competitors (Graphs IV.1.1 and IV.1.2 show 
developments of nominal unit labour costs). The 
dispersion of current account balances increased 
steadily from the mid-1990s, reaching an all-time 
high in 2008, just before the start of the crisis. 
Graph IV.1.1: Nominal unit labour costs– selected euro-area 
countries (2000=100) 
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(167) European Commission (2010c) provides a comprehensive 
assessment of the external performance of euro-area 
Member States since the launch of the euro and reviews 
possible policy responses. 
Graph IV.1.2: Nominal unit labour costs– selected non-euro-area 
countries (2000=100) 
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To the extent that they point to a potentially 
unsustainable growth pattern and inflated nominal 
GDP, external imbalances may signal future 
budgetary risks not captured by standard indicators 
used for budgetary surveillance. In the early years 
of EMU, high revenue growth has generally been 
accompanied by deteriorating current account 
balances and competitiveness, while improving 
current account balances and competitiveness have 
been associated with low nominal revenue growth. 
Graphs IV.1.3 and Graph IV.1.4 illustrate these 
features for euro-area countries.  
Graph IV.1.3: Changes in (i) the current account (relative to EU16 
average) and versus changes in nominal revenues 
(relative to EU16 average) in EMU (2000 – 2007) 
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Both the high level of output growth and its 
composition, which was tilted towards highly 
taxed components such as domestic consumption 
and investment in housing, induced high 
government revenue growth in a number of 
countries. A rising share of the tax base increase 
was due to temporary and unsustainable factors, as 
aggregate demand consistently exceeded output 
and prices and wages increased at the cost of 
deteriorating competitiveness. Domestic asset 
price developments, in particular housing prices, 
also contributed to windfall revenues and were in 
some cases promoted by favourable tax treatment, 
though with large differences across countries.(168) 
The high revenue growth was generally matched 
by consistently high nominal growth of 
government spending. Thus, windfalls stemming 
from high price and wage inflation and booming 
domestic demand were spent. To the extent that 
increases in expenditures more and more reflected 
revenues that turned out to be temporary, 
contingent budgetary risks built up. (169) 
The existing literature is relatively scant on the 
effects of unwinding of macroeconomic 
imbalances on budgetary developments over the 
medium term. Studies tend to suggest, however, 
that post-boom periods which are accompanied by 
the correction of current account and 
competitiveness imbalances may be particularly 
 
                                                          
(168) See for instance European Commission (2009) showing the 
importance of domestic credit growth for government 
finances European Commission (2006) found that large 
revenue growth was to some extent related to the effect of 
entry into the euro area, which in some of the Member 
States led to a large decline in the exchange risk premium 
feeding credit growth and noted that "This effect of growth 
composition, high wage and price growth and booming 
asset prices on nominal revenue growth cannot be 
continued forever as the accompanying deterioration of the 
current account balances and the appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate need to come to an end. At some 
point in time, expenditure growth rates will need to be 
adjusted downward." 
(169) Countries that experienced a long period of high growth 
and inflation tended to spend revenue windfalls, as 
potential growth and estimates of structural revenue levels 
tended to be overestimated. Ex-post downward revisions in 
potential growth estimates put continuous downward 
pressure on the measured structural budget balance, as 
growth declined towards and below its ‘true’ potential. The 
assumptions made about the length of cycles in the filtering 
of cyclical effects from structural effects affect the size and 
risk of such measurement errors. See Langedijk and Larch 
(2010) for an assessment of the effect of different 
smoothing parameters for potential output filtering on ex-
post revisions of cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
estimates. 
costly from a growth and budgetary 
perspective.(170)  
Graph IV.1.4: Changes in the real effective exchange rate (relative 
to EU16 average) versus changes in nominal 
revenues (relative to EU16 average) in EMU (2000 – 
2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Increased uncertainty and the sudden increase of 
risk aversion in international capital markets 
during the crisis forced a rapid unwinding of 
imbalances. Capital inflows reversed and credit 
growth tumbled, reinforcing the sharp contraction 
in private consumption and investment due to the 
revision of growth prospects. As a result, imports 
contracted more than exports and the current 
account deficits were reduced.  
The level of current account imbalances in 2008 
and their change in the period 2008-2010 are 
highly correlated as current account imbalances are 
being halved, on average (Graph IV.1.5 and 
IV.1.6). The adjustment is characterised by sharp 
contractions in domestic demand. The contribution 
of domestic demand to growth in 2008–10 is 
particularly negative in countries that had large 
current account deficits in 2008 (Graph IV.1.7 and 
IV.1.8).(171) Countries outside the euro-area with 
that saw a sharp reversal of capital flows had 
particularly negative contributions of domestic 
demand to GDP growth over that period (the Baltic 
states and Bulgaria). In the euro area, domestic 
demand dropped sharply in Ireland and Spain, and 
to a lesser extent in Greece. 
                                                          
(170) See e.g. Corsetti et al. (1999) and Mussa (2005) 
(171) The rebalancing comes at a high cost in terms of 
underutilisation of labour and capital. See QREA I-2009. 
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However, the convergence in current accounts is 
taking place with only limited rebalancing in price 
competitiveness. In some countries, austerity 
packages included sizeable cuts in public wages, 
and private sector wages and prices are also 
adjusting. Such adjustment occurred in particular 
in Ireland and the three Baltic states. In other 
countries, the fast increase in unit labour costs has 
come to a halt, but reversal has not set in (Graph 
IV.1.1). 
Graph IV.1.5: Level of the current account balance in 2008 vs 
changes in the current account balance 2008-10 – 
euro-area Member States 
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Graph IV.1.6: Level of the current account balance in 2008 vs 
changes in the current account balance 2008-10 – 
non-euro-area Member States 
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In the face of collapsing private spending, 
government expenditure remained stable or was 
increased through discretionary spending, resulting 
in very large budget deficits in the context of 
falling government revenue. Increases in public 
debt effectively replaced those in private debt.  
Graph IV.1.7: Current account balance in 2008 and cumulative 
domestic demand contribution to growth 2008-10 - 
euro-area Member States 
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Fiscal consolidation is particularly difficult in 
times of low nominal growth in a context of 
nominal rigidities. Moreover, the effects on output 
- through large multipliers affecting domestic 
demand and revenues - may be sizeable owing to 
credit and liquidity constraints. At the same time, 
very low nominal growth would make servicing of 
accumulated liabilities very difficult. Debt 
dynamics depend on the difference between 
interest rates and growth. In times of 
competitiveness adjustment of overvalued real 
exchange rates, real growth will be low and real 
interest rates high as relative prices adjust, 
resulting in a high snowball effect, especially if 
debt itself is high. (173) 
Graph IV.1.8: Current account balance in 2008 and cumulative 
domestic demand contribution to growth 2008-10 - 
non-euro-area Member States 
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Note: The grouping differs from graph IV.1.7 to allow an evenly 
distributed grouping as current account deficits tend to be much larger in 
non-euro area countries. 
 Source: Commission services 
The speed and the economic and budgetary costs 
of the adjustment of imbalances will depend both 
on the degree of price and wage flexibility and on 
the ease with which resources can be reallocated 
across sectors in different countries. Adjusting to 
the external imbalances will not only involve cuts 
in production costs and prices. There is also a need 
for a reallocation of demand and productive 
resources between the non-tradable and the 
tradable sector and for changes in relative prices 
between these two sectors. To the extent that price 
and wage adjustment is hampered by nominal and 
real wage rigidities and product prices do not react 
to demand signals, the adjustment process will be 
stretched and may eventually be achieved at a 
permanently lower level of output and higher level 
of structural unemployment.(172)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(173) These effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio can also be 
disentangled as follows. First, the numerator, nominal debt 
is affected by the impact of adjustment dynamics on the 
structural and nominal budget balance (and thus net 
lending) as discussed above. Second, the denominator, 
nominal GDP deviates from potential (nominal) GDP and 
will need to adjust down, as both real GDP and the price 
level are above their potential. The deviation of prices from 
the equilibrium price level is reflected by the overvaluation 
of the real exchange rate. The downward adjustment 
process reduces the denominator and increases the 
nominator, leading to a higher debt to GDP ratio when 
imbalances have been unwound. In fact the direct effect of 
downward real exchange rate adjustment on public 
finances can be considered similar to the nominal 
depreciation of a currency in a country with largely foreign 
denominated debt. Instantaneous adjustment of the 
imbalances would lead to an increase of the debt-level to 
that level. In the case of an immediate price adjustment 
there would not, however, be an effect of adjustment 
through lost output.    
(172) In the extreme case of fully flexible price and wage 
adjustment, there are no output costs to competitiveness 
adjustments. See Deroose et al. (2004). 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AND GOVERNMENT 
FISCAL BALANCES 
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From a policy perspective, studying the 
relationship between the government's fiscal 
balances and the current account balance is crucial 
to assessing whether fiscal policies could help 
resolve external imbalances or contain the build-up 
of excessive current account imbalances. Most 
studies that have examined the impact of fiscal 
policy on external imbalances have approached the 
issue by focussing on the effects of budget 
balances and government debt ratios on aggregate 
demand. The evidence is inconclusive.  
The conventional wisdom that fiscal deficits drive 
current account imbalances relates to the 
accounting identity between domestic savings, 
investment and the trade balance(174). If, according 
to this Keynesian view, fiscal expansions imply 
lower domestic saving, this translates into a current 
account deficit. If a fiscal expansion stimulates 
private consumption, private investment and the 
propensity to import, it supports the so-called twin 
deficit hypothesis. 
Many studies have found evidence of the twin 
deficit hypothesis, although the magnitude of the 
correlation differs. In most of them the link is 
found to be affected by the level of development of 
the country, its trade openness and the economic 
cycle. The twin deficits hypothesis if often tested 
via the relationship between fiscal policy and the 
real equilibrium exchange rate (REER), on the 
basis  that a fiscal expansion/consolidation would 
induce REER appreciation/depreciation that in turn 
should further negatively/positively affect the 
current account balance. Kumhof and Laxton 
(2009) and Beestma and others (2008) find 
significant supportive evidence for the twin deficit 
hypothesis. With respect to REER response to 
fiscal expansion, Beestma and others (2008) and 
Benetrix and Lane (2009) find evidence of REER 
appreciation, in contrast with the findings of 
Monacelli and Perotti (2007) which point to REER 
depreciation.  
(174) (X -M) = (S - I ) + (T -G). According to this identity current 
account (X-M) is equal to the government budget balance 
(T-G) plus the difference between private domestic saving 
and private investment (S-I). 
A second set of studies focuses on inter-temporal 
consumption preferences and the role of 
expectations. Under the hypothesis that Ricardian 
equivalence holds, a fall in public saving would be 
offset by the increase in private saving, leaving 
output and the current account balance unchanged. 
This result depends on the share of liquidity 
constrained agents present in the economy and on 
households' perceptions of future fiscal policy. In 
particular, Kim and Roubini (2008) and Nickel and 
Vansteenkiste (2008) find evidence supporting of 
Ricardian equivalence.  
 In looking at the determinants of current account 
developments, several studies find fiscal policy to 
have a negligible role compared to other factors 
such as productivity and output shocks. The weak 
impact of macro-fiscal policy on the current 
account balance is also emphasized in recent 
studies of the developments in Greece, Ireland and 
Spain. In particular Bitzis and others (2008) and 
Cardoso and Domenech (2008) find that current 
account deficits were mainly driven by private 
investment and capital inflows coupled with 
competitiveness lags, while current uncertainty and 
precautionary saving account for the more recent 
reversal of current account trends. 
Overall, the key issue appears to be the extent to 
which changes in the fiscal stance are offset by 
private sector decisions, as households and firms 
discount the future changes in taxes and 
expenditures that will be necessary for the 
government to respect the inter-temporal budget 
constraint.  
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Table IV.2.1: Overview of literature on the relation between fiscal policy and the current account balance 
Policy 
implications:
Reference Data, Sample and 
Methodology
Fiscal Variables Main channels and determinants Long-run effects
Abbas Hagbe Fatas 
Mauro and Velloso 
(2009)
VAR, panel data (95-
07) for 124 countries
+ gov.consumption 
(1% of GDP in real 
terms)
CA balance deterioration is caused by higher imports and 
stronger demand. The relationship is stronger in countries 
more open with respect to trade and financial transactions. 
There is a slower effect in advanced economies compared 
to developing countries (0,2 vs 0,3 of fiscal consumption 
increase). Large Changes in CA position are found to be 
weakly correlated with fiscal policy shocks.
More persistent effects in emerging 
countries and in economies above 
potential probably due to higher 
share of liquidity constrained 
agents and a larger demand for 
imports.
Kumhof and Laxton 
(2009)
macro-simulation 
models calibrated on 
US and on a general 
small economy.
1 dollar tax-cut Fiscal stimuli produce a rise in the saving-investment gap 
triggered by an increase in private consumption. The 
hypothesis of households' ricardian behaviour is rejected. 
In the short run fiscal stimuli raises the current account 
deficit by 0.5 dollar.
From 0.75 to 1 dollar of fiscal 
deterioration turns in CA deficits for 
US and small open economy 
respectively [explain better]
Benetrix and Lane 
(2009)
VAR, EMU 11 (except 
LU)
+ gov.spending 
(different sources)
Gov.spending leads to increasing demand in the non-
tradeable sector leading to REER appreciation and a loss 
in competitiveness for tradeables. Among government 
spending, public investment ise found to have the 
strongest impact on C.A. and REER appreciation.
Maximum C.A. reaction after 2 
years from the fiscal shock. REER 
changes persist longer.
Beetsma Roel 
Giulodori and 
Klaasen (2008)
EU 14,VAR data 1970-
2004
+ gov.spending (1% 
of GDP)
Current Account deterioration is due to rises in output 
triggered by government spending. Income effect leading 
to higher imports plays a key role. Trade balance 
deteriorates by 0.5 % of GDP after 1 year and 0.8 percent 
of GDP after 2 years.
REER appreciation appears with 
some delay but persists longer. It is 
likely to be due to increases in 
wages.
Monacelli and Perotti 
(2007)
VAR, 
UK,USA,CAN,AUS 
data 1973/74-01
 + government 
spending (1% of GDP 
in real terms)
Fiscal expansions drive higher consumption and trade 
balance deterioration in AUS and UK (0.6% of GDP) and 
to a lesser extent in CAN. In US the trade balance effect is 
much smaller. When government spending is deflated on 
the basis on its own deflator trade balance improves. 
REER tends to depreciate in all countries except CAN.
US trade balance goes back 
almost immediately to trend and in 
the long term shows an 
improvement.  
Kennedy and Slok 
(2005)
panel regressions, 14 
OECD countries data 
1982-2003
budget balance (1% 
increase)
Budget balance deterioration is found to be coupled with 
current account deficit via saving-investment channels.
The paper analyses the role of how 
structural reforms affect the current 
account position. Labour market 
reforms are expected to improve 
the current account balance 
through devaluation .  Product 
market reforms and financial 
market reforms are expected to 
negatively affect the current 
account by increasing imports and 
investment respectively. Empirical 
tests confirm the theoretical 
framework although the coefficients 
are not always significant and the 
impact is rather limited.
Mohammadi (2004) panel regression, 63 
countries data 1975-98
government spending 
(1% of GDP)
Saving-investment gap translates into higher current 
account deficit. Weaker effect for developed countries (0-
0.26). Higher effect if gov.spending is bond financed (0.22-
0.50 in advanced countries). Symmetrical movement 
between budget balance and current account. 
Twin Convergence (Twin Deficit Hypothesis)
Similar results: Nomandin (1999) Debelle Faruqee (1996) Baxter (1995) Andersen (1990) Roubini (1988) Bernheim (1988) 
Fiscal consolidation can help close the gap between saving and investment in order to achieve a reduction in the 
current account deficit. In countries facing external imbalances, fiscal expansion may accentuate external troubles.
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Policy 
implications:
Reference Data, Sample and 
Methodology 
Fiscal Variables Main channels and determinants Long-run effects
Kim and Roubini 
(2008)
VAR, US budget balance (1 % 
of GDP  increase)
Concerns over long-term debt sustainability following fiscal 
expansions lead to higher interest rates. This causes 
investment crowding-out and to some extent higher 
saving, explained by partial Ricardian behaviour. The 
results is a small C.A surplus. On the exchange rate side 
a budget deficit drives nominal and real depreciation 
caused by the fall in private consumption and output. 
Nevertheless with respect to a general assessment of 
fiscal policy impact, twin divergences are found to be 
largely due to output shocks rather than fiscal shocks. 
Nickel and 
Vansteenkiste (2008)
panel regression 
controlled for different 
government debt 
thresholds, 22 
Industrial countries, 
data 1981-07
budget balance Government debt influences private sector expectations 
(behaviour exhibits Ricardian effects).  Fiscal stimulus 
translates in significant (0.61) C.A. deficits in low debt 
countries (debt < 40% of GDP) where concerns over debt 
sustainability are lower; small C.A. deficits (0.15) are 
expected in medium debt countries (44%<debt<90%), 
while in high debt countries (debt > 86%) fiscal expansion 
leads to current account surpluses (-0.2)  by crowding out 
investment and by increasing households' saving rate.
Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996)
New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics 
Model  (Inter-temporal 
Model)
 + government 
spending
Following higher government expenditure, Ricardian 
behaviour induces households to decrease consumption 
against the backdrop of expected future tax hikes. Falls in 
public saving are offset by increases in private saving. 
Since the demand for money is assumed to depend on 
private consumption, a fall in consumption leads to a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, as well as of 
the real exchange rate as prices are assumed to be sticky. 
Only small current account deficits can be expected in the 
short-run following fiscal expansions.
No effect on CA
Similar Results:
Policy 
implications:
Reference Data, Sample and 
Methodology 
Fiscal Variables Main channels and determinants Long-run effects
Ahearne, Schmitz 
and Von Hagen 
(2009).
OLS regression, EU15 budget balance Budget balances have a limited role in the current EU 
external imbalances. A rise in the fiscal balance by one 
percent of GDP raises the trade balance with respect to 
the euro area countries only by 0.04 percent of GDP. Even 
for Portugal, where fiscal balance amounted to -5.4 
percent of GDP in 2005, at most half a percentage point of 
total trade deficit of 12.5 percent was explained by the 
budget deficit.
Financial market integration and 
lower risk premia following the Euro 
introduction have stimulated capital 
inflows in economies with relatively 
lower capital endowments leading 
to CA deficit.
Cardoso and 
Domenech (2008) 
Preliminary
DGE Model Small 
Open Economy
+ gov.consumption 
(1% of GDP)               
+ public Investment, 
(1% of GDP)               
-  labour taxes(1% of 
GDP)
Private saving changes are only partially due to fiscal 
policy shocks. Ricardian equivalence holds only partially. 
Nevertheless even including a larger share of non-
Ricardian consumers, no evidence of substantial C.A. 
deterioration is found. In the model the share of the private 
saving decrease is almost totally offset by the decrease in 
private investment due to asset price dynamics (Tobin's 
q).  
C.A. development is better 
explained by output shocks, 
uncertainty, investment decision, 
precautionary saving.
Bitzis Paleólogos 
and Papazoglou 
(2008).
VAR analysis, Greece 
data 1995-06
budget balance Oil prices and freight costs are important determinants in 
the short-term. Budget Balance has just limited impact. 
Nevertheless fiscal consolidation is considered important 
in addressing the competitiveness problem because it 
may lead to REER depreciation.
C.A. deficits can be explained by 
several factors. IEMU accession 
made the problem of price 
competitiveness wore since 
inflation has been persistently 
above euro area average. 
Furthermore REER appreciation 
has been amplified by the 
decrease in risk premia following 
EMU which has driven large 
investment inflows into the Greek 
economy. The consequent high 
internal demand has also driven 
increases in imports.
Fiscal policy has no impact on the Current Account deficit, particularly in the long-run. Relying on fiscal consolidation 
to reduce external imbalances is misleading. Nevertheless, in case of concerns over the country's external position 
fiscal consolidation may be welcomed to induce REER devaluation and to restore investors' confidence in order to 
avoid massive capital flight. 
The causes of external imbalances have to be found in the medium-term interlinkages between different variables, 
other than fiscal policy which has negligible direct impact on the external position. Its indirect role in affecting some 
of the determinants of current account variation cannot be excluded.  
Twin Divergence: Limited role both for the fiscal balance and Ricardian equivalence (especially in the long-run)
 Ahmed (1987)
Twin Divergence: Ricardian Equivalence as main driver
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Bussière Fratzcher 
and Muller (2005) 
panel regression, 21 
OECD countries data 
1960-03
- cyclically adjusted 
primary balance (1% 
of GDP)
Productivity shocks rather than budget balance are found 
to be the main channel affecting investment and C.A. 
Productivity shocks lead to C.A. deficit by increasing the 
inflows of foreign investment and by raising the share of 
imports through the income effect.  Short-term effect of 
budget balance may not be excluded depending on 
composition of fiscal shocks .
Primary balance found to have a 
very limited role in C.A. 
deterioration.
Reference Data, Sample and 
Methodology
Fiscal Variables Main channels and determinants Long-run effects
Corsetti and Muller 
(2006)
VAR, AUS, CAN, US, 
UK data 1980-06
+ government 
spending (1% of 
GDP)                     + 
budget deficit (1% of 
GDP)
For economies that are not very open to trade and for 
shocks that are not too persistent, fiscal expansions have 
no effect on the C.A. and could even induce a trade 
surplus by crowding out domestic investment. In more 
open economies the rise in domestic sector prices attracts 
more investment. UK, CAN (open economy) show trade 
balance deterioration by 0.5 and 0.17. No deterioration for 
US and AUS (relatively closed economy)
Cavallo (2005) two countries general 
equilibrium model
+ government 
expenditures in 
goods, gov 
expenditures in non-
traded labour services
Expenditure in non-tradeable labour services has a limited 
impact on the trade balance. Since over time gov. 
spending has been found to be increasingly concentrated 
on the non-tradeable sector the overall effect of 
gov.consumption has a small effect on the C.A. deficit
Chinn and Prasad 
(2000)
OLS regression panel, 
set of industrial and 
developing countries, 
1971-95 data
budget balance (1% 
increase in budget 
balance)
Saving and investment gap is the main determinant. Fiscal 
consolidation leads to C.A.  improvement by reducing this 
gap. Nevertheless such a relationship is not always 
significant for industrial countries. In the latter the initial 
stock of Net Foreign Assets is positively correlated with 
the C.A. Balance.
 
No clear findings over twin divergence/convergence depending on countries' state of development, openness, type of government 
Similar studies emphasising no link between the budget deficit and C.A.: Erger Guerrieri and Gust (2005) Gruber and Kamin (2005) Kalhid and Guan (1999) Dewald 
and Ulan (1990) 
(1) On 26 November 2009, the European Commission organised a conference on 'External Imbalances and Public Finances'.  The presentations and 
papers mirrored the existing literature in that they did not provide conclusive evidence on either the short or long-run relationship between fiscal policy 
and current account imbalances, although a wide range of models and possible effects were presented leading a rich debate. The complexity of 
interlinkages between fiscal policy, saving and investment, and the difficulties to capture it with conventional econometric and model based analyses, 
was stressed in the panel discussion.   
 
                                                          
There are, however, macro- and microeconomic 
transmission channels of fiscal policy to saving 
and investment imbalances that are not evident 
from analyses limited to budget balances and debt 
developments. Fiscal policies can affect savings 
and investment behaviour despite being neutral 
with respect to the deficit and debt. A thorough 
analysis of non-conventional macroeconomic and 
microeconomic transmission channels is required 
to expose the full effect of the public finances on 
external imbalances. 
As regards macro transmission channels that are 
not captured, inflation dynamics and revenue 
windfalls due to credit booms may play a non-
negligible role. As government revenue windfalls 
– such as those stemming from the credit bubble – 
are spent, the budget balance remains unaffected 
while aggregate demand and output are stimulated. 
This is because the short-term multiplier effect of 
government spending is greater than that of an 
equivalent increase in taxation.(175) (176)  
The increase in aggregate demand may lead to 
higher inflation and wage growth. High inflation 
reduces the real interest rate and raises nominal 
GDP directly, leading to lower debt and deficit 
ratios while the underlying and unobservable fiscal 
position deteriorates with competitiveness 
imbalances. The low real interest rates also feed 
the credit boom, providing further windfall 
revenues and inflationary pressures, reinforcing the 
(175) Government expenditure has a direct impact on aggregate 
demand while only a proportion of the increase in revenues 
actually affects aggregate demand (as the private sector 
also saves). When consumers are Ricardian, the existence 
of liquidity and credit constrained households adds to the 
expansionary effect of a permanent increase in spending.   
(176) Criticism of the balanced budget multiplier theorem mainly 
regards the distortionary effect of tax increases on 
consumption and investment demand of private agents. 
However, in the case at hand, the revenue increases are 
generally not accompanied by tax increases but can be 
characterised as windfall gains.     
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph IV.2.1: Fiscal policy and current account balances: macro and micro linkages 
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Note: Dotted lines represent micro-channels. 
Source: Commission services. 
dynamics. The reverse dynamics occur when low 
wage and price inflation and revenue shortfalls 
lead to deteriorating budget balances, requiring 
additional consolidation measures.(177) 
corporate profits and housing revenues, feeding a 
virtuous or vicious cycle.  
The ongoing reversal in countries with the largest 
imbalances provides scope for further analysis on 
the full set of transmission channels by which 
fiscal policy affects the build-up and unwinding of 
current account imbalances. 
Further, micro effects and incentives on the 
revenue and expenditure side that affect private 
sector savings and investment behaviour are not 
typically captured by studies on the impact of 
fiscal policy on external imbalances. For example, 
increases in public wages and employment may 
contribute to private sector wage developments 
and may feed credit booms (mortgages and house 
prices) and inflation. Housing subsidies, as well as 
tax measures (e.g. mortgage deductibility) 
contribute to the transmission of fiscal policy to 
credit and construction booms, wealth effects and 
saving and investment behaviour. In turn these 
affect inflation and windfall revenues through 
  
(177) Deroose et al. (2004), “Reviewing adjustment dynamics in 
EMU:  from overheating to overcooling” use an illustrative 
model of adjustment dynamics to show that the interaction 
between real exchange rate adjustment and real interest rate 
developments may contribute to periods of overheating and 
overcooling during which output might be either above or 
below long-run potential for an extended period, leading to 
external imbalances. 
3. MACRO-FINANCIAL AND (CONTINGENT) FISCAL RISKS - 
AN ANALYSIS WITH COMPOSITE INDICATORS 
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In the previous sections, the complex linkages 
between budgetary and broader macroeconomic 
developments were discussed with particular focus 
on external imbalances, suggesting that large 
macroeconomic imbalances reflect contingent 
budgetary risks. Fiscal policy and fiscal 
surveillance requirements need to be differentiated 
across countries by gathering more information on 
fiscal risks and vulnerabilities. The set of possible 
indicators is very wide. This section proposes new 
synthetic indicators reflecting fiscal and macro-
financial risks in the EU countries.(178) These 
indicators are then used to asses developments in 
macro-financial and fiscal risk in EU Member 
States over the past decade.   
3.1. SELECTING AND GROUPING RISK 
INDICATORS 
We identify three groups of indicators (Table 
IV.3.1):  
(i) Budgetary risk indicators reflect risks related to 
actual and projected sovereign financing needs. 
The indicators include the level of government 
debt, government debt-to-GDP falling due over a 
24-month horizon, the implicit interest rate on 
sovereign debt (to capture the history of the 
country as a sovereign debt issuer) and the gap to 
the primary balance that would lead to debt 
converging to 60% GDP by 2020. (179)  
(ii) Macro-financial risk indicators reflect risks 
which, if they materialized, would put pressure on 
the fiscal position and imply a sudden increase in 
fiscal financing needs. They stem from financial 
sector exposure, as well as external and domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances. The effects can be 
direct on revenues, expenditures and debt or 
indirect through denominator effects. The list of 
indicators includes external debt falling due over a 
24-month horizon, the current account balance, 
credit to the private sector, a competitiveness 
index. The share of construction in GDP is added 
as an indicator of a housing boom, inflated 
(178) The work presented here builds on the work presented in 
European Commission (2009). 
(179) Contingent liabilities, e.g. related to the financial sector, 
have not been included since they are better reflected in the 
macro-financial risk indicators.  
measurement of potential GDP and structural 
adjustment needs. The level of GDP per capita is 
used as a proxy of potential growth and catching 
up (low GDP level is here considered as a risk-
reducing factor).  
(iii) Indicators measuring short-term budgetary 
adjustment rigidity reflect the difficulties to raise 
revenues or cut expenditures, or to cover financing 
needs by using liquid assets. Countries with a high 
revenue-to-GDP ratio relative to their level of 
development, a large share of non-discretionary 
spending in total spending, sharply increasing 
expenditures in the medium run due to ageing 
populations, poor institutions and governance and 
with fewer liquid government assets, can be 
expected to face more difficulties mobilising 
resources when needed and have a larger risk of 
not meeting required budgetary adjustment plans. 
The indicators are selected from a much larger 
group of potential indicators. To the extent 
possible, overlap has been minimised as many 
indicators reflect similar risks. Indicators that were 
considered but not included are, inter alia, headline 
budget balance (captured by primary balance and 
interest expenditures), cyclically adjusted budget 
balance, absorption-adjusted budget balance 
(captured by current account), tax volatility and 
risk of shortfalls based on historical ratios (largely 
covered by current account, construction to GDP), 
revenue share from corporate and housing taxes 
(deviation from moving average), interest 
expenditure to government revenue, potential 
growth (proxied by GDP/capita considering pro-
cyclicality of potential growth indicators), inflation 
(as it gives mixed signals: high inflation may point 
to overheating pressures and loss of 
competitiveness on the one hand, but also helps 
reducing debt/GDP if it stems from 
undervaluation), indicators of labour market and 
wage flexibility; deviation of the REER (captured 
by current account); reserve coverage of short-term 
foreign currency debt (data limitations and mixed 
signals as euro area countries have no reserves but 
may have large foreign currency debt in the 
financial sector balance sheets), foreign currency 
public debt to GDP (data limitations), sectoral 
diversity or specialisation, distance to the medium-
term budgetary objective, deviation from the debt 
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stabilising primary balance, parallel economy 
index, economic freedom index, net external debt, 
net government debt, government financial assets 
in addition to liquid assets, contingent liabilities to 
the non-financial sector (covered by indicators of 
private sector credit and maturing external debt), 
track record in meeting budgetary plans. Indicators 
of long-term (i.e., beyond 2020) risks due to 
ageing are not included, since they do not reflect 
short- to medium-term sovereign financing needs 
but signal the need to reform age-related 
entitlements.  
A number of elements must be kept in mind when 
interpreting results and drawing policy 
conclusions. To a certain extent, the indicators 
reflect different risks for euro-area versus non-
euro-area countries, or for highly developed 
countries versus catching-up economies. Also, the 
macro-financial indicator includes both risks 
related to competitiveness and real imbalances, 
and risks related to the leverage in the economy 
and financial sector exposure. Identification of the 
policy action to address the underlying source of 
risk will require a careful analysis of the reason 
behind a high value of the risk indicator.  
3.2. DEVELOPING COMPOSITE RISK 
INDICATORS 
To summarize information, we calculate composite 
indicators. The broadening of fiscal surveillance 
implies taking into account a very large amount of 
information – for the present exercise, and for only 
one year, over 400 data series are considered. 
Composite indicators are very useful to summarise 
such abundant information and help making a first 
screening of country risks. They also facilitate 
comparisons across countries: assessing relative 
positions based on two or maximum three 
dimensions is easier than on an undefined number 
of possible indicators. The exercise is, however, 
subject to criticisms. By selecting a set of 
indicators and excluding others and by aggregating 
different types of risks in composite indicators, 
some information is lost. Simplifying assumptions 
have to be made on the relative importance of the 
different risk indicators. In absence of a strong 
theoretical base regarding the weights of each 
indicator, each indicator is given equal weight in 
the composite indicator.  
 
Table IV.3.1: List of indicators of budgetary risk, macro-financial risk and budgetary adjustment rigidity 
Budgetary risk indicators Rationale
Public debt/GDP Default risk; market saturation; crowding out
Implicit interest rate on gov. debt History as a sovereign debt issuer 
Maturing debt/GDP, in year t and t+1 Short term borrowing needs
Primary balance gap to 60% debt by 2020 Short term borrowing needs; debt prospects
Macro-financial risk indicators Rationale
Current account /GDP Proxy for REER and excess demand (revenues)
Private sector credit indicator Balance sheet risks for the private sector
Maturing external debt/GDP in t and t+1 Exposure to capital account crisis
Construction to GDP Risk of inflated potential growth, credit bubble
Global competitiveness index Attractiveness of foreign capital
GDP/capita Proxy for catching up potential
Short term budgetary adjustment rigidity Rationale
Revenues/GDP (adjusted for GDP/capita) Margin for tax increases
Expenditure inflexibility (composition) (1) Ability to rapidly cut expenditure
Increase in cost of ageing by 2015 /GDP Short term pressure on expenditure
Liquid government assets/GDP (2) Readily available financing in case of stress 
Fiscal governance indicator (3) Ability to set and meet budgetary targets
Institutions indicator (4) Reform and consolidation implementation risks 
(1) I.e. transfers other than in kind and interest expenditures over total expenditures; (2) i.e. general government currency and deposits to GDP; (3) 
Composite indicator taken from Public Finance Report 2009 based on 5 subindices (expenditure rules,  MTBFs, budgetary procedures, public 
procurement transparency and transperency of government policy); (4) Subindex on institutions in the WEF global competitiveness index, based on 
subindices corresponding, inter alia, to property rights, diversion of public funds,  public trust of politicians, judicial independence, favoritism in 
decisions of government officials, wastefulness of government spending, burden of government regulation, efficiency of legal framework, 
transparency of government policymaking, reliability of policy services and strength of auditing. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Two simple scoring approaches have been used as 
described in Box IV.3.1. (180) Since the results 
obtained do not differ significantly between the 
two approaches, only those from the first, main 
approach are presented below. (181)  
regards (i) the time profile of consolidation, (ii) the 
composition of measures, in particular when faced 
with external imbalances and competitiveness 
challenges and (iii) the need for reforms and 
strengthening of budgetary frameworks and 
institutions in countries with risks of limited 
budgetary adjustment capacity. Countries with a 
high score on fiscal risks, especially if combined 
with high macro-financial risks, would need 
strongly frontloaded consolidation. The type of 
measures should take account of macroeconomic 
risks and imbalances. Countries with high 
indicators of macroeconomic risks stemming from 
competitiveness challenges are subject to 
deflationary pressures, relatively high real interest 
rates and low nominal GDP growth. Fiscal 
consolidation and debt reduction is particularly 
challenging in this context. These countries should 
generally endeavour avoiding measures that 
further deteriorate their competitiveness (e.g. large 
increases in taxes on production, profits and 
labour), risking heightening macroeconomic risks. 
The credibility of consolidation plans of countries 
with poor indicators of the short-term capacity to 
react to budgetary stress should be considered with 
particular care. The risk of not meeting 
consolidation plans is particularly high in countries 
with large consolidation needs in combination with 
relatively poor institutions and governance, and 
limited room for cutting expenditure or raising 
taxes. In these countries, credibility of 
consolidation commitments requires the backing of 
specific measures and realistic assumptions. 
Budgetary reforms and strong fiscal frameworks 
are required to meet consolidation needs over the 
medium term.  
 
3.3. STATIC ANALYSIS  
Graph IV.3.1 shows the indicator values for EU 
countries in a 4-quadrants scatter plot, where the 
NE quadrant represent the group of countries 
combining high fiscal and macro-financial 
vulnerabilities. The countries with the lowest 
values on budgetary adjustment rigidity are 
signalled with red dots. (182)  
Graph IV.3.1: Indicators of macro-financial and fiscal risk for EU 
Member States (2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
These country groupings and relative risk 
assessments provide a useful reference for fiscal 
policy and fiscal surveillance, in particular as 
                                                          
(180) In a third approach, double weight was given to selected 
indicators which seemed particularly relevant. Within 
indicators of fiscal risks, debt and short-term debt were 
given a double weight. In the macro-financial dimension, 
the current account and short-term external debt had a 
double weight. Regarding budget flexibility, double 
weights were on the revenue ratio and expenditure 
flexibility indicators. As the results were not significantly 
different, they are not presented here.  
(181) The contribution of the individual indicators to the 
composite risk indicator using the main approach is 
presented in the Annex to this section.     
 
(182) All scores are relative to the EU average, implying that 
even low risk scores based on the 2010 data still imply a 
relatively high risk in historical perspective, especially as 
regards fiscal risks. Section IV.3.4 presents time-varying 
indices allowing a dynamic analysis placing risks in 
historical perspective. 
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 Box IV.3.1: Methodology and robustness of composite indicators
1. MAIN APPROACH 
For each sub-indicator we first calculate standard scores by subtracting the cross-country arithmetic mean 
and dividing it by the cross-country standard deviation. With jix ,  the raw value (for indicator i and country 
j) to be standardized, the standard score jiz ,  is calculated as follows: 
i
iji
ji
x
z
σ
μ−
=
,
,
, with iμ  and iσ
the cross-country mean and standard deviation for indicator i. The composite indicator jZ  for country j is 
then calculated by taking the simple arithmetic average of its standardised scores:  ∑
=
=
n
i
jij zn
Z
1
,
1 . The 
values are then normalised for presentational purposes to fit between 0 and 1 using the following formula: 
)(min)(max
)(min
jjjj
jjj
j
ZZ
ZZ
Z
−
−
=
. We calculate composite indicators for each of the three chosen sub-dimensions 
(fiscal risk, macro-financial risk and rigidities in the budget).  
2. RANKINGS APPROACH 
In an alternative approach, which is used as a robustness check, countries are simply ranked according to 
each indicator. While for the standard approach jix , reflects the raw values of the variables, for the 
rankings approach, they are transformed using a function Rank that simply returns the rank of a value within 
a set of numbers. Initial variables are displayed in such a way that the country with the best performance 
gets 1 point, and the worst 27 points. The rank scores jir , are then calculated as follows: 
)( ,, jiji xRankr = . As in the main approach, the composite indicator is then calculated as the arithmetic 
average of the rank scores: ∑= n jij rnZ 1 ,
1 . The values are then normalised (for presentational purposes) to fit 
between 0 and 1 using the following formula: 
)(min)(max
)(min
jjjj
jjj
j
ZZ
ZZ
Z
−
−
=
.  
The results are rather robust to the scoring methodology. The correlation coefficients of the indicator values 
calculated with the two methods varies between 0.84 and 0.91 for the three different indicators (Graph 1).   
 
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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3.4. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MACRO-
FINANCIAL AND FISCAL RISK 
Section 3.3 presented risk indicators for the year 
2010. Below, time-varying risk indicators are 
calculated. This allows moving from a concept of 
relative risk where each country is assessed 
relatively to the other countries in a single year to a 
concept of risk where each country is assessed 
relative to its score in a base year.  
Specifically, the above-described approach is 
adjusted, calculating risk relative to EU average 
values in 2000. (183)  
kjix ,,
                                                                                  
(183) For each sub-indicator we first calculate standard scores by 
subtracting the cross-country arithmetic mean in the year 
2000 and dividing it by the cross-country standard 
deviation in the year 2000. With  the raw value (for 
We calculate these time-varying composite 
indicators for two of the sub-dimensions: fiscal 
risk and macro-financial risk.  
 
kjiz ,,
indicator i, country j and year k) to be standardized, the 
standard score  is calculated as follows: 
2000,
2000,,,
,,
i
ikji
kji
x
z
σ
μ−
= 2000,i, with μ  and 2000,iσ  
the cross-country mean and standard deviation for indicator 
i in the year 2000. The composite indicator  for 
country j in the year k is then calculated by taking the 
simple arithmetic average of its components: 
kjZ ,
∑
=
=
n
i
kjikj zn
Z
1
,,,
1 . The values are then normalised for 
presentational purposes to fit between 0 and 1 using the 
following formula: 
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,
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=
. 
Box (continued) 
 
 Graph 1: Methodology robustness check - correlation between  fiscal risk, macro risk, and budgetary rigidity 
composite indicator using main approach and ranking approach (2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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The maturing-debt-to-GDP ratio has been dropped 
from the fiscal risk indicators due to limited 
availability of historical time series. Also, an 
indicator of global risk aversion is added to the 
macro-financial risk composite indicator (the 
iTraxx). (184) The iTraxx takes the same value for 
all countries in a single year. Therefore, the 
addition of the iTraxx makes no difference for the 
static indicator as the methodology calculated risks 
relative to the EU average.   
Plotting the development of the fiscal and macro-
financial risk indicator over time provides some 
interesting insights. Graph IV.3.2 plots the 5 EU 
countries with the largest increase in the fiscal risk 
indicator between 2007 and 2009 (Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, Romania and Latvia). It shows that in these 
countries, macro risk gradually built up starting 
from 2002-03, reaching very high levels at the 
time of the crisis. Over the same period, apparent 
fiscal risk reduced in most of them. The case of 
Greece stands out in that the level of fiscal risk 
pre-existing to the crisis was high and was not 
reduced during the build-up of macro-financial 
imbalances that are typically conducive to a 
transient improvement in the fiscal position. When 
the shock of the global financial crisis hit, the 
Greek economy found itself at the intersection of 
the two fold lines exposed by the crisis, namely 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances.  
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
(184) iTraxx is the brand name for the family of credit default 
swap index products covering regions of Europe, Australia, 
Japan and non-Japan Asia. They form a large sector of the 
overall credit derivative market. The indices are 
constructed on a set of rules with the overriding criterion 
being that of liquidity of the underlying Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS). The iTraxx suite of indices are owned, 
managed, compiled and published by International Index 
Company (IIC), which also licenses market makers. Credit 
Default Swap indices allow an investor to transfer credit 
risk in a more efficient manner than using groups of single 
CDSs. The most widely traded of the indices is the iTraxx 
Europe index composed of the most liquid 125 CDS 
referencing European investment grade credits, subject to 
certain sector rules as determined by the IIC and also as 
determined by the SEC.  
A similar graph for the countries with the lowest 
increase in fiscal risks in 2007-09 (Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy and Germany) shows that 
these on average did not experience a similar 
increase in the macro-financial risk indicator nor a 
decrease in the fiscal risk indicator in the run-up to 
the crisis. The increase in macrofinancial risk after 
2007 in all countries is largely due to the increase 
in global risk aversion. Without it, the 
macrofinancial risks in the high risk countries 
reduced considerably as external imbalances 
adjust.   
The picture is very similar when only considering 
euro-area countries (Graph IV.3.3). For countries 
with the highest increase in the fiscal risk indicator 
in 2007-09 (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Luxemburg 
and Slovenia), macro-financial risk increased 
sharply and consistently since 2002. For countries 
with the lowest increase in the fiscal risk indicator 
in 2007-09 (France, Portugal, Austria, Italy and 
Germany), macro-financial risk even decreased on 
average between 2001 and 2006. The Annex to 
this section shows the developments of the fiscal 
and macrofinancial risk indicators for the 
individual countries.  
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Plotting the change in the fiscal risk between 2007 
and 2009 for all countries versus the level of the 
macro-financial risk indicator shows a positive 
correlation (Graph IV.3.8). It also shows two 
groups of apparent outliers. In Ireland and Greece 
fiscal risks increased much more than would be 
expected on the basis of the fiscal-macro-financial 
risk correlation. In the case of Ireland, the 
budgetary deterioration started relatively early, as 
the housing bubble had already burst in 2007 (see 
section IV.5.1) and expenditure growth remained 
high at first. In the case of Greece, as already 
noted, also the starting level of fiscal risk was 
already high, owing in particular to the persistently 
high level of government debt. A second group of 
countries on the bottom of the Graph showed a 
much more limited increase in the fiscal risk 
indicator than could be expected on the basis of the 
level of the macro-financial risk indicator 
(Bulgaria, Cyprus and Hungary). These countries 
undertook significant consolidation measures and 
adjusted the budget to the revenue shortfalls at an 
early stage.  
The contingent fiscal risks that are reflected in the 
macro-financial risk indicator are even more 
obvious when linking it to the development of 
nominal revenue growth. In all countries, the rate 
of annual nominal revenue growth declined in 
2007-2010 when compared to 2004-2007. Graph 
IV.3.9 however shows a strong correlation 
between the size of the drop in revenue growth and 
the macro-financial risk indicator. In particular, for 
all countries with a macro-financial risk indicator 
in excess of 60 in 2007, the drop in revenue 
growth accounted to more than 10 percentage 
points, while for none of the countries with a 
macro-financial risk indicator below 60, the drop 
Graph  IV.3.2: Development of average macro risk of the five EU countries with the highest (left) and lowest (right) increase in fiscal risk 
over 2007-09 
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Graph IV.3.3: Development of average macro risk of the five euro-area countries with the highest (left) and lowest (right) increase in fiscal 
risk over 2007-09 
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in nominal revenues exceeded 10 percentage 
points. 
Graph IV.3.4: 2007 macro-financial risk indicator versus change in 
fiscal risk indicator over the period 2007-09 
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Graph IV.3.5: Change in average revenues growth between period 
2004-07 and 2007-10 versus the 2007 macro-
financial risk indicator 
UK
SK
SI
SE
RO
PT
PLNL
MT
LV
LU
LT
IT
IE
HU
FR
FI
ES
EL
EE
DK
DE
CZ CY
BG
BE AT
y = -0.21x + 1.60
R2 = 0.53
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
0 20 40 60 80 1
2007 macro-financial risk indicator
ch
an
ge
 in
 re
ve
nu
es
 g
ro
w
th
00
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
The Commission Communication of 12 May 2010, 
entitled 'Reinforcing economic policy 
coordination' recognises the need to expand 
economic surveillance and deepen the analysis 
beyond the budgetary dimension to address other 
macroeconomic imbalances, including 
competitiveness developments and underlying 
structural challenges in order to prevent the 
occurrence of severe imbalances within the euro 
area.  The surveillance will include a scoreboard 
that will indicate the need for action. The 
scoreboard would encompass a relevant set of 
indicators and reflect, inter alia, developments in 
current accounts, net foreign asset positions, 
productivity, unit labour costs, employment, and 
real effective exchange rates, as well as public debt 
and private sector credit and asset prices. It would 
appear particularly important to detect asset price 
booms and excessive credit growth at an early 
stage to avert costly corrections of fiscal and 
external imbalances at a later stage. This analysis 
would form the basis for the formulation of the 
recommendations for preventive or corrective 
measures in the Member State(s) concerned. 
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Graph  IV.3.6: Contribution of components to the aggregate indicator 
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Graph  IV.3.7: Contribution of components to the composite macrofinancial risk indicator (main approach) 
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Graph  IV.3.8: Development of the composite fiscal and macro-financial risk indicators in EU Member States (2000-2009) 
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Graph (continued)  
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Graph (Continued)  
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nd Tavares (2005) 
and Hjelm (2002).( ) 
     
The run-up to the global financial crisis of 
2008/2009 was characterised by a sharp widening 
of current account imbalances in the EU (in 
particular in the euro area) together with growing 
divergence in real exchange rates, see in particular 
European Commission (2009). The fact that fiscal 
consolidations in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 will take place in a 
context of unwinding of macroeconomic 
imbalances will make it even more challenging as 
many countries will face the dual challenge of 
reducing debt levels and restoring external 
competitiveness.  
The recent EU experience has shown that 
expansionary fiscal policies might affect current 
account balances through macroeconomic and 
microeconomic channels, see Section IV.2. On the 
macroeconomic side, windfall-led public 
expenditure tends to increase overall aggregate 
demand and nurture inflation dynamics leading to 
deterioration in current account balances. On the 
microeconomic side, fiscal policy decisions 
regarding public employment and wages might 
affect relative prices and real exchange rates and 
tax incentives might feed excessive credit growth. 
The situation of some EU countries at the onset of 
this crisis was in particular characterised by 
sustained wage increase, swift real exchange rate 
appreciation and much deteriorated 
competitiveness positions. Fiscal consolidation 
strategies thus need to contribute to correcting 
such imbalances as these are likely to affect the 
pace of the economic recovery and thus the ability 
to contain rising public deficit and debt levels. 
As discussed in Section III.4, public expenditure 
cuts can have favourable consequences on the 
supply side of the economy, especially those 
spending reductions accompanied by reforms 
increasing labour supply and/or lowering unit 
labour cost. Cuts in public wages can also spill 
over to wage formation in the private sector and 
thus indirectly alleviate governments' budgets by 
improving external competitiveness through real 
depreciation, see Lane and Perotti (2003) and 
Alesina et al. (2002). By contrast, fiscal 
consolidations increasing tax pressure on wages 
could have the adverse effect of reducing both 
take-home pay and employment, depressing 
domestic demand and slowing down economic 
growth.(185) 
Recent empirical studies also pointed to a 
significant influence of public spending on price 
and exchange rates dynamics which may have an 
indirect bearing on current account 
adjustment.(186) In particular, recent evidence in 
the case of Ireland shows that an increase in 
governments' wages spending may lead to short-
run appreciation in real exchange rates (see 
Bénétrix and Lane, 2009) and can also have long-
run effects on external competitiveness (see 
Galstyan and Lane, 2009). Governments' wages 
spending may also have wider consequences on a 
country's competitiveness through its impact on 
labour market outcome. For instance, Pérez and 
Sánchez (2010), considering the cases of Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain show that public sector 
wages tend to exert upward pressure on private 
wages in these countries either directionally by 
leading private sector wage dynamics (France and 
Italy) or through positive feedback process 
between public and private wages (Germany and 
Spain). Exchange rate adjustments have also often 
seen as being necessary for conducting successful 
fiscal consolidations. While the evidence regarding 
the incidence of the composition fiscal 
retrenchment (in particular concerning expenditure 
and wage contention) on the success of fiscal 
consolidation abounds (see in particular Section 
III.5), only a handful of papers have so far 
provided evidence on fiscal consolidation and 
exchange rates suggesting that the effect of 
exchange rate developments (including both 
nominal and real) on the success of fiscal 
consolidations albeit significant is relatively small, 
see in particular Lambertini a
187
                                                     
 The final impact of wage-related taxes would, however, 
depend v
(185)
ery much on national labour market institutions 
(186)
ment or profit, 
(187)
 evidence that real 
and wage bargaining processes, see Boltho and Glyn 
(2006). 
 Government public spending may also have an impact on 
other variables which may also affect a country's 
competitive position, such as private invest
see in particular Alesina et al. (2002). These other aspects 
are not considered in this section, however. 
 Other authors have also found that that real exchange rate 
depreciation favours the start and continuation of fiscal 
consolidation episodes but fail to find
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This section analyses the role played by real 
exchange rate variation and current account 
imbalances for the success of past fiscal 
consolidation episodes building on the analysis 
carried out in Section III.5. A fiscal consolidation 
is defined as an improvement in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) of at least 1.5% 
taking place in one single year or taking place over 
three years if, in addition, each and every year the 
CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.5% of 
GDP. A fiscal consolidation is in turn considered 
as successful if it lowers the public debt level by at 
least five percentage points of GDP in the three 
years following a consolidation episode.(188) The 
experience of EU countries and a set of non-EU 
OECD countries are considered over the period 
1970-2008. 
4.1. EXTERNAL IMBALANCES, EXCHANGE 
RATE VARIATION AND FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATIONS: DESCRIPTIVE 
EVIDENCE 
A look at past evidence indicates that while 
exchange rate depreciations are sometimes 
associated with successful of fiscal consolidations, 
the relationship is far from close. This is illustrated 
in Graph IV.3.1 plotting the evolution of the 
annual change in the real and nominal effective 
exchange rate. (189) In turn this suggests that, for 
exchange rate depreciations to contribute to 
successful fiscal consolidation, inflationary 
pressures need to be contained so that external 
competitiveness is effectively improved. 
Graph IV.3.1 includes, among others, evidence for 
Ireland and Denmark. These two countries that are 
often referred to as having achieved successful 
fiscal consolidations in the wake of large exchange 
rate devaluations during the 1980s and early 
1990s, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). 
Importantly, in both these countries the real and 
nominal exchange rates moved closely enough 
                                                                                   
exchange rate depreciation favour debt reduction 
during these periods reflecting the fact that the 
nominal exchange rate depreciation did not 
translate into significant inflationary pressures. 
Two other prominent examples of successful fiscal 
consolidations accompanied by exchange rate 
depreciations/devaluations are Finland and Sweden 
during their respective financial crises in the 
1990s, see in particular European Commission 
(2009). Here again, a close correlation between 
real and nominal exchange rate suggest that in both 
cases upward inflationary pressures were relatively 
contained. The ensuing export-led recoveries 
helped achieving successful fiscal consolid
significantly, see Ahrend et al. (2006). 
ations 
in both cases. Last but not least, these countries 
be 
found in the fact that the nominal exchange rate 
devaluation eventually resulted in real exchange 
rates appreciation due to inflationary pressures. 
                                                          
(188) Alternative definitions of fiscal consolidation and of their 
success are of course possible. The pros and cons of such 
definitions are discussed in Section III.5. 
 
(189) The exchange rates figures reported in Graph IV.3.1 are 
based weighted average of bilateral exchange rates with 
main trading partners. Source: OECD 
also achieved high quality of public spending 
contributing to boost potential growth. (190) 
Other episodes of fiscal consolidations illustrate 
how the association between exchange rate 
devaluation/depreciation and the success of fiscal 
consolidations is by no means automatic. For 
instance, the Irish fiscal consolidation episode that 
took place in the early 1980s did not appear to be 
successful in reducing public debt levels, while 
such consolidation was preceded by a depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate. The ensuing 
appreciation in the real exchange rate suggests in 
this case that inflationary pressures eventually 
cancelled out the expected positive effect of the 
exchange rate depreciation. Another case in point 
is Greece which has sometimes been considered an 
example of how the absence of the exchange rate 
adjustment was especially damaging for peripheral 
EU countries in the current juncture.(191) Greece 
has in the past undertaken several fiscal 
consolidations, however these were rarely 
successful. In particular the large depreciation of 
the Drachma in the early 1980s did not lead to a 
successful fiscal consolidation in the subsequent 
years. Here also an explanation for this can 
(190) See in particular Gylfason et la. (2010) and Barrios and 
Schaechter (2009). 
(191) See Feldstein, (2010). 
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The cases of non-EU OECD economies also 
illustrate that the relationship between exchange 
rate depreciation/devaluation and the success of 
fiscal consolidation may occasionally be the 
opposite of what one would expect. For instance, 
Graph IV.4.1 shows that, in the case of Japan in 
the second half of the 1980s, successful fiscal 
consolidations were preceded by or coincided with 
Graph IV.4.1: Successful and unsuccessful consolidations and real and nominal exchange rates in a selected sample of countries 
(1) The real effective exchange rate is based on cpi differential. 
Source: Commission services and OECD. 
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sharp exchange rate appreciations contrary to the 
received idea that depreciations are needed to 
smooth the negative impact of fiscal 
consolidations. The other non-EU economy 
considered here is the US: in this country the sharp 
devaluation of the dollar in the mid-1980s (both 
nominal and real) was not sufficient to achieve 
successful fiscal consolidation in the following 
years. On the contrary, successful fiscal 
consolidations in the second half of the 1990s were 
accompanied by real and nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. 
 
                                                          
The evidence shown in Graph IV.4.1 suggests that 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate needs not 
be necessarily associated with successful fiscal 
consolidations. In fact, in order to better 
understand the link between exchange rate 
depreciations and the outcome of fiscal 
consolidations it is necessary to consider also the 
context under which these depreciations take 
place. For example a country may run a large 
current account deficit stemming from buoyant 
internal demand and low interest rates during a 
relatively long period of time. These evolutions 
may lead to REER appreciation and high levels of 
private debt  while the level of public debt might 
remain stable or even tend to decline. In such 
context, a severe adverse macroeconomic shock 
may lead to a significant reduction in economic 
activity, higher interest rates, and/or to sharp 
private deleveraging process kicking this country 
into recession obliging the country to undertake 
fiscal consolidation plans. While a rapid 
depreciation of the REER would help improve the 
external balance and positively contribute to the 
growth recovery, domestic demand may remain 
depressed not only due to the fiscal consolidation, 
but also  due to prices and wages deflation and the 
high level of private debt. Thus at the time when 
public finances need to be consolidated, the high 
level of private debt may push the private sector to 
consolidate too, further reducing economic growth 
and possibly counteracting the direct positive 
impacts of the REER depreciation on the outcome 
of fiscal consolidation. Generally speaking, 
therefore, an analysis of the link between external 
imbalances and the success fiscal consolidations 
must also take consider the role played by current 
account dynamics. Graph IV.3.2 provides 
descriptive evidence on this: a kernel plot density 
curves (equivalent to histograms represented over 
a continuous space) trace the frequency of 
successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations 
against past current account dynamics (represented 
on the x-axis by the change in the current account 
five years before a fiscal consolidation episode 
starts). (192) Evidence for all countries in the 
sample included in the top left diagram (i.e. EU27 
+ OECD no EU countries) suggests that, while in 
general and expectedly both successful and 
unsuccessful fiscal consolidations are more 
frequently distributed around small values, there is 
a tendency for successful consolidations to be 
associated with positive past current account 
changes relative to unsuccessful fiscal 
consolidations. Evidence for the EU27 and the 
EU15 in the top right and bottom left diagrams 
provides more conclusive evidence suggesting that 
unsuccessful fiscal consolidations tend to be 
preceded by substantial deterioration in current 
account positions while successful fiscal 
consolidations episodes tend to be preceded by 
improvement in the current account. The evidence 
is more nuanced for recently acceded Member 
States reflecting the fact that these countries have 
tended to run current account deficits linked to 
their catching up process since the mid-1990s 
onward, especially so since their accession to the 
EU. 
Overall, the evidence presented for the relationship 
between exchange rate depreciation/devaluation 
and successful fiscal consolidations is mixed. 
Countries undertaking fiscal consolidations 
following a period of growing current account 
deficits tended to experience more difficulties in 
achieving success. The following section considers 
these questions in more depth using econometric 
estimations. 
(192) Change in the current account over five years (instead of 
shorter time period) is considered to capture the structural 
nature of a change in the current account position.  
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4.2. EXTERNAL IMBALANCES, REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES AND THE SUCCESS OF 
FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS: RESULTS FROM 
PROBIT ESTIMATIONS 
Several econometric tests have been performed 
using probit estimation of the determinants of 
successful fiscal consolidations. As in Section 
III.4, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating 
whether a country's fiscal consolidation undertaken 
in a given year t was successful or not in reducing 
the level of debt in year t+3. The explanatory 
variables of interest are the annual changes in the 
nominal and real effective exchange rates in year t-
1 and the change (in percentage of GDP) in the 
current account between year t-5 and year t-1 to 
reflect current account dynamics at the onset of 
fiscal consolidation episode. The other control 
variables are the same as those used in Section 
III.4.(193) 
                                                                                  
(193) The other control variables include a measure of the 
business cycle position (measured using the level and 
annual change in the output gap at the start of a fiscal 
Results of probit estimations for the EU and the 
sample of non-EU OECD countries over the period 
1970-2008 are reported in Table IV.3.1. 
Estimations reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 
IV.3.1 show that even controlling for relevant 
variables the exchange rate depreciations, 
measured respectively by the effective nominal 
exchange rate (NEER) and the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) do not exert a significant 
influence on the probability of success of a fiscal 
consolidation, thus confirming that the link 
between exchange rate depreciation and the 
success of fiscal consolidations is not 
automatic. (194) Column 3 includes a variable 
 
consolidation episode), a variable indicating the nature of 
fiscal consolidation (measured by the change between t-1 
and t+3 of the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure as 
percentage of GDP), the level of debt in t-1 and the 
snowball effect of public debt between t and t+3, and an 
indicator on the quality of fiscal governance. More details 
on the definition and sources used for these variables are 
provided in Section III.4. 
(194) The REER used in the econometric estimations reported in 
Table IV.4.1 is measured using unit labour cost 
differentials (source: OECD). The use of REER based on 
Graph IV.4.2: Past current account variations and the success of fiscal consolidations: evidence using Kernel density graphs 
Notes: Past current account variations represent change in percentage points of the current account imbalances  between t-5 and t-1 with t being the 
year a fiscal consolidation episode is started. 
Source: Commission services. 
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measuring past current account changes. This 
estimation shows that countries starting off from 
more favourable positions are also more likely to 
achieve debt reduction. This result in turn confirms 
that the sheer size of current account imbalances at 
the onset of a fiscal consolidation episode can have 
a strong bearing on the outcome of fiscal 
retrenchments. 
The inconclusive result concerning the effect of 
exchange rate depreciation/devaluation could 
reflect the fact that exchange rate realignments 
alone are not sufficient and/or that other policy 
changes are better suited to contributing to 
successful fiscal consolidations through wage and 
price adjustment.(195) A more direct way to 
measure the impact of fiscal policy changes on 
countries' competitiveness is to use instead 
measures of public expenditure with a distinction 
between wages and non-wages government 
expenditure as in Lane and Perotti (2003). As 
suggested earlier, such changes might facilitate 
consolidation through export-led recovery directly, 
by reducing the government wage bill, and also 
indirectly by spilling to private sector wages 
formation mechanisms improving external 
competitiveness. 
Column 4 includes two additional explanatory 
variables measuring the change between the years t 
and t-1 (i.e. the year t indicating the first year of a 
fiscal consolidation episode) in the composition of 
public expenditure splitted into wage and non-
wage components.(196) This additional estimation 
 
                                                                                   
                                                                                  
cpi differential as in Graph IV.4.1 did not yield 
qualitatively different results. 
(195) The absence of significant result on the exchange rate 
variable is also not in line with the limited evidence in the 
empirical literature, see for instance Hjelm (2002) and 
Lambertini and Tavares, (2005).  However it must be noted 
that the criteria used here to define successful fiscal 
consolidations is different to the one used in the existing 
literature which is based on the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance and/or other macroeconomic variables. 
Furthermore, most empirical analysis advocating the 
relevance of exchange rate devaluation/depreciation for 
fiscal consolidation usually make use of more basic 
statistical association (e.g. based on correlation 
coefficients) or case-study analysis concerning small open 
economies (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1997). 
(196) In order to avoid multi-colinearity the variable measuring 
the change in the total public expenditure adjusted for the 
business cycle included in Column 1-3 is removed from 
Columns 4-6. The changes in the composition of public 
expenditure are measured by the first difference in the 
logarithm of the variables expressed in constant prices 
shows that a reduction in government wage 
spending significantly increases the likelihood of 
achieving a successful fiscal consolidation while a 
reduction in non-wage public spending also exert 
similar effect although not significantly so. 
The role played by fiscal consolidations containing 
or reducing public wages expenditure would 
become relatively more important in the absence 
of nominal exchange rate adjustment, i.e., in fixed 
(or pegged) exchange rate regimes as external 
competitiveness cannot be restored via nominal 
exchange rate adjustment. Columns 6 and 7 
provide evidence on this by including interaction 
terms between a variable indicating the type of 
exchange rate regime a country follows during a 
fiscal consolidation episode (i.e. either fixed or 
variable exchange rate) and the two variables 
reflecting the composition of fiscal adjustment 
used in Column 4 (i.e. either wages or non-wage 
expenditure). Two alternative definitions of the 
exchange rate regimes are used: Column 5 
includes results using the IMF classification of 
exchange rate regimes, while Column 6 provides 
result based on the exchange rate regime 
classification proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004).(197) In both cases, the influence of the 
change in government wage spending appears to 
be larger for countries in fixed-exchange rate 
regimes, although the significance of this result 
varies slightly depending on the definition of 
 
(source: OECD). The first year of a fiscal consolidation 
episode is used in order to reflect the fact that, in order for 
wages and other public expenditure cuts to promote an 
export-led recovery these changes must take place 
relatively quickly during a consolidation episode (in order 
to spread to the rest of the economy). The latter was 
confirmed by the insignificance of non-reported results 
obtained considering wage and non-wage public 
expenditure changes over longer time spans. 
(197) The IMF classification has sometimes been questioned in 
the literature as it relies on self-reported country 
information on exchange rate arrangements which may 
differ from practice where dual exchange rate markets 
might better reflect monetary policy and inflation dynamics 
and/or where de jure pegged exchange rate might de facto 
translate into flexible ones (e.g. as in the case of the EU in 
the early 1990s).  Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) propose 
instead a taxonomy based on a broad variety of statistics 
measuring exchange rate volatility matched to official 
arrangements and chronologies on exchange rate 
intervention to derive a "natural" grouping of exchange 
rates regimes taking into account of differences between 
announced exchange rate regime and real ones (derived 
from the statistics) and thus relying on market-determined 
rather than official exchange rate regime. 
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Table IV.4.1: External imbalances and the success of fiscal consolidations: result from probit estimations 1/ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Debt 0.486*** 0.508*** 0.419** 0.209 0.179 0.193
(0.163)) (0.164) (0.163) (0.181) (0.175) (0.180)
Δ cyclically adjusted expenditure -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.037***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Downturn -0.109 -0.098 -0.064 -0.091 -0.167** -0.13
(0.109) (0.114) (0.128) (0.121) (0.083) (0.113)
Recovery -0.027 -0.026 -0.037 -0.091 -0.077 -0.118
(0.104) (0.104) (0.108) (0.107) (0.098) (0.107)
Protracted slowdown -0.159* -0.168* -0.15 -0.225** -0.262*** -0.253***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.096) (0.094) (0.085) (0.095)
Debt-stabilising primary balance -5.812*** -5.602*** -5.078*** -6.600*** -7.620*** -7.381***
(snowball effect of public debt) (1.893) (1.787) (1.937) (2.518) (2.609) (2.598)
Fiscal governance 0.036 0.025 0.063 -0.122 -0.141* -0.142
(0.090) (0.092) (0.094) (0.095) (0.079) (0.092)
Δ Nominal exchange rate (t-1, t-2) -0.001
(0.001)
Δ Real exchange rate (t-1, t-2) 0.005
(0.004)
Δ  Current account change (t-1;t-5) 0.024** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.035**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Δ Gov. wage spending -3.713***
(1.116)
Δ Government non-wage spending -0.44
(0.649)
Δ Gov. wage spending * Fixers – IMF definition -8.175***
(1.929)
Δ Gov. wage spending * Non-fixers – IMF definition -0.619
(1.362)
Δ Government non-wage spending * Fixers – IMF definition 1.729
(1.550)
Δ Government non-wage spending * Non-fixers - IMF definition -0.834
(0.867)
Δ Gov. wage spending * Fixers - Reinhart-Rogoff(2004) -5.803*
(3.273)
Δ Gov. wage spending * Non-fixer - Reinhart-Rogoff(2004) -3.635***
(1.135)
Δ Government non-wage spending *  Fixers - Reinhart-Rogoff(2004) -0.089
(2.458)
Δ Government non-wage spending *  Non-fixer - Reinhart-Rogoff(2004) -0.388
(0.617)
Estimated probability of success 0.283 0.287 0.3 0.28 0.21 0.27
% of probability correctly predicted 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.71
Observations 181 179 170 143 143 143
1/ The IMF and Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) definitions and data on fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes can be found in Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. 
S. (2004), "The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a reinterpretation", Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. CXIX (1): 1-48 and  
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html. The symbol Δ stands for annual variation in percentage unless otherwise indicated. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
exchange rate regime used. This result would tend 
to confirm that fiscal consolidation strategies based 
on public expenditure cuts and, in particular, on 
public wages reduction and/or containment are 
more likely to succeed in countries where 
exchange rates are fixed because these countries 
cannot resort to exchange rate devaluations to 
promote export-led recoveries. 
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An examination of experiences in some selected 
EU countries provides insights in the role that 
macroeconomic fiscal policy and microeconomic 
incentives have played in the building-up of 
competitiveness imbalances and their winding 
down. Below, the role of inflation dynamics, 
growth composition, asset price booms and bust, 
revenue windfalls, nominal expenditure growth 
and micro-fiscal incentives are discussed in the 
cases of Spain, Germany, Ireland and Estonia.   
5.1. SPAIN  
5.1.1. Housing-sector-related effects and fiscal 
incentives in Spain 
Since the mid-1990s, Spain has been growing at an 
average rate of 3¾% per year. Such an 
exceptionally long expansionary period of the 
Spanish economy was driven by a succession of 
credit-led impulses, demographic shocks and 
adjustment processes. Among them, and as in 
some other Member States, nominal interest rates 
converged rapidly toward the low levels of core 
countries, such as Germany, France or the 
Netherlands, on the back of the macroeconomic-
stability policy framework put in place by Spain in 
order to ensure euro adoption. 
The combination of low real interest rates and 
dynamic demography resulted into a significant 
raise in the indebtedness of households and firms 
and stimulated a large asset boom, especially 
housing. A sharp increase in house price came 
hand in hand with an unprecedented increase in the 
number of new dwellings built each year. While 
the number of new residences had hovered at 
around one quarter of a million between the mid-
1970s and the mid-1990s, the figure rose to three 
quarters of a million by 2006. Equity markets also 
boomed in Spain during the last decade. The index 
of the Spanish stock exchange market (IBEX 35) 
increased by 380% from around 3500 points in 
1995 to above 12000 points in 2006. The 
comparison with the evolution in the other large 
members of the euro area provides more 
prominence to the magnitude of the asset boom in 
Spain.  
The asset boom in Spain resulted in a change in the 
GDP composition towards investment in 
dwellings, whereas, corporate profits soared. 
Within this context, the total tax burden rose from 
32¾% of GDP in 1995 to above 37% in 2007 
without relying on significant tax increases. In 
contrast, the tax burden has remained broadly 
unchanged in the euro area at around 40%.  
Interestingly, the increase in the tax burden took 
place in spite of the direct tax reforms of 1999 and 
2003, which aimed at reducing the tax burden on 
personal incomes. Although this period has also 
seen discretionary increases in some indirect taxes, 
especially excise duties, these were not large 
enough to compensate for the reduction in 
revenues associated to direct tax cuts. 
Over the same period, 1995-2007, the Spanish 
economy recorded a steady appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate. This resulted from 
persistent and positive inflation and wage 
differentials with the euro area, combined with an 
also persistent but negative productivity 
differential. A strong domestic demand and 
structural factors, especially rigidities in some 
utilities and services markets, were at the origin of 
a inflation differential of the Spanish economy vis-
à-vis the euro area of above 1 pp. per year on 
average. In line with this inflation differential, the 
positive wage gap with the euro area attained ¾ pp 
per year on average, while productivity recorded a 
negative gap close to 1%. These developments 
were due to a relative specialisation of the Spanish 
economy in low-to-medium technology sectors, 
mainly reflecting a high weight of construction and 
tourism activities. In terms of nominal unit labour 
costs vis-à-vis the euro area, the Spanish real 
exchange rate has appreciated by more than 10% 
since 1995. 
The combination of the steady appreciation of the 
real effective exchange rate, the reduction of the 
risk premia and an increase in population were 
supportive of a demand-based growth model that 
was highly rich in taxes. In effect, while exports, 
which have low tax content, were not growing as 
fast as the whole economy, private consumption 
and the boom in the housing market pushed 
indirect taxes up. Moreover, the economic boom 
raised profits, especially those linked to real state 
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and financial operations, and consequently 
revenues from corporate taxes. 
Research in this area(198) has shown that the 
economic expansion in Spain was accompanied by 
important composition effects, which disappeared 
with the burst of the asset boom. Overall, 
econometric analyses have indicated that about 
75% of the increase in tax revenues observed 
between 1995 and 2006 were of a transitory 
nature. The move away from the highly tax-rich 
growth composition associated with the burst of 
the asset boom has, indeed, led to a permanent 
reduction of tax elasticities. The implementation of 
unfunded tax cuts and expenditure increases in the 
period 1995-2007, especially those more difficult 
to revert in bad times, does not appear to have 
taken account of such transitory composition 
effects. Indeed, the empirical research shows that, 
in the presence of asset booms, and, more 
generally, when the composition of main tax bases 
change significantly, tax elasticities with respect to 
standard bases can lead to misleading conclusions 
of developments in government receipts. In the 
case of Spain and given the context of significant 
composition biases, the use of standard tax 
elasticities for fiscal surveillance purposes might 
have led to an overestimation of structural 
revenues and, concomitantly, to an incorrect 
assessment of the fiscal stance. This is relevant in 
the Economic and Monetary Union because the 
likelihood of occurrence of asset booms may be 
relatively high when the monetary-policy stance is 
not consistent with the country's inflation. 
Fiscal policy might have also contributed to raising 
household indebtedness and to feeding the large 
housing boom in Spain. The fiscal treatment of 
housing in Spain favoured the purchase of housing 
at the expense of other alternative investments. 
                                                          
(198) Martinez-Mongay, and al. (2007) 
Research analysis(199) has shown that, between 
1986 y 2004, the overall net effect of fiscal 
treatment of housing purchase translated into a 
positive incentive to increase housing demand, 
especially in the case of purchases of owner-
occupied houses. Specifically, fiscal measures 
included a deduction from personal income tax for 
the purchase of the primary residence and a 
reduction in tax liability for payment of both 
capital and interest. Moreover, the Autonomous 
Communities (regional governments) have 
progressively added in recent years other 
deductions, albeit less important, for home 
purchases. In addition, the supply of owner-
occupied social housing provided a significant 
subsidy for low-rent households, which remained 
unaltered once the dwelling had been granted, in 
spite of a positive evolution of household incomes. 
Fiscal policy has also shown a persistent bias in 
favour of the purchase of housing at the expense of 
rented housing, notably after some tax reforms in 
1999. This bias has been more significant for high-
revenue households and high marginal tax rates, 
due to the very low taxable implicit incomes. 
5.2. GERMANY 
5.2.1. Competitiveness, current account 
surplus and net external lending 
Since the early 2000s, increasing demand for 
capital goods from catching-up economies and the 
improved price competitiveness fed the largely 
export-based growth of the German economy. 
Depressed inflation and wage growth vis-à-vis 
euro competitors allowed a reversal of the real 
effective exchange rate appreciation that had 
occurred following unification. (Graph IV.5.1).  
(199) García-Vaquero andMartínez (2005)  
 
Table IV.5.1: Key macroeconomic and budgetary indicators - Spain 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP, % change 4.5 4.7 5.0 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.6
HICP, % change 1.8 2.2 3.5 2.8 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.8 4.1 -0.3
External balance, % of GDP -1.1 -2.7 -4.0 -4.3 -3.8 -4.0 -5.9 -7.5 -9.0 -10.0 -9.5 -5.1
Trade balance, % of GDP -0.2 -1.9 -3.1 -2.5 -2.1 -2.4 -4.0 -5.3 -6.4 -6.8 -5.9 -2.1
Balance of primary income, % of GDP -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 -1.7 -2.3 -2.6 -1.9
Net foreign assets, % of GDP -32.0 -33.2 -32.5 -35.1 -39.2 -43.9 -52.7 -56.7 -66.8 -77.5 -79.3
Government balance, % of GDP -3.2 -1.4 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.1 -11.2
Government revenue, % change 5.9 9.2 7.8 7.6 8.4 6.7 8.4 10.5 11.1 8.8 -7.0 -9.4
Government expenditure, % change 5.6 4.4 6.6 6.7 7.8 6.0 8.8 6.8 8.2 9.2 8.3 8.0
Structural balance, % of GDP -0.1 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.2 -4.1 -8.9
Government debt, % of GDP 64.1 62.3 59.3 55.5 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.2 39.7 53.2
Source: Commission services. 
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High export growth and gains in competitiveness 
have not been translated into higher growth of 
household disposable income, domestic demand 
and imports, thus leading to the accumulation of 
high current account surpluses. The current 
account surplus widened considerably, peaking at 
8% of GDP in 2007, in particular due to the strong 
expansion of merchandise trade with the balance 
on services remaining slightly negative. Looking at 
sectoral savings-investment balances, the rising 
current account surplus was largely matched by 
falling public sector net borrowing, as well as 
increased private household savings as wage 
moderation and high unemployment held back 
growth in real disposable income. Also higher 
corporate sector lending contributed to the 
improving current account as corporate balance 
sheets were strengthened (Graph IV.5.2). Overall, 
weak domestic demand reflected low private 
consumption, the continuing correction of 
overinvestment in housing after the re-unification-
induced construction boom and weak corporate 
investment. According to its high savings-
investment ratio, Germany became a net lender 
among the larger EU Member States. 
 
Graph IV.5.1: Real effective exchange rate versus the rest of the 
euro area (2000=100) 
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Source: Commission services and German Bundesbank. 
The collapse of world trade in the course of the 
financial and economic crisis slashed Germany's 
exports by around 14% in 2009. Competitiveness 
based on unit labour cost worsened temporarily as 
a result of the adverse effect on productivity 
arising from the slump in growth and the limited 
reaction of employment levels to the crisis due to 
labour hoarding and working time reductions 
(Graph IV.5.1). In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
German export sector is expected to benefit from 
the recovery of global trade especially in emerging 
market economies. However, given the need for 
household and corporate balance sheet repair in 
some of its traditional trading partners, German 
exports are unlikely to propel output growth in the 
near future. Hence, the German economy will be 
faced with considerable adjustment needs, 
including a re-allocation of resources from sectors 
with current over-capacity and a shift between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, putting 
increasing demands on the flexibility of product 
and factor markets. 
Graph IV.5.2: Net lending (+) / borrowing (-) (% of GDP) /1 
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1/ Not including unification-related debt and asset undertakings by the 
federal government in 1995 of 116.3 bn EUR 
Source: Commission services, German Bundesbank.. 
5.2.2. Fiscal policy and adjustment of 
economic imbalances  
After a surplus in 2000, when one-off revenues 
from the auction of UMTS licences were realised, 
the German general government position relapsed 
into a deficit until 2007 (Table IV.5.2). The deficit 
widened until 2003 mainly on the back of the 
economic downturn in the early 2000s and a three-
step reduction of income tax rates (1999, 2000 and 
2001). General government net borrowing 
decreased considerably since 2004 leading to a 
small surplus in 2007 and a balanced budget in 
2008. The improvement in the structural balance 
between 2004 and 2008 came on the back of 
virtual nominal expenditure freeze during the 
consolidation process required under the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Expenditure growth 
throughout this period fell clearly below GDP 
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growth(200). After an initial drop of almost 1 pp. in 
nominal terms in 2004, public spending grew less 
than ¾ pp. on average in 2004-2007. This could be 
attributed to substantial cuts in public investment 
and subsidies in 2004-2005, moderate public 
sector wage increases and favourable labour 
market developments. Revenues picked up, fuelled 
by the increased standard VAT rate (2007) and 
high profit-related tax receipts, despite tax relief 
introduced with the corporate tax reform in 
2008(201).  
A direct causal link between net lending of the 
public sector and the external balance is difficult to 
establish. However, the 3% of GDP consolidation 
in the nominal general government balance 
between 2004 and 2007 went hand in hand with an 
additional increase in the current account surplus 
of a similar magnitude.  
Fiscal policy measures may have played a role in 
influencing private sector savings and investment 
behaviour in Germany. Two major tax reforms are 
of particular importance: the stepwise changes in 
income and corporate tax rates of the early 2000s 
and the 2007 increase in the standard VAT rate.  
In particular, the 2001 tax reform has indirectly 
contributed to the increase in the current account 
surplus by affecting companies' financing and 
investment decisions. First, with the reduction of 
the corporate tax rate for both retained and 
distributed profits to an uniform rate of 25% in 
2001 and the replacement of the full imputation 
                                                          
(200) With the exception of 2008 when spending went up due to, 
inter alia, one-off measures related to bank rescue 
operations and higher outlays for retirement benefits due to 
ad hoc changes in the pension adjustment formula. 
(201) The corporate tax rate was cut from 25% to 15% and the 
local trade tax rate from 5% to 3.5% of profits. 
system with a 'half-income system' in 2002(202), 
the tax advantages of distributing rather than 
retaining corporate profits were lowered(203). 
Second, investment incentives were negatively 
affected by the measures taken to counter-finance 
tax relief: the declining-balance depreciation rate 
for movable assets was reduced and the 
depreciation rate for company buildings was cut. It 
is difficult to ascertain the importance of these 
changes in explaining the increase in corporate 
savings and the simultaneous drop in investments 
observed in the first half of the 2000s. Other, 
potentially more important factors were at play at 
the same time. On the one hand, wage moderation 
boosted corporate profits and contributed 
decisively to the increase in gross savings of the 
corporate sector. On the other hand, domestic 
investments were curtailed on the back of higher 
capital exports to countries experiencing asset 
booms and as a result of extensive off-shoring and 
outsourcing activities of German firms to take 
advantage of the benefits offered by globalisation 
and to restore competitiveness. 
The 2007 increase in the VAT rate (from 16% to 
19%) affected consumption decisions, but its 
impact cannot be clearly disentangled from the 
effects of other factors at play: continuous wage 
restraint (also in the public sector), strong 
acceleration in inflation and temporary 
consumption-dampening effects of the expiry of 
(202) Under this system only half of the distributed profits of a 
corporation are included in the shareholder's personal 
income tax base and it is no longer necessary to credit the 
corporation tax paid by the company against the 
shareholder's income tax. 
(203) The reform led to a unique effect in 2001 when companies 
had an incentive to distribute accumulated retentions to 
shareholders in order to benefit from a retroactive reduced 
rate on distributed profits. Although the company tax 
reform intended net tax relief, the unexpected strong 
response to this measure (tax refund) resulted in large 
revenue losses. 
 
Table IV.5.2: Key macroeconomic and budgetary indicators - Germany 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP, % change 2.0 2.0 3.2 1.2 0.0 -0.2 1.2 0.8 3.2 2.5 1.3 -5.0
HICP, % change 0.6 0.6 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.8 0.2
External balance, % of GDP -0.7 -1.2 -1.3 0.0 2.1 2.1 4.8 5.2 6.6 7.9 6.6 5.0
Trade balance, % of GDP 1.4 0.9 0.4 2.0 4.6 4.0 5.1 5.3 5.7 7.1 6.2 4.6
Balance of primary income, % of GDP -1.0 -1.1 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -0.7 1.0 1.2 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.8
Net foreign assets, % of GDP 2.9 0.2 1.3 -2.7 3.5 4.3 0.1 -11.4 -15.5 -16.7 -18.2
Government balance, % of GDP -2.2 -1.5 1.3 -2.8 -3.7 -4.0 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 0.2 0.0 -3.3
Government revenue, % change 2.9 4.1 2.2 -1.3 0.7 0.9 -0.5 1.9 4.2 4.8 2.5 -2.3
Government expenditure, % change 1.9 2.4 -3.8 8.0 2.6 1.8 -0.8 0.9 0.4 0.6 2.8 5.0
Structural balance, % of GDP -3.4 -3.4 -2.8 -2.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.5
Government debt, % of GDP 60.3 60.9 59.7 58.8 60.4 63.9 65.7 68.0 67.6 65.0 66.0 73.2
Source: Commission services. 
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the favourable depreciation rules. It appears, 
however, that the consumption of products on 
which VAT were raised had first risen and then 
fallen in response to the measure, reflecting the 
advance purchases of durable goods before the 
2007 VAT rate increase and the subsequent 
adjustment of the consumers' behaviour(204). 
Moreover, the increase in the standard VAT rate 
allowed financing a cut in the rate of contributions 
to the statutory unemployment insurance scheme, 
which reduced the relatively heavy burden of 
social security contributions on labour, trimming 
thus further down the unit labour costs. 
As a consequence of the crisis, net external lending 
has fallen by 4 pp. and is expected to stabilise at 
just below 4% of GDP in 2010 and 2011 (Graph 
2). This matches higher public sector net 
borrowing, while the net lending position of the 
corporate sector is likely to increase after the initial 
drop in 2008 and the net lending position of the 
households is set to remain roughly unchanged. 
The general government budget moved from a 
balanced position in 2008 into a deficit of 3.3% of 
GDP in 2009, driven by automatic stabilisers and 
fiscal stimulus and financial market stabilisation 
measures undertaken in response to the downturn. 
The deficit is projected to widen further to 5% of 
GDP in 2010 and is likely to fall to 4¾% of GDP 
in 2011 due to expiry of certain stimulus measures 
and slightly improved macroeconomic 
environment. Given the national constitutional 
commitment towards fiscal consolidation from 
2011 onwards(205) and the EDP requirements(206), 
Germany will have to pursue a substantial fiscal 
adjustment in the aftermath of the crisis (207).  
 
                                                          
(204) The VAT rate increase was announced more than one year 
in advance, thus the private households had time to adjust 
their expenditure plans.  
(205) The new constitutional budgetary rule, prescribes a 
structural deficit ceiling of 0.35% of GDP for the Federal 
government from 2016 onwards and balanced structural 
budgets for the Länder as of 2020.  
(206) See Council Recommendations to Germany of the 2 Dec. 
2009, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
sgp/pdf/30_edps/104-07_council/2009-12-02_de_126-
7_council_en.pdf  
(207) According to the most recent update of the German 
stability programme (2009-2013), in order to correct the 
excessive deficit by 2013, the government envisages an 
expenditure-based consolidation path with an average 
annual fiscal effort of almost ¾% of GDP in 2011-2013. 
5.3. IRELAND 
5.3.1. Housing boom fuelled external 
imbalances 
In the late 1980s Ireland started a rapid catching-
up process, built on an FDI- and export-led 
strategy(208), and supported by strong fiscal 
consolidation, structural reforms and a low 
corporate tax rate. The competitive position was 
strengthened by the tripartite social partnership 
process fostering wage moderation in return for a 
lighter income tax burden and enhanced welfare 
and labour market policies as well as by nominal 
depreciation of the national currency in the run-up 
to euro area entry. 
From the early 2000s domestic demand took over 
as the main driver of continued strong economic 
growth. The domestically-driven expansion was 
sustained by particularly buoyant housing demand 
going beyond what could be expected on the basis 
of fundamentals(209). The boom in demand 
produced higher price and wage inflation and tight 
labour market conditions, which were only partly 
relieved by increasing migration inflows. The 
latter, in turn, reinforced housing demand and fed 
the overgrowing building industry. 
Overinvestment in non-productive housing led to a 
marked decline in productivity growth, which, 
together with the appreciation of the euro since 
2002, weakened Ireland's competitive position 
(210). However, Ireland's export performance 
                                                          
(208) The 1990s saw significant FDI inflows from the US, while 
the UK maintained its strong presence in the Irish 
economy. In particular, major pharmaceutical and IT 
companies set up their operations in Ireland to serve the 
European and global markets. Later FDI inflows originated 
from euro area countries, and concerned the financial 
services sector (Honohan and Walsh, 2002).  
(209) The housing boom, which peaked in 2006, was fuelled by a 
relatively young and growing population, rapid income 
growth, low (and at times negative) real interest rates and 
easier access to credit - owing to financial liberalisation 
and interest rate convergence in the run-up to EMU - as 
well as a favourable property-related tax regime. However, 
these factors alone cannot fully explain the increase in the 
annual supply of new housing by 11% on average over the 
period 2000-2006, which went hand in hand with an 
average rise in new house prices by 11% and in residential 
mortgage lending by 25%. This led to an oversized 
construction industry, which in 2006 represented 13.3% of 
total employment (as against 8.2% for the euro area). 
(210) The real effective exchange rate based on unit labour costs 
appreciated by more than 40% between 2000 and 2008 
relative to EU member states and other major industrial 
countries.  
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remained rather dynamic, largely because the 
relatively capital-intensive multinational 
companies, which account for the bulk of Irish 
exports, suffered less than the more labour-
intensive indigenous sectors from declining 
competitiveness(211). The external balance, which 
had recorded surpluses for most of the 1990s, 
moved close to balance and remained there until 
2004. Only thereafter were the excess of especially 
housing-related investment over savings together 
with competitive losses reflected in an increasing 
external deficit, which peaked at 5.3% of GDP in 
2007. 
From the late 1990s and until 2007, the general 
government balance was generally in surplus. The 
improvement in the structural balance between 
2003 and 2006 was due to the very significant 
windfall revenues produced by the housing boom 
and tax-rich economic activity more generally,(212) 
whereas expenditure growth throughout this period 
exceeded that of nominal GDP(213). It was 
particularly buoyant in the areas of social transfers, 
the public sector wage bill and public investment. 
Overall, despite improvements in the structural 
balance, fiscal policy was insufficiently leaning 
against the wind and fed into deteriorating 
competitiveness. 
Looking at fiscal policy from a more micro-
economic perspective, a favourable tax treatment 
of housing is likely to have contributed to the 
expansion of the housing market. The tax system 
in Ireland is strongly biased towards home 
 
                                                          
                                                          
(211) Many of the usual macroeconomic data for Ireland should 
be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, while 
economic growth is usually measured in terms of GDP, 
GNI is probably a more appropriate measure for the Irish 
economy and living standards. The difference between 
GDP and GNI is net factor income, which is significantly 
negative in Ireland because of profit repatriations by 
multinationals. Irish GNI is about 15% smaller than GDP. 
Second, some sectors with a marked presence of 
multinational companies are likely to be characterised by 
transfer pricing, attracted by Ireland’s low tax rate on 
corporate profits. This distorts (i.e. exaggerates) standard 
measures of profits, output, productivity etc. (see Honohan 
and Walsh (2002)). 
(212) Taxes directly related to property are estimated to have 
increased by 2¾ percentage points of GDP between 2002 
and 2006 (Public Finance in EMU - 2008). Also other tax 
categories were boosted by the overall tax-rich composition 
of growth as an indirect effect of the property market cycle. 
(213) The gap was even bigger vis-à-vis the growth rate of 
potential GDP augmented with the ECB's inflation 
benchmark, which can be seen as a rate consistent with 
preserving competitiveness. 
ownership as compared to most other EU 
countries. Households are allowed a tax deduction 
on mortgage interest payments, while there is no 
tax on property values or imputed rent and only 
limited taxation of capital gains on residential 
property.(214) In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
there were some attempts to curb the incipient 
housing bubble through taxation policy, but most 
of the measures put in place were reversed and the 
property-related tax regime was even further 
relaxed in later years. Probably the clearest policy 
measure to dampen demand in the 2000s was the 
introduction of the five-year special saving 
incentive accounts in 2001 to encourage household 
savings,(215) but it was only recently, after the 
bursting of the housing bubble, that significant 
steps in the right direction have started to be taken. 
Fiscal incentives, including the low corporate tax 
rate, likely also played a role in attracting financial 
services FDI, which in turn contributed to the rapid 
growth of the financial services sector in 
Ireland(216). 
5.3.2. Policy response and relative price 
adjustments should help rebalance 
growth 
With the correction of the housing market after its 
2006 peak, a sharp domestic adjustment started, 
which has since spread to the wider economy. 
Given the very high degree of openness and the 
weight of the financial sector in the economy, the 
adjustment has been greatly amplified by the 
global economic and financial crisis. Irish real 
GDP fell by nearly 10% in 2008-09. Employment 
saw a broad-based cumulative decline in 2008-09 
by over 9%, with construction most badly hit (-
40%), while prices measured by the HICP fell by 
1.7% and nominal wages by an estimated near 2% 
in 2009. Sharp sustained falls in house prices point 
to some adjustment of relative prices taking place. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2010 forecast, economic activity will decline 
further in 2010, by 0.9%, before returning to 
growth in 2011. This outlook assumes a 
(214) See IMF, 2004 and Rae and van den Noord, 2006.  
(215) This government-sponsored scheme accumulated savings 
amounting to some 9% of GDP, the yields of which 
included a government-funded top-up and were paid out in 
2006-07, thus stimulating economic activity in those years. 
(216) In 2008, the share of financial intermediation services in 
nominal GVA was 10.2% in Ireland, more than double the 
share in the EA16.  
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continuation of the rebalancing of the domestic 
economy already underway in the form of sectoral 
and relative price adjustments.  
As regards Ireland's external position, the external 
deficit nearly halved to 2.9% of GDP in 2009 from 
its peak of 5.3% of GDP in 2007, with a further 
improvement projected for 2010-11 in the 
Commission services' spring 2010 forecast. 
However, the improvement in 2008-2009 was 
mainly driven by the strong decline in imports, 
reflecting the broad-based collapse of domestic 
demand, coupled with the more moderate 
reduction of exports. The ongoing changes in 
relative prices and incomes are contributing to 
making the needed adjustment more lasting. 
The Irish general government balance has seen a 
drastic deterioration since the onset of the crisis, 
from a broadly balanced position in 2007 to a 
double-digit deficit ratio in 2009. The fiscal 
deterioration has occurred in spite of the 
authorities’ significant consolidation efforts since 
mid-2008, with a net deficit-reducing effect of 
around 4% of GDP in 2009 and again in 2010. 
This is due to the collapse in revenues in the 
aftermath of the bursting of the housing market 
bubble, the wider recession and the difficulties to 
quickly bring expenditure in line with revenue 
developments, also in view of the increase in 
social spending and debt-servicing costs. The 
Commission services’ spring 2010 forecast expects 
the consolidation measures to stabilise underlying 
budgetary trends in 2010. The bulk (around two 
thirds) of the consolidation efforts undertaken so 
far is made up by expenditure reduction. Going 
forward, it is not yet clear to what extent the 
authorities’ medium-term consolidation strategy 
towards a deficit of 3% of GDP by 2014 presented 
in the December 2009 stability programme 
update(217) will be based on further current 
expenditure reductions, but a significant 
contribution seems likely. At the same time, 
measures to broaden the narrow Irish tax base are 
envisaged. These notably include the introduction 
of a property tax, which would reduce the bias of 
the tax system towards home ownership and 
thereby help to limit risks to competitiveness from 
property bubbles in the future.  
Empirically, an expenditure-based consolidation 
strategy tends to be more successful in securing a 
lasting improvement in the public finances and 
regaining market confidence than tax-based 
consolidation.(218) There is also some evidence 
based on Irish data suggesting that expenditure 
retrenchment can help to sustain and regain 
competitiveness by bringing about real 
depreciation. However, the composition of the 
adjustment matters. Consolidation focussed on 
current expenditure, especially compensation of 
employees, is most clearly correlated with real 
exchange rate depreciation, with more mixed 
results for public investment.(219) The expenditure-
(217) For details refer to the assessment of the December 2009 
stability programme available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/sgp/convergence/programmes/2009-
10_en.htm.  
(218) See e.g. European Commission (2007), part IV.   
(219) In a VAR analysis, Bénétrix and Lane (2009) find evidence 
that a discretionary negative shock to government spending 
is associated with real depreciation in the short run. 
Evidence that such effects could extend beyond the short 
term are found by Galstyan and Lane (2009). Regarding 
the composition, Bénétrix and Lane (2009) find that 
decreases in wage consumption and investment generate 
real exchange rate depreciation, while the evidence is more 
mixed for public non-wage consumption. Galstyan and 
Lane (2009) find that decreases in the relative level of 
government consumption are associated with depreciation 
of the CPI-based real exchange rate and a decrease in the 
relative price of non-tradables, while a decrease in the 
long-run level of relative government investment would 
have the opposite effect. 
 
Table IV.5.3: Key macroeconomic and budgetary indicators - Ireland 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP, % change 8.4 10.7 9.4 5.7 6.5 4.4 4.6 6.2 5.4 6 -3 -7.1
HIСР, % change 2.1 2.5 5.3 4 4.7 4 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 -1.7
External balance, % of GDP 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.1 0 0.9 0.1 -3.2 -4 -5.3 -5.2 -2.9
Trade balance, % of GDP 11.6 13.9 13.5 15.6 17.2 16.1 15 11.9 9.9 10.2 10.4 17.2
Balance of primary income, % of GDP -11.3 -13.9 -13.8 -15.5 -17 -14.5 -14.4 -14.3 -13 -14.4 -14.2 -18.8
Net foreign assets, % of GDP 25.8 50.5 -8 -15.3 -18 -20.1 -18 -24.7 -5.3 -19.5 -58.4
Government balance, % of GDP 2.3 2.6 4.8 0.9 -0.3 0.4 1.4 1.7 3 0.2 -7.2 -11.9
Government revenue, % change 11.5 15 14.1 5.5 8.1 8.7 10.9 10.1 14.7 5.2 -8.4 -11.3
Government expenditure, % change 8.7 13.8 6.5 18.3 12.2 6.4 7.7 9.4 10.7 13.7 11.1 -1
Structural balance, % of GDP -0.3 0.9 1.1 2 -1.6 -7 -9.4
Government debt, % of GDP 53.6 48.5 37.8 35.6 32.2 31 29.7 27.6 25 25.1 44.1 65.4
Source: Commission services. 
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reducing measures implemented so far in Ireland 
are more or less evenly spread across the public 
sector wage bill, public investment and other 
current spending. While public investment remains 
at a high level in a EU perspective (over 4½% of 
GDP in 2009-10), its containment will require a 
careful prioritisation of projects with a view to 
avoiding possible adverse effects on economic 
activity, including on competitiveness via 
productivity.  
The evidence thus suggests that the ongoing 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation efforts and 
the broadening of the tax base have a role to play 
in strengthening Irish competitiveness in the short 
to medium run, which should in turn help bring 
about a further durable reduction of the external 
imbalances.  
Finally, a more lasting improvement in the external 
balance will crucially have to be supported by 
adequate structural policies aimed at regaining 
competitiveness and rebalancing growth. 
Supporting the sectoral reallocation of labour from 
the non-tradable (e.g. construction) to the tradable 
sector will involve the re- and up-skilling of the 
newly-unemployed, while productivity-enhancing 
measures and adequate wage policies will also be 
important for the return to sustainable growth. 
5.4. ESTONIA 
5.4.1. A real estate boom fuelled external 
imbalances 
Estonia’s economic transition from a planned to a 
market economy started from a very low level of 
GDP per capita and productivity. After reaping 
early benefits from bold reform and stabilisation 
efforts by the mid-1990s, Estonia suffered a 
temporary setback in the wake of the 1998 Russian 
crisis. However, growth quickly resumed as of 
2000 and large financial inflows (both credit and 
FDIs), largely resulting from Estonia's financial 
integration into the EU banking system, helped the 
country to rapidly converge towards the EU 
average.  
 
                                                          
Soon after EU accession and till 2007, low or even 
negative real interest rates and the increasing 
financial integration with the EU promoted credit 
growth, imported capital. This, compounded by 
optimistic expectations about future income 
reflecting strong wage increases, resulted in a 
credit boom and bullish investment activity, with 
capital formation concentrating in financial and 
real-estate sectors (220), and exuberant 
consumption. As a result, GDP growth exceeded 
its potential, leading to accelerating inflation, in 
particular in housing and construction (221), as well 
as to widening external deficits. Real wage growth 
exceeded labour productivity growth, while 
performance of the tradable sectors became 
inadequate to finance the surge in imports and 
ensure the external sustainability of the economy 
as a whole. A loss of profitability and 
competitiveness hurt in particular low-skilled and 
labour-intensive sectors, including where Estonia's 
export volumes had considerably expanded in 
previous years (e.g. in "machinery" related to 
subcontracting arrangements with foreign 
companies). 
The strong GDP growth rates and the particular 
composition of growth led to large increases in 
government revenues, making it difficult to 
identify the underlying situation of the general 
government budgets. Estonia's budgetary 
framework contributed to a relatively solid track 
record and an accumulation of sizeable financial 
assets: over the 2002-2007 period, the general 
government balance was indeed in surplus, with a 
peak at the time of the real estate bubble. 
However, the fiscal rule could not prevent a surge 
in spending in the cyclical upturn, notably through 
ad hoc supplementary budgets. Windfalls 
stemming from higher prices and higher incomes 
were partly spent, with spending particularly 
buoyant in the areas of public investment, the 
public sector wage bill and social transfers. The 
structural balance progressively turned negative, 
pointing to an expansionary fiscal policy in good 
times and adding to the overheating of the whole 
economy. In the downturn, when windfall revenue 
disappeared, this led to a rapidly worsening fiscal 
balance. With hindsight, and based on the different 
view on potential growth formed now after the 
crisis, it is evident that the strength of the fiscal 
position was overestimated and that further 
tightening would have benefitted simultaneously 
the government balance and the stability of the 
economy. 
(220) See e.g. World Bank (2007). 
(221) See e.g. Brixiova and al. (2009) or Lamine (2009).  
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Looking at fiscal policy from a more micro-
economic angle, measures aimed at promoting 
economic stability were also insufficient. Despite 
some efforts (222) to rein in the excessive credit 
boom, existing institutions did not succeed in 
preventing the emergence of a bubble. In 
particular, while in 2003 a decision was made to 
limit the deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments(223), real estate taxation remained 
globally underdeveloped.(224) The favourable 
taxation framework, both for reinvested profits and 
real estate, likely contributed to the unfolding of 
the real estate bubble(225). Overall, tax revenue 
appeared insufficiently diversified and policies 
more directed at fostering growth, than at 
stabilizing the economy. 
(222) Estonia's currency regime (currency board arrangement - 
CBA) leaves little room for discretionary monetary policy. 
However, there is scope for prudential supervisory 
measures: in 2005, the central bank raised the risk 
weighting on housing loans used for calculating capital 
adequacy from 50 to 100%. In September 2006, the bank 
raised the mandatory reserve requirements for banks from 
13 to 15%. Regulations of this stringency were established 
nowhere else in the EU. 
(223) Deduction of interest rates on housing loans has not yet 
been abandoned. Still, it was decided at the end of 2003 to 
reduce the maximum limit for all deductions from taxable 
annual income from 100,000 to 50,000 kroons. In 2008, 
deductions were worth around 1% of GDP. 
(224) Real estate activity is encouraged through several fiscal 
provisions or absence of provisions: tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments (in 2008, still 1% of GDP), 
housing loan guarantees provided by the Credit and export 
Guarantee Fund, property tax limited to land, with the last 
update of the land asset value dating back to 2001, absence 
of imputed rental income for owner-occupied buildings, 
non-taxation of capital gains from selling certain residential 
property, the absence of corporate tax on reinvested profits 
which offers the possibility of tax exemption for capital 
gains and renting profits. 
(225) See Brixiova et al. (2009), Lamine (2010) and OECD 
(2009). 
5.4.2. Policy response and relative price 
adjustments help rebalance growth 
In 2007, growing imbalances appeared 
unsustainable, prompting the bursting of the real 
estate bubble, with interest rates rising and credit 
conditions tightening. The reversal of the 
unsustainably buoyant domestic demand resulted 
in a sharp output contraction in the sectors that 
contributed previously to the high growth rates, 
particularly in construction, financial 
intermediation and retail trade. However, the 
adjustment rapidly spread to the wider economy, 
as the openness and small size of the country 
amplified the impact of the global crisis. Real GDP 
growth sharply declined from an annual average of 
8.9% in 2005-2007 down to a total contraction of 
nearly 18% in 2008-09. Employment fell by 9.2% 
in 2009, while wage growth turned negative (-
4.6%), pulling consumer price inflation into 
negative territory in summer 2009. After this sharp 
correction, the economy is currently expected to 
revert to growth in 2010 and more significantly in 
2011. This outlook assumes a continuation of the 
ongoing rebalancing towards tradable activities as 
well as of the relative price adjustments.  
 
A collapse in imports induced a considerable 
narrowing of the merchandise trade deficit: in 
2008, the external deficit halved (from -16.8% of 
GDP in 2007) and, in 2009, reverted to a surplus, 
which is likely to persist in 2010-11.Despite 
resilient surpluses in exports of services, the 
improvement is to a large extent cyclical. It was 
indeed driven by a strong decline in imports, 
reflecting the broad-based collapse of domestic 
 
Table IV.5.4: Key macroeconomic and budgetary indicators - Estonia 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP, % change 6.7 -0.3 10.0 7.5 7.9 7.6 7.2 9.4 10.0 7.2 -3.6 -14.1
HICP, % change 8.8 3.1 3.9 5.6 3.6 1.4 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.7 10.6 0.2
Wages (gross monthly), % change 10.5 12.3 11.5 9.4 8.4 10.8 16.5 20.5 13.9 -4.6
Wages in public administration and defence, % change 10.0 10.7 12.7 8.7 8.2 9.5 13.7 24.6 16.1 -7.3
External balance, % of GDP -8.6 -4.3 -4.9 -4.9 -10.1 -10.6 -10.6 -9.2 -14.7 -16.8 -8.4 7.4
Current account balance, % of GDP -8.6 -4.3 -5.4 -5.2 -10.6 -11.3 -11.3 -10.0 -16.9 -17.8 -9.4 4.6
Trade balance, % of GDP -9.7 -4.5 -3.3 -2.1 -7.0 -7.4 -7.0 -6.4 -12.1 -11.7 -4.3 5.9
Balance of primary income, % of GDP -1.5 -1.8 -3.6 -4.5 -4.4 -5.3 -5.3 -4.1 -5.2 -6.8 -6.3 -2.9
Net foreign assets, % of GDP -36.6 -51.7 -48.2 -48.3 -54.1 -65.9 -86.5 -85.2 -74.6 -74.3 -75.3 -81.8
General government balance, % of GDP -0.7 -3.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 -2.8 -1.7
General government revenue, % change 9.3 1.4 12.5 9.5 15.7 13.5 8.5 14.1 21.9 21.8 2.0 0.6
General government expenditure, % change 17.7 9.1 3.4 9.0 14.6 9.1 8.4 14.1 19.7 20.8 17.9 -2.0
Structural balance, % of GDP 1.2 2.0 0.4 -0.9 -1.0 -4.4 -2.5
Government debt, % of GDP 5.5 6.0 5.1 4.8 5.7 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.5 3.8 4.6 6.5
Source:  Commission services, Bank of Estonia/Eesti Pank, Statistics Estonia. 
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demand and a more moderate reduction in exports. 
When domestic demand growth eventually 
resumes, the initial overshooting of the fall in 
imports will likely disappear, and the current 
account balance is likely to return to deficit. 
Efforts to improve competitiveness and 
productivity should contribute to preventing 
excessive imbalances re-emerging. (226)  
While Estonia's general government balance 
deteriorated in the course of the crisis, the 
authorities successfully managed to limit the 
headline general government deficits to 2.8% in 
2008 and 1.7% of GDP in 2009. This was achieved 
through huge pro-cyclical consolidation efforts 
since mid-2008(227), accounting for more than 9% 
of GDP in 2009(228) and 4% in 2010. In parallel, 
sizeable fiscal reserves accumulated in surplus 
years allowed limiting public borrowing. 
According to the 2010 update of the Convergence 
Programme, the deficit ratio should be only 
slightly higher in 2010 before diminishing in 2011 
and reverting to surpluses by 2013. However, the 
budgetary outcomes are still subject to the 
uncertain macroeconomic environment and, with 
respect to 2010, the reliance on some volatile 
revenue items. 
Even without any cut in public expenditure, the 
deep recession would have led to a large cyclical 
reversal in the external balance. Nevertheless, 
through changes in relative prices and incomes, the 
huge fiscal consolidation efforts have contributed 
to improving the competitiveness position. In 
particular, the consolidation efforts undertaken so 
far have been focused on expenditure reduction 
(two-thirds of the total effort), most of them with a 
lasting impact. Estonia's experience also suggests 
that expenditure restraint, in particular focused on 
the public sector wage bill and other current 
spending, can actually bring about real exchange 
rate depreciation, securing thereby the necessary 
recovery in cost-competitiveness. (229) Conversely, 
 
                                                                                                                                            (226) See Lamine (2010). 
(227) Nevertheless, in 2008, while revenue already collapsed, 
nominal expenditure growth was still at 18%. 
(228) 9% of discretionary cuts compared to the policies in place 
before that.  
(229) With respect to revenue, a reduction in the total tax wedge 
on labour could however contribute to further improving 
competitiveness: the flat personal and corporate income tax 
rate was reduced from 26% in 2005 to 21% in 2008. 
However, in the downturn, several increases in the 
contribution rates to the unemployment insurance fund 
public investment remains at a high level (over 6% 
of GDP in 2009), but with a careful prioritisation 
of projects to ensure productive investment (in 
infrastructure, education and R&D) and co-
financing from EU funds. In parallel, a 
frontloading and redesigning of the latter has made 
possible a stimulus package consisting of lending 
support to enterprises (including exporting 
enterprises (230) and increased amounts devoted to 
active labour market policies (extending a pre-
existing wage subsidy scheme).  
Estonia's general government debt burden will 
remain the lowest in the EU in the coming years, 
due to the efforts to limit the crisis budget deficits 
to 3% of GDP, as well as to revert to a balanced 
budget as soon as the crisis is over. Moreover, 
jointly with the perspective of euro adoption, 
sound budgetary policies make the country 
attractive to long-term investment, which in turn 
should foster technological progress and higher-
value exports. This in turn could attract foreign 
capital and may deteriorate the current account 
balance. The prudent fiscal policy has been one of 
the major elements of macroeconomic policy 
differentiating Estonia from its Baltic neighbours 
during the last decade, improving the prospects of 
euro adoption.  
Looking forward, in the absence of an independent 
monetary policy, fiscal policy needs to take 
account of possible overheating risks and external 
imbalances. Another real estate bubble cannot be 
excluded in the longer term, when a new cohort of 
borrowers will arrive on the market: the average 
real interest rate might start declining as euro 
adoption becomes increasingly factored into 
market rates. At that time, extending the tax base 
to more stability-oriented revenue sources may 
reinforce the predictability of government incomes 
and surpluses in excess of MTO in the long run. 
Removing the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments as well as reinforcing real estate 
taxation could be among the policy options to 
 
appeared necessary, increasing thereby the total tax wedge 
on labour. The latter is now high by OECD standards 
(notably social contributions) and constitutes vulnerability 
in a weak labour market as well as a potential hindrance to 
competitiveness.  
(230) In addition, a law establishing a state-owned insurance 
company aiming exclusively at supporting exporting 
companies was adopted in late 2009: the company should 
be operational since February 2010. 
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prevent real estate boom/bust from recurring, as 
well as a crowding-out effect from harming 
corporate financing. At the same time, measures to 
prevent a re-emergence of excessive consumer 
credit or to contain consumption, may be useful.  
Finally, when GDP growth has resumed, the need 
to avoid temptations to ease fiscal policy will 
reinforce the case for institutionalising good 
practices. Therefore, in the future, more formal 
expenditure ceilings and/or revenue rules and 
strengthened budgetary processes might play a role 
in maintaining macroeconomic stability.   
Continuing on the positive track record of 
structural reforms will also help Estonia to further 
strengthen its domestic and external adjustment 
capacity, as well as its fiscal position.  Wage 
adjustment is expected to continue in 2010, with 
the new Labour Law further strengthening labour 
market flexibility. Regarding productivity, 
domestic enterprises are mostly SMEs and their 
capacity to invest in R&D is limited. However, 
public policy aimed at promoting R&D as well as 
innovation, both public and private, contribute to 
ensuring that Estonia continues to climb the 
technological ladder (231) and progressively shifts 
to a predominance of medium-to-high tech 
exports. In parallel, efforts made to ensure that 
labour skills and training systems meet the 
evolving market needs reinforce the ongoing shift 
to more sophisticated exports. 
5.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The divergence in competitiveness and current 
accounts can be ascribed to a range of factors. 
Some of them reflect the normal functioning of the 
globalised and increasingly integrated EU 
economy, such as Balassa-Samuelson effects, price 
level convergence and a healthy response to 
                                                          (231) Estonia has been climbing the technology ladder from low 
tech (LT) exports in the late nineties to medium-to-low 
tech (MLT) exports in this decade. The dynamism of 
medium-to-high tech (MHT) exports augurs relatively well 
for future trade developments. Conversely, a successful 
high-tech (HT) episode in the late nineties was made 
possible by specific sub-contracting arrangements on low 
value-added operations in the electronic industry and by 
exceptional cost-competitiveness conditions which have 
now disappeared. As a result, the development of genuine 
HT exports in a broader product range than in the late 
nineties seems to be a longer term prospect (Lamine, 
2010).  
cyclical differences between Member States. EU 
enlargement added to the effects of increasingly 
integrated global markets. Equally, the euro has 
facilitated the divergence in current accounts by 
giving euro-area catching-up economies better 
access to international capital markets, facilitating 
the financing of larger trade deficits. (232) These 
capital flows and corresponding excesses of 
domestic investment over savings played an 
important role in the real convergence and 
catching up process. They allowed a faster build-
up of the capital stock than would have occurred 
through domestic savings alone. 
However, the divergences also have less benign 
causes warranting close monitoring and 
adjustment. The capital flows increasingly 
financed unsustainable trends in consumption and 
unproductive investment, particularly in housing 
construction. They reflected increases in wages 
beyond what was warranted by the increase in the 
capital stock, increases in consumption by more 
than what was justified by increases in future 
incomes, and credit growth fed by housing price 
and construction bubbles. The booming domestic 
demand thus contributed to an increasing loss in 
competitiveness in external deficit countries. The 
imbalances led to the accumulation of high private 
sector and external debt, a surge in house prices 
and increased vulnerability to abrupt changes in 
financial market conditions.  
Budgetary policy played a role in the build-up of 
imbalances: directly, by contributing little to 
aggregate saving; and indirectly by contributing to 
dissaving through its effects on private sector 
decisions. Its importance relative to private sector 
developments and its capacity to affect private 
sector imbalances is still subject to debate. (233)  
(232) European Commission (2009) provides a recent detailed 
discussion of the build up of competitiveness and external 
imbalances.  Langedijk and Roeger (2007), using a DSGE 
model to analyse adjustment in the Euro area, find that the 
absence of an exchange risk premium in EMU allows an 
increase in capital mobility resulting in a lower correlation 
between domestic savings and investment. Due to the 
absence of (exchange rate) risk premia, investment – and 
especially housing investment - responds strongly to 
exogenous shocks.    
(233) See also section IV.2 for a review of literature on the 
impact of fiscal balances on current account balances. 
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Member States 
BE Belgium 
BG Bulgaria 
CZ Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE Germany 
EE Estonia  
EI  Ireland 
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 
IT  Italy 
CY Cyprus 
LV Latvia 
LT Lithuania 
LU  Luxembourg 
HU Hungary 
MT Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
AT  Austria 
PL Poland 
PT  Portugal 
RO Romania 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
FI  Finland 
Part V 
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SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
 
EA Euro area 
EU European Union 
EU-25 European Union, 25 Member States (excl. BG and RO) 
EU-27 European Union, 27 Member States 
EU-15  European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004  
EU-10 European Union, 10 Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004  
(CZ, EE, CY, LV, LH, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) 
Non-EU countries 
AU  Australia 
CA  Canada 
CH  Switzerland 
JP   Japan 
KO South Korea 
NO Norway 
NZ  New Zeeland  
US(A)  United States  
Currencies 
EUR  euro 
ECU  European currency unit 
BGL Bulgarian lev 
CZK  Czech koruna 
DKK  Danish krone 
EEK  Estonian kroon 
GBP  Pound sterling 
 
LTL Lithuanian litas 
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LVL Latvian lats 
HUF Hungarian forint 
RON New Rumanian leu 
SEK  Swedish krona 
SKK Slovak koruna 
CAD  Canadian dollar 
CHF  Swiss franc 
JPY  Japanese yen 
SUR  Russian rouble 
USD  US dollar 
Other  
AMC      Asset management company 
AMECO Macro-economic database of the European Commission 
CAPB Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
CMFB    Committee on monetary, financial and balance-of-payment statistics 
COFOG Classification of the functions of government 
DEA  Data envelope approach 
DG ECFIN Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs 
DR Debt requirement 
DSGE Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
DWF      Discount window facility 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Council 
EDP Excessive deficit procedure 
EERP European Economic Recovery Plan 
EFC Economic and Financial Committee 
 
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union 
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EPC Economic Policy Committee 
ESA(95) European System of National and Regional Accounts 
ESSPROS European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
EU KLEMS European database on capital, labour, energy, material and services 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLS  Generalised least squares 
IBP Initial budgetary position 
ICT  Information and communication technologies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INSEE   Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 
ISCED   International Standard Classification of Education 
LIME     Working group on methodology to assess Lisbon-related Structural Reforms 
LTC Long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
MTBF  Medium-term budgetary framework 
MTO Medium-term budgetary objective 
NAIRU  Non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary least squares 
PBB  Performance-based budgeting 
PISA  Programme for International Student Assessment 
pp Percentage points 
PPS Purchasing power standard 
QPF Quality of public finances 
R&D Research and development 
RAMS  Recently acceded Member States 
 
RoEA Rest of euro area 
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ROW Rest of the world 
SCPs Stability and convergence programmes 
SFEF     Société de financement de l'économie française 
SGP  Stability and Growth Pact 
SLS       Special liquidity scheme 
SSC Social security contributions 
TFP  Total factor productivity 
VAT Value added tax 
WGHQPF Working Group on the quality of public finance 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Asset management company  Public or private 
body aiming at restructuring, recovering or 
disposing of nonperforming assets.  
Automatic stabilisers  Features of the tax and 
spending regime which react automatically to the 
economic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a 
result, the budget balance in percent of GDP tends 
to improve in years of high growth, and deteriorate 
during economic slowdowns. 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)  
Annual guidelines for the economic and budgetary 
policies of the Member States. They are prepared 
by the Commission and adopted by the Council of 
Ministers responsible for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECOFIN). 
Budget balance  The balance between total public 
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a 
positive balance indicating a surplus and a 
negative balance indicating a deficit. For the 
monitoring of Member State budgetary positions, 
the EU uses general government aggregates. See 
also structural budget balance, primary budget 
balance, and primary structural balance. 
Budgetary rules  Rules and procedures through 
which policy-makers decide on the size and the 
allocation of public expenditure as well as on its 
financing through taxation and borrowing. 
Budgetary sensitivity  The variation in the budget 
balance in percentage of GDP brought about by a 
change in the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated 
to be 0.5 on average. 
Candidate countries  Countries that wish to 
accede to the EU. Besides the accession countries, 
they include Croatia and Turkey. 
Close-to-balance requirement  A requirement 
contained in the 'old' Stability and Growth Pact, 
according to which Member States should, over 
the medium term, achieve an overall budget 
balance close to balance or in surplus; was 
replaced by country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives in the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Code of Conduct  Policy document endorsed by 
the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005 setting 
down the specifications on the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the format and 
content of the stability and convergence 
programmes. 
COFOG  (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) A statistical nomenclature used to 
break down general government expenditure into 
its different functions  including general public 
services, defence, public order and safety, 
economic affairs, environmental protection, 
housing and community amenities, health, 
recreation, culture and religion, education and 
social protection. 
Composite indicator: a compilation of several 
indicators into a single index reflecting the 
different dimensions of a measured concept. 
Convergence programmes  Medium-term 
budgetary and monetary strategies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. 
They are updated annually, according to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Prior 
to the third phase of EMU, convergence 
programmes were issued on a voluntary basis and 
used by the Commission in its assessment of the 
progress made in preparing for the euro. See also 
stability programmes. 
Crowding-out effects  Offsetting effects on output 
due to changes in interest rates and exchange rates 
triggered by a loosening or tightening of fiscal 
policy. 
Cyclical component of budget balance  That part 
of the change in the budget balance that follows 
automatically from the cyclical conditions of the 
economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and 
expenditure to changes in the output gap. See 
automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing and structural 
budget balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance  See 
structural budget balance. 
Defined-benefit pension scheme  A traditional 
pension scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a 
pension, for an employee upon that employee's 
retirement is a defined benefit plan. 
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Defined-contribution pension scheme  A scheme 
providing for an individual account for each 
participant, and for benefits based solely on the 
amount contributed to the account, plus or minus 
income, gains, expenses and losses allocated to the 
account. 
Demand and supply shocks  Disturbances that 
affect the economy on the demand side (e.g. 
changes in private consumption or exports) or on 
the supply side (e.g. changes in commodity prices 
or technological innovations). They can impact on 
the economy either on a temporary or permanent 
basis. 
Dependency ratio  A measure of the ratio of 
people who receive government transfers, 
especially pensions, relative to those who are 
available to provide the revenue to pay for those 
transfers. 
Direct fiscal costs (gross, net) of a financial 
crisis  The direct gross costs are the fiscal outlays 
in support of the financial sector that increase the 
level of public debt. They encompass, for example, 
recapitalisation, purchase of troubled bank assets, 
pay-out to depositors, liquidity support, payment 
when guarantees are called and subsidies. The 
direct net costs are the direct gross cost net of 
recovery payments, such as through the sale of 
acquired assets or returns on assets. Thus, the net 
direct fiscal costs reflect the permanent increase in 
public debt. 
Direct taxes  Taxes that are levied directly on 
personal or corporate incomes and property. 
Discretionary fiscal policy  Change in the budget 
balance and in its components under the control of 
government. It is usually measured as the residual 
of the change in the balance after the exclusion of 
the budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers. See 
also fiscal stance. 
Early-warning mechanism  Part of the preventive 
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is 
activated when there is significant divergence from 
the budgetary targets set down in a stability or 
convergence programme. 
 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)  
Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a 
Committee of the Council of the European Union 
set up by Article 114 of the. Its main task is to 
prepare and discuss (ECOFIN) Council decisions 
with regard to economic and financial matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC)  Group of 
senior government officials whose main task is to 
prepare discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council on 
structural policies. It plays an important role in the 
preparation of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, and it is active on policies related to 
labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically-
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
Effective tax rate  The ratio of broad categories of 
tax revenue (labour income, capital income, 
consumption) to their respective tax bases. 
Effectiveness  The same concept as efficiency 
except that it links input to outcomes rather than 
outputs. 
Efficiency  Can be defined in several ways, either 
as the ratio of outputs to inputs or as the distance 
to a production possibility frontier (see also Free 
Disposable Hull analysis, Data Envelope analysis, 
stochastic frontier analysis). Cost efficiency 
measures the link between monetary inputs (funds) 
and outputs; technical efficiency measures the link 
between technical inputs and outputs. Output 
efficiency indicates by how much the output can be 
increased for a given input; input efficiency 
indicates by how much the input can be reduced 
for a given input. 
ESA95 / ESA79  European accounting standards 
for the reporting of economic data by the Member 
States to the EU. As of 2000, ESA95 has replaced 
the earlier ESA79 standard with regard to the 
comparison and analysis of national public finance 
data. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)  A procedure 
according to which the Commission and the 
Council monitor the development of national 
budget balances and public debt in order to assess 
and/or correct the risk of an excessive deficit in 
each Member State. Its application has been 
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
See also stability programmes and Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Expenditure rules  A subset of fiscal rules that 
target (a subset of) public expenditure. 
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Fiscal consolidation  An improvement in the 
budget balance through measures of discretionary 
fiscal policy, either specified by the amount of the 
improvement or the period over which the 
improvement continues. 
Fiscal decentralisation  The transfer of authority 
and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to intermediate and local 
governments or to the market. 
Fiscal federalism  A subfield of public finance 
that investigates the fiscal relations across levels of 
government. 
Fiscal governance  Comprises all rules, 
regulations and procedures that impact on how the 
budget and its components are being prepared. The 
terms fiscal governance and fiscal frameworks are 
used interchangeably in the report. 
Fiscal impulse  The estimated effect of fiscal 
policy on GDP. It is not a model-free measure and 
it is usually calculated by simulating an 
econometric model. The estimates presented in the 
present report are obtained by using the 
Commission services’ QUEST model. 
Fiscal institutions  Independent public bodies, 
other than the central bank, which prepare 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, monitor 
the fiscal performance and/or advice the 
government on fiscal policy issues. 
Fiscal rule  A permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator 
of fiscal performance, such as the government 
budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major 
component thereof. See also budgetary rule, 
expenditure rules. 
Fiscal stance  A measure of the effect of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In this report, it is 
defined as the change in the primary structural 
budget balance relative to the preceding period. 
When the change is positive (negative) the fiscal 
stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). 
 
General government  As used by the EU in its 
process of budgetary surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the excessive deficit 
procedure, the general government sector covers 
national government, regional and local 
government, as well as social security funds. 
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to 
and from the EU Budget. 
Government budget constraint  A basic 
condition applying to the public finances, 
according to which total public expenditure in any 
one year must be financed by taxation, government 
borrowing, or changes in the monetary base. In the 
context of EMU, the ability of governments to 
finance spending through money issuance is 
prohibited. See also stock-flow adjustment, 
sustainability. 
Government contingent liabilities  Obligations 
for the government that are subject to the 
realization of specific uncertain and discrete future 
events. For instance, the guarantees granted by 
governments to the debt of private corporations 
bonds issued by enterprise are contingent 
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay 
depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to 
honour its own obligations. 
Government implicit liabilities  Government 
obligations that are very likely to arise in the future 
in spite of the absence of backing contracts or law. 
The government may have a potential future 
obligation as a result of legitimate expectations 
generated by past practice or as a result of the 
pressure by interest groups. Most implicit 
liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the 
occurrence of uncertain future events. 
Growth accounting  A technique based on a 
production function approach where total GDP (or 
national income) growth is decomposed into the 
various production factors and a non-explained 
part which is the total factor productivity change, 
also often termed the Solow residual. 
Indirect taxation  Taxes that are levied during the 
production stage, and not on the income and 
property arising from economic production 
processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation 
are the value added tax (VAT), excise duties, 
import levies, energy and other environmental 
taxes. 
Integrated guidelines  A general policy 
instrument for coordinating EU-wide and Member 
States economic structural reforms embedded in 
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the Lisbon strategy and which main aim is to boost 
economic growth and job creation in the EU. 
Interest burden  General government interest 
payments on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
Partnership between the EU and Member States 
for growth and more and better jobs. Originally 
approved in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was 
revamped in 2005. Based on the Integrated 
Guidelines (merger of the broad economic policy 
guidelines and the employment guidelines, dealing 
with macro-economic, micro-economic and 
employment issues) for the period 2005-2008, 
Member States drew up three-year national reform 
programmes at the end of 2005. They reported on 
the implementation of the national reform 
programmes for the first time in autumn 2006. The 
Commission analyses and summarises these 
reports in an EU Annual Progress Report each 
year, in time for the Spring European Council. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt and 
deficits  Respectively, a 60 % general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and a 3 % general government 
deficit-to-GDP ratio. These thresholds are defined 
in a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union. See also Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Maturity structure of public debt  The profile of 
total debt in terms of when it is due to be paid 
back. Interest rate changes affect the budget 
balance directly to the extent that the general 
government sector has debt with a relatively short 
maturity structure. Long maturities reduce the 
sensitivity of the budget balance to changes in the 
prevailing interest rate. See also public debt. 
Medium-term budgetary framework  An 
institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond 
the annual budgetary calendar (typically 3-5 
years). Targets can be adjusted under medium-
term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) either on an 
annul basis (flexible frameworks) or only at the 
end of the MTBF horizon (fixed frameworks).  
 
Medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
According to the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact, stability programmes and convergence 
programmes present a medium-term objective for 
the budgetary position. It is country-specific to 
take into account the diversity of economic and 
budgetary positions and developments as well as 
of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public 
finances, and is defined in structural terms (see 
structural balance). 
Minimum benchmarks  The lowest value of the 
structural budget balance that provides a safety 
margin against the risk of breaching the Maastricht 
reference value for the deficit during normal 
cyclical fluctuations. The minimum benchmarks 
are estimated by the European Commission. They 
do not cater for other risks such as unexpected 
budgetary developments and interest rate shocks. 
They are a lower bound for the 'medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTO). 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  An indicator 
combining the change in real short-term interest 
rate and in the real effective exchange rate to 
gauge the degree of easing or tightening of 
monetary policy. 
Mundell-Fleming model  Macroeconomic model 
of an open economy which embodies the main 
Keynesian hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity 
preference). In spite of its shortcomings, it remains 
useful in short-term economic policy analysis. 
NAIRU  Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment. 
Non-Keynesian effects  Supply-side and 
expectations effects which reverse the sign of 
traditional Keynesian multipliers. Hence, if non-
Keynesian effects dominate, fiscal consolidation 
would be expansionary. 
Old age dependency ratio  Population aged over 
65 as a percentage of working age population 
(usually defined as persons aged between 15 and 
64). 
One-off and temporary measures Government 
transactions having a transitory budgetary effect 
that does not lead to a sustained change in the 
budgetary position. See also structural balance. 
Outcome indicator Measures the ultimate results 
(outcomes) of policy choices (e.g. education 
attainment, healthy life years, economic growth).  
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Output costs from a financial crisis  This is the 
gap between the hypothetical output development 
without a crisis and the actual output realised 
against the back of the crisis. Various methods are 
available to calculate output losses, in particular 
either using the trend GDP growth or the level of 
GDP as a benchmark.  
Output gap  The difference between actual output 
and estimated potential output at any particular 
point in time. See also cyclical component of 
budget balance. 
Output indicator  Measures the technical results 
(outputs) of policy choices (e.g. number of 
university graduates, number of patents, life 
expectancy). 
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG)  Pension 
system in which current pension expenditures are 
financed by the contributions of current 
employees. 
Pension fund A legal entity set up to accumulate, 
manage and administer pension assets. See also 
private pension scheme. 
Performance-based budgeting A budgeting 
technique that links budget appropriations to 
performance (outcomes, results) rather than 
focusing on input controls. In practice, 
performance-informed budgeting is more common 
which basis decisions on budgetary allocation on 
performance information without establishing a 
formal link. 
Policy-mix  The overall stance of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The policy-mix may consist of 
various combinations of expansionary and 
restrictive policies, with a given fiscal stance being 
either supported or offset by monetary policy. 
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given 
year that is consistent with a stable rate of 
inflation. If actual output rises above its potential 
level, then constraints on capacity begin to bind 
and inflationary pressures build; if output falls 
below potential, then resources are lying idle and 
inflationary pressures abate. See also production 
function method and output gap. 
 
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs)  
Annual programmes submitted by candidate 
countries which set the framework for economic 
policies The PEPs consist of a review of recent 
economic developments, a detailed 
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public 
finance issues and an outline of the structural 
reform agenda. 
Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Framework 
(PFSF)  Framework for budgetary surveillance of 
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It 
closely approximates the policy co-ordination and 
surveillance mechanisms at EU level. 
Primary budget balance  The budget balance net 
of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primary structural budget balance  The 
structural budget balance net of interest payments. 
Principal components  A statistical technique 
used to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower 
dimensions for analysis. This technique provides a 
compression of a set of high dimensional vectors 
(or variables) into a set of lower dimensional 
vectors (or variables) and then reconstructing the 
original set summarizing the information into a 
limited number of values. 
Private pension schemes   The insurance contract 
specifies a schedule of contribution in exchange of 
which benefits will be paid when the members 
reach a specific retirement age. The transactions 
are between the individual and the insurance 
provider and they are not recorded as government 
revenues or government expenditure and, 
therefore, do not have an impact on government 
surplus or deficit. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy  A fiscal stance which 
amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the 
structural primary deficit during an economic 
upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A 
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance unchanged over the economic 
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See 
also tax-smoothing. 
Production function approach  A method to 
estimate the level of potential output of an 
economy based on available labour inputs, the 
capital stock and their level of efficiency. Potential 
output is used to estimate the output gap, a key 
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input in the estimation of cyclical component of the 
budget. 
Public debt  Consolidated gross debt for the 
general government sector. It includes the total 
nominal value of all debt owed by public 
institutions in the Member State, except that part 
of the debt which is owed to other public 
institutions in the same Member State. 
Public goods  Goods and services that are 
consumed jointly by several economic agents and 
for which there is no effective pricing mechanism 
that would allow private provision through the 
market. 
Public investment  The component of total public 
expenditure through which governments increase 
and improve the stock of capital employed in the 
production of the goods and services they provide. 
Public-private partnerships (PPP)  Agreements 
that transfer investment projects to the private 
sector that traditionally have been executed or 
financed by the public sector. To qualify as a PPP, 
the project should concern a public function, 
involve the general government as the principal 
purchaser, be financed from non-public sources 
and engage a corporation outside the general 
government as the principal operator that provides 
significant inputs in the design and conception of 
the project and bears a relevant amount of the risk. 
Quality of public finances  Comprises all 
arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that 
support the macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, 
in particular economic growth. 
Quasi-fiscal activities  Activities promoting 
public policy goals carried out by non-government 
units. 
QUEST  The macroeconomic model of the EU 
Member States plus the US and Japan developed 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
 
Recently acceded Member States  Countries that 
became members of the EU in May 2004 and 
include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Two additional countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria joined in January 2007. 
Ricardian equivalence  Under fairly restrictive 
theoretical assumptions on the consumer’s 
behaviour (inter alia infinite horizon for decision 
making), the impact of fiscal policy does not 
depend on whether it is financed by tax increases 
or by a widening deficit. The basic reasoning 
behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and 
was revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s. 
Securitisation  Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with 
the intention of paying interest and capital out of 
the proceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or 
from future revenue flows. 
Sensitivity analysis  An econometric or statistical 
simulation designed to test the robustness of an 
estimated economic relationship or projection, 
given various changes in the underlying 
assumptions. 
Significant divergence  A sizeable excess of the 
budget balance over the targets laid out in the 
stability or convergence programmes, that triggers 
the Early warning procedure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Size of the public sector  Typically measured as 
the ratio of public expenditure to nominal GDP. 
‘Snow-ball’ effect  The self-reinforcing effect of 
public debt accumulation or decumulation arising 
from a positive or negative differential between the 
interest rate paid on public debt and the growth 
rate of the national economy. See also government 
budget constraint. 
Social security contributions (SSC)  Mandatory 
contributions paid by employers and employees to 
a social insurance scheme to cover for pension, 
health care and other welfare provisions. 
Sovereign bond spread  The difference between 
risk premiums imposed by financial markets on 
sovereign bonds for different states. Higher risk 
premiums can largely stem from (i) the debt 
service ratio, also reflecting the countries' ability to 
raise their taxes for a given level of GDP, (ii) the 
fiscal track record, (iii) expected future deficits, 
and (iv) the degree of risk aversion. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)  Approved in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
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surveillance of Member State budgetary policies 
and the monitoring of budget deficits during the 
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two 
Council Regulations setting out legally binding 
provisions to be followed by the European 
Institutions and the Member States and two 
Resolutions of the European Council in 
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. 
Stability programmes  Medium-term budgetary 
strategies presented by those Member States that 
have already adopted the euro. They are updated 
annually, according to the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. See also Convergence 
programmes. 
Stock-flow adjustment  The stock-flow 
adjustment (also known as the debt-deficit 
adjustment) ensures consistency between the net 
borrowing (flow) and the variation in the stock of 
gross debt. It includes the accumulation of 
financial assets, changes in the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining 
statistical adjustments. 
Structural budget balance  The actual budget 
balance net of the cyclical component and one-off 
and other temporary measures. The structural 
balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in 
the budget balance. See also primary structural 
budget balance. 
Sustainability  A combination of budget deficits 
and debt that ensure that the latter does not grow 
without bound. While conceptually intuitive, an 
agreed operational definition of sustainability has 
proven difficult to achieve. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative 
change in tax revenues with respect to a relative 
change in GDP. The tax elasticity is an input to the 
budgetary sensitivity. 
Tax gaps  Measure used in the assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances. They measure the 
difference between the current tax ratio and the 
constant tax ratio over a given projection period to 
achieve a predetermined level of debt at the end of 
that projection period. 
Tax smoothing  The idea that tax rates should be 
kept stable in order to minimise the distortionary 
effects of taxation, while leaving it for the 
automatic stabilisers to smooth the economic 
cycle. It is also referred to as neutral discretionary 
fiscal policy. See also cyclical component of fiscal 
policy. 
Tax wedge  The deviation from equilibrium 
price/quantity as a result of a taxation, which 
results in consumers paying more, and suppliers 
receiving less. When referring to labour tax wedge 
more specifically, the tax wedge is usually 
regarded as the difference between the difference 
between the salary costs of an average worker to 
their employer and the amount of net income that 
the worker receives in return, the difference being 
represented by taxes including personal income 
taxes and compulsory social security contributions. 
Total factor productivity  Represents the share of 
total output not explained by the level of inputs 
(labour, capital or primary product). It is generally 
considered as a measure of overall productive 
efficiency. 
UMTS  Third generation of technical support for 
mobile phone communications. Sale of UMTS 
licences gave rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 
2001. 
Welfare state  Range of policies designed to 
provide insurance against unemployment, sickness 
and risks associated with old age. 
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Italy www.bancaditalia.it Banca d'Italia 
Cyprus www.centralbank.gov.cy  Central Bank of Cyprus 
Latvia www.bank.lv Bank of Latvia 
Lithuania www.lb.lt Lietuvos Bankas 
Luxembourg www.bcl.lu Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 
Hungary www.mnb.hu National Bank of Hungary 
Malta www.centralbankmalta.com Central Bank of Malta 
Netherlands www.dnb.nl De Nederlandsche Bank 
Austria www.oenb.at Oestereichische  Nationalbank 
Poland www.nbp.pl Narodowy Bank Polski 
Portugal www.bportugal.pt Banco de Portugal 
Romania www.bnro.ro National Bank of Romania 
Slovenia  www.bsi.si Bank of Slovenia 
Slovak Republic www.nbs.sk National Bank of Slovakia 
Finland www.bof.fi Suomen Pankki 
Sweden www.riksbank.com Sveriges Riksbank 
United Kingdom www.bankofengland.co.uk Bank of England 
 
 
EU fiscal surveillance framework 
Stability and Growth Pact: 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/index_en.htm?cs_mid=570 
Excessive deficit procedure: 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy554_en.htm 
Early warning mechanism: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy1075_en.htm 
 
Stability and convergence programmes: 
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ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
Sustainability of public finances: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy546_en.htm  
Quality of public finances 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12186_en.htm  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/epc_publications_en.htm#Quality%20of%20public%20finances 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm 
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